THE TEACHINGS OF ROZBIHAN BAQLI
Beauty in Sufism
The Teachings of Rūzbihān Baqlī
Kazuyo Murata
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by State University of New York Press, Albany
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Murata, Kazuyo
(Lecturer in Islamic
studies), author.
Title: Beauty
in Sufism : the teachings of Ruzbihan Baqli
/ Kazuyo Murata.
Description: Albany : State University of New York Press, [2016] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Subjects: LCSH: Aesthetics--Religious aspects--Islam. | Sufism. |Baqlī, Rūzbihān ibn Abī al-Naṣr, -1209 or 1210.
اى آﻓﺘﺎب
ﺣﺴﻦ ﺑﺮون آ دﻣﻰ ز اﺑﺮ
ﻛﺎن ﭼﻬﺮĖ ﻣﺸﻌﺸﻊ ﺗﺎﺑﺎﱎ آرزوﺳﺖ
O Sun of Beauty! Come out for a moment
from the clouds, For that beaming, resplendent
countenance is my wish.
—Mawlānā
Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad
Balkhī Rūmī
CONTENTS
Illustrations ix
Acknowledgments xi
Note on Transliteration xiii
Introduction 1
1.
Discourse on Beauty 11
2.
The Language
of Beauty 27
3.
The Theology of Beauty 49
4.
The Anthropology and Cosmology of Beauty 75
5.
The Prophetology of Beauty 101
Notes 129
Selected Bibliography 153
General Index 171
Index of Qurʾānic
Verses 193
Index of Ḥadīths and Sayings 197
vii
ILLUSTRATIONS
Figure 2.1 |
An ontological scheme
of beauty and |
|
|
ugliness |
44 |
Figure 3.1 |
A Venn diagram showing the |
|
|
interrelationship among jamāl, jalāl, |
|
|
and ḥusnā/aḥsan |
72 |
Figure 4.1 |
A diagram showing
human constitution |
|
|
with corresponding Qurʾānic verses |
86 |
Figure 4.2 |
A chart showing the two inner eyes |
|
|
and the corresponding objects of their |
|
|
perception |
97 |
ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
M
y deep gratitude goes to Professor Gerhard Böwering of Yale University for his generous
support and insightful advice that sustained the doctoral research
that became the basis of this book. He has been my
Doktorvater in the truest sense, and I cannot thank him enough for all he has done over the
years. My sincere
thanks also go to Professor Denys Turner and Professor
William Chittick for sharing the scholarly acumen that helped improve my work. Part of the research for this book was conducted in Tehran
during my yearlong aca- demic residence at the Institute
of Philosophy (Anjuman-i
Ḥikmat wa Falsafa-yi Īrān) thanks to Yale’s McMillan Center International Dissertation
Fellowship. I am truly thankful to all the individuals who helped make my research
year in Tehran so fruitful, in particular Dr. Gholamreza Aavani,
Dr. Pari Riyahi,
Ms. Mahin Riyahi,
Dr. Fereshteh Kazempour, Dr. Shahram Pazouki, Dr. Saeed Anvari, Dr. Mehdi Mohaghegh, and Dr. Noushafarin Ansari. I am grateful to Prof.
Ghasem Kakaei of Shiraz University for giving me a pre- cious opportunity to present my work
in Rūzbihān’s home- town, Shiraz, and
to see Mount Bamū, where Rūzbihān had spent some years. I would also like to
express my thanks to Mojtaba
Shahsavari for generously sharing his unpublished critical edition of Rūzbihān’s Manṭiq al-asrār. I am thankful
to Dr. Leonard Lewisohn for sharing his vast knowledge
of exist- ing literature both
modern and premodern. I am also indebted to Matthew Melvin-Koushki for his
comments on an earlier version of this book. My deep gratitude goes to Prof.
Sachiko Murata for all her academic
and moral support
over the years.
xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I remain
forever grateful to my family, Seiya Murata, Junko Murata, and Rie Murata,
without whose trust and support I could not have completed this work. I am also
grateful to the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at King’s College London,
in particular Prof. Paul Joyce and Dr. Carool
Kersten, for their support while
I completed this book. Finally, I would like to express my
sincere thanks to the late Nancy Ellegate of SUNY Press, who gave me
indispensable support and advice throughout the pre-production process but left
us before this book saw the light of day.
NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION
F
or transliterating Arabic
and Persian words,
the International Journal of Middle East Studies system has been employed with the following exception—no distinction is made in transcribing the
identical letters appearing in Arabic and Persian texts, i.e.:
ث is transliterated as th throughout, not as s in
Persian texts
ذ
is transliterated as dh, not z
ض is transliterated as ḍ, not ż
و is transliterated as w, not v or u
ة is transliterated as a or
at (in the iḍāfa construction), not ih
xiii
Introduction
A
s Rūzbihān entered
the ʿAtīq mosque
through the bazaar, he overheard the following conversation between a
woman and her daughter:
“My dear!
I am giving you some advice. Cover
your face and don’t show it to everyone
from the window of
beauty—lest someone should
fall into temptation because of your beauty!
You hear my words—won’t
you take my advice?”
When Rūzbihān
heard this conversation, he wanted to tell that woman: “Even if you advise her
and try to prevent her from showing
herself, she won’t
listen to you or take your advice, because she has beauty, and she won’t
be at rest with [her] beauty until it is joined by passionate love.”1
Muhammad
famously proclaimed, “God is beautiful and He loves beauty.” In a world, however,
where politicized, militant Islam dominates the news, it has become almost counterintui-
tive to associate beauty with Islam. Some may even wonder if there is any room for it in the religion. Edward Farley, a scholar
of Christian theology, argues that this is in fact a common postmodern
situation:
Beauty (the
aesthetic) is not among the primary values or deep symbols of postmodern
societies…. Certain features of postmodern society…tend to diminish beauty
both as an important value and
1
as an
interpretive concept. Contributing to the postmodern effacement of beauty is a
hermeneutic legacy, a tradition of interpretation, governed by dichotomies between
the ethical and the aesthetic, religion (faith) and the aesthetic, and religion (faith) and pleasure. Accordingly, a contemporary aesthetic (or theological aesthetic) that seeks to restore beauty as important to human experience of
religious faith faces the deconstructive task of exposing
and break- ing down these
dichotomies. The displacement of the aesthetic by aesthetics (philosophy of the
arts) in recent times has contributed to the suppression of beauty in hermeneutics, philosophy and criticism. A contemporary
theological aesthetic also works in the setting of a centuries-long
marginalization—in some cases suppression—of the aesthetic by Hebraic
and Christian iconoclasm, asceticism and legalism.2
It is not
only theologians who bemoan the banishing of beauty from modern human life. For
instance, the British poet and writer Kathleen Raine expresses this sentiment
by way of quoting the poignant words of the Irish poet George William Russell
(d. 1935): “One of the very first symptoms of the loss of the soul is the loss
of the sense of beauty.”3 A contemporary scholar of aesthetics,
Elaine Scarry, published On Beauty and
Being Just (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999) as a manifesto for
protecting beauty from various postmodern attacks
and reviving it in contemporary discourse. A more recent attempt at “recovering beauty” can be found in Corinne
Saunders et al., The Recovery of Beauty:
Arts, Culture, and Medicine (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).4
It is not the purpose of the present study to reinstate “beauty” at the forefront of Islam, as Farley tries
to do for Christianity. It aims, rather, to draw people’s
attention to a neglected dimen- sion of Islamic thought, a dimension that was
current espe- cially among premodern Muslim intellectuals and literary figures.
In their way of seeing things, beauty had a central place in the universe
and human life.
They saw God as beauti- ful in Himself and as creator of
an inherently beautiful world, and they regarded
the pursuit of beauty at all levels
(e.g.,
material, ethical,
spiritual, and divine)
as part and parcel of the
life of a good Muslim.
My aim is to investigate the significance of
beauty in Muslim conception of God, the world, and the human being taking as a
case study the works of one promi- nent and prolific Sufi thinker, Rūzbihān Baqlī (1128–1209), who presented some of the most fully developed discussions on the idea of beauty to be found in Muslim
literature.
The questions to be addressed in this study
include the fol- lowing: Why did Rūzbihān talk so much about beauty? What is the significance of beauty for his understanding of God, the world, and the human being? How can
God’s beauty be con- trasted with beauty in His creation—including that of humans, angels, and animals? What role
does beauty have in the pro- cess of God’s creation of the world and human
beings? Does beauty have any soteriological significance? What determines the
degree of beauty found in a thing or perceived by an indi- vidual? Does beauty
have any role in the ideal way of life? Does
the pursuit of beauty have any practical
implications for the daily
lives of Muslims? What exactly is the connection between love and beauty? Is
there any Qurʾānic foundation for Rūzbihān’s discussions of
beauty (jamāl, ḥusn, iḥsān, etc.)? What key symbols and imagery does he employ in
speaking about beauty? Overall,
what is the place of beauty in the intel- ligible structure of Rūzbihān’s
thought specifically and in the underlying worldview of traditional Muslim
thinking generally?
Despite the refined nature of Rūzbihān’s
theory of beauty, his view on beauty—or for that matter, his thought in general—
remains largely unexplored and unknown mostly because of his famously
convoluted style. Moreover, even among schol- arly publications on love and beauty
in Sufism, there is nothing that focuses on the concept of beauty, as most discuss
love and treat beauty in passing.
This is the first book that is devoted to a systematic analysis of the concept of beauty as such in Sufism
and that attempts a reconstruction of the worldview in which Rūzbihān
and many other Sufis situate the idea of beauty.5
In order to analyze the exact role and significance of beauty in Rūzbihān’s thought, the following
two steps must be taken: first to decipher his technical
terminology and often cryptic and flowery language, and second to undertake a systematic
analysis of his numerous
works so as to reconstruct his overall
worldview, which is nowhere explicitly stated in his works nor presented in the
secondary literature.
I should say at the outset that the focus
of the present study is not
aesthetics, a term coined by the German philosopher Alexander Gottlieb
Baumgarten (1714–1762), who wrote a two-volume
treatise in Latin
called Aesthetica (1750–58)6 and derived the term from the Greek,
aisthētika, meaning “percep-
tible things.”7 The proper subject of aesthetics is perceptible
things, such as artifacts and nature. A modern dictionary defines it as the
“study of the feelings, concepts, and judg- ments arising from our appreciation of the arts or of the wider class of objects considered moving, or beautiful, or sublime.”8
Although aesthetics can be a theoretical investigation into the nature of beauty and the engagement with objects in the world that are pleasing to the senses,
Rūzbihān’s concern (and that of most premodern Muslim intellectuals)
was to understand beauty for the sake of coming to know God. Knowing the cre-
ated world itself was a secondary concern, even if the nature of the world has close connections with theological principles. For Rūzbihān, inquiry into
beauty is inquiry into the origin, end, and purpose of human existence. The
story of beauty is the story of the unfolding of divine beauty through its two
mirrors, the universe (the macrocosm) and the human being (the microcosm).
A number of scholars
have noticed the significance of beauty
in Rūzbihān’s writings. Nazif Hoca writes,
for example, “At the center of his thought is divine self-manifestation (tajallī) and the worship of God through
human beauty.”9 Some schol-
ars have even categorized Rūzbihān’s thought as jamāl-parastī
or zībāʾī-parastī
(“beauty-adoration”), a term used to charac- terize a number of Sufis and philosophers,10 including
Aḥmad Ghazālī (d. 1126; the younger
brother of Abū Ḥāmid
al-Ghazālī), ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī (d. 1131; a disciple of Aḥmad Ghazālī), ʿAṭṭār (d. 1221;
a Persian Sufi poet), Awḥad al-Dīn Kirmānī (d. 1238; a Persian
poet and friend of Ibn al-ʿArabī), Rūmī (d. 1273), Fakhr al-Dīn ʿIrāqī (d. 1289; a fol- lower of Ibn al-ʿArabī), and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
Jāmī (d. 1492; a Persian
litterateur and major scholar in the school of Ibn al-ʿArabī).11 As can be seen from the list, “beauty-adoration”
does not refer to a unified historical
movement, but functions rather as an ahistorical label
for characterizing various
authors from different times
and places who happen to share a common
tendency in thinking, though many of them may well have had historical
connections.
Among the authors who frequently spoke about
their love for beauty, Rūzbihān is especially worthy of attention. His works contain
a substantial amount of discussion of beauty of all sorts, divine, human, and cosmic.
Although key passages on the subject are scattered throughout his works, they
are held together by an overall worldview and common themes. His discussions of
beauty are multidimensional, encompass- ing the fields of theology,
cosmology, cosmogony, anthropol- ogy, psychology, and
prophetology. His firm training in the religious sciences—such as the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, Arabic gram- mar, jurisprudence, and
dogmatic theology (particularly Ashʿarism)—adds depth to his discussions while
allowing him to approach the notion of beauty from multiple angles.
Rūzbihān’s Life
Rūzbihān’s life has been the subject
of extensive discussion by several scholars, so I will only present
the essentials here. The
standard story is that he was born in 1128 in the town of Pasā (also
transcribed as Fasā or Basā in Arabic)
in the Fārs prov- ince in southwestern Persia, near the ancient capitals of
Pasargadae and Persepolis. He lived during the Seljuk period under the local
Salghurid dynasty, whose capital was Shiraz, where Rūzbihān spent most of his
adult life.12 Hence, he is called “Shīrāzī,” though originally he
was “Fasāʾī,” that is, from Pasā.
Rūzbihān started having visions as early as at age three, and a vision at age fifteen
left him in an ecstatic
state for a year and a half, leading him to join up
with Sufis.13 Paul Ballanfat argues
that Rūzbihān was twenty-three years old when he first moved
to Shiraz, where he commenced his formal studies in a Sufi convent established
by Sirāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Khalīfa b. ʿAbd al-Salām b. Aḥmad b. Sālba (d. 1165), from whom he is
said to have received a khirqa, or a tattered cloak
of initiation.14
Thereafter,
Rūzbihān led an ascetic life at Mount Bamū
in the outskirts of Shiraz, where he
remained for seven years.15 Not all the details of his life are
clear, but at some point he under- took travels to various regions, such as
Iraq, Ḥijāz (including Mecca), Syria, and possibly Alexandria.16
When he settled again in Shiraz, he established his own convent at the age of thirty-eight,
in 1165.17 After spending some time in Pasā around 1174,18 he went back to Shiraz
and became established as a scholar-preacher in the grand mosque, known as Masjid-i ʿAtīq.19 He continued
to instruct the public and his disciples until his passing in 1209.
Rūzbihān’s Works
Rūzbihān is known to have composed
at least forty-five works in Arabic and Persian in diverse fields, such as Arabic
gram- mar, Qurʾānic exegesis, Ḥadīth commentaries, jurisprudence, principles of
jurisprudence, dogmatic theology (kalām),
and Sufism. The last category has the greatest number of works, thirty-one,
some of which are extant in print or in manuscript form, and some of which are
lost.20 The present study draws on
works from four of these
categories, though the perspective
in all of these works is Sufi: Qurʾānic
exegesis (ʿArāʾis al-bayān fī ḥaqāʾiq
al-qurʾān), Ḥadīth commentary (al-Maknūn
fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya),
dogmatic theology (Masālik al-tawḥīd),
and Sufism (ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, Mashrab
al-arwāḥ, Ghalaṭāt al-sālikīn,
Kitāb al-ighāna, Kashf al-asrār, Lawāmiʿ al-tawḥīd, Manṭiq al-asrār, Risālat al-quds, Sayr al-arwāḥ, Sharḥ-i
shaṭḥiyyāt). I pay particular
attention to works that have not received much scholarly attention, either
because they are relatively new publications, were written in Persian rather
than Arabic, or were simply too obscure
to read. These include ʿArāʾis
al-bayān, which had been available
in an Indian lithograph edi- tion
but was newly printed by Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya in Beirut in 2008; al-Maknūn fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya (pub-
lished in Iran in 2002); Masālik
al-tawḥīd (edited by Ballanfat in 1998;
unstudied except for a brief discussion by the editor), ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn (two editions by Muʿīn and Corbin and by Nūrbakhsh
have been available for decades but
have received
little
scholarly attention in the West, perhaps because of the high-flown Persian style), and Mashrab al-arwāḥ (published in 1973 but little studied until now).21
Among these works, perhaps the most systematic in presen- tation is Mashrab al-arwāḥ, in which Rūzbihān
explains the journey of human spirits from God to the world and back to God through
a series of 1,001 stations. Systematic in a different
way is his Masālik al-tawḥīd, which is his sole extant
work in dogmatic theology. He
presents key theological terms in a rigid structure following
the standard language
in kalām. This is in good
contrast to the language he uses in his other works, which is rather cryptic,
allusive, ambiguous, and literary. His Qurʾān commentary follows a standard
structure of tafsīr works, which is to say that he cites clusters of verses and com-
ments on them from the first chapter to the last, though it is a thoroughly Sufi
work.
Previous Scholarship on
Rūzbihān
Much of the
modern scholarship on Rūzbihān in the early twentieth century reflects the
secondary interest of scholars working on figures preceding Rūzbihān. The most
prominent example is the work of Louis Massignon, the first Western scholar to
pay attention to Rūzbihān’s writings. He tried to reconstruct the lost corpus of the famous Sufi martyr al-Ḥallāj (d. 920) by salvaging snippets of his sayings quoted
by Rūzbihān.22 A few
scholars then took an interest in reconstruct- ing Rūzihān’s
life—Vladimir Ivanow (1928),23 followed by Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh
(1969)24 and Paul Nwyia (1970).25
The first scholar to focus on the content of
Rūzbihān’s thought was Henry Corbin, who edited two of Rūzbihān’s Persian
works, ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn (1958)26 and Sharḥ-i
shaṭḥiyyāt (1966).27
He also devoted half of his major work, En
Islam ira- nien: Aspects spirituels et philosophiques, vol. III, Les fidèles d’amour: Shîʿisme et soufisme (1972), to a
textual analysis of three of Rūzbihān’s works, namely Kitāb al-ighāna, Kashf
al-asrār, and ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn. As suggested by the title of this volume,
Les fidèles d’amour, which is Corbin’s translation of ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn
(literally, “The Jasmine of Passionate Lovers”), Corbin devoted most of his study to this treatise
by Rūzbihān. Forty years after the
publication of his book, it remains the most in-depth
analy- sis of Rūzbihān’s overall thought.
Also active around
the same time as Corbin
was the Turkish scholar Nazif Hoca, who edited
two of Rūzbihān’s Arabic works, Kashf al-asrār (1971)28
and Mashrab al-arwāḥ (1974).29
In Iran, Jawād Nūrbakhsh published an
improved edition of ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn based on a newly discovered manuscript.30 He also published two short Persian
treatises by Rūzbihān31 and the hagiography written by his great-grandson, Sharaf al-Dīn Rūzbihān Thānī, which had
also been published by Dānishpazhūh.32
Annemarie
Schimmel was perhaps
the first to draw English readers’ attention to Rūzbihān’s
writings through her works on Persian poetry, even though she never wrote a
separate article or book on Rūzbihān himself.33 Her interest
in Rūzbihān was carried on by her former
student, Carl Ernst,
who became the first
major scholar to publish on Rūzbihān in English. His Rūzbihān Baqlī: Mysticism and the Rhetoric
of Sainthood in Persian
Sufism (Richmond: Curzon, 1996) is still the only monograph
on him. In it, Ernst
focuses on the history of the Rūzbihāniyya order from its formation to
its gradual institutionalization, the history of Rūzbihān’s family, and an
analysis of the “inner structure of sainthood,” in which he mainly treats
Rūzbihān’s visionary experiences. Ernst’s earlier work, Words of Ecstasy in Sufism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), devoted a section to the ecstatic aspect
of Rūzbihān’s writings. He also translated Kashf al-asrār in 1997. Firoozeh Papan-Matin recently published a critical
edition of Kashf al-asrār (Leiden:
Brill 2006).
The scholar who has been most prolific in
writing about Rūzbihān in recent years is Paul Ballanfat, who has edited a
number of Rūzbihān’s Arabic works34 and translated his visionary diary, Kashf al-asrār, into French.35
In his long French introduction to the Quatre traités inédits de Rûzbehân Baqlî Shîrâzî, Ballanfat pays close attention to two things:
the histori- cal reconstruction of Rūzbihān’s biography and an analysis
of what he considers to be the key features of Rūzbihān’s
thought. Ballanfat’s attempt at reconstructing Rūzbihān’s life is proba-
bly the most extensive among all existing
biographical work
on him.
Ballanfat’s analysis of Rūzbihān’s thought seems to feature aspects that might
be unexpected, such as the “prob- lem of evil” and Iblīs, which have more to do with Rūzbihān’s
influential predecessor, al-Ḥallāj. Ballanfat also pays signifi- cant attention
to Rūzbihān’s “equivocal” language.36 One of his contentions is that
love, contra Corbin, is not central to Rūzbihān’s thought, so he focuses on
other sides to it that he finds more central or important.
1
Discourse on Beauty
T
he concept of beauty has inspired
generations of Muslim intellectuals—philosophers, Sufis, dogmatic theologians, jurists, and litterateurs—to
engage in discourse from various angles, ranging from poetry to metaphysics. Some took a prac-
tical interest in the subject, discussing how to create beautiful and persuasive writings (as in poetics) or whether it is permis- sible to display external beauty
(as in jurisprudence); others took a more theoretical approach, analyzing the concept
of beauty as such. Among all these Muslim intellectuals, two groups have made notable contributions
on both the practical and the theoretical levels: Sufis and philosophers. Sufis
saw God as their beautiful beloved and sought intimacy with Him by beautifying their inner qualities. Philosophers, not least because of the influence
of the Theology of Aristotle, a compila-
tion of paraphrases from Plotinus’s Enneads, equated beauty
with being,
their fundamental subject
of analysis.
Close examination of key discussions in three major
schools of thought—philosophy (falsafa),
Sufism (taṣawwuf, ʿirfān), and dogmatic theology (kalām)—reveals Muslim thinkers’
wide-ranging yet interconnected reflections on the notion of beauty (jamāl, ḥusn). It is these reflections
that provide the intellectual milieu in which Rūzbihān’s theory of beauty
may be situated. It must be noted that the lines separating these three schools
of thought are not clear-cut, because many schol- ars, like al-Ghazālī, combine the
various perspectives.
11
The foundation of much Muslim discourse on beauty (jamāl) is the saying of Muhammad,
“Indeed, God is beautiful and He
loves beauty” (Inna Allāh jamīl yuḥibb al-jamāl).1 This ḥadīth
has had practical and theoretical implications for generations of Muslims,
who took it as an encouragement to pursue beauty on various levels—from personal
grooming to the improve- ment of one’s moral qualities to the quest for an
encounter with God. There are many other ḥadīths and Qurʾānic verses of import
for the Muslim
understanding of beauty,
most often using the other Arabic
word root denoting
beauty: ḥ-s-n. These include
such Qurʾānic verses as Blessed is God,
the most beauti- ful
(aḥsan) of creators (Q 23:14) and We
have created the human being in the most beautiful stature (Q 95:4).
Among ḥadīths, one that plays an especially
important role is the so-called
ḥadīth of Gabriel,
according to which the angel Gabriel appeared to Muhammad
in front of a number
of com- panions to ask him
about the religion that he was teaching them. Muhammad explained that it has
three basic dimen- sions—islām (submission), īmān (faith), and iḥsān (doing what is
beautiful; a fourth-form derivation from ḥasuna,
i.e., to be beautiful). Doing what is beautiful means to “worship God as if you see Him, for even if you do not see Him, He sees you.”14
On the basis of this statement, Muslims have understood the complementarity of the acts of submission, faith, and beautiful intention, with the last
holding the key to the perfection or “beautification” of Muslim faith and
worship.
If we turn to Muslim cultural production, we
find poets, litterateurs, Qurʾān reciters, and calligraphers searching for the
best sensory means of expressing beauty—whether liter- ary, auditory, or
visual. In contrast, philosophers, dogmatic theologians, and Sufis tended to
ponder the nature of beauty primarily on the intelligible level, so as to understand the prin- ciples
behind beautiful phenomena in the world, while striv- ing for an experience of
beauty beyond the sensible world.
In terms of the sheer diversity of the
angles through which beauty was analyzed as a concept and as a sensible
phenome- non, no group surpasses the philosophers (falāsifa). Their investigation ranges over fields such as rhetoric,
poetics, optics, and music.2 Along with the Sufis and, to a lesser degree, the dogmatic theologians, the philosophers also paid close
attention to
beauty in the areas of metaphysics, cosmology, psychology, and ethics. In fact,
it is these last four fields of inquiry that lie at the center of the shared
discourse on beauty among Muslim intellectuals.
Recent Western scholarship has pointed out that despite
the abundance of philosophical discussion of the idea and phe- nomena of beauty, aesthetics—i.e., investigation of the princi-
ples of beauty and human taste on the sensible level—was never a major topic of
discussion in Muslim philosophy. As Deborah Black writes,
On the whole,
Islamic philosophers did not view artistic and literary
creativity as ends in themselves. Rather, their interest was in
explaining the relations of these activities to purely intellectual ends. In the case of
poetics and rhetoric in particular, the emphasis in Islamic philosophy was
pragmatic and political: poetics and rhetoric were viewed as instru-
ments for communicating the demonstrated truths of philosophy to the populace, whose intellectual abilities were
presumed to be limited.3
For the philosophers, the pursuit of the principles of beauty in the sensible order of things (art,
literature, speech, etc.) was a means to an end—i.e., to maximize the effect of their words
on the masses in their effort to convey philosophical truths to them for educational purposes. This is in contrast to the udabāʾ
(“litterateurs”), whose goals did not usually go beyond the very act of
producing beautiful literature that appeals to human sensibility. Aaron Hughes
argues that the philosophers
focused primarily on the process of intellection in the human aesthetic
experience, that is, the soul’s encounter with a beautiful object:
Although
Muslim and Jewish philosophers approached aesthetics from what we would today
call a number of different disciplinary perspec- tives, common to all is the
role and function of beauty in the noetic development of the individual. This involves…a process whereby an individual
encounters a beautiful object, resulting in
a sub- sequent correspondence between the soul of the knower and the object
known. This correspondence in turn allows
the individual to recognize the beauty
of the intelligible world.4
Common to the
philosophers, dogmatic theologians, and Sufis
is the notion that the highest degree of beauty belongs to the most perfect being, which the philosophers call the
“Necessary Being” or “First Cause,” and which the dogmatic theologians and Sufis
call “God.” Although the language
and approach used by each group differs, the general content of their discussion
can be categorized into the following main themes: ontology (i.e., beauty as
perfection of being), theol- ogy (beauty as an attribute of God), cosmogony and
cosmology (the role of beauty in the origination and structure of the world),
ethics (how to beautify one’s soul by acquiring virtues), and psychology (the effect of beauty on the
human soul).
Ontology
The most
fundamental aspect of the philosophical discourse on beauty is ontology. Al-Fārābī (d. 950), for instance, argues that beauty (jamāl) is found in that which “is in its most excellent state of existence
and…has attained its ultimate per- fection.”5 Al-Fārābī maintains
that the intensity of beauty is proportionate
to the degree of a thing’s ontological perfection. Hence, he concludes, “[S]ince the First is in the most excellent
state of existence, its beauty surpasses the beauty of every other beautiful
existent.”6
Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna; d. 1037) writes: “There
cannot exist beauty (jamāl) or
splendor beyond that [being whose] quid- dity is purely intelligible,
purely good, free from any deficiency, and
unique in all respects. The Necessary Being has pure beauty and splendor.”7
Here Ibn Sīnā is speaking about the same being that al-Fārābī
has referred to as “the First,” but he
adds another point: since ultimate
beauty can be found only in
the perfect being that is purely intelligible and good, it cannot
be found in
the sensible world, which is a realm of deficiency and imperfect being.
Al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), who inherited elements
from various intellectual schools including philosophy (while publicly pre-
senting himself as a critic of philosophy), offers a similar
onto- logical analysis of beauty though with a subtle difference. He
argues that every single thing has a unique perfection proper to itself, and
its particular beauty depends on the degree to which it has actualized the
perfection that is meant for it.
Each thing’s
beauty (jamāl and ḥusn) is for the per- fection that is fitting
and possible for it to be present with it. When all its possible
perfections are present, it will be in the utmost
limit of beauty.
If only some of them are present, it will have
beauty in the mea- sure of what is present.
Thus a beautiful horse is that
which combines all that is fitting for a horse, such as appearance, shape,
color, beautiful running, and ease in attack and retreat. A beautiful script is
that which combines all that is fitting for a script,
such as the proportion of the
letters, their alignment, their being in the right sequence, and the beauty of
their order.
Each thing
has a perfection that is fitting for it, and its opposite may be fitting for
something else. So the beauty of each thing
lies in its fitting perfection. Thus the human being is not
beautiful through what makes a horse
beautiful, nor is a script beau- tiful through what makes a voice beautiful, nor are vessels beautiful through what makes clothing beautiful,
and so on with other things.8
What is
noteworthy here is that instead of regarding sensible things as imperfect
beings in contrast to its ultimate source— God—al-Ghazālī recognizes a
relative perfection of each thing, that is to say, a perfection
that is specific and uniquely proper to each object. The degree of each thing’s
relative perfection accounts for its beauty. By acknowledging that each thing has
a relative
perfection, al-Ghazālī is able to analyze the beauty of
sensible objects on their own terms without
constant recourse to God as the highest
principle of beauty—thus venturing into the
area of aesthetics proper. Underlying all these discussions by al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā,
and al-Ghazālī is the fundamental notion of beauty as the perfection of being.
Theology
The dogmatic
theologians addressed the issue of beauty on the basis of the Qurʾān’s
ascription of the most beautiful names (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā)
to God (7:180; 17:110; 20:8; 59:24). Many concluded
that the names should be numbered
ninety-nine and extracted from the language of the Qurʾān itself. They were
able to establish a more or less standard list of God’s most beautiful names, with a good deal of variation.9 On the basis of
the lists of the divine names, they divided a major cluster into two types: the names of gentleness (luṭf) and the
names of severity
(qahr), corresponding to the two oppos- ing aspects of God seen in relation to His creation.10 They also
called these two types the names of bounty (faḍl)
and justice (ʿadl), or mercy (raḥma) and wrath (ghaḍab). For example, the name “life-giver” (muḥyī) indicates God’s gentle or
merciful side, and “death-giver” (mumīt)
shows His severe or wrathful side. According to this schematization of the divine
names, the names of
gentleness are seen to attract human beings to God and create intimacy between
them, whereas the names of severity inspire fear in human beings and put them at distance from God. These two opposing
categories of divine names came to be also referred
to as the names of beauty (jamāl) and names of majesty (jalāl).11
That God has these two dimensions—the beautiful and the
majestic, the
gentle and the severe—is a widespread theme in Sufi texts, be they commentaries on the divine
names, such as those of al-Qushayrī, al-Ghazālī, Samʿānī,
and Ibn al-ʿArabī, or other works that deal with theological issues. The
general question of the divine attributes interested philosophers as well.
Their main concern was the exact ontological relation- ship between
the divine attributes (ṣifāt) and the divine
essence (dhāt)—in other words, whether the attributes
were identical
with the essence, and if not how it would
then be possible to maintain God’s oneness. For instance, in Book Eight of al-Shifā, “On Knowing the First Principle
of All Existence and On
Knowing His Attributes,” Ibn Sīnā has
a chapter entitled, “On the relation
of the intelligibles to Him; on making it clear that His positive and negative
attributes do not necessitate multiplicity in His essence; that to Him belong
the most tre- mendous splendor, the loftiest majesty, and infinite glory; on
explaining in detail the state of intellective pleasure.”12
If the dogmatic theologians sought to
systematize their understanding of God’s beauty by setting up schemes to cat-
egorize the Qurʾānic names of God, the philosophers engaged mainly in the analysis of God’s
beauty in terms of ontology, leading them to the conviction that beauty and being are iden-
tical. As for the Sufis, for the most part they agreed with the views of both
philosophers and theologians, but they also stressed the implications of God’s
beautiful names for human life, as people should study and know the divine
names with the aim of beautifying the soul by embodying God’s most beautiful
qualities. They took a variety of approaches to this task, as we will see with
Rūzbihān.
Cosmology
In addressing
the cosmological significance of beauty, we might begin by recalling the
original sense of the Greek word cosmos—“order.”
It is this that constituted beauty for the ancient Greeks. The Muslim
philosophers show a strong Greek influence in their analysis of
beauty; especially prominent are elements of Pythagoreanism and Neoplatonism, both of which had been transmitted to the Muslim
world through Syriac and Arabic translations before
the tenth century.
A perfect example of the combination of the
Pythagorean and Plotinian under- standing of beauty is found in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ
(“the Brethren of Purity”),
a group of anonymous tenth-century phi- losophers who composed an encyclopedic work, al-Rasāʾil (“The Epistles”), covering a vast range
of philosophical topics. In their discussion of music, for example, the Ikhwān speak
of the music of the spheres,
which appears in accordance with
the
Pythagorean principle of proportion, as well as the moral benefit of music in
taming the animal soul.13
As for the Neoplatonic side of the
discussion, the Ikhwān explain that a human aesthetic experience depends on the
mutual relationship between the universal and the particular souls. Perceiving beauty in a sensible object
is an occasion for the particular soul to be reminded of its higher
origin, the uni- versal soul that lies in the intelligible realm, which is the realm of
true beauty. Such an experience calls the soul to return to its origin by making it turn away from
corporeal existence. The Ikhwān write,
When the
traces of beautiful (ḥisān) sensory
things take form in particular souls, these [souls]
come to resemble and correspond to the universal soul, yearn for it, and
wish to join with it. When they become separate from the bodily frame, they
will ascend to the kingdom of heaven and join with the highest plenum.14
By “the highest plenum” (al-malaʾ
al-aʿlā), the Ikhwān explain, they mean
“the residents of the heavens and the celestial spheres.”15
The above passage echoes Plotinus’s
discussion in the Ennead I.6.2: “the
soul, since it is by nature what it is and is related to the higher
kind of reality
in the realm of being,
when it sees something akin to it or a trace of its kindred reality, is
delighted and thrilled and returns to itself and remembers itself and its own
possessions.”16 For both Plotinus and the Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, the true
experience of beauty pertains to the intelligible world, not to the sensible.
At the same time they also recognize that sensible beauty prompts the
individual soul to conform
or attune17 itself
to its original state of beauty
through the process of recollection.
The notion that the individual soul mirrors
the beauty of higher order resonates with much of Sufi thinking as well. Though
it is almost impossible to pinpoint where Muslim writings come under direct
Greek influence outside the philo- sophical tradition, especially in the later centuries, the general
Muslim
discourse on beauty—especially among the
Sufis—has
certain striking similarities to the Plotinian under- standing whether there be
direct or indirect influence or not.
Cosmogony
As for the
function of beauty in cosmogony, beauty plays a significant role especially in the general
Sufi understanding of creation
(khalq). There is a crucial “creation
myth” found in many Sufi texts. This is the so-called ḥadīth of the Hidden
Treasure, in which God says,
“I was a Hidden Treasure, and I loved to be recognized. So I created
the creatures so that I may
be recognized.”18 In general, Sufis interpret this saying in the
following manner. The clause “I was a Hidden Treasure”
cor- responds to the state of God in His solitude without the pres- ence
of anything else. While God knew and loved Himself in His solitude, He wanted
something else to appreciate and come to know His Treasure. Hence, God created
the world so that His Hidden Treasure would no
longer be hidden. Thus, God’s love for Himself and His desire to be known are
the driving force for the creation of the world.
In conjunction with another key ḥadīth, “God
is beautiful and He loves beauty,” the ḥadīth of the Hidden Treasure has
contributed to the idea that creation was driven by God’s desire to manifest His beauty so that it might
be witnessed and known by others. Creation is then
the self-disclosure (tajallī) of God’s beauty as a result of His overflowing love
for His own beauty. This process also brings about the duality of subject and
object, knower and known, lover and beloved. Without creation, God’s beauty could not have been known or loved by
anything else.
Ethics and Chivalry
Ethics (ʿilm
al-akhlāq) and etiquette (ādāb)
are subjects dis- cussed by practically all groups of Muslim intellectuals,
though it was the philosophers who established ethics
as a dis- cipline. They often regarded it as “medicine
for the soul,” just as there is medicine
for the body. The philosopher-physician
Abū Bakr al-Rāzī
(Rhazes), for example, wrote an ethical treatise entitled Spiritual
Medicine (al-Ṭibb al-rūḥānī), full of
advice on how to control
one’s lower self or soul (nafs)
and to treat its various
illnesses, such as envy, anger, and lust, all of which are generally considered
ugly qualities of the human soul. The goal of philosophical ethics can be taken as the beau- tification of the soul, which
involves the removal of the vices of the lower soul that hinder the higher
functions of the ratio- nal soul.
The emphasis on disciplining and beautifying
the soul is even more evident in Sufism, where the soul is described as being in need of ascending a stairway back to God in the foot-
steps of the Prophet in his miʿrāj.
Each step in the path is understood as an increase in proximity to the divine
beauty, and the steps are typically understood as refinements and beautifications of the soul. Rūzbihān’s
Mashrab al-arwāḥ is an example of the genre.
Sufi literature addresses ethics in a
variety of ways. One of the most distinctive instances is a current of thought and prac-
tice
known as futuwwa, or “chivalry,” which is characterized by the training of the soul in ethics, that is, the beautiful traits of the soul, such as generosity,
self-sacrifice, humbleness, camaraderie, and
mutual respect. Futuwwa literally
means “young- manliness,” representing the “young man” ( fatā) ideal
charac- terized by the above-listed virtues. Sufis often discuss Abraham
and Joseph as representatives of the young man ideal as the Qurʾān
calls each a fatā, along with the
Companions of the Cave, who in Maybudī’s view
encapsulate the young man ideal.19
Among prominent Sufi authors who wrote on futuwwa were
al-Sulamī (d. 1021), Shihāb al-Din ʿUmar al-Suhrawardī (d. 1234), and Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240). Though essentially a
practical discipline, underlying the ideals of futuwwa is a radi-
cal commitment to tawḥīd, or the assertion of God’s
oneness, in everyday human conduct by giving
no significance to any- thing other than God, above all one’s own ego. By sacrificing
self-concern in interhuman transactions, Sufi “chevaliers” strive to live up to
the beautiful young man ideal modeled on Abraham, who was ready to sacrifice
his own beloved son for the sake of God.
On a more general
level, Sufi ethics
also revolves around
the idea of “becoming characterized by the character traits of God” (takhalluq bi-akhlāq
Allāh)—which comes from a state- ment ascribed to Muhammad and which
Sufis took to mean the cultivation or internalization of the most beautiful
names of God. In support of this ideal, al-Ghazālī quotes another ḥadīth connected with God’s most beautiful names:
“God has ninety-nine character traits:
whosoever becomes characterized by one of them will surely
enter the Garden.”20
Psychology of Beauty and Love
Psychology,
or the study of the soul (ʿilm al-nafs)
is a well- established subfield of philosophy,
so it is no surprise to find philosophers analyzing beauty in
psychological terms. Ibn Sīnā explores the psychology of beauty in a treatise
called Risāla fī al-ʿishq (“Treatise on Love”), which
contains a detailed analysis of various kinds
of love. In keeping with the Aristotelian psychology adopted by most Muslim
thinkers, Ibn Sīnā divides the “soul” into several kinds, each of which
embraces the qualities of the lower kind—the vegetative, animal, human, and
angelic—and argues that each kind pos- sesses a kind of “love” according to its
own nature.21
When Ibn Sīnā analyzes the animal and
rational souls, he points out that sensible
beauty causes love in the animal soul,
while intelligible beauty causes love
in the rational soul. He explains
that loving sensible beauty brings human beings down to the level of beasts,
and loving intelligible beauty raises
the soul to its most noble level. Such a view comes from his basic
understanding that intelligible beauty serves as a ladder for the human being
to come closer to the Absolute Good (which he calls elsewhere the Necessary
Being or God). This Good is the rational soul’s ultimate object of contemplation. It is the cause and origin of all sensible and intelligible
beauty, the possessor of the highest beauty, and the ultimate object of love.22 Ibn Sīnā thus discovers a necessary connection between beauty and love on all levels of existence and
considers the Absolute Good as the most proper object
of love for the
rational
soul. In explaining such hierarchical scheme of love and beauty, Ibn Sīnā places a definite emphasis
on the signifi- cance of intelligibility even in the human experience
of love.
Love also plays
an extremely important role in Sufi psychol-
ogy. Generations of Sufis have written works explaining the distinctions to be drawn among the soul (nafs), the spirit (rūḥ),
the heart (qalb), and the secret core
(sirr). They investigated various
states (aḥwāl) of the human soul,
such as hope, fear, joy, sorrow, bewilderment, and love. They also wrote many
works revolving around the theme of love and beauty. The Persian poet Jalāl
al-Dīn Rūmī (d. 1273) is one of the most famous Sufis who spoke about the necessity of love in human
life and the path to God. Other Sufis known for their talk of love and beauty include
Aḥmad Ghazālī (d. ca. 1126), Aḥmad Samʿānī (d. 1140), ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī
(d. 1131), Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā Suhrawardī al-Maqtūl (d. 1191), Rūzbihān Baqlī (d.
1209), and Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 1240).
Most Sufis
were aware that love and beauty are inseparable,
for the
source of all love in the universe is the fact that God loves beauty.
As a result, human love necessarily takes
beauty as its object. Aḥmad Ghazālī points out that beauty always needs a lover: “The eye of beauty is shut to its own beauty, for it cannot perceive the perfection of
its own beauty except in the mirror of the lover’s love. Hence, in this
respect, beauty must have a lover so that the beloved may feed on its own
beauty in the mirror of the lover’s love and seeking.”23 Here
emerges a basic Sufi picture
of beauty as the perennial beloved (maḥbūb, maʿshūq).
Just as the philosophers regard the First Cause or the Necessary Being as the ultimate object
of contem- plation and love for the rational
soul, the Sufis
also see God as
their eternal beloved, with whom they strive forever, in this world and the
next, to achieve union.
Psychology of Beauty and Pleasure
In
psychological analyses of beauty, philosophers often asso- ciate beauty with the pleasure (ladhdha) that accompanies the perception of beauty. They point out
that the more beautiful a thing is,
the greater the pleasure is in perceiving it. Hence,
given that
the First is the most perfect and the most beautiful being, the pleasure It
causes is also the greatest—to the point that it is beyond human comprehension.
Al-Fārābī writes, “Pleasure and delight and enjoyment result and increase only
when the most accurate apprehension concerns itself with the most beautiful…objects.”24
Moreover, “since the First is absolutely the most beautiful…the pleasure which
the First enjoys is a pleasure whose character we do not understand and whose
intensity we fail to apprehend, except by analogy.”25
In contrast to al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā focuses
on the intense plea-
sure that
people experience in the cognition of intelligible beauty. He argues that since
intelligible beauty is superior to sensible beauty and causes more intense
pleasure, human beings must separate themselves from their bodily dimension in
order to experience it. He writes, “If we become isolated from our body by examining our essence—when it has become an intellective world corresponding
to the true existents, the true beauties, and the true pleasures and become
conjoined with them as the intelligible is conjoined with the intelligible—
then we will find infinite pleasure and splendor.”26 Ibn Sīnā’s
emphasis on the necessity of separating the intellect from the body to experience the true pleasure
of perceiving beauty may
echo the Plotinian disdain for the body and the search for beauty in the
intelligible realm, but the emphasis on the intel- ligible over the sensible
is common across
all currents of philo-
sophical (and Sufi) thinking in Islam.
Psychology of Beauty and Sorrow
If the
perception of beauty causes love and pleasure, the fail- ure to perceive
beauty, that is, the object of one’s love, will result in sorrow (ḥuzn), as some Muslim thinkers point
out. The connection between beauty and sorrow is a theme that appears in the
Qurʾān itself and is a well-developed literary theme in post-Qurʾānic
literature. The Qurʾān’s twelfth chap- ter consists mainly
of a narrative on the life of Joseph, and the
Qurʾān calls it the most beautiful of tales (Q 12:3).
Joseph’s beauty was the reason that Jacob had a particular attachment to him
among all his sons,
and due to the loss of Joseph
Jacob fell into despair and sorrow.
This Qurʾānic narrative inspired the Illuminationist (ishrāqī) philosopher Suhrawardī to compose the
allegorical tale, “On the Reality of Love” (Risāla
fī ḥaqīqat al-ʿishq), to depict the interrelationship among beauty, love,
and sorrow, by present- ing them as three brothers with distinct personalities.27
In this allegory, Beauty is the eldest brother to whom the second brother Love clings, but when Love is separated from Beauty, Sorrow
becomes Love’s constant companion. Sorrow also befriends both Jacob upon the
loss of his son and Zulaykhā, the unnamed wife of the vizier of Egypt (biblical
Potiphar) in the Qurʾān, who suffers unfulfilled love for Joseph.
If we combine our earlier discussion of the
divine names with the present analysis of human psychology, the following
picture emerges: when human beings
encounter God’s mercy, gentleness, and beauty (jamāl), their natural reaction
to it will be attraction and love. When faced with God’s wrath,
severity, and majesty (jalāl),
they will likely experience alienation and sorrow. This theological fact is reflected in the art of Qurʾānic recitation, according to Michael
Sells: in the recitation of verses that highlight
human beings’ encounter
with God’s majesty
or their alienation from Him, the dominating tone is that of sorrow.28
Summary
The general
picture that emerges from this analysis of the Muslim discourse on beauty is as follows. It begins with the
understanding that the first principle, the perfect being, is beautiful. God is the possessor of the most beautiful names, but in relation to the world, He can be beautiful
or majestic, merciful or wrathful. He knew His own beauty for eternity, and He created the world because
of His desire to make His
beauty known in the temporal realm.
God’s beauty is reflected in the cosmic order. Higher levels
of beauty correspond with higher levels of intelligibility, and lower levels
appear in the sensible realm. The harmony pro- duced by this cosmic order reminds the human soul, which is
engrossed in
corporeality, of its higher origin and invites it to turn away from the
sensible world toward the intelligible world. The human aesthetic
experience—that is, finding beauty through the senses—has the proper function
of direct- ing attention to that which is beyond the sensible world. Beauty is
a powerful force that attracts human beings and redirects them toward the intelligible realm because all beauty
derives from the ultimate principle of beauty, perfection, and intelligibility.
Human beings are naturally drawn to beauty
and find it lovable by nature. In their search for beauty, they may find
pleasure in attaining the object of their love, but they will experience sorrow
if they lose access to their beloved—be it divine, human, animal, vegetative,
or even mineral—because it is the very nature of human beings to love beauty.
Sorrow is then the longing for a lost or unattainable beauty, and pleasure and joy result from attaining
beauty.
When human beings realize that the ultimate
source of all beauty is God, they become lovers of God and strive to see more
of His beauty. They realize that this requires the refine- ment of their inner
qualities, for the beautiful God cannot be seen by someone whose
heart is rusty
and full of ugly charac- ter traits. In this process, they
try to turn away from the lower animal soul and its egoistic desires so as to
seek ultimate beauty alone. As a result of perseverance in this quest, they
become purified of the lower
realm. It is in such state of purity
that the heart can reflect a beautiful image of the divine in itself, and they
themselves become beautiful.
For many of the thinkers examined above, to
search for beauty was to seek God. For both the philosophers and Sufis, an
aesthetic experience is a reminder or sign of God, because they know that every
beautiful object derives from its beauti- ful Creator. Perhaps the role of the
dogmatic theologians in shaping this view was less discernible than the
philosophers and Sufis, but they still had the important function of provid-
ing a terminological framework for speaking about God as “beautiful,” for
example, in their discussion of the divine names. However, the dogmatic
theologians’ strictly rationalist interpretation of Qurʾānic
language and their rejection of the cognitive
value of images
and symbols seem to have restricted
their
discussion on the nature of beauty to a limited and rigid framework.
In contrast, philosophers did not limit
themselves to language drawn from the Qurʾān and the Ḥadīth. They felt free to use terminology based on Arabic
translations of Greek sources or the Persian intellectual
tradition. They approached beauty in terms of things’ intelligibility, for they
saw the sen- sible world per se as a realm of imperfection, deficiency, and
ugliness, unless one saw through
its phenomena to their intel- ligible sources, that is, the
realities of things in the divine. Ultimate beauty per se is to be found only
in the intelligible world, in the most perfect being, which transcends human cognitive
capacity. By exercising the intellect fully, they strove
to come ever closer to a pure cognition of the most perfect being as far
as humanly possible. In contrast to the dogmatic theologians’ focus on the
abstractions of reason, the philoso- phers also turned their attention to the
sensible world to illustrate how the principles of beauty left their traces in
the sensible order of things, and this attention to the world
resulted in the development of aesthetic theories in optics, rhetoric,
and poetics.
For their part Sufis sought to attain the highest beauty by a
process of
inner transformation—i.e., purification and beautification—driven by their love
for God. Given that it is God’s love and beauty that brought the world into existence, it is that same love and beauty that bring human beings back to the divine presence. While this is
a picture that emerges from those of the Muslim thinkers who have specifically
written about beauty, we can say that most Muslim thinkers have traditionally
understood that the search for beauty in various areas of human life is part of their religious
path—the path to human perfection—for all beauty is a pointer to its
origin, God.
2
The Language of Beauty
O
ver the centuries, various intellectuals—from medieval Sufis to modern Western
scholars—have remarked that Rūzbihān’s language is dense and recondite,
particularly dif- ficult to understand, let alone translate. A well-known
scholar of Sufism and Persian literature, the late Annemarie Schimmel
noted,
What so
profoundly impresses the reader in Rūzbihān’s writing, both in his commentary
on the Shaṭḥiyāt and his ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn…is his style, which
is at times as hard to translate as that of Aḥmad Ghazzālī and possesses a
stronger and deeper instrumentation. It is no longer the scholas-
tic language of the early exponents of Sufism, who tried to classify stages and stations,
though Baqlī surely knew these theories and the technical terms. It is the language refined
by the poets of Iran during
the eleventh and twelfth centuries, filled with roses and nightingales, pliable and colorful.1
Carl Ernst—a
scholar on Rūzbihān and former student of Schimmel—calls his style “at
times…admittedly convoluted and obscure” and even lists the names of highly educated pre- modern Muslims—including Jāmī (d.
1492), a prolific writer in later theoretical Sufism and Persian literature, and Dārā
27
Shukūh (d.
1659), a Mughal scholarly prince—who regarded Rūzbihān as a difficult writer to
understand centuries ago.2 Ernst quotes Jāmī as saying,
“He has sayings that have poured
forth from him in the state of overpowering ecstasy that not everyone can
understand.”3
Though these statements point to the difficulty of Rūzbihān’s language, the reason
suggested for it in each case is different—
from his flowery style in Persian (Schimmel) to the ecstatic nature of his utterances (Jāmī). In fact there are numerous pos- sible reasons for the difficulty of his
language, including his multidimensional learning, the shifting target
audiences, his sensitive theologico-political concerns, the varying tones of his voice
from the personal
to expository, ecstatic
to reserved— all the while being as poetic as the context
permits—and last but not least, his highly developed technical terminology.
It is the purpose of the present chapter to
decipher this last aspect—Rūzbihān’s technical terminology—with a focus on
several terms that are essential to his discussions of beauty— namely, ḥusn, jamāl, mustaḥsan, mustaqbaḥ, and qubḥ.
While these are all Arabic
terms—as most of his technical terms are (even
in his Persian works)—Persian equivalents will be intro- duced whenever applicable. The first
section introduces the two most
important terms—ḥusn and jamāl—and traces their usage in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth,
the two key sources for Rūzbihān’s technical terminology. The
second and main sec- tion of this chapter investigates his usage of these terms
in his works, while examining
how the specific senses in which he employs these terms relate to precedents in the Qurʾān, Ḥadīth, and other Muslim
literature that was available to him.
As ḥusn and jamāl are two concepts central to Rūzbihān’s discussion
of beauty, which is the topic of this book, I will limit the
treatment of these terms in this chapter to the basic termi- nological
distinction between them, while also paying atten- tion to two other terms that are characteristic of his discussions of beauty: mustaḥsan and mustaqbaḥ. In addition to exposing the basic linguistic framework
of Rūzbihān’s discourse
on beauty, the present chapter aims at bringing out a provisional
picture of his ontology of beauty. In
the subsequent chapters, we shall see how the bare skeleton of his ontological
scheme (as shown in a chart at the end of this chapter)
grows into a
complex
theology of beauty (chapter 3), a cosmology and anthropology of beauty (chapter
4), and a prophetology of beauty (chapter 5).
“Beauty” in the Language of the Qurʾān and H. adīth
Two key Arabic terms are normally translated as
“beauty” in English: ḥusn and jamāl. Any Muslim discourse
touching upon the subject
of beauty utilizes
either or both of these terms. The present section examines their
contextual basis in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth in order to prepare the ground for Rūzbihān’s
usage.
H. usn
We will begin
with ḥusn and its derivatives, as
they have a more prominent role to play in the Qurʾān than jamāl. Medieval lexicographers—such as Ibn Fāris (d. 1004), al-Jawharī (d. ca. 1006), and Ibn Manẓūr (d. 1311), who lived relatively close to Rūzbihān’s time—present ḥusn first of all as an ant- onym of qubḥ (“ugliness”), implying the meaning
of “beauty” for ḥusn.4 The sense of beauty inherent
in the Arabic root ḥ-s-n
is further confirmed by the fact that al-Jawharī compares
tazyīn (“to ornament/decorate”) to taḥsīn (a transitive verbal noun from the same root ḥ-s-n), which
he apparently understands in the sense of “to
make something beautiful.”5 However, “ugliness” (qubḥ)
is not the only antonym that Arabic lexicog- raphers list for ḥusn.
Another antonym that they commonly mention is sūʾ,6 which is usually translated as “evil” or “badness.”7 This second antonym suggests
ḥusn’s additional connotation of
“goodness.” Hence, ḥusn denotes both
beauty and goodness at the same time.
As ḥusn encompasses both goodness and beauty without
an internal distinction, the term may remind some readers of the Greek kallos, which also signifies goodness
and beauty with- out an internal distinction. This word is present as a prefix
in English, for example, calligraphy, meaning “beautiful writing.” Due to the double sense of ḥusn, scholars have often wavered between translating it as “goodness” or “beauty.” For instance,
the
lexicographer Edward William Lane lists the following words as possible English
equivalents of ḥusn: “goodness, or
goodliness, [generally the latter,] beauty,
comeliness, or pleas- ingness”; “symmetry; or just proportion of the several
parts of the person, one to
another”; “anything, moving the mind, that is desired, or wished for.”8
To complicate the matter further, when
scholars wanted to translate ḥusn in the sense of “beauty” in a text where the term
jamāl also appears, they often
resorted to translating jamāl as
“beauty” while choosing one of its synonyms in English to translate ḥusn, such as “loveliness,” “prettiness,” and “comeli- ness.” Thereby they attempted to
maintain a distinction between the two terms in the English
translation, even though the original author is likely to
have employed them in the same meaning, using both together for emphasis or
harmony of language, a literary technique especially common in Persian
writings.
It must be noted, however, that the
challenge of translating ḥusn into
English has more to do with the linguistic frame- work of the English language
than anything else. This is also clear from the fact that Persian speakers,
when they want to translate ḥusn, have
an apt Persian equivalent: nīkūʾī, which
denotes both goodness and beauty.9 For instance, both Aḥmad
Ghazālī and the Illuminationist thinker Yaḥyā Suhrawardī (d. 1191) use nīkūʾī as
a Persian equivalent of ḥusn.10
Moreover, Aḥmad’s elder and famous brother,
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111)
employs nīkūʾī in his discussion of
beauty in Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat (“The Alchemy of Happiness”).11 In the present
book, both jamāl and ḥusn will
be translated as “beauty” rather than
using the cumbersome double translation of “goodness-
and-beauty” for ḥusn. However, the
Arabic will be noted in parentheses in many cases where the distinction between
the two terms is important.
In the Qurʾān, words derived from the root ḥ-s-n appear 193 times in various forms,
including (but not limited to): verbs (ḥasuna,
aḥsana); nouns (ḥusn, ḥasana); an
adjective (ḥasan); an active
participle (muḥsin); and a verbal
noun (iḥsān). Seventy-seven of these are related to the forth-form verb, aḥsana (“to do what is good and
beautiful”), occupying a prominent place in the Qurʾān.
Toshihiko Izutsu explains,
“The verb aḥsana (inf. iḥsān) is one of the key ethical terms in
the Qurʾan. Most generally it means ‘to do good,’ but in the actual Qurʾanic
usage this word is applied mainly to two par- ticular classes of ‘goodness’: profound piety towards
God and all human deeds that
originate in it, and acts motivated by the spirit of ḥilm [‘forbearance’].”12 In fact, it was the moral over- tone of being “good” inherent in
the root ḥ-s-n that prompted the late
Izutsu, an eminent scholar of Islamic thought, to undertake a detailed analysis
of this word root in his
Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qurʾān,13
though it must be noted that his analysis of ḥusn is limited
by the very nature of his book: “ethico-religious.” What falls outside the scope of his book is an ontological analysis of ḥusn, which is essential for a
full grasp of the term.
Key Qurʾānic verses that contain ḥ-s-n derivatives include: Blessed is God, the most beautiful (aḥsan) of creators
(Q 23:14), To
God belong the most beautiful (ḥusnā)
names (Q 7:180), To Him belong the most beautiful (ḥusnā) names (Q 17:110,
20:8, 59:24), Surely you have a beautiful (ḥasana)
example in God’s messenger—
for
those who hope for God and the Last Day, and who remember God much
(Q 33:21), Indeed We created the
human being in the most beautiful (aḥsan) stature (Q 95:4), He formed you then made your forms beautiful
(aḥsana) (Q 40:64,
64:3), Verily God loves those who do what is beautiful (muḥsinīn) (Q
2:195), and who made beautiful (aḥsana) everything
He has created (Q 32:7). Though the above is only a small sample of the verses containing ḥ-s-n derivatives, it is already clear that in the Qurʾān ḥ-s-n is used to designate beauty
in a whole range of beings—from God Himself (Q 23:14, 37:125, 7:180,
17:110, 20:8, 59:24)
to the prophet Muhammad
(Q 33:21), human beings (Q 40:64, 64:3, 95:4, 2:195), and all of
God’s creation (Q 32:7).
As for the Ḥadīth literature, whose corpus
is much vaster than the Qurʾān, there are countless instances where ḥ-s-n derivatives appear. One of the
most famous ḥadīths that fea- ture these is known as the aforementioned ḥadīth
of Gabriel, in which the archangel Gabriel
appears to Muhammad
in front of a few of his
companions to ask him the meaning of islām
(“submission”), īmān (“faith”),
and iḥsān (“doing what is beau- tiful”). With regard to the third, the Prophet
replies, “Iḥsān is that you worship God as if you see Him, for even if you do not
see Him, He sees you.” While this is one of
the most famous ḥadīths among Sunnis, it does not have a key role in Rūzbihān’s discussion of ḥusn
(though he does refer to it in his writings).
Much more prominent in Rūzbihān’s discussion
of beauty is the ḥadīth, “I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form” (Raʾaytu rabbī fī aḥsan ṣūra).15 Here, the word aḥsan—the super- lative of ḥasan,
“beautiful”—describes the “form” in which God appeared to the Prophet. This ḥadīth
plays an important role in Rūzbihān’s discussion of the vision (ruʾya) of God, which took place for him
often in indescribably beautiful forms. In fact the vision of the beautiful God is a major theme in Rūzbihān’s writings, particularly
in his diary of visions, Kashf al-asrār (“The
Unveiling of Secrets”),16 which will be examined in subsequent
chapters.
In short, ḥ-s-n derivatives abound in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth,
which gives them an official status as scriptural terms to describe the beauty of both God and creatures. The above and other passages in the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth
containing ḥ-s-n derivatives form the
fundamental textual basis for later Muslim discourse—including Rūzbihān’s own—on the beauty (ḥusn) of God and His creation.
Jamāl
The other key
term that denotes “beauty,” jamāl, is
a noun derived from the root j-m-l, which has the basic root meanings
of “to be beautiful,” “to gather,” and “that which pertains to the camel” (jamal).17 Even though it is
not impossible to see relationships among these three senses, they appear quite
dis- tinct from one another, and here we are concerned only with the first. Jamāl is almost without exception
translated into English as “beauty.” In modern Arabic,
it is the standard word for
beauty, much more commonly used than ḥusn,18 whereas
in the Qurʾān, it has only a marginal presence.
In fact, the word jamāl appears in the Qurʾān only once: And the cattle—He created
them for you; in them is warmth,
and uses various, and of them you eat. There is beauty in them for you when you bring them home to rest and
when you drive them forth abroad to pasture (Q 16:5–6).
In this single Qurʾānic usage, jamāl is
a quality of beauty ascribed to an animal—in
this case, the cattle.
The adjectival form, jamīl (“beautiful”), appears in the Qurʾān seven times. In three of
these it is used in conjunction with the word patience as
in “Beautiful patience!” (ṣabrun jamīlun). This phrase appears
twice as the words of Jacob in his despair over the loss of his beloved son, Joseph (Q 12:18, 12:83), and it is
understood more generally to encourage patience in times of affliction. The third
instance is found as part of God’s admonishment: So be thou patient with a beautiful patience (Q 70:5).
In the Qurʾān,
jamīl occurs twice as a description of the manner in which women
should be set free if divorce is agreed
upon: Set them free in a beautiful
manner (sarāḥan jamīlan) (Q 33:49); I will set you free in a beautiful manner (Q 33:28). It also
appears once
to describe the act of “pardoning” (ṣafḥ): So pardon thou,
with a beautiful pardoning (Q
15:85). It also appears once to des- ignate
the proper manner of “leaving” or “abandoning” some people: And bear thou patiently
what they say and leave them beau- tifully (hajran jamīlan) (Q 73:10). Thus, in only eight verses does
the Qurʾān talk about beauty using the Arabic
root j-m-l, in contrast to ḥ-s-n, which it mentions
nearly two hundred
times. In these eight verses the term jamāl/jamīl is always applied to
creatures—first to animals and then to the ideal manner of human conduct—from how to set women free to manners of pardoning or abandoning people.
What this implies is that the Qurʾān itself does not ascribe the quality of jamāl to God. One of the visible
consequences of this fact is the absence of al-jamīl (the
Beautiful) in many early lists of the ninety-nine
names of
God.
Daniel Gimaret in Les noms divins en Islam points out that while jamīl does not appear as a divine name in the Qurʾān, it has come to be considered as such by some Muslims
on the basis of the aforementioned ḥadīth, “Indeed God is beautiful
and He loves beauty.” He further explains
that the notion
of divine beauty became
a popular subject
among certain groups of Muslims,
such as naive
anthropomorphists and Sufis,
but cautiously treated by most dogmatic
theologians, including both Muʿtazilites
and Ashʿarites. Among the Muslim thinkers who have compiled lists
of divine names
and included al-jamīl
(“the Beautiful”) as a divine name, Gimaret
mentions al-Qushayrī (d. ca. 1072) and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111).19
The origin of attributing jamāl to God is without doubt the
well-known saying of Muhammad, “Indeed God is beautiful and He loves beauty”
(Inna Allāh jamīl yuḥibb
al-jamāl). It is found in both the Ṣaḥīḥ of Muslim and the Musnad
of Ibn Ḥanbal. In both cases, it is situated in a dialogue between Muhammad
and a certain man. Muhammad first says, “No one who has a dust mote’s weight of
arrogance in his heart will enter paradise.” In Ibn Ḥanbal’s versions, the man
notes that he loves to adorn himself with beautiful (ḥasan) outer garments and asks the Prophet directly: “Is that
arrogance?” The Prophet replies by saying in one version “No, that is not
arrogance,” and in another, “No, that is beauty (jamāl).” Then he proceeds to remark, “Indeed God is
beautiful and He loves beauty.”20
In Muslim’s version, after the same initial statement by the Prophet it reads:
“Then a man said, ‘A man likes his
garment and sandals to be beautiful (ḥasan).’
He replied, ‘Indeed God is beautiful and He loves beauty. Arrogance is to be
insolent toward God and to despise people.’”21
The most apparent meaning of this ḥadīth is
that adorning oneself properly is not an act of arrogance, but rather one done
out of love for beauty. Hence, it means that there is no blame in loving beauty
and adorning oneself with it, because this is to follow the divine custom of loving beauty.
Another point to be noticed here is that the Prophet
takes jamāl to be a synonym of ḥusn, which is clear from the fact that he responds to the man who
likes his clothes to be ḥasan by confirming
that it is fine because God loves jamāl, using the other Arabic
word for beauty.
A more striking point made in this ḥadīth is
this: not only does God love beauty but He Himself
is jamīl. Hence, the first
half of this ḥadīth—“God is beautiful”—introduces a signifi- cant leap from the seemingly mundane
discussion of the qual-
ity of one’s clothing
to that of the beauty of God. This establishes a prophetic precedence for ascribing jamāl
to God, not just to creatures, as was done in the Qurʾān. Being a sound ḥadīth,
it has hence given jamāl/jamīl
an official status
as an appropriate term to describe
God, sowing the seed for the flowering of the medieval
theological, philosophical, and mystical discourse on jamāl as an attribute of God.
Another
noteworthy point about this ḥadīth is that the seeming “leap” from the mundane beauty
of an outer garment to the divine beauty
is not presented as a leap in the statement, but rather as the result of an
evident interconnection between the beauty of God and that of creatures. In
other words, in keeping with much of Muslim discourse, God and His cre- ation
are not cut off from each other as if they constitute the two separate domains
of the sacred and the profane. Rather, the world always
reflects God’s characteristics or attributes—
including beauty—as if it is God’s mirror.
This is a standard interpretation of the word āya, “sign,” frequently used in the Qurʾān to designate natural
phenomena, prophetic miracles, and the Qurʾān’s own verses.
Thus, we can see that even if the Qurʾān
never ascribed jamāl to God, the word
gains a wide significance in Muslim theological discourse because of its prophetic endorsement. It is
no overstatement to say that this ḥadīth, “Indeed God is beautiful and He loves
beauty,” is the foundation of all Muslim discourse on God as jamīl.
Rūzbihān’s Definitions
Among Rūzbihān’s works, the Arabic treatise, Mashrab al-arwāḥ (“The Drinking Place of Spirits”)22—also
called by the Persian title Hazār wa yak maqām (“One Thousand and
One Stations”)—is arguably the best source for studying
his termi- nology. As the Persian title indicates, this work
consists of an exposition of 1,001
stations (maqāmāt,
sing. maqām)
through which human spirits travel—from their creation by God and their pre-earthly life in the presence of God to their embodied existence on earth and their
eventual return to God. In each section of this book, Rūzbihān provides an
exposition of a single station. Each of these
designates a state
of human beings as they progress on the Sufi path—e.g., repentance, hope, fear, joy,
love, bewilderment, certitude, and annihilation. Such a structure allows the
work to be used almost as an annotated lexicon of Rūzbihān’s terminology. What
interests us here is the fact that both ḥusn
and jamāl appear among the
“1,001” stations.
It must be noted that while there is a general
sense of a hier-
archical order in the progression of the twenty chapters in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, the ordering of individual stations
inside a chapter does not
always appear strictly hierarchical. In other words, just because the station
of ḥusn appears before that of jamāl, it does not necessarily mean that ḥusn is a lower station
than that of jamāl.
Another point to be made about the Mashrab is that while 1,001 is the “official”
total number of the stations that it presents, in reality
there are 1,004 stations presented in the work, as there are three chapters
that contain one extra station each (i.e., chapters 1, 5, and 8). However,
since in each of these chapters, the additional
station holds a special, high place in relation to all the previous stations,
perhaps they are not meant to be counted like the rest.
H. usn and Jamāl
In the
section on the station of ḥusn, Rūzbihān
writes: “Understand that ḥusn is one
of the attributes of God and is eternal because His essence is eternal.…God’s ḥusn is one of His most specific descriptions. God said, Blessed is God, the most beautiful (aḥsan) of creators [Q
23:14].”23 Rūzbihān cites this Qurʾānic
usage of the word aḥsan—“the most
beautiful”—to corroborate his view that ḥusn
is an attribute of God. The idea that God possesses ḥusn is confirmed among others by Muhammad’s saying, “I saw my Lord
in the most beautiful form,” which Rūzbihān takes to be a testimony to the
Prophet’s “vision of God the Exalted in the clothing of ḥusn.”24 Thus, the Prophet saw the most beautiful creator in “the most beautiful form.”
We saw that the Prophet had used ḥusn and jamāl as syn- onyms in the conversation leading to his famous
saying, “Indeed God is beautiful and He loves
beauty.” In al-Maknūn
fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya (“The Hidden in the Realities of the Prophetic Speech”), also known as Arāʾis al-ḥadīth (“The Brides of Ḥadīth”),
Rūzbihān explains the ḥadīth in this manner:
“He loves inner
beauty (jamāl al-bāṭin), such as love, recognition, and certitude, and external beauty,
such as humil- ity and submissiveness.”25 He thus explains
that the jamāl that God loves consists of certain states invisible to outside
observers
(i.e., “inner beauty”) and attitudes that are perceiv- able through one’s
conduct (i.e., “outer beauty”) befitting the God-human relationship.
It is worth asking if Rūzbihān discerns any
difference between ḥusn and jamāl. In one place he rejects any differentia- tion between the two concepts: “The difference
between ḥusn and jamāl is [only] in words, and there is no difference in the
realities of the meanings of the[se] attributes.”26 However, after
saying this he admits two distinct perspectives in com- paring the two: one
that treats them as synonyms and the other that distinguishes them as having
slightly different con- notations. From the first perspective, both ḥusn and jamāl would generically indicate “beauty.” Rūzbihān does not pro-
vide any further explanation of this view, treating it as
self-explanatory. From the second perspective, however, he points out a subtle
difference: ḥusn is a more gentle
and invit- ing kind of beauty
than jamāl. Ḥusn inspires hope and joy in its perceiver, while jamāl is more intimidating due to its associa-
tion with “fear and recognizing majesty.”27 Furthermore, he argues that because
of the awe-inspiring connotations of jamāl, it can only cause maḥabba, a love less intense than ʿishq (“passionate love”), which is
caused by ḥusn.28
This subtle distinction between ḥusn and jamāl made by Rūzbihān, as we shall see, lies at the heart
of his highly sophis-
ticated theory of beauty. For the purposes
of the present chap- ter, let us simply note that in this little passage
on the contrast between jamāl and ḥusn, we can already glimpse how Rūzbihān
gives ḥusn a higher
status than jamāl in
his grand metaphysical scheme, which is perfectly
in keeping with the Qurʾānic pri- macy of the term ḥusn over jamāl.
Mustah. san: “What Is Deemed Beautiful”
Mustaḥsan
is a term that has a notable
presence in Rūzbihān’s writings on beauty, playing
an important role in his discussion
of the relationship between divine
beauty and beautiful things in the world. The word is a passive participle from the
verb istaḥsana, a tenth-form derivative of ḥ-s-n. As a tenth-form verb it has the sense of “to consider” or “to deem” something to be
something. In modern Arabic usage, istaḥsana
is commonly
taken to mean
“to deem something right or good” or “to approve.”29 The verbal noun istiḥsān
has a specific
usage in the technical terminology of Islamic
jurisprudence (fiqh), often translated
as juristic “preference.”30 In Rūzbihān’s usage of the word istiḥsān, he
preserves its root meaning and Qurʾānic con- nection to ḥusn. In other words, he takes it to mean “to deem something ḥasan,” that is, (good
and) beautiful. Hence,
he uses the verb’s passive
participle, mustaḥsan, “what is
deemed beautiful,” applying it to objects that people perceive as beautiful.
Rūzbihān’s
use of mustaḥsan/istiḥsān finds little parallel in other Muslim texts. The term does not
appear in the Qurʾān nor does it seem to originate in the Ḥadīth.
The most probable source for Rūzbihān’s usage of the term is a work by
Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-Daylamī
(fl. ca. 950), Kitāb ʿaṭf al-alif al-maʾlūf ʿalā al-lām al-maʿṭūf
(“The Book of the Inclination of the Familiar Alif toward the Inclined Lām”), one of the earli-
est Arabic compendia on passionate love or “eros” (ʿishq), a book with which Rūzbihān was thoroughly familiar.31
There is no doubt that al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf al-alif has strong presence in Rūzbihān’s
discussions of love and beauty, most notably in his celebrated Persian
treatise, ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn (“The
Jasmine of Passionate Lovers”). Al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf revolves around the question of the permissibility of ascribing
passionate love to the God-human relationship—a question also posed by a female
interlocutor at the beginning of Rūzbihān’s ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn. The latter book contains a chap-
ter entitled “On the excellence of ḥusn,
ḥasan, and mustaḥsan,”32
and this finds a clear
parallel in chapter
3 of al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf, which is called “Mention
of some of the features
belonging to love and
passionate love.” It has four subsections: (1) On the excellence of
beauty (ḥusn); (2) On the excellence
of the beauti- ful (ḥasan);
(3) On the excellence of what is deemed beautiful (mustaḥsan); and (4) On the excellence of love and passionate
love. In the third subsection al-Daylamī writes,
Know that
things deemed beautiful derive [their] beauty
(ḥusn)33 from the universal
beauty that is in the proximity of the Real. Then the
strength of beauty partly remains
upon them in proportion to
their
proximity to the universal [beauty] after being issued forth, while it becomes
weak and dimin- ished in proportion to their distance from it, even to the
extent that almost no beauty may be noticed in them due to its hiddenness in them. And no one will
become aware of it except the folk of recognition.34
Though “the folk of recognition” (ahl al-maʿrifa) is most likely a reference
to the Sufis, the explanation of beauty (ḥusn)
that al-Daylamī provides here is strikingly Neoplatonic—from the idea of being “issued forth” (inṣidār), which is evocative of “emanation” (ṣudūr or fayḍ)
to the idea of the universal beauty (al-ḥusn al-kullī). These terms are part of the language that was imported
from the Greek philosophical tradition and natural- ized in the Arabic language
through the writings of philoso- phers such as al-Kindī, al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sīnā,35 though this is not to say that the content of such
Muslim philosophical dis- cussions is also foreign.
One passage in Rūzbihān’s work is
reminiscent of the above quotation from al-Daylamī: “Every one and every thing is
given a ray of that light [of God]. In this world, passionate lovers have sweet basil from the garden of
the beauty (jamāl) and majesty (jalāl) of the One. In proximity to that
light, the shade of beauty (ḥusn)
increases. In distance from the quarry, beauty (ḥusn) decreases.”36 Here Rūzbihān presents God, the One,
as the source of beauty. The closer one comes to the source, the more beauty one is able to perceive; the farther one is from God, the less beauty one is able
to perceive.
In a similar way, Rūzbihān says, “That which
is deemed beautiful is deemed beautiful because of the manifestation of God’s beauty (ḥusn)
within it.”37 Thus, things deemed beauti-
ful derive their beauty from God’s ḥusn.
God as the Beautiful is the source
of all beauty found in the world,
or more specifi- cally, in things deemed
beautiful. Rūzbihān’s language is not as noticeably philosophical as that of
al-Daylamī, but his understanding of the relationship between
mustaḥsan and ḥusn fits squarely in al-Daylamī’s
metaphysics. For both scholars, mustaḥsan represents individual or partial
beauty, that is, each
object in the world having a share of that universal beauty by way of what may be called the process of derivation,
participation,
emanation, or creation (depending on one’s perspective).
Concerning the Qurʾānic verse, Blessed is God, the most beau- tiful of creators (Q 23:14), Rūzbihān
says, “He described Himself as bringing into
being what is deemed beautiful in His king- dom [i.e., this world]
by manifesting His beauty (ḥusn) within it.”38 Hence, the most beautiful creator is He who creates things
deemed beautiful to manifest His own beauty. Rūzbihān then gives as an
example of divine manifestation through some- thing deemed beautiful Moses’s
encounter with God through the intermediary of the mountain (Q 7:143). In this
verse, Moses says to God, “My Lord, show me so that I may look upon Thee.” The verse
goes on: He said,
“Thou shalt not see Me but look at the mountain. If it stays firmly
in its place, then thou shalt see Me.” When his Lord disclosed
Himself (tajallā) to the mountain,
He made it crumble
to dust, and Moses fell down in a swoon. Rūzbihān writes, “That which
is deemed beautiful is deemed beautiful because of the manifestation of God’s
beauty within it, and this is the beauty (ḥusn) of His self-disclosure (tajallīhi) within it, just as He disclosed Himself in
the mountain to Moses.”39 Hence, the idea of God as the most
beautiful creator has two significations: not only is God beautiful in Himself,
but also what He creates is beautiful and should be deemed beautiful by humans.
Mustaqbah. : “What Is Deemed Ugly”
If everything God creates is beautiful in reality and we should deem it beautiful, why do we still
perceive some things to be ugly? Mustaqbaḥ,
the antonym of mustaḥsan, is Rūzbihān’s
answer to this question. The word is a tenth-form passive par- ticiple from qubḥ (“ugliness”) denoting “what is deemed ugly.” It
is important to remember the strong connotation of “deem- ing” or “regarding”
inherent in tenth-form words, for there is a difference between things in
themselves and human percep- tion of them, a point Rūzbihān explains in the
context of things’ beauty.
We have seen that according to Rūzbihān God
possesses beauty and is the source of all beauty found in the world. Where then does ugliness
(qubḥ) stand in his ontological
scheme? Does it exist to begin with, and is that why we per- ceive it in the world?
On this question, Rūzbihān explicitly states that “God is the creator of things
deemed beautiful and things deemed ugly.”40 This is to say that while God is beauti- ful Himself, His creation
is either deemed beautiful or deemed
ugly by humans. It is also important to note that “what is deemed beautiful”
and “what is deemed ugly” refer to the realm of creation only, not to the
Creator, who is beautiful by definition, not merely deemed beautiful, and never ugly nor deemed ugly because ugliness
implies imperfection, while God is perfect being.
Rūzbihān argues that it is a grave mistake to identify things that are
deemed either beautiful or ugly with God Himself. This would
constitute unbelief (kufr), because
it blurs the fun-
damental distinction between the Creator
and the created.41 However
beautiful a thing in the world may be, it cannot be God
because its beauty
derives from God. It is ontologically
dependent on Him and its beauty is inferior to His in every respect. The same
principle applies to identifying an ugly thing with God. It also constitutes unbelief because it involves
mixing up the
created and the Creator. Moreover, it would entail the
additional theological error of equating a deficient/ ugly being with God, who is a perfect/beautiful being. Even though Rūzbihān
does not provide such a full explanation, such an understanding seems to
underlie his argument that neither things deemed beautiful nor things deemed ugly can be identified with God without
the charge of unbelief.
To come back to the initial question, why do
some created things appear beautiful and some ugly? Put differently, where is
the line that divides things that appear beautiful from those that appear ugly?
On this matter Rūzbihān writes,
If God disclosed Himself
through a thing to a thing,
that thing would be beautiful (ḥasuna)
through His self-disclosure in the eyes of all the recognizers and the
witnessers. If He curtained Himself
from a thing, that thing would be ugly in the eyes of the view- ers,
and that would be in the station of intimacy. Aḥmad b. ʿAṭāʾ said concerning
the meaning of recognition: “Things
deemed ugly are ugly through
being curtained, while things deemed beauti-
ful are beautiful through His self-disclosure.” The recognizer said—may God be
pleased with him— “Deeming things beautiful does not occur to any- one except
the one who sees the Existence-giver of things in things.”42
In short, Rūzbihān
argues that a thing appears ugly when it hides
God and beautiful when it reveals
God. At the end of the
passage, he encapsulates this station in the voice of his alter ego, “the
recognizer”: perception of beauty in things depends on one’s ability to see God
in things. Thus, he introduces an element of individual human perception into his discussion of beauty.
Rūzbihān calls this ability to find God’s ḥusn in created objects “the eye of
contentment” (ʿayn al-riḍā), which is
a well-established Sufi technical term that he uses in the new context of beauty.
The basic sense
of riḍā as most Sufis under- stand it is contentment, satisfaction, or approval
in the face of both ease
and adversity, or divine mercy and wrath.43 While contentment appears as one of the
1,001 stations in the Mashrab, Rūzbihān does not provide a concentrated discussion
of the eye of contentment as such in this work. However, we find a useful discussion in ʿArāʾis al-bayān, in which he writes, “The eye of contentment sees the ugly as
beautiful (ḥasan) among all, just as
it was said: The eye of contentment is dim toward every shortcoming / but the eye of evil makes appear evil traits. It
was said: The eye of enmity is responsible for evil traits / while the eye of contentment is dim toward
shortcom- ings.”44 This is Rūzbihān’s basic explanation of
the term.
However, when he employs the term in his
discussion of beauty, a new horizon opens:
“When the eye of contentment is opened…one will see the quiddity of being and the beauty (ḥusn)
of God’s artisanry (iṣṭināʿ) that becomes manifest
from [that quiddity] in every atom.”45 Then one will “deem
all things decreed by the Unseen
as beautiful.”46 “Then,”
he says,
the vision
of beauty (ḥusn) and ugliness will become
equal, because in the vision of [divine]
tremendous- ness, no trace of temporally originated things47
remains and
the acts of [divine] severity and gen- tleness will be equal. All things will come out from the source
of all with a single description. That is why
God praised Himself
for giving existence
to the realm of being and what
is within it and explained that nothing emerges from Him except the perfec-
tion of beauty with His words, Who made
beautiful everything He has created. (Q 32:7)48
Thus, Rūzbihān
argues that in reality everything in the world is beautiful (ḥasan) because it is God’s handiwork,
endowed with a perfection of beauty. It is important to note that here only ḥasan would be appropriate in this discussion, not jamīl; put another way, it would be
right to say that everything is ḥasan but
wrong to say everything is jamīl—for
reasons that will become clear in the next chapter.
With the eye of content- ment a person will be able to see
everything in creation as mustaḥsan rather than mustaqbaḥ, because however far removed a thing is from
God, or however defective a thing may be, insofar as it exists,
it is God’s creation and therefore beautiful and to be appreciated.
The question of mustaqbaḥ
versus mustaḥsan
thus turns out to be an issue of human perception in
accordance with one’s level of knowledge. Rūzbihān’s choice of the tenth-form
words aptly captures the human judgmental factor of “deem- ing” in this process
of perceiving beauty and ugliness in cre- ated
things. To put it in a philosophical language, in the realm
of creation there are only things deemed beautiful
or deemed ugly, not beauty or ugliness itself.
Depending on people’s
per- spectives, the same things may appear beautiful
or ugly. What then is beautiful or ugly in itself,
not relative to human per- ception? One may say that “beauty” (ḥusn) itself belongs to God alone (as a
divine attribute), whereas “ugliness” (qubḥ)
itself is nonexistence, that is, sheer deficiency (of beauty), which by definition
does not exist, therefore, is a mere theo- retical construct. Rūzbihān does not
speak in this exact manner, but such a philosophical explanation does not contra-
dict with his understanding of beauty either. However, he maintains that with the eye of contentment it is possible
to see everything as
beautiful (ḥasan).
If we construct a scheme representing the
interrelationship among ḥusn, mustaḥsan, mustaqbaḥ, and qubḥ, we may get the following picture:
Figure 2.1 An ontological scheme of beauty and ugliness
God stands
alone as the sole possessor of ḥusn as
such, while His creation, or the world,
is the domain in which ḥusn is either manifest or veiled—depending on
individual human perception. Hence, creation is the domain of mustaḥsan and mustaqbaḥ rather than of ḥusn or
qubḥ itself.
Alternatively, to use a philosophical language
once again, at the top of this ontological hierarchy
lies universal or absolute (kullī or muṭlaq) beauty, which is the realm of
the necessary being (wājib al-wujūd).
Here no ugliness can be found, for ugli- ness is by definition a lack of beauty or being. At the bottom of
this ontological hierarchy is the conceptual opposite of abso- lute beauty,
that is, absolute ugliness, which equals absolute nonexistence or impossible
being (mumtaniʿ al-wujūd). In between
absolute beauty and absolute ugliness lies partial or relative (juzʾī or nisbī) beauty, which is the realm of possible being (mumkin al-wujūd) or the domain of
creation (or “genera- tion and corruption”), consisting of things that come to be and cease
to be. While both beauty and ugliness
may be perceived
in this middle domain,
they are relative, not absolute, which
is to say that things in this domain can only be mustaḥsan or mustaqbaḥ, that is, deemed beautiful or ugly, but never beauty or ugliness itself. Since Rūzbihān mostly avoids
philosophical language and prefers a more literary style, he does not draw such
direct parallels between his own language and the more commonly used language
of Muslim intellectuals. However, once one gets past the linguistic barrier
of his peculiar phrase-
ology and terminology, it is possible to discern such a structured ontology of
beauty in his writings.
Summary
Upon
analysis, Rūzbihān’s essential terms of beauty reveal a worldview that revolves
around the notion of beauty, which can be understood ontologically as the
fullness or perfection of being. God is called
jamīl (“beautiful”) and is the possessor of ḥusn (“beauty”). He is “the most beautiful
(aḥsan) creator” of a world through which He manifests His own beauty
(both jamāl and ḥusn).
In Rūzbihān’s ontology, there is nothing
that truly exists but God’s ḥusn; everything else (i.e., creation)
is a reflection or shadow of His ḥusn. If human beings focus on the
manner in which something reveals God’s beauty, it will appear beautiful (mustaḥsan) to them. If they fix their eyes on
the manner in which it veils God’s beauty, it will appear ugly (mustaqbaḥ) to them.
Put another way, perception of beauty and
ugliness is per- ception of God’s presence and absence, respectively. God’s
presence in the world is mind-independent reality; God exists whether or not
human beings sense His presence. The same goes for beauty. Those who sense
God’s presence more strongly than His absence will find the object of their perception beauti- ful; those who sense God’s absence more than His
presence will find it ugly. That is the reason why the same objects can appear
beautiful to some people and ugly to others. In Rūzbihān’s view,
it is up to individual human beings to attain
the right perception of reality,
which is possible
by cultivating “the eye of
contentment.”
In this light, one may say that according to
Rūzbihān it is ugliness that lies in the eye of the
beholder. This is to say, beauty is reality and all there is to
be perceived; its reality neither depends on nor is relative to individual
human perception. Perception of ugliness in the world simply indicates defective individual perception or ignorance on the part of its perceiver,
for what exists is ḥusn and what we
call ugliness is nonexistence.
By extension, one can draw an analogy
between the above view and a contemporary discussion in psychology: Rūzbihān’s contrast
between mustaḥsan and mustaqbaḥ is
like the difference between perceiving a glass of water to be “half full” and regarding it as “half
empty,” respectively. In the first perspective—that is, deeming something beautiful or
the glass to be half full—one’s attention is fixed on the presence of some- thing. In
contrast, the second perspective—finding something ugly or the glass to be half empty—highlights
what is absent, indicating the perceiver’s incapacity to recognize what is pres- ent. In an everyday situation,
people who always see things from the second perspective are likely to be
constant com- plainers, who fail to be grateful for what they have. This cer-
tainly would be considered a vice in Islam, constituting kufr, for the term means not only “unbelief” but also
“ingratitude,” being the antonym of both “faith” (īmān) and “gratitude” (shukr).49
Moreover, the first perspective in the above
instance goes well with the notion of “contentment” (as in “the eye of con-
tentment”), because whoever takes this perspective appreci- ates and is content
with what is present, as this person’s attention is not drawn
to any lack. This is a mode of perceiving each thing in the world as
equal in beauty to everything else insofar as it exists. For example, one would
perceive a tree in full bloom as beautiful as when it is withered, for both are
God’s creation and how He intends them to be. A person
with the eye of contentment is able to see God and His beauty in the
tree in both situations.
Implicit in Rūzbihān’s presentation of the
eye of content- ment is his understanding of creation. The eye of contentment
emphasizes the sameness of things because of the presence
of
being in each
and every one of them—as he had said, “When the eye of contentment is opened…one will see the quiddity of being and the beauty (ḥusn) of God’s artisanry that becomes
manifest from [that quiddity] in every atom.”50 In other words, beauty (ḥusn) lies in being; ugliness lies in nonbeing
(ʿadam).
Thus, Rūzbihān’s analysis
of beauty (ḥusn) in contrast to ugliness (qubḥ) is quite ontological in nature. Having under-
stood his basic terminology and ontology of beauty, we are
now ready to
explore his understanding of beauty in God, the world, and the human being, which are the subjects of the sub- sequent chapters. The next chapter will examine God’s
beauty, more specifically the notion of God as jamīl as well as the pos-
sessor of ḥusn and of the most beautiful names (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā) with a view to uncovering the difference between ḥusn and jamāl in Rūzbihān’s theology.
3
The Theology of Beauty
There is nothing
like Him.
—Qurʾān 42:11
To God belong
the most beautiful names.
—Qurʾān 7:180
Were there no unveiling of His beauty
how could there be love in people’s spirits? He made Himself recognized in the
signs
Then He gave out the descriptions of the attributes.
—Rūzbihān
Baqlī
T
he story of beauty1 for Rūzbihān—and
for that matter, all Muslims who talk of it—begins with God Himself, God in His
aloneness. In mythic language, the story goes like this: Once upon a time—or, “before”
there was time or any tempo-
ral existence—God was, and nothing was with Him. To this state alludes a famous
monologue attributed to God and fre- quently
mentioned in Sufi literature: “I was a Hidden Treasure, so I loved to be recognized. So
I created the creatures so that I may
be recognized.”2 Like many others, Rūzbihān under- stands the unfolding of the Hidden
Treasure as the process of God’s self-disclosure, first
within Himself, then in creation. In the course of this process the divine beauty becomes
manifest.
49
In order to
understand the place of beauty in Rūzbihān’s theology, several key questions
need to be addressed at the outset. First, what is the difference between God’s jamāl and ḥusn? Where are the two situated in Rūzbihān’s theological
framework? And, what exactly is his
theological framework? One of the biggest challenges in answering these
questions is Rūzbihān’s abstruse language. Rūzbihān, like Sufis in gen- eral,
likes to use figurative and imagistic language often drawn from the Qurʾān and
the Ḥadīth, the same sort of lan- guage that is preferred by Persian poets in
particular. He likes to employ
concrete imagery where dogmatic theolo- gians and philosophers would use
abstract, technical lan- guage. Upon close intertextual analysis of his works,
it becomes clear that many of his figurative expressions form part of his
systematic terminology, some of which consis- tently correspond to well-known
technical terms in dogmatic theology. Hence, one of the objectives here is to
decode and recast Rūzbihān’s allusive language into the clearer, more common
vocabulary of general Muslim theological dis- course. A key text in this endeavor is Rūzbihān’s sole extant work in
dogmatic theology, Masālik al-tawḥīd (“The
Paths to Asserting Oneness”), a little-studied work whose content will be examined in conjunction
with related discussions in his other works.
The Technical
Languages of Dogmatic Theology, Philosophy, and Sufism
To begin
discussing the question, “What is God’s
beauty?” we must first
address a more fundamental question, “How can
we speak about God?” “Speaking about God”—which is the most basic sense
of the word theology—was never a
simple matter for Muslims. Throughout Muslim intellectual history, the dogmatic
theologians (mutakallimūn) have tried
to co-opt for themselves the function of setting the basic linguistic-
conceptual framework for appropriate manners of speaking about God. Although Rūzbihān is primarily known as a
Sufi, he was also well versed
in the discipline of dogmatic
theology
(kalām) as well as other Muslim religious
sciences, like any well-trained scholar.
In order to understand the precise nature
of Rūzbihān’s lan- guage, it might be useful to begin with a brief
characterization of “Sufi,” “theological,” and “philosophical” writings.
There are at least two fundamental differences between these three categories of writings: the first
is lexical, that is, they utilize
dif- ferent sets of technical terms; the second
is epistemological, that is, their immediate sources of knowledge are different.
First of all, Muslim philosophers (falāsifa) redefined stan- dard Arabic words (including those used in the
Qurʾān) in the light of concepts drawn from Greek philosophy. Moreover, many of
them preferred using a language that is devoid of Qurʾānic expressions. Thus,
instead of “God” (Allāh), they liked to use terms like “the necessary being” (wājib al-wujūd),
“the first cause” (al-ʿilla al-ūlā),
“the sheer good” (al-khayr al-maḥḍ), and so on. With the use of an unambiguous, strictly definition-bound language, Muslim philosophers aimed
at gaining indubitable knowledge of the principles behind all things through
demonstration (burhān), which avoids contradiction.
Dogmatic theologians are similar to the
philosophers in their rational argumentative method and their use of a strictly
definition-bound language. Thus,
each term ideally
has a fixed meaning in all contexts, thereby avoiding ambiguity and
con- tradiction in arguments—in contrast to Sufi literature, where intentional ambiguity
and contradiction are common features. Dogmatic theologians differ from
the philosophers in their preferred technical terms,
and they make a point
of anchoring their
terminology in Qurʾānic expressions. Thus, the Qurʾān not only provides linguistic tools for them to speak
about God but also serves as
the fundamental source of their knowledge about God. For dogmatic theologians,
the truth of the Qurʾān is a given; their task is to interpret its verses with
the assis- tance of rational speculation (naẓar)
so as to construct a non- contradictory, systematic understanding of God and
His creation. For this reason, some translate mutakallimūn as “spec- ulative
theologians,” and kalām as
“speculative theology.” Other common translations are “dogmatic,” “dialectic,” and
“rational”
theologians/theology. However, in contrast to the philosophers, who consider
observing the world and using the
intellect sufficient for obtaining all knowledge, dogmatic theologians take the words of the Qurʾān as the very basis and starting point for all their inquiry.
Thus, while both dogmatic theologians and philosophers engage in rational
speculation, the former’s reliance on the power of the intellect is much more
limited than the latter’s.
While competing schools of dogmatic theology
existed for many centuries, by the time of Rūzbihān
in the twelfth cen- tury, the dominant school
was that of the Ashʿarites, whom he apparently
follows and defends in the Masālik—often
against the claims of the Muʿtazilites. One key difference
between these two schools
of dogmatic theology
lies in their
degrees of rationalism:
while the Muʿtazilites were outright rationalist theologians, the Ashʿarites—who
appeared out of the Muʿtazilite circle to establish the middle ground between rationalist theology and literalist Ḥadīth scholarship—took a more nuanced
approach to interpreting the Qurʾān. The gen-
eral Ashʿarite stance on speaking
about God was to employ the words of the Qurʾān as far as
possible, as they believed that each Qurʾānic word corresponds to a reality
either in a way that humans can understand or beyond human compre-
hension. Where their rational interpretation of the Qurʾān failed, the Ashʿarites embraced Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal’s herme- neutic
principle of accepting
the apparent meaning
of verses “without
[asking] how” (bi-lā kayfa).
All this suggests that the Ashʿarites were
acutely aware of the limits of human rational speculation for understanding God
as well as of the inadequacy of human language in describing God as He really is. In other words, they knew that there is a limit to positive
(cataphatic) manners of speaking about God. Hence, Ashʿarites also made use of
negative (apophatic) descriptions of God.
However, it was the Sufis who took apophatic
theological discourse to another level. This is largely because of the very
nature of their immediate source of knowledge, namely direct
encounters with God, expressed in various ways—vision (ruʾya), witnessing (mushāhada), audition
(samāʿ), and so on. Through such direct encounters with God, Sufis attain maʿrifa,
that is,
“recognition” or “experiential knowledge” of God, which is contrasted with ʿilm, a bookish type of knowledge that
results from memorization of the views of others and rational speculation
rather than direct experience. For this reason, Sufis often associate maʿrifa with what they call “tasting”
(dhawq), indicating its personal, direct, and experien-
tial nature. It must be noted, however, that the superiority of maʿrifa over ʿilm in Sufi
understanding holds true only on the
human level, for the distinction between these two types of knowledge does not
apply to God’s knowledge, which is always expressed as ʿilm on the basis of the Qurʾānic
terminol- ogy. The process of attaining maʿrifa—which includes Sufis’ visionary or auditory encounters with
God—is ineffable by nature, as it does not take place on the ordinary plane of
con- sciousness, which is dependent on the five external senses.
Knowing full well that finite human language
cannot prop- erly capture such encounters with the infinite God, Sufis tried to
cope with—or even play with—the inadequacy of human language in their effort to
describe what they “saw” (or “heard,” which might be easier to express in
words). In their effort to describe
the infinite with finite human language, Sufis devised at least three
linguistic strategies: the use of (1) poetry, which involves metaphors,
symbols, and images to point out how something is like something else by analogy; (2) para- doxes and contradictions,
in which Sufis simultaneously affirm and deny a quality to God (coincidentia oppositorum); and (3) negation (apophasis), that is, to describe God by point- ing out what He is not, highlighting God’s transcendence or
incomparability (tanzīh). These three
methods go beyond the limits of human language by intentionally exposing its col- lapse, be it through ultimately
inadequate metaphors, contra- dictions, or negations. This is what Michael
Sells calls “the language of unsaying.”3 The Sufi “play” with
language—by laying open its vulnerability cum richness through contradic-
tions, negations, and ambiguity—is exactly
what distinguishes their language
from those of the philosophers and theologians, who try to avoid
precisely this: ambiguity and contradiction in their use of language. At the same time, this is precisely what
makes Sufi language particularly difficult to understand for those used to
philosophical and theological languages.
As for the lexical characteristics of general Sufi language, it can
contain any mixture
of terms from the Qurʾān
and Ḥadīth, poetic expressions, and technical
terminology of kalām and fal- safa. The Sufis pay special attention to Qurʾānic
language, in many cases transforming the words into technical terms of their discipline, for example, “divine
self-disclosure” (tajallī), “annihilation” (fanāʾ), “witnessing” (mushāhada), and “unveil- ing” (kashf, mukāshafa). While these terms often characterize Sufi writings, it is
important to note that there is no single “Sufi language.” Some Sufis are
poetic in their expressions, avoiding theological and philosophical terms;
others incorpo- rate philosophical and/or theological terms to the exclusion of poetic language. What is actually found
in the texts depends on the learning and preference of each Sufi writer. Hence, “Sufi language”
is the most multifarious and complicated among the three groups.4
Rūzbihān’s Language
Rūzbihān’s
language is no exception. He makes heavy use of metaphors, paradoxes, and
negations, and he also utilizes the languages of the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, Sufism,
and dogmatic theology. He shows less interest in adopting the technical terms
of philosophy. This is especially evident in the manner in which he makes
use of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Daylamī’s compen- dium on the topic of passionate love (ʿishq), ʿAṭf al-alif
al-maʾlūf ʿalā al-lām al-maʿṭūf, which includes
many philosophical dis- cussions. As Takeshita has shown in his comparison of al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf
and Rūzbihān’s ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn,
there is no doubt that Rūzbihān had a thorough familiarity with al-Daylamī’s work.5 Indeed,
paraphrases of the ʿAṭf can be found in Rūzbihān’s various
works, not limited
to the ʿAbhar; however, he
rarely mentions any of the philosophical discus- sions that are plentiful in
the ʿAṭf.
In contrast to his reticence on philosophy,
he does not hide the theological side of his learning, more specifically, his sub-
scription to Ashʿarism. In fact, he
even seems to show off his allegiance to Ashʿarism by attacking Muʿtazilism in Masālik al-tawḥīd. This is noteworthy given the critical
tone of voice in
this work, a
tone rarely encountered in his other writings, where his Ashʿarite inclination is detectable but rarely empha- sized. On reading the Masālik, Toby Mayer notes, “The great visionary
and mystical exegete, Rūzbehān Baqlī (d. 1209), was strongly Ashʿarite in his theology….In other texts, it is fasci- nating to see Ashʿarite terms and ideas transposed by Baqlī into a purely mystical
context. For instance,
the difficult kalām
issue of the visio beata is
explored anew, no longer as an epi- sode of the eschaton, or of the Prophet’s ascension, but insofar as Baqlī himself claims to have encountered God ‘in the most
beautiful of forms’ in the privacy
of his own home.”6 Also, Rūzbihān occasionally uses the Ashʿarite expression “without
(asking) how” (bi-lā kayfa) in describing his visions of God in his diary of daily visions, Kashf al-asrār
(“The Unveiling of Secrets”). On this Ernst
comments, “Rūzbihān occasionally resorts to conventional theological language, particular [sic]
the formula
‘without (asking) how’ (bi-lā kayf); pietist
groups such as the Ḥanbalīs and Ashʿarīs
used this phrase to insist on the literal truth of seemingly anthropomorphic
scriptural pas- sages without engaging in intellectual speculation about their modality.”7
In short, Rūzbihān’s language is a mix of (1) terms
from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth, (2) technical terms of Sufism,
(3) technical terms of dogmatic theology,
(4) a limited number of technical
terms from other disciplines such as philosophy, and (5) terms of his own invention, which will be
discussed shortly.
Rūzbihān on Ashʿarite Theology:
Kitāb masālik al-tawh. īd
Among the
forty-five works attributed to Rūzbihān, at least three are known to have been
written in the field of dog- matic theology: al-Intiqād fī al-iʿtiqād (“The Critique in Belief”), al-Ḥaqāʾiq fī al-ʿaqāʾid (“The Realities
in the Dogmas”), and Masālik al-tawḥīd.
However, the last one is the sole surviving work in full; the first is lost and
the second is preserved only as excerpts.8 Since Paul Ballanfat
published the text of Masālik al-tawḥīd in
1998,9 the work has not attracted
much scholarly attention, most likely due to its
unoriginal
theological content as a précis of the basic Ashʿarite creed. However, for the
purpose of the present study, a close textual analysis of the Masālik yields a unique benefit: being
virtually the only place where Rūzbihān pres- ents the theological system in
which his mind operates and defines key terms in dogmatic theology as he
understands them, it helps us decipher his Sufi works by revealing the
underlying terminological and conceptual framework of his thought that turns
out to be deeply rooted in Ashʿarism. Moreover, a comparison of his use of
terms in the Masālik and in his Sufi works
reveals that some of his seemingly poetic expressions found in the latter are
in fact his own translations of otherwise well-known technical terms in
dogmatic theology.
In Masālik al-tawḥīd,
which is an Arabic treatise of
twenty-two pages in a modern edition, Rūzbihān
deals with several well-known points of contention
between Ashʿarites and Muʿtazilites, such as the questions of the existence of
divine attributes and the possibility of the vision
of God. His reasons
for choosing to discuss these particular issues in the Masālik are not self-evident in the work. The editor of the text,
Paul Ballanfat, thinks that the virulent opposition that Rūzbihān expresses
toward Muʿtazilism in this treatise indicates the extent to which it still held
sway in Fārs, and particularly in Shiraz during his time.10
Masālik al-tawḥīd consists of four short chapters,
respectively entitled: “The First Pole: On the Recognition of the Essence
of God”; “The Second
Pole: On the Recognition of the Attributes of God”; “The Third Pole: On
the Recognition of the Acts of God”;
and “The Fourth Pole: On the Recognition of What Is Heard (samʿiyyāt).” Thus,
in the first three chapters, he engages in the standard
theological discussion of examining the notion
of God in terms of essence, attributes, and acts. The final chap- ter
presents various sayings
from the Ḥadīth
literature, that is, the reports that have been
transmitted and heard concerning God. Among
the main points Rūzbihān makes in the Masālik
are: (1) the unknowability of God’s essence;
(2) affirmation of the seven eternal attributes of God
(i.e., knowledge, power, hearing, seeing, speech,
desire, and life);
and (3) affirmation of everything in this world as divine acts.11 “Human acts” are in
fact divine
acts that are, as the Ashʿarites say, “acquired” (muk-
tasaba) by human beings.12
The three basic theological terms—essence,
attribute, and act—are important linguistic tools that Rūzbihān uses to ana-
lyze the notion of God’s beauty. Dogmatic
theologians’ tripar- tite
analysis of God implies that when people say “God” (Allāh), they could be implicitly referring to God on any of these
three distinct levels: (1) His essence (which is unknow- able); (2) His
attributes (which are knowable); or (3) His acts (which are knowable). Thus,
there may be ambiguity inherent in any Muslim discussion of
“God” that does not make use of these three technical terms.
Essence (dhāt): the Unknowable and Hidden God
One of the first points that Rūzbihān makes in Masālik al-tawḥīd is the
utter transcendence and inconceivability of God in Himself, that is, the divine
essence. He writes,
The first pole, on the
recognition of God’s essence: He is an eternal existent without
beginning or end, one who is truly existent, not like the existence of things
that abide through other things;
rather, He is an exis- tence that abides through
itself. He is not a body, nor a substance, nor an accident, for substance is the locus of accidents,
and nothing is a substance without being spatially
located. Rather, He is incomparable with being interrelated with temporally originated things.13
Presented
above is a standard discussion of God as an exis- tence (wujūd) whose eternity is contrasted with “temporal origination” (ḥudūth), which applies only to created
things. Rūzbihān thus points out that the first thing that can be said about
God in His essence is that He exists and is entirely incomparable to creation.
The unknowability of God’s essence is a
widely accepted dictum in Muslim theological discourse, in association with
which Muslims often quote the following ḥadīth
(which exists in slightly
different versions): “Reflect
upon everything, but
do not reflect
upon God’s essence.”14 Rūzbihān’s commentary on a version of this ḥadīth is as follows:
“Reflect upon God’s creation, but do not reflect upon God.”…When the Prophet saw the recognizer covet- ing the recognition of the depth of the essence, he
commanded him to abandon reflecting upon [God’s] essence,
for he knew that the temporally originated does not perceive the eternal as it is in reality. Rather,
by way of reflecting upon creation he reaches the station of the
incapacity to recognize because of
his being annihilated in God’s unicity. His “incapacity to perceive
is itself perception,” as Abū Bakr said.15
In short,
God’s essence is the utterly transcendent aspect of God to which no creature
has access. It is often said to be the referent of the verse, There is nothing like Him (Q 42:11),
which Rūzbihān interprets to mean, “Whatever you agree upon from
the throne to the earth, I am incomparable with that.’”16 The
phrase, “from the throne to the earth” is a common expression for the whole created realm.
Rūzbihān warns that if someone persists in
thinking about God’s essence, he would become utterly “bewildered at the first
radiance of the majesty of the unicity. His understanding would be annihilated
short of perceiving the assaults of tre- mendousness. So he will return from
there to creation bewil- dered, annihilated, and incapable of perceiving the
reality of the divinity.”17 The word reality (ḥaqīqa) designates the thing as it is in itself, so “the reality of the
divinity” is the divine essence, God as He is in Himself
and for Himself.
It is so utterly beyond human comprehension that it is not
only bewildering but also annihilating for
the thinker. Annihilation (fanāʾ) is an impor- tant technical term
in Sufism, indicating the obliteration of separative existence in the face of
God’s sheer oneness.
In Mashrab al-arwāḥ too, Rūzbihān discusses the manner in which God’s
essence annihilates those who seek Him. He explains that the reason why God’s
essence is unknowable to human beings is that anyone who has even a glimpse of
it would simply be annihilated, for God’s sheer oneness does not allow the duality
of the knower and the known to remain.
In sum, there
can be no true knower of God’s essence except God Himself. Rūzbihān writes,
“The Real discloses some of the lights of His essence unmixed to the secret core (sirr), so his secret core is drowned in the ocean of His essence. His locus there is
the locus of annihilation….The recognizer says: The vision of the self-disclosure of the essence
annihilates the sight of those who look.”18
The idea that God alone
knows His essence
appears promi- nently in Rūzbihān’s interpretation of certain Qurʾānic
verses, such as With Him are the
keys of the unseen; none knows them but He (Q 6:59). In his interpretation, the word unseen (al-ghayb)
refers to God’s essence, because its nature is unseen, that is, hidden and unknowable. His commentary reads: “None
knows His attributes and essence in truth except He in Himself.”19
In his Sufi works, Rūzbihān employs a number
of alterna- tive expressions to refer to “the divine essence,” such as
“unseenness” (ghayba), “treasure house” (khizāna), and “trea- sure” (kanz), among others.20
Moreover, in a passage quoted earlier, he used the terms “depth” (kunh), “unicity” (waḥdāniyya), and possibly also “tremendousness” (ʿaẓama) in oblique reference to God’s essence.
Thus, what he calls God’s “essence” in Masālik al-tawḥīd appears as “depth,” “unseen- ness,” and so on in
his Sufi compositions.
There are still other Qurʾānic verses that Rūzbihān consid-
ers as
indicating the unknowability of God’s essence.
A verse of particular importance in Rūzbihān’s discussion of this idea
is Thou shalt not see Me (Q 7:143),21
God’s famous reply to Moses’s request on the mountain,
“Show me so that I may look
upon Thee” (Q 7:143), which was briefly
discussed in the previ- ous chapter. Below
is another instance
of Rūzbihān’s interpre- tation of the verse: “[Moses]
asked from [God] for one of His eyes (ʿayn)
with which to see Him, that is, to see the source of
the source (ʿayn al-ʿayn), the depth of the depth, the eternity
of the eternity, the secret of the essence, the reality of the reality.”22
All these phrases—“the source of the
source,” “the depth of the depth,”
“the eternity of the eternity,” and “the reality of the reality” are used in apposition to “the secret of the
essence,” which means that they all signify the divine
essence. The
use of ʿayn to refer to the essence
is apt given another sense of the word, “fountainhead” or “source,” for all being emerges
from the divine essence. Rūzbihān’s use of the word ʿayn in
the sense of “essence” can be found in his
other works. For instance, in the Mashrab
he writes, “Then He manifests the ʿayn
in the ʿayn, I mean, the essence
in the essence.”23 Thus, the above commentary shows Rūzbihān’s view that what Moses requested
from God in this Qurʾānic episode was the vision of
God’s essence. Rūzbihān explains God’s reply, “Thou shalt not see Me,” as meaning “Thou shalt not perceive Me as I
am (kamā anā),”24 that is,
“as I am in My essence.”
Since the divine essence is the “God” that
cannot be seen, known, or perceived in any way—i.e., the transcendent God— its
discussion naturally leads to apophatic
theology. However, in addition
to engaging in apophatic theology, a strong point of many of the dogmatic
theologians, Rūzbihān also engages in cataphatic theology. In other words, as
much as he talks of God’s unknowability in Himself, he also explains His know-
ability through His acts. This is typical
of the Sufi approach, as Sufis maintain that excessive stress
on God’s undeniable oth- erness and unknowability cuts Him off from the also
undeni- able fact of His presence
in all things through His creative acts, concerning which the Qurʾān talks
extensively. Since the notion of divine acts must be first understood in order
to understand the complex substructure of the divine attributes, the divine
acts will be examined next.
Acts (afʿāl):
The Beautiful Creations of God
God’s “act” (fiʿl) is a term used in Muslim
theological dis- course that refers
to every single
thing in creation. The idea of every created thing as a divine act is
a standard notion in Ashʿarite theology. Rūzbihān makes his allegiance to Ashʿarism
clear in the following passage by supporting the view that human actions are
God’s creations and that human beings only “acquire” them without ever creating them,
a sig- nature doctrine of Ashʿarite
theology called “acquisition” (kasb).
Understand
that from the throne to the earth is created by God, and everything except His
exis- tence is His act. He gave each act its existence from sheer nonexistence, and such is
everything that is temporally originated in His kingdom. The acts of the
servants are also created by God, even if they are acquired by the servants.
God desired them in beginninglessness (azal)
as a favor and mercy.25
At this point
it is worth revisiting the ḥadīth, “Reflect upon God’s creation, but do not reflect
upon God.” When we dis- cussed it in the previous section, we focused on the
latter half of this ḥadīth, which points out the unknowability of God’s
essence. Now, let us turn our attention to the first half of this ḥadīth: “Reflect
upon God’s creation.” It suggests that it is worth thinking about God’s acts, but
why? Implicit in this saying is the idea that while God cannot be known as He
is in Himself, He can be known indirectly through His act or creation.
Rūzbihān points out that creation
indicates—by virtue of its
existence—the existence of its Creator: “The creation is a pointer to the existence
of the Creator, and the act points
to the Actor.”26 To prove the above statement, Rūzbihān produces a standard rationalist argument in which
he refutes the idea of infinite regress in the chains of causes, concluding
that there must be a first cause
that is eternal
in order for there to be tem- porally originated things.27
The same argument can be found, for instance, in a work of dogmatic
theology by al-Qushayrī, a famous Sufi and defender of
Ashʿarism whom Rūzbihān held in high regard. Al-Qushayrī writes, “The bringer-of-existence of the world is
beginningless. The proof for this is that if it were [also] brought into
existence, it would require another bringer-of-existence as well as the latter’s
bringer-of-existence, and it would
go back in a chain
ad infinitum, and that is impos-
sible.”28 Having established the single, eternal
existence of the first cause, Rūzbihān states,
“Reflecting upon creation increases certitude
in God’s unicity.”29
Aside from producing such rational
arguments, Rūzbihān also refers to a standard idea that human beings are
created with an innate nature (fiṭra)
that recognizes God:
God captured
within the nature of the souls a lumi- nous, intellective, and holy innate
nature that testi- fies to its bringer-of-existence and recognizes that it
has been conquered by the subjugation of its Artist (ṣāniʿ) and overpowered by the governing of its Cre- ator; it is capable
of making God recognized by way
of the lights of His act and the glow of His artifacts.
These guide the souls on the path of affirming
God’s existent and eternal essence, from which stem all things.30
Another thing
that an act reveals about
its Actor, according to Rūzbihān, is the Actor’s characteristics, or attributes. He
writes, “There is a manifestation of the essence
in the clothing of the attributes, while the attributes become
manifest in the clothing of the acts”;31 “His essence is the quarry
of His attri- butes, and His attributes are the quarry of His act”;32
“If the acts and the attributes were recognized, the essence would [also] be
recognized.”33 Thus, God becomes manifest and knowable in stages: He emerges
out of the unknowable essence first by way of the knowable
attributes and then by the know- able acts. Conversely, His acts, that is to say, the entire creation,
reveal His attributes, which in turn reveal the unfathomable divine essence
indirectly by “clothing” it, which is a signature term in Rūzbihān’s writings, to be discussed in the subsequent chapters. Put another way, the acts and attributes are the beau- tiful clothes that cover up as well as reveal the invisible divine essence.
Likewise we should reconsider the verse, “Thou shalt not see Me” (Q 7:143), which,
in Rūzbihān’s interpretation, is God’s reply to Moses’s request to see God’s
essence. God’s reply then continued like this: “But look at the mountain: if it stays in its place, then thou shalt see Me.”
In the light of the foregoing analy- sis, if we translate this part of
the verse, it might read: “Thou shalt not see My essence. But look at My act:
if it stays in its place, then thou shalt see My essence.” The verse ends in
the following manner: When his Lord
disclosed Himself to the mountain, He made it crumble down, and Moses fell down
in a swoon. When he awoke, he said,
“Glory be to Thee! To Thee I have turned in repentance, and I am the first of the believers.” In other
words, in
response to Moses’s request, God revealed His essence to His act (i.e., the
mountain) instead of revealing it directly to Moses.
Facing a direct
revelation of God’s
essence, the mountain is annihilated, as no creature can bear such a
direct manifestation of the divine essence. Moses had indirect witnessing of the divine essence
through the intermediary of the divine act that was the mountain.
However, even this sight
of the mountain crumbling into dust was too strong for Moses to bear, even if he was a prophet.
His “swooning” represents, one might say, the annihilation of ordinary
consciousness.
Rūzbihān
argues that Moses
saw God’s beauty
in the moun- tain before falling
unconscious: “Moses saw the beauty
of eter- nity (jamāl al-qidam) in the mirror of the mountain, and then he fell down.”34 The “mirror”—which is a common image for cre- ation in Sufism—is an especially apt symbol for the mountain, since it shows how divine acts function as mirrors of the invis- ible essence by displaying its
attributes. Another key term in this discussion is tajallī or self-disclosure, which appeared in the verbal
form in the verse Q 7:143: his Lord
disclosed Himself (tajallā) to the mountain. If we use both mirror and self-disclo-
sure to explain the verse, we can say that the mountain
served as a mirror of God and the locus of His self-disclosure.
Thus, in Rūzbihān’s interpretation, both the ḥadīth
“Reflect
upon God’s
creation, but do not reflect upon God” and the Qurʾānic verse, Thou shalt not see Me. But look at the
mountain: if it stays in its place, then thou shalt
see Me (Q 7:143)
make the same two points: (1) God’s essence
cannot be known directly,
so it should not be thought about; and (2) human beings should think about
God’s acts instead of His essence if they wish to know His essence, because His
acts display His attri- butes, through which they can attain approximate
knowledge of the divine essence.
The idea that divine attributes become manifest
through divine acts also appears in Rūzbihān’s
interpretation of the following key ḥadīth and Qurʾānic verse, both mentioning jamāl:
“[The Prophet] said, ‘Indeed God is beautiful, and He loves beauty.’ God said, There is beauty in them [i.e., the
cattle] for you when you bring them home
to rest and when you drive them forth abroad
to pasture [Q 16:6]. This is the beauty that stems from
the beauty of His act and His power.”35
The Qurʾānic
verse points out how beauty (jamāl)
is appar- ent in the cattle,
that is, a divine attribute
becomes manifest in a divine act. The ḥadīth explains why
beauty can be found in creation: because God is beautiful. What the beautiful Creator creates is also beautiful, as it reflects its Creator’s
attributes. This is also the point Rūzbihān makes in his interpretation of another Qurʾānic verse, Blessed is God, the most beautiful (aḥsan) of creators (Q 23:14), as we saw in the previous chapter.36
Attributes (s. ifāt): The Knowable, Beautiful God
The third
term to be discussed is attributes (ṣifāt,
sing. ṣifa), which derives
from the root w-ṣ-f,
meaning “to describe.” The Arabic for “essence,” dhāt
has a close relationship with ṣifāt, because dhāt is a term that functions
in conjunction with ṣifāt, for the root meaning of dhāt is “possessor of,” implying the
possessor of attributes. As one Ashʿarite theologian put it, dhāt
is “what is described by the attributes” (mawṣūfa bi-l-ṣifāt),37 which is analogous to saying
“possessor of attributes.” Such grammatical
analysis of the word dhāt is
not always present
in theological texts, but this is most probably because it was so
obvious for Arabic speakers. Thus, dhāt is a contentless word that only
indicates possession of something,
which is in fact fully in line with the idea of the unknowability of the divine
essence: dhāt is unspecifiable in itself and can only be described indirectly by the attributes it possesses.
In order to investigate the place of jamāl and ḥusn in Rūzbihān’s understanding of God, it helps to understand the
close relationship between
divine attributes and divine names. Both attributes and names describe the divine essence,
and the difference between
the two is grammatical. While
divine attri- butes take the form of substantives (e.g., life, power, and maj- esty), divine names appear as adjectives, e.g., the Living (al-ḥayy) and the Majestic (al-jalīl); or as active
participles, for example,
the Powerful (al-qādir), the Exalter (al-rāfiʿ), and the Abaser (al-khāfiḍ); or as nouns,
for example, the Light (al-nūr)
and God (Allāh). In short, divine
attributes are the qualities designated by the divine names
that have come in the Qurʾān.
For this reason, if God is said to possess
ninety-nine names, these names designate
ninety-nine attributes at the same time.
At the beginning of Masālik al-tawḥīd,
Rūzbihān introduces seven attributes of God in the following order: knowledge,
power, hearing, sight, speech, life, and desire.38 In the second
chapter of the Masālik, entitled “The Second
Pole: On the Knowledge of the Attributes,”39
Rūzbihān discusses each of these seven attributes in detail while supporting
his exposi- tion with relevant passages
from the Qurʾān and Ḥadīth.
Since the affirmation of the distinct and eternal existence of these seven attributes of God is one of the centerpieces of early Ashʿarite
theology in contradistinction to Muʿtazilism, which denied their eternal existence, Rūzbihān’s presentation of divine attributes in the Masālik is also limited to those seven
attributes typically discussed
by the Ashʿarites. The above seven attributes are what Ashʿarites call “attributes of the
essence” (ṣifāt al-dhāt) or “essential attributes” (ṣifāt dhātiyya), which they contrast with another category of attributes called “the attributes of the act” (ṣifāt al-fiʿl), which will be discussed
later.
In the Masālik,
Rūzbihān’s subscription to Ashʿarism becomes clear from such statements as:
“These [seven] attri- butes are in His essence beginninglessly and endlessly (azali- yyatan abadiyyatan),”40
by which he opposes the Muʿtazilite denial of the existence of divine attributes. Muʿtazilites denied the
existence of divine attributes in distinction to the divine essence, arguing
that affirming their existence would imply multiplicity in God’s being,
which contradicts the principle of God’s
oneness. The Ashʿarite
response to this criticism was to
say that the attributes are neither the essence nor other than the essence (lā hiya huwa wa-lā ghayruhu).41
In the Masālik Rūzbihān criticizes Muʿtazilites
multiple times, and the main purpose of its second chapter seems to be to
counter the Muʿtazilite denial of the existence of divine attributes by taking
up the Ashʿarite position on the matter.
While these seven attributes are the most
commonly dis- cussed, Ashʿarites did
not necessarily limit their discussion of the attributes of the essence to
seven. For instance, some Ashʿarites (including al-Ashʿarī himself) consider subsistence
(baqāʾ) as the eighth essential
attribute.42 Moreover, the Ashʿarites accept those anthropomorphic
attributes men- tioned in the Qurʾān, such as “hand,”
“face,” and “foot”
also as essential attributes therefore eternal. In the Mashrab, Rūzbihān confirms,
“Hand is one of the specific attributes of the
essence and is beginningless and endless and is the quarry
of power.”43 In the subsequent two sections he also confirms God’s “foot” and “face”
as attributes of the essence.44 These anthropomorphic attributes are also
called “revealed attri- butes,” for they are the attributes of God confirmed by
the Qurʾān.45
While Masālik al-tawḥīd contains Rūzbihān’s most focused discussion of divine attributes, it is certainly
not the only place
where he analyzes them. For example, in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, a much longer Arabic work, Rūzbihān gives
a more extensive treatment of the subject than in the Masālik. At the beginning
of the book’s sixteenth chapter,
he explains the seven essential attributes of God one by one while focusing
on the experience of the human spirit traversing the path to God in the
process of realizing the true meaning of each attribute.46
In his Qurʾān commentary, Rūzbihān discusses
the seven attributes of the essence in association with the six days of creation as described in the
verse, Indeed your Lord is God who
created the heavens and the earth in six days (Q 7:54). He explains that out of the divine essence emerged the divine
attributes, which appeared one by one over the six days of creation
in the order of knowledge, power, hearing, sight, speech, and desire.
Once these six attributes became manifest, God completed the process of creating the world by manifesting the seventh attri- bute, life. This is analogous to
the process of creating Adam, which is completed
by God’s breathing
of the living spirit into clay. Rūzbihān writes,
Each of His
days is the manifestation of one of His attributes from the rising place of
eternity. Each arises in nonexistence so that a temporal being may come to be.
These six days were the manifestation of six of His attributes. The first was knowledge, the second power, the third hearing, the
fourth sight, the fifth speech, and the sixth desire. Things
were
perfected through
the manifestation of the lights of the six attributes. When He
completed them, the temporally originated things became like Adam’s body
without a spirit, which is one of the seven attributes, that is, His eternal,
beginningless, and subsistent life, incomparable with the roaring of breaths,
similarity, and analogy. Hence the things abide through His attributes, which
abide through His essence.47
The attributes of the essence
presented above constitute a cat- egory of the
divine attributes that is contrasted with the attri- butes of the act. The
basic difference between these two categories is that the first designates God
in Himself and the second designates Him in relation to His creation. Thus,
life, which is an attribute of the essence,
designates God regardless of any act He may perform. In
contrast, gentleness and sever- ity, forgivingness and vengefulness, are attributes that become
manifest through His activity.
A second
important difference between the attributes of the essence and the attributes of
the act is that the latter include pairs of complementary qualities such as gentleness and sever-
ity, forgiveness and vengefulness, and exaltation and abase- ment, showing the
two opposing aspects of God’s dynamic relationship with His creation. In
contrast, essential attributes are not accompanied by their opposite qualities:
God has life, knowledge, power, and so on, but never death, ignorance, or
powerlessness. Over the course of time in Muslim intellectual history (especially in
dogmatic theology and Sufism), these two subcategories of the active attributes
came to be referred to as gentle and severe attributes, or beautiful and
majestic attributes.48 Thus, beauty
and majesty are themselves two attri-
butes of God’s act as well as the
names of the above two oppos- ing subcategories of the
attributes of act.
At the beginning of his Qurʾān
commentary, in interpreting
the very first verse of the Qurʾān, In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate, Rūzbihān
analyzes the word “God” (Allāh) in
terms of beauty and majesty. First, he presents the Arabic tetragram, A-L-L-H to stand for five concepts: I-ness
(A: anāniyya), unicity (A: waḥdāniyya), beauty (L: jamāl),
majesty
(L: jalāl),
and He-ness (H: huwiyya). He then calls the middle two concepts—jamāl and jalāl—as “two
attributes” (ṣifatān) of God, by which he is referring to the whole range of the beauti- ful and majestic attributes. He-ness refers to the divine essence,
whose unknowability is highlighted by the use of the third- person
pronoun, He, which grammatically
refers to what is absent, making it a common
choice to symbolize the unknow- able.
Rūzbihān writes, “The [letter] A is
an allusion to the I-ness (anāniyya)
and unicity (waḥdāniyya)….In His name
Allāh there are two Ls: the first is an allusion to beauty (jamāl) and the second to majesty (jalāl). None recognizes these
two attributes except the
possessor of the attributes. The H is
an allusion to His He-ness (huwiyya), which
none recognizes except
He.”49
Names (asmāʾ): God as the Possessor of the Most Beautiful Names (al-asmāʾ al-h. usnā)
Numerous Qurʾānic
verses and ḥadīths refer to various names
of God. On the basis of these, generations of Muslim scholars have compiled
lists of divine names, often varying in
the total number, while the most widely accepted number has been ninety-nine,
largely due to the famous ḥadīth, “To God belong ninety-nine names.”50
Among the key Qurʾānic verses that address
the notion of divine names is Blessed is the
name of thy Lord, possessor of
majesty and generous giving (Q 55:78). The main point Rūzbihān
makes in interpreting this verse is the utter transcendence of God’s essence,
which he expresses by the term majesty (jalāl). Yet at the same time, he maintains that approximate knowledge of
God’s essence is attainable
incrementally by way of His names, qualities, and finally attributes. This is
where Rūzbihān recognizes the dilemma of the human situation: human beings need
divine names to call upon God, yet these names are ultimately inad- equate in
addressing Him. Rūzbihān’s Qurʾān commentary reads:
His saying,
Blessed is the name of thy Lord, possessor of majesty and generous giving (Q
55:78), is what we say about Him whose name is hallowed
beyond the
perception of
imaginings and the allusion of intel- lects,
since His name is a quality, while
the qualities are attributes,
and the attributes abide through the essence.
How would he who is incapable of perceiv-
ing the reality of the name of the eternal object of description attain the
knowledge of the existence of the named? He is more majestic than that thoughts
can comprehend the holiness of His majesty or that formulas of remembrance can
encompass an iota of His qualities. His majesty bewilders the intellects of the recognizers in the fields of His
exaltedness. He drowns the spirits of those who profess oneness in the oceans
of His tremendousness and annihi- lates the secret cores of those who arrive in the lofty mountains of His magnificence.51
The ultimate
inadequacy of the divine names in addressing God is an idea that Rūzbihān, like Sufi teachers
generally, sees as also
underlying the following saying of the Prophet: “I do not count Thy laudations
before Thee; Thou art as Thou hast lauded Thyself.”52 Rūzbihān
writes, “The most eloquent of the
worlds spoke about the reality
of bewilderment and the court- yards of tremendousness: ‘I do not
count Thy laudations before Thee; Thou art as Thou hast lauded Thyself.’ He remem- bered Him by remembering [His] majesty.”53
In other words, even the Prophet, who is the most eloquent human being, had to
declare his incapacity to praise God adequately, for only God is capable of
praising Himself in the true sense. In the above passage, Rūzbihān makes use of
such terms as bewil- derment, tremendousness, and majesty again to allude to
the unfathomable, hidden, and transcendent nature of the divine essence. In his
Ḥadīth commentary, he explains why even the Prophet’s laudation is ultimately
inadequate: it is because
laudation
stems from the fact of being temporally originated and [the Prophet] knows that
laudation by a creature is fitting
only for a creature. He saw the incomparability of the
beginninglessness and said: “I do not count Thy laudation.”…He added [God’s
own] laudation to it because
He knows it but no
one else
does. Then he said, “Thou art as Thou hast lauded Thyself.”54
Rūzbihān thus
emphasizes the unfathomable gap between temporally created beings and the
eternal, uncreated God, a gap that renders
any creature’s naming
and lauding God inad-
equate. In the end,
everything
lauds God according to its capacity, and every rememberer remembers according to the measures of his capability, nature, knowledge, and understanding.
Remembrance of the Real is outside the imaginings of humans, because laudation
and recognitions are without limits. No one has truly lauded Him except He; no one has described
Him with what is proper to Him except
He. All the proph- ets are
incapable of doing that such that the most majestic in capacity and loftiest in position among them said: “I do not count Thy
laudations before Thee; Thou art as Thou hast lauded
Thyself.”55
Another
important Qurʾānic verse on the subject of the divine names is To God belong the most beautiful names, so call upon Him by
them (7:180). In his commentary on
this verse, Rūzbihān subdivides divine names into four categories: (1) the names of
the essence, (2) the names
of the attributes, (3) the names of the
acts, and (4) the specific (khāṣṣa)
names or “the tremendous names” (al-asmāʾ
al-ʿiẓām), which constitute a subcategory of the
names of the essence. The idea of “God’s most tremendous
name” (ism Allāh al-aʿẓam) appears in some ḥadīths, in which
the Prophet explains it as a name “by which if God is called, He answers.”56
Rūzbihān writes,
He described
Himself that He has the names of the essence, the names of the attributes, the
names of the acts, and the specific
names that report the won- ders of His beginningless attributes
to the hearts of the recognizers and that originate from His eternal essence, as He says: And to God belong the most beau- tiful names,
so call upon Him by them. He reported to
the people in
search of those tremendous names that
they will not attain them except through their unveilings. Those names will not
be unveiled to them except through the unveilings of the specific attributes,57
the keys to whose treasury are those names. Those attributes will not be
unveiled except through the unveiling of the essence. Whoever is specified for
these unveilings will be guided to His most tremendous name and be guided
through His light to the meanings of the attributes and the lights of the
essence. If he calls upon Him by [the most tremendous name], he will be
answered.58
Rūzbihān
seems to regard the first three categories of the divine names as commonly
known to people,
while the fourth category is only known
to the elect,59 as its knowledge leads
to the knowledge of the most tremendous name, the secret and powerful
name of God, invoking Him with which is guaran- teed His response. In Mashrab al-arwāḥ Rūzbihān briefly dis- cusses
the most tremendous name of God and argues that it is also the name by which
God calls the human being who has attained all the most beautiful names of God.
“When all the [divine] names, qualities, and attributes are attributed to the
recognizer while he is unified with the lights of the [divine] essence, has become God’s bride in the beauty (jamāl)
of inti- macy, and has become holy in God’s holiness,
the Real names him with His most tremendous name
just as He named Himself with His most tremendous name.”60 It is worth noting that Rūzbihān does not discuss this fourth category
in his pre- sentation of either the divine names or attributes in Masālik al-tawḥīd, which,
as had been pointed out earlier, is a work of
the Ashʿarite dogma. In contrast, in his works
that are not spe-
cifically concerned with Ashʿarite theology,
he talks about the
attributes in a variety of ways, some of which would be beyond
the pale of the standard Ashʿarism.
A further examination of the verse,
To God belong the most
beautiful names (Q
7:180), brings out yet another
key aspect of divine beauty. The word for “most
beautiful” is ḥusnā, which is a superlative from the
adjective ḥasan,
“good-and-beautiful.” What this verse indicates
is that each of the divine names
is the
most beautiful. Now, we might recall that God is the possessor of majestic (jalīl)
and beautiful (jamīl) names and attributes. If God possesses both jamāl and jalāl in
names and attributes and yet each and every one of His names is considered the most
beautiful, it means that the most beautiful names encompass both jamāl and jalāl.61
Figure 3.1 A
Venn diagram showing the interrelationship among jamāl, jalāl,
and ḥusnā/aḥsan
Rūzbihān,
like most other scholars, understands jamāl
as an attribute of God’s act, which is accompanied by its counter- part, jalāl, another attribute of God’s
act. He considers ḥusn an eternal attribute of God’s
essence, as God is good-and-beauti- ful (ḥasan) in Himself, independent of His
acts. Rūzbihān writes in Mashrab al-arwāḥ:
“God’s ḥusn is one of His most spe- cific descriptions”;62 and “Understand
that ḥusn is one of the attributes of
God and is eternal because His essence is eter- nal.”63 Possibly on
the basis of these statements, Corbin asserted that beauty is not just one of
the numerous attributes of God’s act but rather an attribute of His essence.64
This is a logical conclusion also in the light of the fact that God’s ḥusn is not accompanied by its opposite, qubḥ (“ugliness”), which cannot be
attributed to God as it contradicts God’s nature by denoting deficiency and
imperfection, a principle that applies to the rest of the attributes of the
essence.
Summary
In sum, there are multiple senses
to God’s “beauty”: (1) God is the
possessor of ḥusn, which
is an attribute of His essence; (2) God
is the possessor of jamāl, which
is an attribute of His acts,
understood in contrast to jalāl; (3)
God is the possessor of a number of attributes of acts categorized as beautiful (jamāliyya) and contrasted with majestic (jalāliyya); (4) all the names and attributes of God are the most beautiful (ḥusnā); (5) God is the
most beautiful creator (aḥsan
al-khāliqīn), whose creation is also beautiful. Thus,
the transcendent, unfathomable God of There
is nothing like Him (Q
42:11) and Thou shalt not see Me (Q
7:143) is countered by the knowable, approachable
God of To Him belong the most beautiful names (Q
7:180). Rūzbihān understands creation as a gradual
process of divine
self-disclosure (tajallī) out of His unknowable essence, which corresponds to the pro- cess of the unfolding of the Hidden
Treasure by way of the manifestation of the most beautiful (ḥusnā) names, attributes, and acts,
including those of beauty (jamāl) and
majesty. The driving force for God’s creation of the world is God’s love of His
own beauty and His desire for this beauty to be recog- nized rather than
remaining forever hidden and unknown.
The next chapter will shed light
on Rūzbihān’s understand-
ing of the different
degrees to which the divine attributes of ḥusn
and jamāl become manifest in
creation—the domain of divine acts—with a focus on the beauty of the human
being and the world. We will also see how the ḥadīth of the Hidden Treasure connects
to the purpose of human
life in Rūzbihān’s anthropology.
4
The Anthropology and Cosmology of Beauty
Indeed We have created
the human being in the most beautiful stature.
He who made beautiful everything He has created
—Qurʾān 95:4
—Qurʾān 32:7
T
he Qurʾān calls God the most beautiful creator (Q 23:14), which signifies two things: God is
beautiful Himself and what He creates
is also beautiful. The present chapter investi- gates the latter: the beauty of
creation. We have seen in the previous chapter
how God in His love to be recognized begins to
unfold His Hidden
Treasure to show forth His most beauti- ful names and attributes. The
unfolding continues by way of the divine acts, or creation. Key questions to be
addressed in this chapter are: What is the role of beauty in the creation of
the world and human beings? What makes anything beauti- ful? Why is perception of beauty pleasurable? What differenti- ates
divine, human, and cosmic beauty? What purpose does beauty serve
in human life?
In addressing these
questions, the chapter will trace the entire cycle
of created existence, from its
origin to return.
Rūzbihān
presents the cycle of created existence, particu- larly human existence, in terms of the journey
of the spirits
75
from their
creation by way of their embodied life on earth to their eventual return to
God. He enumerates the key stages or stations (maqāmāt) that the spirits may go through in their journey to God in
two of his Arabic works, namely Mashrab
al-arwāḥ and Sayr al-arwāḥ (“The
Journey of the Spirits”). Mashrab
al-arwāḥ contains Rūzbihān’s most elaborate and detailed presentation of
these stations, which he counts as 1,001. In many of these stations, beauty has
an important role to play.
The story of creation coincides
with the story of the Hidden
Treasure. In Sharḥ-i shaṭḥiyyāt, Rūzbihān
explains that this ḥadīth indicates God’s love for His own beauty in eternity,
which is love that extends to His beautiful creation as well. Regarding God’s
love for creation, Rūzbihān distinguishes two kinds: general love and specific
love. He maintains that God’s general love is the driving force for the
creation of all creatures, that is, all divine
acts. In contrast, His specific love is
connected to His essence, and with this specific love God creates the prophets
and saints. The distinction between the general (ʿāmm) and the specific
(khāṣṣ) is a recurring
theme in Rūzbihān’s
discussion of both love and beauty, as will be seen.
When [God]
looked at the act through love, He cre- ated the universe with desire. This
love is general. When He made the lover appear through this love, He looked at
him through the eternal essence. This love is specific. He knows this love from Himself in His eternal knowledge; it is His love
for the proph- ets and the saints. Know that He loves
them, and they love Him [Q 5:54] pertains solely
to eternal attributes. It is incomparable with the tenderness of nature and the changes of temporal origination.
In eternity
He became the lover of His own beauty (jamāl). Inevitably
love, lover, and beloved were one. Since they
are attributes, they do not have the de- fect of temporal origination. When He
became His own lover, He wanted to create a creation so that it would become
the place of His love and gaze,
with- out alienation or intimacy. In His eternity
He created
the spirits
of the lovers and made their eyes see His beauty (jamāl). He taught them that He was their lover before they came to be: “I was a Hidden Trea-
sure so I loved to be recognized.”1
Rūzbihān thus
explains the mechanism of how God and His saints and prophets become mutual
lovers: first God creates them out of love and then displays His beauty to
them, which makes them love God in return.
At the beginning of Sayr
al-arwāḥ, Rūzbihān enumerates the initial
stages of creation, which comes forth from the hidden and unknowable essence in
its process of self-disclosure. At the first disclosure of Himself to
Himself in His hidden essence, God recognizes
His own beauty (jamāl). Out of this
recogni- tion the multiple
attributes emerge. Thereafter begins the pro- cess of creation per se, or
the manifestation of His creative acts: He creates first
His lovers and then the prophets and saints. Finally He creates the world by
issuing the engendering com- mand, Be! (kun), as in the Qurʾānic verse, When He desires a thing, His command
is to say to it “Be!”; then it is (36:82), to which
Rūzbihān alludes by the two letters K and N (which together spell kun).
The command brings everything into existence except human beings, whose
creation requires a more elabo- rate process.
When [God] shone forth from the
rising place of eter- nity and disclosed
Himself to nonexistence through His knowledge, He did not see anything other
than Himself. He marveled at His beauty (jamāl).
His attributes spread apart from one another. Then He brought His lovers into
existence so that they might take pleasure in union with Him and rejoice in His
subsistence. Then He desired to create the spirits of His prophets and saints,
just as He said, “I was a Hidden Treasure, so I loved to be recognized.” Then He scooped up some water from the
ocean of the letters K and N.2
The process
of creation may be better understood if we also examine a parallel passage
in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, where
Rūzbihān
explains how God’s self-disclosure takes place in stages. God discloses Himself
first to His essence in its abso- lute unicity; second to His attributes in
their multitude, which involves the dynamic tension between beauty and majesty;
and finally to His command of
love, “Be!” (Q 36:82). Rūzbihān says that the driving force for God’s creation of
the world is His love (maḥabba) for the beauty
of “the self-disclosure of all the attributes and the essence,” which
directly connects to the wording of both the ḥadīth,
“so I loved (aḥbabtu) to be recog- nized” and the Qurʾānic
verse, the most beautiful (ḥusnā) names. In short, it is God’s
love for the ḥusn of His attributes—which
embrace beautiful (jamīl) and
majestic (jalīl) attributes—that
leads to the creation of the world.
When God
wanted to bring the realm of being into existence, He exalted Himself in His
magnificence and disclosed Himself to His essence through His essence and from
His essence to His attributes, so beauty was subtilized for majesty and majesty
for beauty. He Himself sought from Himself in knowl- edge of eternity the
hiding places that He had rec- ognized from Himself before the known objects.
Desire responded to knowledge, knowledge to contentment, contentment to the
decree, the decree to the ruling property, and the ruling property to the essence. The beauty (ḥusn) of the self-disclosure brought together all the
attributes and the essence in the brilliance of love (maḥabba) such that the All
itself became manifest in the love. He disclosed Himself from the love to the
command, and He disclosed Himself from the command in the K and N, which are among
the names and the qualities. From between the two became manifest a light, and that light became the non-compound
intellect (al-ʿaql al-basīṭ).3
The
“non-compound intellect” that emerges from the light in the above passage seems
to be what the philosophers and Sufis commonly call “the universal intellect” (al-ʿaql al-kullī).
Both “non-compound” (or “simple”) and “universal”
emphasize
the fact that this is a singular
intellect (i.e., not mul-
tiple) and has no parts (i.e., not composite), yet it is the germ of all created reality.
The subsequent stages of creation, namely how
multiple things emerge from the non-compound and sin- gular intellect, are
presented below.
Beauty in the Creation of Human Beings
The Birth of the Spirits
After God
utters the engendering command, “Be!,”
the multi- stage formation of the human being begins. From the non- compound
intellect spirits emerge in all their multiplicity. Rūzbihān describes the
process thus: first there was a com- plete state of equilibrium of the attributes and the essence,
but then there appeared agitation due to “the overpowering force of
eternity. Then the equilibrium became dispersed. God then gathered together the
dispersed things,” and out of them He created the spirits that would eventually
become embodied in human form.4 Once God created
the spirits, He taught or made
them recognize the entirety of His most beautiful names. Rūzbihān writes that
having created the spirits, God then “kept them in the veils of the unseen in
order to make them recognize all the names, attributes, qualities, acts, and the maj- esty
of the essence, and to show them the treasures
of the mar- vels of the eternity of the essence and the wonders of the
subtleties of the attributes, just as He said…‘I was a Hidden Treasure, so I
loved to be recognized.’”5
After the spirits are born in the very first of the 1,001 sta-
tions presented in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, they start enjoying
God’s self-disclosure, which is described by
the subsequent three stations: the
spirits taking pleasure in the direct perception of the divine act (the second station); their finding
the direct self-disclosure of the
divine attributes (the third station); and their vision of the self-disclosure of the divine
essence (the fourth station).6
In the fifth station, the spirits find servant- hood in relation to God. Then the spirits gain preparedness for recognition (the sixth station) and then reach the station of standing still in presence
(the seventh station). It is in the
eighth station
that the spirits
hear the divine address, “Am I not your Lord?” (Q 7:172),7 which is a key Qurʾānic event to which we will turn next. In sum, in the first seven stations
of the spirits’ journey,
the spirits are born and then through
expo- sure to God’s essence and attributes gain the preparedness to encounter God on the Day of the Covenant.
The Day of the Covenant:
The First Manifestation of God’s Beauty, or a Covenant of Love
The notion of the covenant (ʿahd, mīthāq) is a major discussion in
Sufi literature and important in the Qurʾān generally. A key verse reads:
When thy Lord took from the children of Adam, their seed from their loins
and made them testify of themselves, “Am I not your Lord?” they said, “Yea, we testify”—lest you say on the Day of Resurrection, “Indeed, we were
heedless of this” (Q 7:172). Basic Muslim understanding of
this verse is that it indicates human beings’ primordial acknowledgment of God
as their Lord, whom alone they
promise to worship. If we turn to Sufi literature, we find that this covenant—often referred to by Sufis
as ʿahd-i Alast (“the covenant of ‘Am I not?’”)—is a recur- ring theme
and has special significance beyond the simple acknowledgment of monotheism.
Rūzbihān refers to the covenant in various
places in his writings. He often uses the term (divine) address (khiṭāb)8
to refer to it, emphasizing the auditory nature of the event. When he
presents it as constituting the eighth station
in the Mashrab, he writes
that it is an event
in which the spirits hear (samāʿ)
the divine address of “Am I not your Lord?”9 “Audition” (samāʿ) is an
important practice in Sufism, referring to an auditory encounter with God by
way of hearing His words. Audition and vision constitute the two key modes in
which human beings may encounter
God. In Rūzbihān’s view, human audi-
tion of God originates in the covenant, for it was the human spirits’
primordial audition of the divine address.10 For this reason, he sometimes uses the term samāʿ by itself to allude to
the covenant. Audition was the human experience of God’s “address.”
A striking feature
of Rūzbihān’s interpretation of the cove- nant is that he understands it as an occasion at which God
manifested His beauty to the
spirits for the first time. Moreover, since witnessing beauty causes passionate love, he argues
that this in fact was a covenant of passionate love. Humans accepted God not only as their
Lord but also as their
beautiful Beloved. Rūzbihān writes, “The Real unveiled His beauty (jamāl) to the spirits of the passionate
lovers in His first appear- ance after
introducing Himself to them by saying, ‘Am
I not your Lord?’”11; and “He unveiled to [the spirits] the
beauty (jamāl) of [His] majesty, and
spoke to them in a specific address.”12 He also says, “He made [the
spirits] all become passionate lovers of [God’s] beauty and majesty between the
light of [His] attributes and the light
of [His] essence.”13 While Rūzbihān is quite explicit
in presenting the covenant as a cov- enant of love for divine beauty,
he is hardly the first person to associate the event with beauty. For
instance, ʿAyn al-Quḍāt (d. 1131) wrote, “Remember that day on which the beauty
(jamāl) of ‘Am I not your Lord’
was unveiled to you.”14
Rūzbihān further explains that the covenant
was an occa- sion on which God made the spirits recognize Him through the most
beautiful attributes, both the beautiful and the majestic. He writes that the
divine address of “Am I not your Lord?”
was an expression of God’s “making Himself recog- nized to them as well as
self-disclosure to them through the quality of
majesty and beauty (jamāl). When the spirits’ faces became
enraptured in eternity’s face and when they became impassioned after the [divine]
address and the vision of the
beginningless and endless essence, they responded to the Real with ‘Yea’ in love and recognition. This is one of the mean- ings of their immersion in the witnessing of the beauty (jamāl) of His exaltedness, magnificence,
and subsistence.”15 Rūzbihān also writes, “The spirits were immersed
in the oceans of the eternal beauty (jamāl) and became enraptured through the
quality of passionate love in the deserts of recognition.”16
In ʿAbhar
al-ʿāshiqīn, Rūzbihān again discusses the two types of love for God (maḥabbat-i ilāhī): general and specific. General love for God derives
from seeing God’s beauty in creation, which people in general are able to do.
In contrast, specific love belongs
only to the elect, which
originates in their witnessing of God, one of whose occasions is the covenant.
Rūzbihān then applies the distinction between
the general and the specific to his categorization of
God’s attributes and acts.
As for the specific love, it belongs to the
elect after witnessing [God]. The folk of witnessing have three
occasions of witnessing. One occurs to the spirits before the bodies, before
human existence, in the presence of the [divine] glory. When He brought them together, He said to the chieftains of the spirits: “Am I not your Lord?” They
said “Yea” (Q 7:172) vol- untarily. The pleasure of the speech reached them.
They asked for beauty (jamāl) from the Real so that recognition would become complete. The Real took off the veil of invincibility and
presented to them the beauty (jamāl) of the majesty
of the essence. The spirits
of the prophets and saints became drunk from the effect of the listening and the beauty
of the majesty. They fell in
love with the eternal Witness (shāhid)
without any trace of temporal origination. From that friendship (walāyat), their love (maḥabbat) increased in accordance with the degree of divine nurturing, because when
the holy spirits appeared in the earthly form, all became sayers of “Show me”
because of the ancient love-madness.17
The last sentence refers to Abraham
and Moses, both of whom said
“Show me” (arinī)
to God on different occasions
(Q 2:260 and 7:143, respectively) but who, in Rūzbihān’s view, were in the state of intoxication or
love-madness, a subject examined in detail in the next chapter.
It is also worth noting that in the above
passage Rūzbihān presents the divine address as directed at some of the spirits
rather than all: “When He brought them together, He said to the chieftains of the spirits:
‘Am I not your Lord?’” He argues
that the specific love belongs to the elect, and it originates in the divine
speech addressed exclusively to them. This argu- ment is in line with Rūzbihān’s
view that while all human spirits saw God’s first manifestation of beauty on
the Day of the Covenant, only some of them said “Yea” (Q 7:172) in acknowledgment of God as their Lord.18
In sum, the
Day of the Covenant proceeds in the following manner: God addresses the spirits
while disclosing His beauty and majesty to them. The spirits hear that address and see the divine beauty.
Consequently, they come to recog- nize and love God, not just to serve Him as
their Lord. Finally, these human spirits reply to God by saying “Yea” to acknowledge God as their only
Lord and Beloved. This cov- enant further indicates the primordiality of human
love for God, which is a major theme in Sufi literature. A famous example is Aḥmad
Ghazālī’s Sawāniḥ, in which he exten-
sively discusses the beginninglessness of ʿishq
and its rela- tion to ḥusn.19
He also describes the covenant as an occasion for the human spirits to witness
God’s beauty thereby becoming His passionate lovers, which is in agreement with
Rūzbihān’s view.
The Birth of the Human Body
After presenting the primordial witnessing of God’s beauty
at the covenant as the eighth station in the Mashrab, Rūzbihān gives further accounts of the spirits’ witnessing
of God (the ninth to thirteenth stations).20 Thereafter begins the
spirits’ gradual descent to earth, which culminates in the bodily birth of the spirits
or their entrance into the human body. Rūzbihān’s
presentation in the Mashrab is
elaboration on the Qurʾānic account of the bodily formation of human beings,
which is concisely presented by Böwering as follows:
The Qurʾān mentions four stages in the creation of humans…God created the first
human being, Adam, from dust (min turābin,
Q 3:59), procreat- ing human beings through the sperm, shaping them individually to their
complete figure, and finally making them male and female. “[God] cre- ated you
of dust, then of a sperm-drop (min nuṭfa),
then shaped you in the form of a man (rajulan)” (Q 18:37), and “then made you
pairs” (Q 35:11), while other qurʾānic verses state that God created every animal
of water (Q 24:45) and the jinn from a flame of fire (Q 55:15).21
In the Mashrab, the fourteenth station marks
the spirits’ entrance into the realm of sovereignty (malakūt). In the fif- teenth station, they enter the world of form.22 Thereafter, the spirits oversee
the development of the clay, first in the form of
a sperm drop (cf. Q 76:2) in the womb,
then an embryo,
and so on in the subsequent
three stations. In the nineteenth station, the spirits gaze at the “beauty of
the form” (jamāl al-ṣūra), which is
then perfected in the twentieth station.23 Thereafter
the spirits enter the bodily form (the twenty-first station),24 which is a process
described by the verse, I blew into him of My spirit (Q 15:29; 38:72). This
marks the birth of human beings proper; earlier there were only disembodied
spirits and life- less bodies. It must be noted that Mashrab al-arwāḥ focuses on human beings, and Rūzbihān does not discuss how God cre-
ated other creatures such as the jinn and angels.
Blowing of God’s Spirit and Shaping with His Two Hands
Rūzbihān
maintains that God’s blowing of His spirit into the bodily form signifies the
impartation of the full range of the divine attributes, including
those of the essence (one of which is life) and those of the acts
(which encompass beautiful and majestic attributes). He writes, “I blew into him of My spirit, that is, I brought
him into life through My life and spirit, which appeared from the
manifestation of [My] majesty and beauty.”25 He also
writes, “Blowing is the manifestation of the attribute in the act. Do you not see that He says regarding the reality of Adam,
When I shaped him and blew into him of My spirit
(Q 15:29)? The ‘shaping’ [refers
to] the world
of the divine act, while
the ‘blowing’ [refers to] the world of the attribute.”26 Human
existence encompasses two realms: bodily and spiri- tual. The bodily realm is
visible and hence manifests God’s activity, such as “shaping,” while the
spiritual realm pertains to the higher, inner dimension of the human being that
is inseparable from the presence of the divine life and the rest of
the attributes.
Rūzbihān often discusses the verse I blew into him of My
spirit alongside another: I
created with My two hands (Q 38:75). For instance,
in ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, he presents these two verses as constituting the meaning of the ḥadīth,
“God created Adam
in His form.”27 In other words,
he suggests that “God’s form” in which Adam was created consists of the divine
attributes, one group of which is represented by spirit and the other by the two
hands. The first group is the attributes of the essence, one of which is life, symbolized by spirit here.
The other group is
the attributes of the act, which are divided into two types as
discussed in the previous chapter:
beautiful and majestic
attri- butes. As Rūzbihān
writes, “The self-disclosure of the essence is what He said:
I
blew into him of My spirit; the self-disclosure
of the attributes is what He
said: I created with My two hands.”28 Other key verses describing the process of the formation of the human being
are: He formed thee and made your forms beautiful (Q 40:64); He who created thee then shaped thee and balanced thee and composed
thee in whatever form He willed
(Q 82:7–8); and Indeed We have created the human being in the most
beautiful stature (Q 95:4). The root utilized
for describing the beauty of the human form (ṣūra) and stature (taqwīm)
in the above two verses is ḥ-s-n rather than j-m-l.
As already mentioned, j-m-l has a very limited application in
the Qurʾān, whereas ḥusn designates
all-encompassing beauty, including both jamāl and jalāl. Hence,
ḥusn is a more fitting term to
describe the beauty of the human being, for human beauty is nothing but a reflection
of the full range of the divine attri- butes,
which are altogether the most beautiful (ḥusnā).
This point is clear from Rūzbihān’s interpretation of the verse,
“He formed you and then made your
forms beautiful (Q 40:64): for I clothed you with the lights
of My majesty and beauty
(jamāl)
and with My character.”29
Elsewhere,
he comments on the Qurʾānic
notion of creating
and forming the human being: “We
created you through the acts and formed you through the attributes. Also, We
created you through the command then formed you through the man- ifestation of
the self-disclosure of the attributes to you.”30 He thus points out
how the distinction between creating and forming parallels that between
the body and the spirit,
between the act and the attribute, which moreover corresponds to the
distinction between khalq and khuluq, or creation and charac- ter. In other words,
the human being
is made up of a divine act (“Be!”) that engenders the clay and the divine attributes (“cre-
ated with My two hands,” “blew into him of My spirit,” etc.) that
shape,
nurture, and enliven the clay and give it the inner and outer form of beauty.
The foregoing discussion may be sum- marized in the following chart.
Figure 4.1
A diagram showing human
constitution with corresponding Qurʾānic verses
Once human
beings begin their life on earth, this also marks the beginning of their long
journey back to God, which pro- cess takes the rest of the Mashrab for Rūzbihān to explain. Given the primordial covenant of
love that the spirits made with their beautiful God before entering into their
bodies, embodied life is a test of whether they can stay true lovers of God by seeking and finding signs of God’s beauty in the world and in themselves. Whether or not
they have kept the cove- nant will become
clear on the Day of Judgment, a key Qurʾānic event in which beauty and
majesty, according to Rūzbihān, have major roles to play.
The Day of Judgment: Vision
of God’s Beauty or Majesty in the Hereafter
We have seen
in the previous chapter that whether humans can have a vision of God in this
life and/or the next was a topic of major debate among dogmatic theologians in
the early centuries of Islam. Their primary concern
seems to have been whether it was possible to see
God in this life and the next, not what could have happened before this life. As dis- cussed
earlier, Rūzbihān’s presentation of the events on the Day of the Covenant is
clear: humans not only heard but also saw or
witnessed God: on that day, God addressed humans
and disclosed
His beauty to them. Moreover, Rūzbihān affirms the possibility of seeing God in
this life and the next, though this does not imply that he thinks that all
human beings will attain it.
Two key verses that refer to the vision of
God in the afterlife are the following, which describe the Day of Judgment: Some faces on that day shall be radiant, gazing
upon their Lord (Q 75:22– 23) and Some faces on that day shall shine, laughing
and joyous (Q 80:38–39). Rūzbihān comments on the first verse in this manner:
They gaze
upon [God’s] beauty (jamāl). Then their faces come to gaze [upon
it] radiantly, delightedly, and happily. This is due to the beauty (ḥusn) of the self-disclosure of His jamāl.…Had they witnessed Him
face-to-face through the description of maj- esty, tremendousness, and magnificence,
then they would have perished at the first of His assaults, and their faces
would have been baffled.31
With regard
to the second Qurʾānic verse, Some faces
on that day shall shine, laughing and
joyous (Q 80:38–39), Rūzbihān com- ments,
“That is due to the brilliance that reaches [the faces] from gazing at God’s
beauty (jamāl).”32 In
other words, their faces shine with delight because they are now allowed to see
God’s beauty.
In contrast, the Qurʾān describes the state of those who fail
to attain that joyous state like this: Some faces on that day shall be scowling (Q 75:24). This is because
they will be seeing God’s majesty rather than His beauty. Moreover, Rūzbihān
com- ments on the verse,
On that day there
shall be dust on some faces,
overspread with darkness (Q 80:40–41) thus: “Upon them there shall be dust (ghabra)
of separation on the day of meeting; and upon
them there will be darkness (qatara) of the lowliness of the veil and the
darkness of punishment—we seek refuge in God from rebuke.”33 Rūzbihān
then interprets the “dust” as indi- cating three things: distance, darkness,
and separation, follow- ing the commentaries of al-Sarī al-Saqaṭī
(d. 865), Sahl al-Tustarī
(d. 896), and al-Qushayrī (d. 1072), respectively.34 These ideas
point to God’s majesty.
In short, Rūzbihān
maintains that the human story begins with a vision and audition of the
beautiful God and ends with a vision of either the beautiful God or the
majestic God, depending on whether or not people have kept the covenant of love during
their lives on earth. Those who have kept it will
encounter God’s beauty and mercy, and those who have not kept it will face
God’s majesty and wrath. The true test lies between the Covenant of “yesterday” and the Judgment of “tomorrow”: this earthly
existence that they face today. How human beings live today determines how they will re-encounter their Lord after death.
Search for Beauty in the World
Seeing human life as a search
for divine beauty,
Rūzbihān sug- gests that all beauty
found in this world is a reminder
of God’s beauty as witnessed
on the Day of the Covenant. For this reason, there is great benefit in seeking
beauty on all levels, and Rūzbihān encourages people to do so whenever
possible. He points out that in each human being there remains at least a vague
memory of God’s jamāl witnessed on
the Day of the Covenant. In a key passage
in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, he writes,
In everyone
who witnesses [the Unseen], there remains the sweetness of the address of
eternity. When [those who have reached the station of audi- tion] hear any
goodly sound, see and witness any- thing comely and deemed beautiful, or smell
any goodly fragrance in this world,
they will hear it as an
intermediary between the attribute and the essence through the quality of being
prior to any act that emerges from the Real. It is as if one hears from the
Real through the Real. Hence,
every speck of engen-
dered being has a specific
tongue that speaks
to him with the eternal
speech.35
Thus, it
turns out that for those who have reached the advanced station of being able to
recognize God at all times, every aes-
thetic experience—i.e., a sensory encounter with a beautiful
object—is a reminder of the Day of the Covenant as it evokes the same pleasure that they had
experienced in beholding God’s beauty on that day. In other words, every
instance of beauty in the sensible world—be
it a flower, a good smell, or a
handsome face—triggers recollection of the beautiful God along with the
pleasure this brings to its perceiver. Rūzbihān continues, “So, [this eternal
speech] stirs him up away from his own existence toward the subsistence of the
Real through the quality of annihilation [of everything other than Him]. God said, Those who hear the speech and follow the most beautiful of it [Q 39:18].”36 For those who are able to hear God’s speech, that speech is so loud that it
annihilates creation from their awareness, making them turn away from creation
toward God alone, or away
from things’ beauty toward God’s beauty.
Seeking Intimacy with Every Instance of Beauty
There is a term of particular importance in Rūzbihān’s discus- sion of beauty in general: istiʾnās, which means “to seek inti- macy (with something).” In Rūzbihān’s
usage, this verb usually takes as its direct object something beautiful. Rūzbihān
seems to have taken this expression from a saying of an enig- matic early Sufi, Dhū al-Nūn
al-Miṣrī (d. 861), though Rūzbihān does not always mention
the name. For example, in his Ḥadīth commentary, Rūzbihān explains the saying, “I saw my Lord in the most beautiful (aḥsan) form” in this manner: “It was
[the Prophet’s] seeking intimacy with the beautiful (ḥasan) face, just as it has been reported
that he used to love beautiful faces, because ‘Whoever seeks intimacy
with God seeks intimacy with everything comely (malīḥ)
and every handsome
face.’”37 Rūzbihān attributes the last statement to Dhū al-Nūn
in Mashrab al-arwāḥ.38
Dhū al-Nūn’s statement serves as one basis for Rūzbihān’s defense of the
practice of loving beautiful human faces as a commendable activity for Muslims on the example of the prophet Muhammad. Elsewhere, Rūzbihān also
observes rather matter-of-factly that it is natural for every “seeker of inti- macy
to seek intimacy with all things deemed beautiful.”39
In Manṭiq al-asrār Rūzbihān explains that gazing
on beauti- ful faces is
commendable because seeking intimacy with beauty is a sign of strong
yearning for the divine beauty
to
which every
other beauty connects. Moreover, seeking inti- macy with beauty in the world
clarifies human beings’ vision of reality, increasing their capacity to behold divine
beauty. He writes: “Whoever
seeks intimacy with the beauty (jamāl) of the beginninglessness seeks intimacy with the beauty of the forms
of temporal origination by yearning
for the quarry of holiness, because no one knows the degrees
of intimacy with the Real except those who recognize the saying of the master
of human- ity: ‘Gazing at a
beautiful (ḥasan) face increases
sight.’”40 A fuller version of the ḥadīth is mentioned
in ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn:
“Three things increase the power of sight: gazing at greenery, gazing at
beautiful faces, and gazing at flowing water.”41
While interpreting this ḥadīth, Rūzbihān
points out the onto-
logical difference between human beauty and cosmic or natu- ral beauty.
He argues that all creatures are beautiful insofar
as they are divine
acts, which is the general
sort of beauty
given to creation. This
general beauty is the result of God’s “general love” mentioned at the beginning of this chapter;
likewise, the specific beauty is the result of God’s specific
love. Human beings have both general
and specific beauty, the latter of which derives from the light
of God’s essence
and attributes. Since all
divine acts point to divine beauty, looking at them enhances human insight,
which is the ability to recognize reality
beyond appearances, but to a much lesser degree than gazing at beauti- ful human faces does, because they
reveal God’s essence and attributes. Rūzbihān writes,
“In beauty (ḥusn) there is the light
of the specific act in which the light of the essence and attri- butes is
clothed, while in the purity of greenery and flowing water there is the light of the general
act in which the Real man-
ifests the light of the specific act by way of describing Himself.”42
Rūzbihān further comments on the above ḥadīth: “This is from the station of the eye of gathering,
and in this is an allusion
to the station of becoming clothed.”43 “Eye of gathering” is
a term that Rūzbihān uses to indicate the ability to see the created
and the uncreated in a thing
at the same time as if gathering the two in one vision. “Becoming clothed” (iltibās) is a unique term that appears
in his writings. Ernst translates it as “clothing with divinity,” which he contrasts with kashf, or unveiling.44 Ballanfat notes the peculiar significance of iltibās in Rūzbihān’s thought and devotes sixteen
pages of his book to analyzing it.45
He translates the term as amphibolie (as Corbin does) and specu- lates on its etymological connection to talbīs. However, he casts a negative connotation on the term by emphasizing its connec- tion to Iblīs, a connotation that I do not find in Rūzbihān’s use of the term.
I translate the term as “becoming clothed”
to pre- serve the literal
sense of the word. I do not include “divinity” in my translation of the term as Ernst
does, because clothing
seems to work both ways—creation
becoming clothed by God and God becoming clothed
by creation. With regard to the former, Rūzbihān writes, for instance,
“the recognizer is clothed with the brilliance of the beauty (jamāl) of eternity.”46 As for
the latter perspective, he writes, “Do you
not see how Moses fled from his cane when tremendousness was clothed by it?” referring to the episode of his cane turning into a snake.47
Here Rūzbihān takes the cane as the thing by which tremendousness, a word often
referring to the divine essence, was clothed.
It is the human being in possession of the
eye of gathering who is capable of seeing the uncreated Creator clothed by every created
thing, for every instance of sensible beauty is a pointer to
God, the source of all beauty. Since God’s essence and attributes are intangible and too intense
to be seen directly by humans, they appear as veiled or clothed by the human form. At the same time, beautiful human beings are clothed in the divine
essence and attributes. It is the eye of gathering that can perceive
both what is clothed
(God) and what clothes (creation) or both what is clothed (creation) and what clothes (God) simultaneously. The opposite
mode of perception is called the eye of separation (tafriqa), which sees the created apart from the Creator.48
Superiority of Human Beauty over Cosmic Beauty
Rūzbihān
regards human beauty as far superior to cosmic beauty, because the former is a
stronger reflection of divine beauty in that it carries the full range of the
divine attributes. In other words, human beauty is specific beauty, whereas
cosmic beauty is general beauty.
We can see how the tripartite
analysis of God in terms of essence,
attributes, and acts as dis- cussed in the previous
chapter serves as a basis
for Rūzbihān’s examination of
the difference between divine, human, and cosmic beauty.
Because human beings are able to reflect the full range of the divine attributes, it was said, “He who recognizes himself
rec- ognizes his Lord,” the saying commonly attributed to the Prophet to
which Rūzbihān alluded earlier. To know oneself may be sufficient for attaining
knowledge of God because the human being can mirror the full range
of the divine attributes.
The world is a mirror of God, and so are individual human beings. To know God by observing the world
is possible, but one must search through the entire world to discover
the divine attributes scattered
throughout. This suggests
the greater “effi- ciency” of knowing oneself as a path
to knowing God than studying the
entire world. Rūzbihān ascribes to the common notion of the human being as a
microcosm, because “the two worlds are kneaded
within the human
being.” As he writes, “In the creation of the human being and
in beautiful (ḥisān) faces the marks of His power are more than those found in the realm
of being, because the two realms of being and the two worlds are kneaded
within the human
being. Within him [God’s] work is known. If he recognizes himself, he will recognize his Lord.”49
Rūzbihān also points out that although humans can become passionate lovers
of both God and other
humans, they can never become passionate lovers of things. In his view, human beauty is
superior to cosmic beauty not only in that it reveals the beautiful attributes
of God, but also in that it can serve as a window through which passionate
lovers witness and adore the beautiful God. In contrast,
cosmic beauty as found in non-
human creatures can only be objects of due respect as God’s beautiful creatures
for those naive “ascetics,” by which
Rūzbihān seems to mean stiff-minded conservatives who con- demn passionate love of God and the
celebration of human beauty as a
manifestation of divine beauty. They are suspi- cious of passionate love generally because
it is not a Qurʾānic term. They are concerned about the potential harm that it may
bring, such as leading people away from God. Rūzbihān explains the opposite approaches to beauty taken by the ascet-
ics and the passionate lovers in this passage:
As for the difference between
Adamic beauty (nīkūʾī) and non-Adamic beauty among engendered beings and things in this world,
it is that human beauty
(ḥusn)
has the specific
characteristic of the lights
of God’s self-disclosure of the essence, while other things only have beauty
from the freshness of the divine act. The vision of an engendered being is the qibla of ascetics, whereas the face of Adam is the qibla of
the passionate lovers.50
Rūzbihān’s use of the term “specific
characteristic” (khāṣṣiyyat), which derives from the same root as “specific” (khāṣṣ), high- lights Adamic beauty’s connection to the divine
essence, ren- dering it specific beauty rather than general beauty.
Rūzbihān further points out that while human
beauty can cause love, cosmic beauty produces “mere” faith in God devoid of love for Him. In Rūzbihān’s view, this is not enough for the ideal human life: one must
not only have faith in God but also love Him, so that God’s love for humans can be recip- rocated, as the Qurʾān says, He loves them, and they love Him
(Q 5:54). Rūzbihān writes,
The immature
in the Shariah carp at us and say, “The signs of the creation of the heavens
are greater— why do you not look at them?”
Yes indeed, there are
signs in the heavens, and the signs are the path for the tight-hearted in the world. But in Adam’s
face is the emergence
of the sun of the self-disclosure of the
[divine] essence and attributes, because passionate love came out of Adam’s beauty (ḥusn),
while the light of faith came from the mold of the engendered being.51
Rūzbihān’s
contrast between cosmic beauty and human beauty and their association with
faith and love, respectively, are also clear from his argument “the signs
[i.e., the acts] are the locus of faith” but not of love, because “witnessing
the beauty (jamāl) of eternity does not occur in the signs.”52
Another implication of the above
discussion is that the study of
things in the world will not make humans passionate lovers of God, however much they may come to admire God as an
amazing Creator of this complex world. Rūzbihān’s warning toward “the immature
in the Shariah” is firmly based on his ontological analysis of cosmic
and human beauty,
for they fail
to understand
the order of things. The more perfect a thing is, the more beautiful it is, because
it is more similar to God. The more
a thing reflects of God’s beauty, the more admiration and love it deserves. The more admirable and lovable a thing is, the
stronger its attractive force toward the source of all beauty— God. Therefore, Rūzbihān maintains that there is no reason to
restrict human search for beauty in the created domain to non- human objects, ignoring the more
obvious human beauty.
In fact, Rūzbihān argues that looking at
beautiful human faces is a means to finding
God—both His beauty
and majesty. In his
commentary on the ḥadīth, “Seek good in those with beautiful faces,”53 Rūzbihān
writes, “The beauty of the face is the garb of the light of God’s majesty. He garbs it [i.e., beauty] on the face of everyone characterized by His character. Part of His lofty
character is His munificence and generosity, so he who is qualified by His beauty is qualified
by His munificence and generosity.”54 Moreover, this ḥadīth
also means:
Seek the purity of the Real’s
self-disclosure from the beautiful faces, for they are the
locus of the appear- ance of the lights of [God’s] beauty and majesty. Then you
may come to love God by means of His act and you may recognize the realities of
His art in the holy
spirits and pure [bodily] frames. Thus you may attain to the recognition of the
secrets of [God’s] attributes and the realities
of [His] essence.55
Rūzbihān also
comments on a closely related ḥadīth: “Make use of beautiful (ḥisān)
faces and the black pupil, for God is ashamed to chastise a comely face in the
Fire.”56 He further writes, “When God
distinguishes a servant with outer and inner beauty (ḥusn) and clothes him with the clothing of love for Him, He makes
him a niche for the self-disclosure of His beauty and majesty, so His light
appears from his light.”57
Correspondence between Inner and Outer Beauty
Rūzbihān
makes it clear that in speaking of beauty, he is referring not only to physical beauty,
but also to a hidden
cor- respondence between the outer and the inner.
He refers to this
correspondence by using two Arabic terms
that are commonly contrasted: khuluq and khalq, or
character and creation (or physical constitution), which derive from the same
root. He argues that it is because
of the correspondence between a per-
son’s character and creation that the Prophet said, “Let the most beautiful
in face among you lead you, for he is more likely
to be the most beautiful
in character.”58 Rūzbihān writes, “[The Prophet]
explained that beauty (ḥusn) of
character follows upon beauty (ḥusn)
of creation.”59 Thus, outward beauty is understood to be a reflection of inner beauty.
In turn, the inner
beauty of a human being
mirrors divine beauty:
“Whoever has more subtle existence has a finer body, a more noble spirit, and a more precious soul. In his [bodily]
frame, the light of the [divine] quarry is more apparent from his substance.”60
The idea that there is a connection between
inner and outer beauty is also suggested by another ḥadīth: “‘He who prays much
by night—his face is beautiful by day,” on which Rūzbihān comments,
“God discloses Himself
during the night to
those who pray,
and then garbs
their faces with some of His
light. Then their faces become the niche of the lights of the Real’s self-disclosure, with the light
of the [divine] self-disclo-
sure glitters within them. The beauty (ḥusn)
to which he alluded is a garb of the Real’s light.”61
Those Who Know God Are Loved by People
We have already seen that the more beautiful
a thing is, the stronger the
love it causes in its perceiver. Moreover, there is a relationship between
knowledge and love, especially when it comes to God—the more humans know of God, the more they love Him, because
they can see more of His beauty.
Here are some of Rūzbihān’s descriptions of such lovers/knowers of God:
The truthful,
loving recognizer is like roses and sweet basil because his body is created
from the dust of the paradises and his spirit
from the light of
the sovereignty of the All-Merciful. All creatures love
him and all things seek intimacy with him, for people find in him a breeze from the Real, and they
perfume
themselves with his scent. When someone is accepted by the people, their love
for him is an indication of his recognition of God. When some- one is not like that, their
hatred for him is a mark of his
misery—we seek refuge in God! Thus Abū Saʿīd
al-Khudrī reported from the messenger of God: “Shall I not tell you who is the most beloved
to God? They said, “Yes, O messenger of God,” thinking
that he would mention a man. He replied: “Surely the most beloved of you
to God is the most beloved of you to the people.” Then he said,
“Shall I not tell you who is the most hated by God?” We
said, “Yes, O messenger of God,” thinking that he would mention
a man. He replied: “Surely the most hated by God is the most hated of you by the people.” He made us understand that the love that people’s
hearts have for a person is the
testimony to God’s love for him, because hearts incline toward whosoever has
the garb of Lordship, they love whosoever has the reality of recognition, and they see God’s gifts in the features of the recognizers. Indeed, when God loves
a servant, He makes him lovable to the hearts of all creatures from His throne
to the earth.62
If lovers of God are loved by other people, how do these lovers
themselves see others and the world around them? On this, Rūzbihān remarks:
“When the passionate lover’s journey in passionate love is complete, he will
not see anything deemed beautiful without seeing
God’s beauty (ḥusn) within
it. This is why the passionate lover loves the
beauty of every beautiful thing in existence.”63 Earlier,
we saw how Rūzbihān encour- ages the practice of loving and seeking intimacy
with beauti- ful things as a means to advance on the path to God. At the end of
this path, human beings are able to see God’s beauty behind all beautiful things,
as if these things become
transpar- ent. Rūzbihān refers
to this mode of perception by the already mentioned term the eye of gathering. He also uses the term the eye of the spirit in
the same meaning.
One of his poems reads: “Being became the mirror of the
Real and the Real appeared from it. / With the eye of the spirit I gaze at the spirit in the
mirror.”64 Elsewhere, Rūzbihān contrasts the
eye of the spirit with the eye of the intellect. While
the eye of the spirit
sees the beauty of the
Creator, the eye of the intellect sees the created object. Given that he uses
the eye of the spirit synonymously with the eye of gathering, the eye of the intellect can be under- stood to correspond to the eye of
separation.
Rūzbihān further discusses this idea while
commenting on the ḥadīth, “God created Adam
upon His form.”65 In discuss- ing Adam’s beauty, Rūzbihān recognizes
the dilemma of whether to see creation (Adam) as “transparent”—which means to
see only God with the eye of gathering—or to focus on the “opaqueness” of
creation, which hides its Creator. Rūzbihān addresses this issue by calling God
the “Artist” (ṣāniʿ) and His creation
“art” (ṣunʿ). First, he describes the
state in which he was once so overcome with the sheer
creative power of the Creator such that he could only see the Creator,
consequently falling in love with Him. While the eye of the spirit was fixed on
God, his other eye, namely the eye of the intellect was fixated on His creation
instead.
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Figure 4.2 A chart
showing the two inner eyes and the corre- sponding objects of their perception
Note that in the following passage,
“intellect” refers to the par- tial intellect belonging to
individual human beings, which is inferior to the spirit, as opposed to the
universal or non-com- pound intellect discussed
earlier, which is superior to the spir- its as they derive from it. Rūzbihān
writes,
The bird of
the garden of beginninglessness had become hidden in the nest of the acts with
the cur- tain of the art of the pearl. It put on the clothing of We have created the human being in the most beautiful stature (Q 95:4) and was ornamented by the beauty
(jamāl)
of the meaning of “God created Adam upon
His form” in the beauty (ḥusn) of He made your forms beautiful (Q 40:64, 64:3). The art of the Artist
was lost in the Artist. I did not know what a rarity that
was or what that was. Without
choice the eye of my spirit
lingered on that mirror, and the tumult of passionate love overcame me. The eye of the spirit remained on the Artist, and, in unbelief, the eye of the intellect on the artifact (ṣanīʿat). I saw the eternal beauty
(jamāl) with the eye of the
spirit, and the form of Adam with the eye of the intellect. It also took
possession of me and said: “Look at the human world with the human eye.”66
At the end of the above
passage, Rūzbihān warns,
“Look at the human world with the human eye.” The
passage is describing Rūzbihān’s visionary encounter with God, who tells him to
use the sober eye of separation to look at the human world rather than the
intoxicated eye of gathering. This is because the latter induces a state of intoxication in which one would be unable to distinguish between the
created and the uncreated.
In fact, Rūzbihān
is aware of the danger
of being stuck
with either eye. If one is stuck with the eye of separation, one would be incapable
of seeing anything beyond sensible phenomena, which is also problematic for seekers of God.67 His defense of the love of beautiful human faces may
even seem to suggest defense of shāhid-bāzī, literally
meaning “witness-play,” refer- ring
to an often-criticized practice of watching beautiful youths merely to enjoy
the sight of them as manifestations of divine beauty. Later in Muslim history shāhid-bāzī became almost synonymous
with homoeroticism in some circles and was vehemently denounced by jurists and
theologians. Although Rūzbihān does not use the term shāhid-bāzī in his writings, he does use the term shāhid in
a way that is consistent with much of earlier Sufi literature.
For instance, Rūzbihān calls Adam shāhid,
that is, a beautiful being through whom God is witnessed.
Instead of shāhid-bāzī, Henry Corbin uses another term to characterize Rūzbihān’s approach to human beauty:
jamāl-parastī (or zībāʾī-parastī), meaning “adoration of beauty.”68 However, no Sufis who were later thought to belong
to this trend of thought had used the phrase to label themselves in their own times, so this label is hardly perfect, especially since “adoration” may connote “worship,” when the only proper
object of worship is God, as Sufi teachers repeatedly affirm. Rūzbihān would
support the adoration of the “beautiful” inas- much as it reminds one of the divine beauty. Gradually,
one can cultivate the eye to see that divine beauty disclosing itself in all things.
Summary
Rūzbihān’s
distinction between cosmic and human beauty is closely related to his
discussion of God’s essence, attributes, and acts. He argues that cosmos has
general beauty insofar as it is a divine act, a divine
creation. Human beings,
in contrast, have specific
beauty, consisting of the divine
attributes, which in turn
describe the divine essence. However, the degrees of their specific
beauty vary and largely depend
on their effort
in beautifying their souls by eliminating vices or ugly qualities.
Rūzbihān presents the driving force for
God’s creation as the most beautiful creator (Q 23:14) to be His eternal
desire to be recognized, as expressed by the ḥadīth
of the Hidden Treasure.
Beauty creates beautiful things, which seek to return to their origin. In other
words, beauty is the origin and end of human existence as well as the
means of returning to the origin. Hence, becoming
beautiful and finding divine beauty in all things including oneself
are the goal of human life. At the same time,
they constitute the fulfillment of the covenant, because it was a covenant of
love, promising to love only that beautiful God whom human beings witnessed
on that primordial day. If they
want to encounter that beautiful God again in this life and the next, that is
possible only by beautifying their own souls by embodying the full range
of the most beautiful names
of God. This is a task too heavy
for most human
beings without guides on the path. And these guides are the prophets, who
represent the most beautiful class of human beings.
5
The Prophetology of Beauty
Surely you have a beautiful example in God’s messenger.
—Qurʾān 33:21
H
uman beauty is superior to cosmic beauty,
but not all human beauty is equal. At the zenith of human beauty
stand the prophets, who represent
the highest degree of human perfection. Rūzbihān calls the prophets the mirrors of God and argues, “Adam, Joseph, Moses, Jesus,
and Muhammad…are the quarries of the innate human nature of beauty that derives
from the beauty of the beginningless, for God makes His
beauty appear from them in the world. Hence, beauty (ḥusn)
is inherited from them by the people of beauty (jamāl) in this world and the next,
and they are at the center of God’s beauty (ḥusn) in the world.”1 While
all prophets are beautiful, five fig-
ures stand out in Rūzbihān’s discussion: Adam, Joseph,
Abraham, Moses, and Muhammad.2 It is in the discussion of
prophetic beauty that Rūzbihān’s theory of beauty culminates.
The very fact that creation
is a realm of relativity seems to necessitate the variety of “perfections” represented by the multiple prophets. In fact, Rūzbihān’s presentation of each instance of prophetic beauty has a
different emphasis, as will be seen in the present
chapter. Discussion of prophetic beauty is
prominent in Rūzbihān’s writings, which led Henry Corbin to declare “prophetology of beauty” to be one of the six themes
101
that
characterize the stages of inner journey in Rūzbihān’s scheme.3
Adam: The Symbol of Universal Human Beauty
Adam is the first
human being and the first prophet, so he occupies a place of prime importance
in Rūzbihān’s discus- sion of beauty.
Emblematic is the following episode
of Adam’s life in paradise that Rūzbihān recounts:
“Adam toured around paradise and returned to the
[divine] presence, embarrassed. God asked him, ‘What is this embarrassment?’ He
replied, ‘Out of delight
with my beauty (jamāl),
because Thou hast not
created any creature in paradise more beautiful (aḥsan) than I.’”4 Rūzbihān constantly praises and
admires Adam because he represents
the beauty and perfection of the original human state. He emerges as a key figure
in both ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn and Mashrab al-arwāḥ, where Rūzbihān mentions Adam almost as often as Muhammad.
In ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, a work of
about 140 pages, Rūzbihān mentions Adam nearly seventy times. In the very
last and highest station in the spirits’ journey to God, namely the
1,001st station in Mashrab al-arwāḥ,
Rūzbihān pres- ents a crucial discussion of Adam. What is it about Adam that
fascinated Rūzbihān so much? One useful way to examine
this question is to investigate the contrast between Adam and the
angels, discussed extensively in the Qurʾān and often com- mented upon by Rūzbihān.
We saw in the previous chapter that as the
forefather of all humanity Adam symbolizes generic human beauty, for the Qurʾānic term Ādam refers both to Adam as an individual and to
the human being (insān)
generically, though a crucial differ- ence remains: all are human, but
not all are prophets. Most people are beautiful only potentially; their innate
human nature of beauty (fiṭrat al-ḥusn) awaits rediscovery. In contrast,
Adam and other prophets possess beauty in full actuality. In Rūzbihān’s
view, Qurʾānic verses and ḥadīths about Adam simply demonstrate the power of human beauty in full actual- ization. Key to his discussion of Adam’s beauty
is the Qurʾānic episode of God presenting Adam to the angels and command-
ing the latter to prostrate toward him:
When thy Lord
said to the angels, “Indeed, I am placing on earth
a vicegerent,” they said, “Wilt
Thou place therein one who will do corruption there and shed blood,
while we glorify Thee and proclaim Thee holy?” He said, “Indeed, I know what
you do not know.” And He taught Adam the names, all of them. Then He presented
them unto the angels and said, “Now tell Me the names of these, if you speak
truly.” They said, “Glory belongs
to Thee! We have
no knowledge except what Thou hast taught us. Indeed Thou art All-Knowing, All-Wise. He said, “O Adam,
tell them their names.” When he told them their names, He said,
“Did I not tell you that I know
the unseen [things] of the heavens and the earth? I know what you display and
what you were hiding. When We said to the angels, “Prostrate to Adam,” they
prostrated themselves except Iblīs; he refused and waxed proud, so he was one
of the unbelievers. (Q 2:30–34)
In this Qurʾānic episode,
the angels prostrate to Adam because of his knowledge of the names, all of them (Q 2:31), which they lacked. While this verse is often understood to mean that God
taught Adam the names of all things, Rūzbihān also takes it to
mean all the names of God, that is, the most beautiful names of God. He writes, “Adam became more knowledgeable than the
angels because he knew all His most beautiful names, which are the keys to the doors of the treasuries of the [divine]
attributes and the realities of the [divine] essence.”5 He explains elsewhere
that the names that God taught to Adam were such that “in them was
the announcement of all of the essence, attributes, qualities,
and acts. He taught what was and what will be.”6
Rūzbihān maintains
that Adam did not simply
have knowl-
edge of the
divine names, but they were deeply ingrained in his being. In interpreting another verse, Verily God has chosen Adam and Noah (Q 3:33), Rūzbihān
argues that this is what made Adam superior to the angels.
He chose Adam
by the knowledge of the [divine] attributes.
He unveiled the beauty (jamāl) of the
[divine] essence before creating the world in the eter- nity of eternity.
When He wanted to create [Adam’s]
spirit, He looked toward His majesty through His beauty and looked toward His beauty through His majesty. Then from these two looks
appeared Adam’s spirit, which He created with a specific attribute. He blew a
spirit into his spirit, which is the knowledge of the [divine]
attributes….Hence, through these attributes, he has precedence over the noble,
dutiful angels.7
Rūzbihān also
explains that God commanded the angels, “Prostrate to Adam”
(Q 7:11), because
God “disclosed Himself to [the angels] through
the light of His beauty
(jamāl) from the mirror of
Adam’s face.”8 In this process, Adam became “the qibla of the self-disclosure of the attributes and the essence.”9 Therefore, it was not toward Adam’s
humanity that God com-
manded the angels to prostrate; it was toward the divine beauty that was
manifest in Adam. The only creature in this episode that did not prostrate to
Adam at God’s command was Iblīs because, Rūzbihān explains, “he was veiled from
that majesty and beauty by his looking at himself, his making analogy, and his
ignorance.”10
One theme that emerges here is the close
connection between beauty and knowledge or recognition (maʿrifa). The dividing line between
those who prostrated to Adam and Iblīs was whether or not they were able to recognize
God’s beauty and majesty in Adam. Rūzbihān points out this connection more
directly in the following passage: “The difference between things deemed
beautiful and things deemed ugly is that God created what is deemed beautiful
to be a mirror of gentleness and what is deemed
ugly to be a mirror
of severity. Severity came to be the locus of disavowal
(nakarat), and gen-
tleness the locus of recognition.”11 Recognition of reality leads to finding beauty and deeming things
beautiful; disavowal of reality results
in finding ugliness or deeming things ugly. The latter describes Iblīs’s
state in which he refused to bow down to Adam.
Rūzbihān makes a further point: it is wrong
to deem God’s majestic aspect ugly and only His beautiful (jamīl) aspect
beautiful (ḥasan), for they together comprise God’s ḥusn, while there is no ugliness
in God.
If an idle
talker says that what appears in Adam’s face is the same in a face deemed ugly,
then he has not recognized the marvelous innate human nature and the extract of
nearness. Do not listen to his sor- cery, fraud, trickery and meaningless talk,
because it is all nonsense. If he says that [i.e., what appears in Adam’s
face] is apparent
in this [i.e.,
human face deemed ugly],
these are purely
foolish words. Those who profess oneness know that what
is deemed ugly is one of the relative
things, for in eternity itself, there is nothing ugly.
But he [i.e., the idle talker] has supposed that His severe face is
uglier.12
Here the
distinction between jamāl and ḥusn becomes essen- tial, because
Rūzbihān is arguing
that it is the mistaken
identi- fication of God’s jamāl with
ḥusn that leads to another mistaken identification of God’s jalāl with qubḥ. It is true that in the cre- ated realm of relative things, things
deemed ugly may reflect God’s severity, as discussed in the previous quote.
However, in the eternal realm of the absolute, there is nothing but ḥusn, with no room for ugliness, things
deemed ugly, or even things deemed beautiful. This is because absolute
ugliness is by defi-
nition nonexistence, and things deemed beautiful or ugly are relative things,
therefore, do not belong to the realm of the absolute.
Rūzbihān notes that the angels were also
ignorant when they protested to God, saying, “Wilt Thou place therein one who will do corruption and shed
blood, while we glorify Thee by praise and
proclaim Thee holy?” (Q 2:30). He writes, “When [the angels]
did not know God truly and were incapable of perceiving the truth…they were
turned away from the door of Lordship
and God turned them toward Adam…because they were worshipping God in
ignorance.”13 Here Rūzbihān presents the angels as ignorant
worshippers of God. In a more nuanced
presentation of the difference between the angels and human beings who share
Adam’s level of knowl- edge, he writes:
The difference
between the bearing witness (shahāda) of the angels and that of the folk of knowl- edge
among the children of Adam is that
the angels bore witness with respect to certitude and the pos- sessors of
knowledge with respect to witnessing (mushāhada). Also, the testimony
of the angels was from the
vision of the acts, and the testimony of the knowers was from the vision of the attributes. More- over, the testimony of the angels
was from the vision
of tremendousness, but the testimony of the know- ers was from the vision of beauty (jamāl). Hence fear was
born from [the angels’] vision, but hope [was born] from the knowers’ vision.14
Another difference
between the angels and Adam is that
God created the angels to worship Him, but He created Adam to love Him. Rūzbihān
explains that God “did not see any pure lover in the realm of being as He would
have desired. So He placed Adam for the sake of love, because He created the
angels for the sake of worship. Upon consultation with the angels, He made them
recognize that they are empty of love due to their preoccupation with Him by
way of worship.”15 Since love is the inevitable response to seeing
beauty, if the angels do not love God, it is because they are unable to see
God’s beauty.
The idea that the angels are compulsory
worshippers of God who do not know passionate love is a common theme in Sufi literature.
Even though the angels are usually placed above all other creatures in the
hierarchy of being, when con- trasted with the best of human beings—that is, those who have
lived up to their innate nature—the angels become the same as the rest of nonhuman creatures in the
sense that they are all static “end-products” of God’s act of pronouncing “Be!” (Q 36:82), out of which
they emerged. Both the angels
and nonhu- man creatures are
incapable of disobeying God, for which reason they can never move “up” or
“down” in relation to God. They are fixed in their own places, and God will
neither reward nor punish them for their action because they do only what God
commands them to do. They worship God out of compulsion, but never out of love, for love by nature
is
voluntary and
can never be forced. In contrast, human beings constantly fluctuate
in their relation
to God, either
by obeying or disobeying God.
If they do obey, they do so out of love for Him. Rūzbihān shows that it is this possibility of love for God
that puts humans above all other creatures, including the angels.
Adam’s superiority over the angels is clear,
but so is the superiority of the rest of the prophets over the angels. Then
what fascinated Rūzbihān about Adam so much that he praised him much more often
than most other prophets? There seems
to be nothing special about Adam’s beauty, because it is shared by all humanity
in their innate nature. In fact, it is precisely the universality of Adamic
beauty that seems to constitute its unique appeal for Rūzbihān. Adam symbolizes
the original human perfection and beauty that all human beings are able to
rediscover within themselves. Hence, Rūzbihān’s celebration of Adam’s beauty turns out to be the
celebration of the beauty of innate human nature— what he calls fiṭrat al-ḥusn—which is waiting to be
rediscov- ered by each human being. The human quest, then, is to recover the
primordial state in which Adam
existed in the full image of God, embodying all His most beautiful attributes.
When people achieve that state, Rūzbihān says that they become “the second
Adam”16—and that, Rūzbihān seems to suggest, is the goal of human
life.
Joseph: The Beautiful Prophet
The prophet
most commonly associated with the idea of beauty in Islam is undoubtedly Joseph.
The twelfth chapter
of the Qurʾān—Sūrat Yūsuf—is
named after him and devoted
to his story, providing ample evidence for his special beauty, both
external and internal, that is, his attractive physical appearance and moral
uprightness. The significance of Joseph’s beauty is also noted in the Ḥadīth
literature. In line with the Qurʾānic depiction of Joseph as an extremely
beauti- ful human being, Muhammad is reported to have said, “Joseph
was given half of [all] beauty” (shaṭr
al-ḥusn).17 The Qurʾān even calls Sūrat Yūsuf the most beautiful of tales (Q
12:3).
Rūzbihān comments: “How would it
not be the most beautiful of tales?
This tale is eternal without beginning or end. Every beauty (ḥusn) in the world goes back to it, and
every beauty and everything deemed beautiful emerge from it.”18
Rūzbihān’s
most concentrated treatment of Joseph is found
in his Qurʾān commentary on Sūrat Yūsuf, even though the predominant theme
there is not beauty per se but rather love (ʿishq), specifically the love of Jacob and Zulaykhā for Joseph.
This is nothing unusual, as beauty is almost invariably dis- cussed along with
love, and love is a common discussion in Sufi texts, because it designates the
true relationship between human beings and God.19 In ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, Rūzbihān spends more
time praising Adam’s beauty than
Joseph’s, and the same applies to Mashrab
al-arwāḥ, in which he mentions Joseph at various points but usually in
passing. Thus, outside Rūzbihān’s Qurʾān commentary, the figure of Joseph finds
no concentrated treatment in Rūzbihān’s works.
The relative dispersion of Rūzbihān’s discussion of Joseph’s beauty does not undermine his importance for Rūzbihān’s
understanding of prophetic beauty. In fact, he does not shy away from making such striking
statements about Joseph as, “The entire world was not worth a single hair of Joseph”;20 and “our master [Muhammad] said that ‘half of [all] beauty was given’ to Joseph. His beauty (ḥusn) came as miracles
and signs, for in him was the mark of God’s beauty (jamāl).”21 These are
statements that Rūzbihān
makes to highlight
the true worth of
Joseph in contrast to the paltry price (Q 12:20) for which the
caravan sold him as a slave in Egypt.
In interpreting the verse, When Joseph said to his father, “O father, indeed I saw eleven stars, the sun, and the moon
prostrating to me” (Q 12:4),
Rūzbihān writes, “So the sun is like the essence, the moon the attributes, and the
stars the descriptions, quali- ties, and names.”22 Elsewhere
he explains the prostration of the sun, the moon, and the stars to Joseph in this manner:
In the mirror
of his beauty (jamāl) the counte-
nance of the beginningless beauty appeared, so the planets of the heavens of
messengerhood pros- trated to him reverently,
just as the angels did to Adam. This is because both were the Kaʿbas of the
attributes as
well as the rising places of the sun of beginningless things. Because of that,
the sun wor- shippers of eternity prostrated to those two princes of
nonexistence.23
The “sun”
represents God Himself, who is the only proper object of worship and prostration by the creatures. Joseph and Adam were
prostrated to because both displayed the divine attributes, through which the
sun of the divine essence shines forth, even though they are “princes of
nonexistence,” that is, prophets created ex
nihilo by God.
Rūzbihān recognizes that the beauty of both
Joseph and Adam was due to an endowment of the divine
attributes, but he seems to
regard Joseph’s beauty as superior to Adam’s because angels prostrated to Adam, but Jacob and his sons prostrated to Joseph, and prophets are superior to angels.
[Joseph] was
the second Adam because he had the same garb of lordship that Adam had. When
the angels saw what they saw upon Adam, they all pros-
trated to him. However, here noble prophets pros- trated to him, and they are
better than the angels. How should they not prostrate to these two when the
holy lights and the majesty of the gloriousness shine forth from [their] faces?24
From the theological viewpoint, the prostration of creatures to another creature—even a
prophet—poses a problem. Rūzbihān explains
that it happened in the cases of Adam and Joseph because these were instances
of becoming clothed (iltibās). Joseph became
clothed in the divine attributes, which are what Jacob and his sons witnessed,
causing them to prostrate.25
Rūzbihān often discusses Joseph’s beauty as
a mirror. He writes about him, “In the mirror of his beauty
(jamāl) the face of eternal beauty was apparent”;26 “He was the
mirror of the Real’s beauty (ḥusn), and his beauty was an effect of the quar- ries of beginningless beauty.”27
Like the Kaʿba in an earlier passage, the mirror
signifies the locus
of divine self-disclosure. To be a mirror
of God’s beauty
is to be clothed in His beauty: “The beauty (ḥusn)
of the beginningless beauty (jamāl) clothed
[Joseph’s] face,
and in God’s lands he was God’s
mirror from which the Real
disclosed Himself to the worshippers.”28
In the story
as told in Sūrat Yūsuf, the first
person to display intense affection for Joseph was
his father, Jacob. Rūzbihān takes Jacob’s love for Joseph
as an indication of Jacob’s
strong love for God, as he writes about Jacob, “His love (ʿishq) for Joseph was nothing but love
for the Real. Joseph’s beauty (jamāl)
was a means of approach to God’s beauty in love. It was for this reason that
our master [Muhammad] said, ‘[Joseph] was given half of [all] beauty.’”29
Rūzbihān also writes, “[Joseph’s] beauty was from that [divine] beauty, and the
light of the attributes in his creation (khalq)
and character (khuluq) was from that
very perfection [of God].”30
After Joseph was separated from his father by his half-broth- ers’ plot (cf. Q 12:9–18), the first person to discover
Joseph was a water-carrier of the caravan that happened to
pass by the well into which Joseph had been cast. Upon discovering Joseph
in the well, the water-carrier says, “Good
news! Here is a boy” (Q 12:19). Rūzbihān interprets this verse as
meaning, “This is the one through whom eternity is witnessed (shāhid al-qidam).”31 As discussed earlier,
shāhid literally means “wit- ness,” a term that has gained a special
connotation in later Sufi
literature (especially in the Persianate world). It designates a beautiful
person through whom divine beauty can be wit- nessed and contemplated upon.32 Rūzbihān often calls Joseph
a shāhid, for instance, in such
phrase as “Jacob’s passionate love for
that shāhid of God,”33
that is, the person through whom God is
witnessed. However, the water-carrier from the cara- van did not call Joseph a shāhid but merely
referred to him as
“a boy” (ghulām), which certainly does not do justice to either
Joseph’s extreme beauty or his status as a noble prophet. In other words, the
water-carrier did not have full perception of Joseph’s perfect qualities when
he made the above statement. Rūzbihān explains that this is the reason
why the caravan ends up selling
Joseph for a paltry price (Q
12:20): “God had a secret in
Joseph and He concealed His secret from them. If He had unveiled the reality of
what He had put in him, they would have died. Do you not see how they
said, ‘Here is a boy’? If they knew the traces of [divine] power in him, they
would have said, ‘This is a prophet and a righteous man.’”34
Rūzbihān also writes, “When they did not
recognize him through the specific
characteristics of prophecy
and sainthood and did not see
the traces of God’s beauty (jamāl)
upon him, they sold him for a paltry
price (Q 12:20)
due to their ignorance of him and of the treasures of power, the lights of
witnessing, and the divinely-given knowledges of the unseen placed within him.”35
Thus, the connection between beauty and knowledge is again clear: people’s
perception of prophetic beauty depends on their level of understanding.
Another important character in Sūrat Yūsuf
is Zulaykhā, the unnamed wife of the man from Egypt
who buys Joseph in the Qurʾān (the biblical Potiphar), who is attracted to
Joseph. She strikes a good contrast with Jacob, whose particular affection for
Joseph was due to his awareness of prophetic qualities in Joseph. However, Sufi
commentators on the Qurʾān did not hesitate to elevate Zulaykhā’s love for
Joseph to the love of God. This interpretation appears prominently in versions
of the Joseph and Zulaykhā tale in Persian literature culminating in that by Jāmī (d. 1492). Rūzbihān takes a similar
line of argu- ment when he presents Zulaykhā’s passionate love for Joseph
as
coming from a higher origin than shahwa, or sexual appetite. He interprets the verse, She made for him and he would have made for her (Q 12:24), as indicating the inseparability of beauty and love: “Zulaykhā’s passionate love and Joseph’s
beauty (jamāl) are two attributes that stem from two beginningless
quarries, and they are the attributes
of beginningless beauty and begin- ningless
love (maḥabba).”36 Thus, Joseph and Zulaykhā symbol- ize beauty and love, which are joined for eternity
and the inseparability of which is one of the common themes in Sufi literature.
Another group who witness Joseph’s
beauty in Sūrat
Yūsuf are the women of Egypt. Upon seeing Joseph, they proclaim, “God save us! This is no mortal; he is no other than a noble angel”
(Q 12:31). Their calling Joseph a noble
angel indicates their real- ization that
Joseph’s beauty transcends ordinary human beauty, but like the water-carrier,
they failed to see the truth about him: that he was a prophet—neither a mere
young boy nor an angel.
Rūzbihān writes, “They
saw him in the attribute of holy angels…meaning: This is
no person to delude anyone into having sexual
appetite. He is hallowed beyond
our world
because upon him is the garb of the angels [made]
of the beam- ing lights and the divine proof.”37
Part of the evidence that the Egyptian
women noticed some- thing special about Joseph’s
beauty is that they cut their hands upon seeing him: “O possessor of
intellect! Understand that when the female companions of Joseph saw Joseph,
they saw the garb of Lordship upon the locus of servanthood. Hence, upon seeing
him they fell into [the state] in which the angels fell, prostrating to Adam upon seeing
him.”38 Such is the effect of perceiving divine beauty in the
prophets. The fact that the women of Egypt cut their hands highlights their
sense of bewilderment and awe.
Zulaykhā was the only person in the gathering who did not
cut her
hands. By focusing on this fact, Rūzbihān makes another point: Zulaykhā was
superior to the women of Egypt in appreciating Joseph’s beauty, as she was
better prepared to bear the actual
sight of its intensity: “Zulaykhā knew that [the women of
Egypt] were too weak to bear the initial sights of Joseph, his beauty (ḥusn), beauty (jamāl), gentleness, and visage.”39 Since Zulaykhā had
become accustomed to the beauty of Joseph over time, she was not bewildered to
the point of cutting herself with a knife. Here emerges another important fact
about human perception of beauty: one must have the receptivity and
preparedness for bearing its sight. Otherwise one will be bewildered by its
intensity and not be able to perceive it fully.
Just as Adam’s superior beauty and knowledge
caused Iblīs’s envy, which became a major source of the trials of the children of Adam, Joseph’s
beauty became the source of tribu-
lation for him and those around him. Joseph’s beauty was so intense that it
caused diverse reactions: intense affection and love (Jacob), envy (his
half-brothers), passionate love (Zulaykhā), and bewilderment (the women of
Egypt). The complex human attributes and psychological states that arose in
reaction to Joseph’s beauty have no doubt contributed to elevating Sūrat Yūsuf
as one of the most extensively com- mented and elaborated upon sūras in Muslim history.
While there are certain parallels between
the Qurʾānic sto- ries of Adam and
Joseph, one key difference is that Rūzbihān understands Joseph’s beauty to be
special in the sense that it
was not given
to all humans, unlike Adam’s beauty, which lies in each human being’s innate
nature. In contrast to the Adam story, which deals with the human situation across the board, the Joseph story focuses
on his chosenness as a locus of the extraordinary manifestation of divine
beauty. As the intensively beautiful
human being, Joseph’s life becomes the epicenter of the most intense love—one
that eventually transforms his lover into a lover of God in the Sufi retelling.
This seems to be what makes Joseph’s story the “most beau- tiful” of stories.
Moses: The Witness to the Self-Disclosure of the Divine Beauty
For many
Muslim thinkers, the most significant Qurʾānic epi- sode of Moses is his
encounter with God’s self-disclosure (tajallī)
on the mountain. He said, “My Lord, show
me so that I may look upon Thee.” God replied, “Thou shalt not see Me, but look at the mountain. If it stays
firmly in its place, then thou shalt
see Me.” When his Lord disclosed
Himself to the mountain, He made it crumble
into dust, and Moses fell down in a swoon (Q 7:143). According to Rūzbihān, this was not the self-disclosure of
“God” but rather of God’s beauty. He interprets Moses’s request this way: “If You
were to show me Your beauty (jamāl), I would be able to look at You.”
Rūzbihān explains that Moses made this request not because he was unable to see
God. Rather, “every atom of Moses saw God. When his
intoxication became predominant and his yearning increased, the formali- ties of knowledge
fell away from him, and only passionate love remained. Then the tongue of expansion got into motion in search of awareness of the
Reality.”40
God’s reply to Moses’s
request was, “Thou shalt not see Me.”
Rūzbihān explains
that this was the denial
of the possibility for Moses
as a creature to see God’s essence directly. However, God does not simply leave
Moses at that but suggests that he “see” God through the intermediary of
creation, that is, the mountain. Rūzbihān writes, “The Real replied to him
saying, ‘Thou shalt not see Me’—that is, ‘You will not perceive
Me just as I am, because you have the intermediary of temporal
origination
in the midst—even though you have from Me
beginningless eyes and endless sight.’
Then He turned
him over to an intermediary by saying, ‘Look at the mountain.’”41
Note the difference between “looking” (naẓara)
and “seeing” (raʾā): everyone
can look, but only some will see, just as every- one who listens will not necessarily hear (cf.,
Q 7:198). When God
finally disclosed Himself
to the mountain, “Moses saw the
beauty (jamāl) of eternity in the
mirror of the mountain, and then he swooned.”42 Thus, Moses had an indirect vision of God. Rūzbihān
provides another commentary on God’s reply to
Moses, “Thou shalt not see Me but look at the mountain”:
“As long as you are you, you will not see Me through the description of eternity,
subsistence, the assaults of tremendousness, and magnificence. Look at your likeness in the realm of temporal
origination, that is, the mountain.
Look at the mountain, because in you is the defect of temporal origination, and
you will not see Me except through the intermediary
of temporal origination.” So He made the moun- tain a mirror of His acts and
then disclosed Himself through His attribute to His specific act and then to
the mountain. Then Moses saw the beauty of eter- nity in the mirror of the mountain. He fell down in a
swoon, because he reached his goal to the extent of his state. Had He disclosed Himself
solely to Moses, then Moses would have become dust;
and had He disclosed Himself solely to the mountain, the moun-
tain would have been burnt down to the seventh earth, for He disclosed Himself
to the mountain from the source of exaltedness and the glories of beginninglessness.43
There is an
unfathomable gap between the Creator and the created, the eternal and the
temporal. Creatures—even prophets—can never see God in Himself (i.e.,
in His essence) but only His attributes as manifest in creation (i.e.,
divine act). That is why God
disclosed His attribute, beauty, to Moses through the intermediary of a divine
act, that is, the mountain functioning as a mirror. In the preceding
sections on Adam
and Joseph,
we have seen that Rūzbihān calls both Adam
and Joseph “mirrors” of God for others to see God. One difference here is that it is an inanimate object,
the mountain, that serves
as a mirror to display God to Moses (as opposed to Adam for the angels).
Other Qurʾānic verses also indicate Moses’s
connection to beauty, such as, “I threw love upon thee from Me and that thou
mightest be made upon My eyes” (Q 20:39). This is a verse com-
monly cited by Muslim thinkers
primarily to indicate
the con- nection between
Moses and the notion of love. And if God loves Moses, he must be
beautiful. This is a point that Rūzbihān also
makes:
Adam was the qibla of the angels, because he was
God’s means of approach [placed] between Him and His angels, for on him was the garb of His maj- esty and beauty. Thus [the Prophet]
said, “God cre- ated Adam upon His
form,” meaning that He threw upon him the beauty (ḥusn) of His attributes and the light of
witnessing Him. Likewise, God said with regard to the reality of Moses, “I threw love upon thee from Me.” And love is a specific property
of His beginningless
attributes.44
While Moses had a similar function to that of Adam and Joseph in that he was a mirror to display God’s
beauty, Rūzbihān does not
call Moses a qibla because in contrast to Adam and Joseph
he was never an object of prostration in the Qurʾān.
If Adam received his beauty by being created
upon God’s form, then it was God’s throwing love upon Moses that made him beauti- ful. Both the form and the love consist
of the most beautiful
divine attributes. In other words, God’s casting love upon Moses meant endowing
him with the most beautiful attributes.
In discussing the same verse in Mashrab al-arwāḥ, Rūzbihān explains that the “love” (maḥabba) that God cast upon Moses consisted in “comeliness” (malāḥa):
The
recognizer said—God bless his spirit—“Love and
beauty (ḥusn) are two beginningless attributes,
neither of
which emerges in the truthful servant without the other, because there is no
division in the attributes.” This
meaning is well known from God’s speech in which He said concerning His
speaking companion, Moses: I threw love
upon thee from Me and for thee to be made upon My eyes [Q 20:39]. Qurʾān commentators
said, “There is comeliness in your eyes, so no one sees you with- out loving
you.”45
In the above
passage we can also see the recurring theme of the inseparability of love and beauty
and the idea that seeking intimacy (istiʾnās) is a natural
effect of beauty.
In his commen- tary on Q 20:39 in the ʿArāʾis, Rūzbihān
makes the connection with intimacy more explicit:
the verse “means that whoever saw him loved him and sought intimacy with him.”46
In sum, Rūzbihān presents Moses both as a lover of God who seeks a vision of His beauty and as a beautiful
prophet embodying the divine attributes.
Abraham: The Seeker of Intimacy with Divine Beauty
While Rūzbihān
discusses Adam, Joseph,
and Moses as beau-
tiful in themselves, he presents
Abraham primarily as a seeker of
beauty, or to use Rūzbihān’s expressions, a mustaḥsin (liter- ally, “one who deems beautiful”) and a mustaʾnis bi-l-mustaḥsanāt (one
who seeks intimacy
with things deemed beautiful). Rūzbihān’s understanding of him as a mustaḥsin is largely due to the famous Qurʾānic
event of Abraham saying about the stars, moon, and sun, “This is my Lord” (Q 6:76; 6:77; 6:78).
The passage begins with the verse, Thus We were showing Abraham the sovereignty
of the heavens and the earth (Q 6:75). Rūzbihān explains that God “tested
him with the vision of the sovereignty to distract him from witnessing eternity
by the sweetness of seeing it.”47 This was Abraham’s first test,
fol- lowed by the second test:
When night outspread over him, he saw
a star and said, “This is my Lord”
(Q 6:76). Rūzbihān explains that Abraham mistakenly regarded the star as his Lord because
he was
fascinated by the beauty of the star as a divine act. Abraham was then in the station
of “becoming clothed,”
for he saw the star clothed in
divine attributes:
In the same way He tested him at his beginning
with the station of becoming clothed
when the star of the self-disclosure of the light of the specific act became
manifest in the form of Sirius. He gazed at it when the night of testing
outspread over him. Then he saw with the eye of desire the light of
His specific act, whose drinking place is the lights of the attribute. Then he said with the tongue of wonder,
“This is my Lord.”48
In a way, Rūzbihān’s
notion of “becoming clothed” (iltibās)
encompasses the two opposing symbols
of the world as a sign
and a veil (ḥijāb, sitr), pointing
out the ambivalent status of God’s creation that reveals and hides God at the
same time. While the fact it hides and covers up God may be taken as a “bad”
thing for the seekers of God, it is obvious to Rūzbihān that God needs to be veiled
in order to be seen,
for His essence can never be seen directly by creatures. Abraham’s seeing the star
clothed in divine attributes intensifies his wonder and desire for his Lord,
who he realizes is not the star that sets.
The next stage of Abraham’s search for God
is described in the subsequent verse: When he saw the moon rising, he said, “This is my Lord.” But when it set, he said, “If my Lord does not guide me, surely I will be of the people gone astray” (Q 6:77).
At this stage, Abraham sees divine attributes in the moon:
When the night of separation from the first
station outspread over him, the light of the attribute
appeared from the quarry of the essence.
It became manifest
to him in the moon from the light of the specific act. He
looked at it and saw the witnessing of the attribute in the act. Then He said with the tongue of yearning,
“This is my Lord.” Then the turn of
intimate friend- ship turned around him. He nurtured him with the light of
joining and made him reach the station of passionate love. He made him taste
the flavor of the
reality of the joy of his secret core, and his yearning
to seek increase was incited.49
Abraham says “This is my Lord” (Q 6:78) for the third time in reference to the sun. Rūzbihān explains
that the sun here rep- resents the divine essence, manifesting itself in a
divine act:
Then the
lights of the essence appeared in the attri- butes, and the lights
of the attributes and the essence
appeared in the specific acts. Then its lights appeared
in the sun. When his present moment
became limpid and pure and the darkness of the night
of separation was enveloped,
the sun shone upon his moment. So he looked at and saw the witnessing of the
majesty of eternity in the mirror of the sun. Then he spoke with the tongue of passionate
love, “This is my Lord.” So the jealousy of eternity reached him and disen-
gaged him from seeing the intermediaries while see-
ing eternity, for he saw the setting of the signs with the attribute of their annihilation in the tremendous- ness of the lights
of eternity. Then eternity itself
was unveiled to him.50
Through his
encounter with the star, moon, and sun, Abraham underwent a three-stage
transformation from a desirer to a yearner to a passionate lover of God, for he
“spoke with the tongue of passionate love” when he said “This is my Lord” for the third time. Hence, Rūzbihān seems to
maintain that at this third stage, Abraham no longer regarded a created thing
(the sun) as his Lord,
but he was actually seeing
God’s essence when he said
about the sun, “This is my Lord.”
Hence, Abraham declares in the subsequent verse
(Q 6:79): “I have turned my face
to
Him who originated the heavens and the earth, as a man of pure faith. I am not of the idolaters,” which is a declaration of his faith in the one and only God.
Rūzbihān also discusses Abraham’s
threefold vision in
Mashrab al-arwāḥ in the section entitled
“On deeming things beautiful,” because it was Abraham’s deeming
the stars, moon, and sun beautiful that made him
say, “This is my Lord.” The eye that deems things
beautiful is the eye of contentment.
Rūzbihān
writes, “When the eye of contentment is opened in the face of trust
[in God] through
the light of truthfulness, and when the dust of nature is taken away
by the limpidness of sincerity and the light of election, one sees the quiddity of exis-
tence and the beauty of God’s
production appearing from it in all
atoms.”51 Such a person will “deem beautiful
all the things decreed by the unseen in the clothing
of the [divine] acts….For
him the vision of beauty and ugliness
will be equal because he is in [the midst of] the vision of
tremendousness, where the traces of temporally originated things no longer remain,
and the acts of severity and gentleness are equal.”52 As examples of those who are in this state, Rūzbihān
mentions Abraham for saying “This is my
Lord” and Muhammad for saying “Lord, show
us things as they are.”53 In fact, Rūzbihān
writes that the latter saying was Muhammad’s “asking
for what the intimate friend had seen.”54
To deem things beautiful is to transcend the
distinction between jamāl and jalāl and
to see ḥusn in each thing, which is a pointer to the overall beauty and
goodness of God. Those capable of finding
ḥusn in every thing
will be capable
of recog- nizing God behind
each thing. Hence, Rūzbihān concludes, “Deeming things beautiful does not occur
to anyone except one who sees Him who brings things into existence in the
things.”55 As discussed in the previous chapter, there are two
complementary ways of perceiving reality: the eye of gather- ing and the eye of separation. Between the two, it is the eye of
gathering that “sees Him who brings things into existence in the things,”
thereby bringing together
the Creator and the cre- ated
in a single perception. Hence,
the eye of gathering deems things beautiful, and this is the
mode of perception that Abraham had in saying “This is my Lord,”
recognizing God’s ḥusn in the celestial objects.
Elsewhere in the Mashrab al-arwāḥ, Rūzbihān comments on
Abraham’s words,
“This is my Lord,” in the following manner: “This station pertains to the station of being clothed
and the passionate lover’s seeking
intimacy with the vision of the Real in everything that is deemed
beautiful.”56 In other words, the star, moon, and sun were deemed
beautiful by Abraham because they were clothed in the divine attributes and essence.
Since he was able to recognize God in them, he fell in love and
sought
intimacy with them in order to gain access to God. Rūzbihān draws the general
conclusion that people seek inti- macy with everything deemed beautiful because
the thing reflects the divine beauty. As Rūzbihān writes, “What is deemed
beautiful is deemed beautiful due to the appearance of God’s beauty (ḥusn) within it. That is the beauty of His self-disclosure, just as He
disclosed Himself to Moses in the mountain.”57 Similarly, in an account
of his visions Rūzbihān
writes, “I saw Abraham among the mountains where the lights of the star [of] the acts had
arisen, and the acts are the mirror of the self-disclosure of the essence and
the attributes. [Abraham] was seeking
the Real and was saying,
‘This is my Lord.’”58
Rūzbihān also points to a “subtle allusion”
in Abraham’s statement. He writes, “‘This
is my Lord’ is an excuse for the angels and the prophets in their
prostration to Adam and Joseph, because in that case the Real disclosed Himself
from the celestial bodies whose quarries are the [divine] acts, and in this
case the Real disclosed Himself from the attributes.”59 In other
words, since prostrating to what is other than God (i.e., creatures) goes
against the principle of monotheism, if there
is any excuse for the angels to have prostrated to Adam or Jacob to Joseph, it has already been stated by
Abraham: “This is my Lord.” Both Adam
and Joseph were loci of divine self-disclosure, clothed
in the divine attributes.
In interpreting another key verse involving
Abraham, Rūzbihān again presents him as a seeker of beautiful visions of God.
He explains Abraham’s words, “Show me how
Thou bringest the dead back to life” (Q 2:260), as his request for
“beauty (jamāl)
in seeing those through whom God can be witnessed (shawāhid),”60 that is, beautiful creatures in whom
divine beauty is manifest and witnessed. Here Rūzbihān cites Ibn Khafīf as
having said that “the requests by Moses and Abraham were the same except that
Abraham’s was more subtle in beautiful manners when he asked to see the dead
being brought back to life.”61 Nonetheless, both Moses and Abraham
were asking for some vision of God, and their requests were fulfilled to a
certain degree, both by way of an intermediary.
In ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn,
Rūzbihān explains that Abraham made this request
(mentioned in Q 2:260) only after he had seen the sovereignty of the heavens and the earth (Q 6:75). His statement, Show me how Thou bringest the dead back to
life (Q 2:260) was his another attempt at
finding God through observation of the world, having been dissatisfied with his
attempt to find Him in the star,
the moon, and the sun, “because in them there
was no trace of beauty (jamāl).”62 It is worth noting
that this is an alternative reading of the verses about Abraham’s gazing at the
sky, as Qurʾān commentators, not least Rūzbihān, often offer multiple
interpretations of a given verse.
In response to Abraham’s request, “Show me how Thou bringest the dead back to life,” God responds, “Or dost thou not have faith?” (Q 2:260). Rūzbihān
explains that this “answer came because the signs [i.e., all created things, or
the divine acts] are the locus of faith,” but “witnessing the beauty (jamāl)
of eternity does not occur in the signs.”63 Abraham
had faith in God
because he was able to see the world as His act and recog- nize Him as the Creator. However,
Abraham wanted to see more than God’s act—His attribute, and specifically His
beauty. Here, Rūzbihān’s interpretation of the
Abraham story comes close to that of the Moses story, in which Moses
asks God, My Lord, show me so that
I may look upon Thee (Q 7:143).
Later in the same work,
Rūzbihān takes another
perspective and highlights differences between Abraham and Moses. Abraham
asked for an indirect vision of God by way of cre- ation becoming clothed by Him; in contrast, Moses asked for a
direct vision of God. Rūzbihān associates Abraham with sobri-
ety and iltibās, and Moses
with intoxication and “sheer wit- nessing” (mushāhada-yi ṣirf ), by which he means “witnessing of the Real without
intermediary.”64
Although Rūzbihān offers various
interpretations of Abraham’s and Moses’s encounters with God as depicted in the
Qurʾān, he consistently highlights the unbridgeable gap between God and the human being,
the uncreated and the cre- ated. As Rūzbihān writes, “God replied to His intimate friend by saying,
‘Or dost thou not have faith?, for surely you did not perceive Me with the conditions of eternity’s secret,
since you are a created
thing, imprisoned by the qualities of temporal origination.’”65
Muhammad: The Most Beautiful Prophet
How then does
the beauty of Islam’s last and most important prophet compare with that of the
four prophets discussed above? Rūzbihān has no doubts as to Muhammad’s superior
beauty. In one passage, for example, he compares them to indi- cate their different degrees of
beauty: “If Abraham had seen Joseph and Adam, he would have seen in them much
more than what he saw in the celestial bodies.…If all of them had seen the beauty (jamāl) of the master of the prophets and mes-
sengers, they would have fallen
into rapture in the wastelands and deserts.”66
Muhammad’s superior beauty is connected to
his superior knowledge of God, for as mentioned, human beauty entails
experiential knowledge of the divine. Rūzbihān contrasts Adam with Muhammad and
points out that only Muhammad can have a vision of God’s essence.
Adam’s heart
is the closest heart to God except for Muhammad’s heart, so no heart in all of
God’s cre- ation compares to [Muhammad’s] heart, because his heart is the depository of the secret
of the secrets, the realities of the lights,
and the vision
of the sheer essence. The Real did not open up any heart other than
Muhammad’s heart to the God-given knowl- edge, the unknown knowledge, and the
realities of recognition, tawḥīd, unveiling,
witnessing, secrets, and lights, because his heart was the oceans of [divine]
self-disclosure and approach.67
Rūzbihān
highlights the difference between Joseph and Muhammad by associating Joseph’s
beauty with that of the divine attributes and Muhammad’s beauty with that of
the divine essence.
[The Prophet]
said, “God said,
‘O Muhammad, I garbed the
beauty of Joseph’s face with the light of the Footstool, and I garbed the light
of thy face with the light of My Throne.’” God discloses Him- self to the Footstool from the light of His attributes,
and He
discloses Himself to the Throne from the light of His essence. Hence, the
Footstool is illumi- nated by the light of the attributes, and the Throne is illuminated with the light of the
essence.68
In the same passage
he writes, “The light of the Throne
is spe- cific to the beauty
of the master of the messengers and gives him superiority over Joseph. When he
was asked, ‘Are you more beautiful (aḥsan)
or is Joseph?’ He replied, ‘I am comelier (amlaḥ) than Joseph.’”69
Rūzbihān maintains that Muhammad’s superior
beauty is connected to his character, as suggested by the verse, Verily thou art upon a tremendous character (Q 68:4). Rūzbihān
explains: “[T]hat is, ‘I have clothed you with My character. You are upon My character, and My character is tremendous,’”70
for “tre- mendous” is one of the divine names. He then quotes al-Wāsiṭī:
“This is the clothing of the attributes and
being characterized by His character traits.” And, quoting al-Wāsiṭī again,
“God manifested His power in Jesus, His penetration in Āṣaf, and His anger
in Moses’s cane,
while He manifested His character traits
and qualities in Muhammad, as He said, Verily
thou art upon a tremendous
character.”71
On a related
ḥadīth, “Assume the character traits of the All-
Merciful,” Rūzbihān comments:
“This is a description of some- one whom God garbed in the
brilliance of the holiness of the beginningless beauty (jamāl) and the endless majesty before the clay of the mortal human
being came into being.”72 In Rūzbihān’s vocabulary, “to garb” (kasā) means the same as “to clothe”
(albasa) and indicates that a
creature displays God’s attributes. Muhammad is beautiful because God clothed
him with all the most beautiful (ḥusnā) attributes, not least those
of beauty and majesty. No other creature surpassed Muhammad in the
assimilation of the divine attributes, for his spirit was “the closest creature
to God.”73
In Rūzbihān’s presentation, Muhammad’s
superior beauty has a double significance: he is not only the most beautiful
human being, but he also has the most intense
vision of God’s beauty. Rūzbihān discusses the Prophet’s vision
of God in his commentary on the verse, The heart did not swerve in what it saw
(Q 53:11),
explaining that the Prophet saw God’s beauty
with his eye and heart.
God mentioned
the vision of the Prophet’s heart, not the eye, because the vision of the eye
is a secret between him and his Beloved. It was because of jealousy that He did
not mention it, for the vision of the
heart is general, but the vision of the eye- sight is specific. He showed His
beauty (jamāl) to the Prophet
face-to-face, so he saw Him with his eyesight, which had been daubed with the
kohl of the light of His essence and attributes. What God had willed remained
in his vision through seeing face-to-face. All
of his body became merciful eyes, and he saw the Real through them altogether.
Then the vision joined to the heart, and his heart saw
the beauty (jamāl) of the Real and it
saw what he saw with his eye. There was no difference between what he saw with
his eye and what he saw with his heart.74
A ḥadīth of
import for Rūzbihān’s discussion of Muhammad’s vision of God’s beauty is “I saw
my Lord in the most beautiful form.”
Rūzbihān explains this saying in various ways in his writings. In his Ḥadīth
commentary, he says, “This is from excessive love. When the servant loves his Lord, he sees Him in a beautiful form
so as to have the full enjoyment
of witnessing in his vision.”75 In Mashrab al-arwāḥ he argues that when the
Prophet made the above statement he was seeing with the eye of gathering, which
Rūzbihān explains here as “that which sees the lights of the attributes in the
clothing of the acts.”76 Rūzbihān then com- pares the Prophet’s
statement to a Sufi saying, “I have not looked at anything without seeing God
within it,” and the verse, Thou didst not throw when thou threwest,
but God threw (Q 8:17), both of
which indicate the mode of perception dic- tated by the eye of gathering.77
Rūzbihān gives another reading of this ḥadīth
in ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, where he uses it to contrast Muhammad’s state
with those of Abraham and Moses. He writes,
Sobriety in
passionate love was the station of Abra-
ham. For that reason, he made a request in becoming
clothed: My Lord, show me how Thou bringest the dead back to life (Q 2:260). Intoxication was the station
of Moses. He wanted the sheer absolute. He said, My Lord, show me so
that I may look upon Thee (Q 7:143). Both stations
were preserved for Muhammad. In the
station of sobriety, he said, “Show us things as they are.” In the station of
intoxication, he said, “I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form.”…When he
passed beyond temporal origination with the eye of the drunken spirit, he saw
the beginningless being and said, “I do not count Thy laudations.”78
Muhammad is
not only the most beautiful prophet and the most perfect perceiver of God’s beauty,
but he is also the most
passionate lover of beauty. Rūzbihān
cites a number
of ḥadīths to make this point,
including “Gazing at a beautiful face increases sight”79 and its
variants, such as “Greenery and beautiful faces made him marvel”;80
“Three things increase the power of sight: gazing at greenery, gazing at
beautiful faces, and gazing at flowing water”;81 and “Gazing at
faces increases sight; gazing
at greenery and flowing water
increases sight.”82
Rūzbihān explains the last of these sayings
like this: “In the
beauty (ḥusn) [of the face] is the
light of the specific act in which the light of the essence and the attributes
is clothed. In the limpidness of greenery and waters is the light of the gen-
eral act within which the Real discloses
the light of the specific act by its being attributed to
Him.”83 Moreover, he writes, “This is from the station of the eye of
gathering and within it is an allusion
to the station of becoming
clothed.”84 Rūzbihān
understands the Prophet’s love of beautiful things in the world
as an indication of his vision of reality through
the eye of gath- ering and his
recognition of the world as clothed in divine attributes. In other words, the
Prophet saw God in every instance of beauty in the world, so he took pleasure in looking
at beautiful things.
Rūzbihān also discusses another ḥadīth,
“Three things from your world were made lovable
to me: good fragrance
and women,
and my delight is in prayer.”85 He explains that the Prophet “is
seeking the lights of witnessing in the mirror of the attribute of the act—and
here is no accusation of indwelling. Rather, the Real discloses Himself to
those who seek to witness Him in the beautiful and the deemed beauti- ful.”86
Indwelling (ḥulūl), sometimes
translated as incarna- tion, is a heretical belief
that some theologians ascribe to some Sufis. Rūzbihān explains that finding
God’s beauty in a thing does not mean that God “dwells” in the thing. Rather,
it con- stitutes God’s self-disclosure, His showing of Himself, and every
instance of His self-disclosure will be deemed
beautiful.
The Prophet as a lover
of beauty is also indicated by his act of kissing the first fruit of the
season (bākūra), which is men- tioned
in the Ḥadīth literature.87 Rūzbihān writes, “When he saw a first
fruit, he would kiss it and place it upon his eyes. One of the recognizers
said, ‘I have not looked at anything without seeing God in it.’”88
In ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, Rūzbihān
explains further: “His kissing was the spirit’s
contact with the eternal act from love’s appetite. His
putting it upon his eyes was nearness’s wanting nearness.”89 Here
the first fruit is deemed beautiful by the kisser, who is nothing but the
appre- ciator of its beauty and the seeker of intimacy
with the beauti- ful. Rūzbihān explains that kissing a beautiful thing is a natural
reaction for human beings.
In everything deemed beautiful, there
is the effect of that Beauty (ḥusn),
because every particle
of engen- dered being has a spirit from the Real’s act, in which
it is in direct contact with the quality of the attri- butes and the
self-disclosure of the essence. In par- ticular, things deemed beautiful have
no eye except the eye of the Real.
Whatever is closer
to the quarry of beauty (jamāl) is closer to the covenant
of love…. Whatever came forth
newly in the garden of divine decrees from the Beloved, he would immediately
kiss it and place it upon his eyes.90
Rūzbihān also refers to the rose to make a
similar point, in keeping with a saying ascribed
to the Prophet, “The red rose is
from the
splendor of God. Whenever someone wants to look at God’s splendor, let him look
at the red rose.”91 Rūzbihān explains:
This is an allusion
to self-disclosure and the eye of gathering, that is, the
self-disclosure of the Real through the quality of splendor in the Garden, for
the Garden makes the red rose grow. [The Prophet] also said, “The red rose is
the master of the aro- matic plants of the Garden after the myrtle,” for the
lights of the essence’s self-disclosure penetrated the rose.
The Real made it into a mirror for the beauty (ḥusn) of His splendor for the folk of His intimacy and His love. In
the same way the red rose is the most beloved of the aromatic plants to His
friends, so much so that [the Prophet] used to love it, kiss it, place it upon his eyes, and say, “This
is freshly acquainted with its Lord.”92
In sum,
Muhammad is beautiful as a mirror of God, someone clothed in His attributes; he
loves beauty found in things in the world because he can see, with the eye of
gathering, that these things are clothed in God’s beauty; and he loves beauti-
ful things in the world because he sees God’s beauty in them, further enhancing
his ability to see God. It follows that to love beauty
in creation is a commendable practice for humans. To do so is simply to follow the
most perfect human being, who has set down for humankind a beautiful model: Surely you have a beautiful example in
God’s messenger—for those who hope for God and the Last Day, and who remember
God much (Q 33:21).
Rūzbihān’s discussion of beauty culminates
in the proph- ets’ beauty not only because
they are the most beautiful
beings in creation but also because they are the greatest lovers of
beauty, which means the greatest lovers of the beautiful God, the source of all
beauty. By imitating the prophets, human beings can become beautiful themselves
and increase their chances of encountering God’s beauty and gentleness rather
than His majesty and severity
in this life and the next. Love of
beauty is the way of the prophets,
which is nothing
but their
longing for
the divine, with whom they have made the cove- nant of love. This is the
longing famously encapsulated by Rūmī in one of the beginning verses of his Mathnawī:
Whoever
remains far from his origin seeks again for the days of his union.93
Beauty, therefore, is the origin
and the end of human existence.
If human beings live this life beautifully, their beauty will be the means
whereby they return
joyfully to their beautiful God.
NOTES
Introduction
1.
Sharaf al-Dīn Ibrāhīm b. Ṣadr al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad Rūzbihān Thānī, Tuḥfat al-ʿirfān fī dhikr sayyid al-aqṭāb
Rūzbihān, in Muḥammad Taqī Dānishpazhūh, Rūzbihān-nāma (Tehran: Intishārāt-i
Anjuman-i Āthār-i Millī, 1347sh/1969), 110. This passage is discussed in Carl Ernst,
Rūzbihān Baqlī: Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Sainthood in Persian
Sufism (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), 4; and in Henry Corbin, En Islam iranien:
Aspects spirituels et
philosophiques, vol. 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 1971–72), 28.
2.
Edward Farley,
Faith and Beauty: A Theological Aesthetic (Alder- shot: Ashgate, 2001), 117.
3.
Kathleen Raine,
“The Use of the Beautiful,” in Defending
Ancient Springs (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 157.
4.
The editors’
introduction provides a useful survey
of the shifts in scholarly discourse on beauty over the centuries.
5.
As the author
himself notes, Cyrus Zargar’s Sufi
Aesthetics: Beauty, Love, and the Human Form
in the Writings of Ibn ‘Arabi and ‘Iraqi
(Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press, 2011) is not, despite its title, about aesthetics or
beauty as such, but rather about visions of God in a beautiful human form (p.
2), which is a specific discussion in connection with beauty.
6.
The Oxford
Dictionary of Art (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988),
s.v. “Aesthetics.”
7.
The Concise
Oxford Dictionary of Art Terms, ed. Michael Clarke (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001), s.v. “Aesthetics.”
8.
The Oxford
Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Simon Blackburn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), s.v. “Aesthetics.”
9.
Nazif Hoca, “Das arabische Werk Kitāb mašrab al-arwāḥ,” Akten des VII. Kongresses für Arabistik und
Islamwissenschaft, Göttingen,
15. bis 22. August
1974, ed. Albert
Dietrich, Abhandlungen der
129
Akademie der
Wissenschaften in Göttingen, Philologischhis- torische Klasse, Dritte Folge,
no. 98 (Göttingen: Van-denhoeck
und Ruprecht, 1976), 211.
10.
Henry Corbin
is one of the first Western scholars to discuss this term. See Corbin, “Introduction,” in Le jasmin des fidèles d’amour; Kitâb-e ‘abhar al-‘âshiqîn,
ed. H. Corbin and M. Muʿīn (Tehran: Département d’iranologie de l’Institut
franco-iranien 1958), 6ff.
11.
The best
resource to familiarize oneself with representative texts from these authors isʿAlī
Akbar Afrāsiyābpūr’s Zībāʾī-parastī dar ʿirfān-i islāmī (Tehran: Intishārāt-i
Ṭahūrī, 1380sh/2001).
12.
Cf. Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī: Mysticism and the Rhetoric of Saint- hood in Persian Sufism (Richmond:
Curzon, 1996), 1–2; Firoozeh Papan-Matin, The
Unveiling of Secrets Kashf al-Asrār:
The Vision- ary Autobiography of Rūzbihān al-Baqlī (1128–1209 A.D.) (Leiden:
Brill, 2006), 5–6.
13. Rūzbihān,
Kashf al-asrār, ed. Papan-Matin, in The
Unveiling of Secrets, 7–10; Ernst, trans., The Unveiling of Secrets: Diary of a Sufi Master (Chapel Hill:
Parvardigar Press, 1997), 9–11; Ernst, Rūzbihān
Baqlī, 2; Paul Ballanfat, “Une mystique de la ruse: Re- marques sur la
pensée de Rûzbehân Baqlî Shîrâzî,”in Quatre
traités inédits de Rûzbehân Baqlî Shîrâzî (Tehran: Institut français de
recherche en Iran, 1998), 58–59.
14. Ballanfat, Quatre traités, 64.
15. Ibid. Cf. Ernst, Rūzbihān
Baqlī, 12n5.
16. Papan-Matin, The Unveiling
of Secrets, 6; Ballanfat, Quatre
traités, 68–70. His trip to Alexandria is
disputed. See Papan-Matin, The Unveiling
of Secrets, 6n6.
17.
Ballanfat, Quatre traités, 71.
18.
Ibid., 72–73.
19.
Ibid., 75.
20. Ernst has compiled
a handy list of works attributed to Rūzbihān
in “Appendix A: The Writings of Rūzbihān Baqlī:
A Checklist,” in Rūzbihān Baqlī, 151–59.
21.
An English
translation of various
passages from Mashrab
al-arwāḥ can be found in Javad Nurbakhsh, Sufi Symbolism: The Nurbakhsh Encyclopedia of Sufi Terminology, 16
vols. (London: Khanqah-i Nimatullahi Publications, 1987–).
22.
Cf.
Massignon’s edition of Kitāb al-ṭawāsīn by
al-Ḥallāj (Paris: Libraire Paul Geuthner, 1913).
23.
Wladimir Ivanow, “A Biography of
Ruzbihan al-Baqli.” Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal N.S. XXIV (1928):
353–61; “More on Biography of Ruzbihan al-Baqli.” Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic
Society VII (1931): 1–7.
24.
Muḥammad Taqī
Dānishpazhūh, Rūzbihān-nāma (Tehran:
Intishārāt-i Anjuman-i Āthār-i Millī, 1347sh/1969).
25.
Paul Nwyia, ed., “Waqāʾiʿ al-Shaykh Rūzbihān al-Baqlī al-Shīrāzī: Muqtaṭafāt min kitāb Kashf al-asrār wa mukāshafat al-anwār,” al-Mashriq LXIV, no. 4–5 (1970): 385–406. For a brief overview
of the scholarship until 1996, see Ernst, Rūzbihān
Baqlī, xi–xiii.
26.
Corbin and Muʿīn,
eds., Le jasmin des fidèles d’amour;
Kitâb-e ‘abhar al-‘âshiqîn (Tehran: Département d’iranologie de l’Institut
franco-iranien 1958).
27.
In Henry
Corbin, ed., Commentaire sur les
paradoxes des soufis (Sharh-e Shathîyât) (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1966).
28.
Nazif Hoca, ed., Rūzbihān al-Baḳlī ve Kitāb Kaṣf al-asrār’ı
ile Farsça bāzi Šiirleri (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1971).
29.
Nazif Hoca, ed., Kitāb maşrab al-arvāḥ va huva’l-maşhūr
bi-hazār u yak maḳām (bi-alfi maḳāmin
va maḳāmin) (Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaasi, 1974).
30.
Jawād Nūrbakhsh,
ed., ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn (Tehran:
Intishārāt-i Yaldā-Qalam, 1380/2001).
31.
Jawād Nūrbakhsh, ed., Risālat al-quds wa risāla-yi ghalaṭāt al-sālikīn (Tehran: Khānqāh-i
Niʿmat Allāhī, 1351sh/1972).
32. Dānishpazhūh, Rūzbihān-nāma (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Anjuman-i
Āthār-i Millī, 1347sh/1969).
33. See for example Schimmel’s Mystical Dimensions of Islam
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1975).
34. See Ballanfat, ed., Quatre traités.
35.
Le dévoilement des secrets et les apparitions des lumières: Journal spirituel du maître de Shîrâz (Paris: Seuil, 1996). Ernst published
his English translation of Kashf al-asrār
at around the same time in The
Unveiling of Secrets: Diary of a Sufi Master (Chapel Hill: Parvardigar
Press, 1997).
36. See chapter 5 of Ballanfat’s introduction to Quatre traités.
Chapter 1. Discourse on Beauty
1.
Cf. Muslim, Kitāb al-ṣaḥīḥ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya,
1992), 2.74; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, Musnad al-imām Aḥmad (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth
al-ʿArabī, n.d.), V.120, V.121, V.149.
2.
Cf. Valérie
Gonzalez, Beauty and Islam: Aesthetics in Islamic Art and Architecture (New York: I. B.
Tauris, 2001), 19–25. Jamal Elias has an extensive discussion of Ibn
al-Haytham’s aesthetic theory in Aisha’s
Cushion: Religious Art, Perception, and Practice
in Islam (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2012), 156–60. Ḥasan Bulkhārī presents the notion of
beauty in optics accord- ing to Ibn
al-Haytham and Kamāl al-Dīn Fārisī in Maʿnā
wa mafhūm-i zībāʾī dar al-Manāẓir wa Tanqīḥ al-manāẓir (Tehran: Farhangistān-i
Hunar, 1387sh/2008).
3.
Deborah Black,
“Aesthetics in Islamic
philosophy,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.rep.routledge.com/
article/H020 (accessed May 6, 2016).
4.
Aaron W.
Hughes, “‘God Is Beautiful and Loves Beauty’: The Role of Aesthetics in Medieval Islamic and Jewish
Philosophy,” in The Texture of the Divine:
Imagination in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Thought (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 2004), 161.
5.
Al-Fārābī, Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: Abū Naṣr
al-Fārābī’s Mabādiʾ ārāʾ ahl al-madīna al-fāḍila, trans. R. Walzer (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985), 83–85.
6. Al-Fārābī, Perfect State, 85.
7.
Ibn Sīnā, al-Najāt, ed. M. Fakhrī (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq
al-Jadīda, 1985), 281. Gonzalez
discusses this passage
in Beauty and Islam, 15.
8. Al-Ghazālī,
Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifa, n.d.),
4.299.
Richard Ettinghausen discusses a parallel passage in Kīmīyā-yi saʿādat in “Al-Ghazzālī on Beauty,” Art and Thought: Issued in Honour of Dr. Ananda K. Coomaraswamy on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday, ed. K. Bharatha
Iyer (London: Luzac,
1947),
163. For
further discussion of al-Ghazālī’s view on beauty, see Carole Hillenbrand,
“Some Aspects of al-Ghazālī’s Views on Beauty,” in Gott ist schön und Er liebt die Schönheit: Festschrift für Annemarie Schimmel zum 7. April 1992 dargebracht von Schül- ern, Freunden und Kollegen, ed. Alma
Giese and J. Christoph Bürgel (Bern: Peter Lang, 1994), 249–65; Jamal Elias, Aisha’s Cushion, 162–68; and Binyamin
Abrahamov, Divine Love in Is- lamic Mysticism: The Teachings of al-Ghazâlî and al-Dabbâgh (Lon- don: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 47–56. Abrahamov argues that Ibn al-Dabbāgh, the author of Kitāb mashāriq anwār al-qulūb wa-mafātīḥ
asrār al-ghuyūb, largely follows al-Ghazālī’s under- standing of beauty
though with some points of divergence; for Ibn
al-Dabbāgh’s view on beauty’s connection to perfection and
pleasure, see Abrahamov, Divine Love,
105–13.
9.
For a history of Muslim writings
on the divine names, see Daniel Gimaret, Les noms divins en Islam: Exégèse
lexicographique et théologique (Paris: Les editions du cref, 1988). For a general
survey on the subject, see J. W. Redhouse, On
“the Most Comely
Names,” i.e. The Laudatory Epithets, or The Titles of Praise,
Be- stowed on God in the Qurʾān or by Muslim Writers (London: Trüb- ner, 1880).
10. For details see chapter 3.
11.
Cf., Parwīz Sulaymānī, “Jalāl wa jamāl,” Dānishnāma-yi jahān-i islām [The Encyclopedia of the world of Islam], ed. Ghulām Riḍā Ḥaddād ʿĀdil, et al. (Tehran: Bunyād-i
Dāʾirat al-Maʿārif-i Islāmī,
1996–present), vol. 10, #442, http://rch.ac.ir/article/ Details/9813.
12.
Ibn Sīnā, The Metaphysics of the Healing:
A Parallel English-Arabic Text, trans. M. E. Marmura
(Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 2005), 291. Al-Fārābī’s analysis of the
divine attributes such as life, knowledge, etc., can be found in Perfect State, chap- ter 1, 57ff.
13.
See Amnon
Shiloah, The Epistle on Music of the
Ikhwan al-Safa (Baghdad, 10th century)
(Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Fine Arts, School of Jewish Studies, 1978).
14.
Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Safāʾ wa-Khullān al-Wafāʾ,
ed. Buṭrus al-Bustānī (Beirut: Muʾassasat al-ʿIlmī
li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 2005), vol. 1, 201. Cf. Hughes, Texture of the Divine, 163; Shiloah,
The Epistle on Music, 69.
15. Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ, Rasāʾil Ikhwān al-Safāʾ, vol. 1, 201.
16.
Plotinus, Plotinus, vol. 1 (Ennead I.
1–9), trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1966), 235. It must be noted, however, that the Ennead I did not form part of the Plo- tinian corpus that was available in medieval Arabic
translation.
17.
It is worth
noting that Plotinus describes the experience of hu- man encounter with
something ugly as finding something to be “out of tune.” Cf. Plotinus, Plotinus, vol. 1, 235 (Ennead I.6.2).
18.
Though not
considered as “sound” by Ḥadīth scholars, this divine saying is quoted
frequently in Sufi and other texts. A major Sunni scholar, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1209), for
instance, mentions it in Tafsīr al-Rāzī (Dār
Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī), 28.188 (in his commentary on the verse Q 51:56).
19.
Rashīd al-Dīn
Maybudī, Kashf al-asrār wa-ʿuddat
al-abrār, ed. ʿAlī Aṣghar Ḥikmat (Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1381sh/2002), vol. 5,
668 (Q 18:13).
20.
Al-Ghazālī, al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ maʿānī asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā, ed. Fadlou Shehadi (Beirut: Dār
al-Mashriq, 1971), 162. See also its fourth chapter, which is
called “Explaining that the ser- vant’s perfection and happiness lie in being
characterized by the character traits
of God and adorned by the meanings
of His attributes and His
names in the measure that can be conceived
of for him,” ibid., 42. I translate words derived from the Arabic root ʿ-r-f consistently as follows: “to recognize” (ʿarafa), “recog- nition” (maʿrifa), and “recognizer” (ʿārif). I am fully aware of some scholars’ criticism against using “recognition,” a term less commonly used than “gnosis”
to translate maʿrifa. The truth is that
no perfect translation exists for this critical term in Sufism. I prefer to use “recognition” to
“gnosis” to avoid the latter’s two key problems: being suggestive of Gnosticism, which
is a separate tradition, and the lack of a verbal form to translate ʿarafa, which makes one bound to use two
etymologically un- related English words to translate ʿarafa and maʿrifa. In the end, it is a question of translation
philosophy: some prefer to alter the translation of a single term depending
on the context; some prefer to stick to a single translation for each term for the sake of consistency. Each method has its advantages and disadvantag- es, and I belong to the second camp. I translate
ʿilm as “knowl- edge” and maʿrifa as “recognition” throughout this book. While ʿārif was a synonym for a Sufi (i.e., someone who has maʿrifa) during Rūzbihān’s time, it came
to acquire different connota- tions over the subsequent centuries. For the
history of its re- lated terms, ʿirfān and
taṣawwuf, and the polemics
surrounding them, see Ata Anzali’s forthcoming work, Mysticism in Iran: The Safavid Roots of a
Modern Concept (University of South Carolina Press). Also, for Chittick’s rationale for translating maʿrifa as “recognition,” see his
Divine Love: Islamic Literature and the
Path to God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 230–32.
21. Ibn Sīnā, Risāla fī al-ʿishq, in Traités mystiques d’Abū ʿAlī al-Ḥusain ibn ʿAbdallāh ibn Sīnā ou d’Avicenne, ed. August
Ferdinand Meh- ren (Frankfurt
am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic- Islamic Science, 1999), 3:5–22;
Emil L. Fackenheim, “A Treatise on Love
by Ibn Sina,” Mediaeval Studies 7
(1945): 215–25.
22. Black, “Aesthetics in Islamic philosophy.”
23.
Aḥmad Ghazālī,
Sawāniḥ, in Majmūʿa-yi āthār-i fārsī-yi Aḥmad Ghazzālī (ʿārif-i mutawaffā-yi 520
A.H.), ed. Aḥmad Mujāhid (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 1370sh/1991), 135.
Cf. Pour- javady, Sawāniḥ: Inspirations
from the World of Pure Sprits, the Oldest Persian Sufi Treatise on Love (London:
KPI, 1986), 33; Hellmut Ritter, The Ocean
of the Soul: Man, the World, and God in the Stories
of Farīd al-Dīn
ʿAṭṭār, trans. O’Kane
(Leiden: Brill, 2003), 416;
Joseph Lumbard, “Aḥmad al-Ghazālī (d. 517/1123
or 520/1126) and the Metaphysics of Love,” PhD disserta-
tion (Yale University, 2003), 275. Ḥishmat-Allāh Riyāḍī pres- ents Aḥmad Ghazālī’s view on love and beauty
in relation to
various other
Sufis’ views on the subject in Āyat-i
ḥusn wa ʿishq, 2 vols. (Tehran: Ḥaqīqat, 1381sh/2002), see esp. vol. 1, 195ff.
24. Al-Fārābī, Perfect State, 85.
25. Ibid.
26.
Ibn Sīnā,
al-Najāt, 282. Gonzalez discusses this passage in Beau- ty and Islam, 15.
27.
Shihāb al-Dīn
Yaḥyā Suhrawardī, “On the Reality of Love,” trans. W. M. Thackston, The Philosophical Allegories and Mystical Treatises (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 1999), 58–76.
28. Michael Sells, Approaching the Qurʾān: The Early
Revelations
(Ashland: White Cloud Press, 1999), 23.
Chapter 2. The Language of Beauty
1.
Annemarie Schimmel, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1975), 298. To demonstrate her point of the impossibility of translating Rūzbihān’s flowery language, Schimmel provides a sample translation of Rūzbihān’s
Persian work, Sharḥ-i
shaṭḥiyyāt: “Look well, for the heart is the marketplace of His love, and there the
rose of Adam on the branch of Love is from the color of manifestation [tajallī] of His Rose. When the nightingale ‘spirit’ becomes intoxicated by this rose, he will hear with the ear of the soul the song of the bird of Alast [‘Am I not your Lord?’]
in the fountainplace of preeternity.”
2.
Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī, 10.
3.
Cf. ibid. I
have modified his wording (“in the state of overpow- ering and ecstasy”) here in accordance with a newer edition
of Jāmī’s Nafaḥāt al-uns, ed. Maḥmūd ʿĀbidī
(Tehran: Sukhan, 1386sh/2007), 261. Ernst’s own assessment of Rūzbihān’s
“elliptical style”—with a special attention to the question of “fidelity” and “infidelity” in Rūzbihān’s writings—can be found in his Words of
Ecstasy in Sufism (Albany: State Univer- sity of New York Press, 1985),
esp. 85–94. There, Ernst notes that Rūzbihān’s difficult language is partly
responsible for the limited general circulation of his works: “His works were
less commonly read than `Ayn al-Qudat’s because of their greater difficulty, but they were influential among
learned Sufis,” 85.
4.
Ibn Fāris, Tartīb maqāyīs al-lugha (Tehran: Pazhūhishgāh-i
Ḥawza wa Dānishgāh, 1387sh/2007), s.v. ḥusn;
Al-Jawharī, Tāj al-lugha
wa-siḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyya (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1999), s.v. ḥusn; Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1988), s.v. ḥusn.
5. See al-Jawharī, Tāj al-lugha
wa-siḥāḥ al-ʿarabiyya, s.v. ḥusn.
6.
See for
instance, Ibn Manẓūr, Lisān al-ʿarab,
s.v. ḥusn, where he contrasts ḥusnā (the
adjectival form of ḥusn in the feminine
superlative) with sūʾā (“the worst,”
“the most evil”). In addition, he contrasts
ḥasana (a substantive form) with sayyiʾa
(“bad/evil deed”).
7.
Edward
William Lane translates sūʾ as “evil,
ill; iniquity, in- jury, offence, calamity, misfortune” and explains the verb, sāʾa
thus: “to be or become bad, evil, foul, wicked; to become worse,
deteriorate (condition); to grieve, sadden, afflict, hurt, vex, torment, trouble,
offend, pain, make sorry, displease,” Arabic-English Lexicon (New York: F. Ungar, 1955–56),
s.v. sūʾ and sāʾa, respectively.
8.
Ibid., s.v. ḥusn.
9.
If we turn to
contemporary Persian scholarship, we see that Nasrollah Pourjavady regards nīkūʾī (not zībāʾī, which is the more common Persian word for “beauty” today)
as the most accurate Persian translation of ḥusn.
He therefore translates ḥusn as nīkūʾī and jamāl as zībāʾī in
Persian. See Pourjavady, “Maʿnī-yi ḥusn wa ʿishq dar adabiyāt-i ʿirfānī [The meaning of ḥusn and ʿishq in Sufi literature],” Sophia Perennis 2, no. 1 (1976): 43. In another
article on the topic of beauty, Pourjavady explains that the word zībāʾī comes from zībanda būdan, i.e., to be “befitting,” “becoming,” for which
reason he considers zībāʾī inadequate
as a full rendering of ḥusn—see
Pourjavady, “Ḥusn wa marātib-i idrāk-i ān: Nigāhī bih naẓar-i ḥukamā wa ʿurafā [Ḥusn and the levels of its perception:
An observation on the views of the philosophers and Sufis],” in Ishrāq wa ʿirfān: Maqālahā wa naqdhā [Illumination
and Sufism: Articles and cri- tiques]
(Tehran: Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāhī, 1380sh/2001),
178. Also
see Pourjavady, “ḥusn,” Dānishnāma-yi jahān-i islām, vol. 13, #384, http://rch.ac.ir/article/Details/12004.
10. See Aḥmad Ghazālī,
Sawāniḥ, 132; Suhrawardī, Fī ḥaqīqat al-ʿishq [On the reality of
passionate love], in The Philosophical
Allegories and Mystical Treatises, ed. W. Thackston
(Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1999),
58.
11.
Abū Ḥāmid
al-Ghazālī, Kīmiyā-yi saʿādat (Tehran:
Shirkat-i Intishārāt-i ʿIlmī wa Farhangī, 1386/2007), vol. 2, 575.
12. Toshihiko Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qurʾan
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 224.
13. See chapter 11, “Good and Bad,” in Izutsu, Ethico-Religious Concepts in the Qurʾān,
esp. 221ff. Cf. Murata and Chittick, The
Vision of Islam, 108–11 and 268.
14.
Well-known versions
of the ḥadīth of Gabriel
are found in al-Bukhārī,
Ṣaḥīḥ, 4.1792 and Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 1.134, 1.143. Its variations as
well as partial reports are found in numerous col- lections including: al-Tirmidhī, Sunan (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub
al-ʿIlmiyya, 1994), 7.331; Abū Dāwūd, Kitāb
al-sunan (Mecca: Dār al-Istiqāma, 1997),
12.459; Ibn Mājah,
Sunan, 1.24, 1.25;
Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad,
1.46, 1.84, 1.86, 1.524, 3.159, 5.169, 5.113,
among others.
Murata and Chittick explain the ḥadīth of Gabriel in The Vision of Islam, xxv–xxxiv.
15.
While this is a well-known saying
of the Prophet, in this ex-
act form it appears only outside the six books of standard Sunni Ḥadīth: al-Dārimī, al-Musnad (Riyadh: Dār al-Mughnī, 2000),
II.1366; Abū Yaʿlā Mawṣilī, al-Musnad (Damascus:
Dār al-Maʾmūn li-l-Turāth, 1984), IV.475; Ṭabarī, Jāmiʿ al-bayān fī taʾwīl al-qurʾān, ed.
Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1420/2000), 22.507; and Ibn Khuzayma,
Kitāb al-tawḥīd wa-ithbāt ṣifāt
al-rabb (Riyadh: Maktab al-Rushd, 1994), I.201, II.533, II.539, among
others. Variations of this say- ing, however, do appear in major Ḥadīth collections, includ- ing Ibn Ḥanbal’s Musnad, which records “My Lord—exalted and majestic is He—came to me at night in
the most beautiful form,” I.607; V.13; VI.522. Essentially the same ḥadīth
(except for the glorification formula for God—tabāraka wa-taʿālā in place of ʿazza wa-jalla) is also found
in al-Tirmidhī’s Sunan, 9.84. Variations are often found in Sufi literature.
A good example— especially in connection to the subject of beauty—is found in ʿAyn
al-Quḍāt Hamadānī’s (d. 1131) writing: “From ‘I saw my Lord’—God—‘in the most
beautiful form, a beardless youth’ a group has appeared who worship jamāl.” See Nāmahā-yi ʿAyn al-Quḍāt
Hamadānī, ed. ʿAlī-Naqī Munzawī and ʿAfīf ʿUsayrān (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Asāṭīr,
1377sh/1998), I.156.6–7 (Letter #18). On the Prophet’s seeing God in the most beautiful form as reported in these ḥadīths, also
see Corbin, Creative Imagina- tion in the
Ṣūfism of Ibn ʿArabī, trans. R. Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1969), 272–81; Schimmel, Mystical
Dimensions, 290.
16.
For a study
of color symbolism in Rūzbihān’s Kashf
al-asrār, see Antoni Gonzalo
Carbó, “El cielo teñido de rojo: La visión del
color en el Diarium spirituale de Rûzbihân Baqlî (m. 606/1209),” Convivium: Revista
de Filosofia 13
(2000): 31–59.
17.
While discussing the significance of camels to Bedouin life in The
Bedouins and the Desert: Aspects of Nomadic Life in the Arab East, Jubrail Jabbur emphasizes that the word
for camel, jamal, shares
the same root as jamāl and that the sense of jamāl as “beauty” may even have derived
from jamal. He writes,
“The lexicographical compendia
held that the camel’s name, jamal, is derived
from the word jamāl, ‘beauty,’ since the Bedouins
consider the camel a fine beautiful animal. In a Prophetic tradition it is said: ‘He brought a fine beautiful (jamlāʾ) she-camel,’ and in another we read: ‘Then a fine beautiful (jamlāʾ) woman appeared before him.’ And who knows, perhaps the word jamāl (‘beauty’) is itself derived
from jamal (‘camel’),
since the latter is the source of goodness and life for
the Bedouin. Desert life decreed that the Bedouin woman should be of slender
build, due to the great amounts of mov- ing about, traveling, and working that
she did, which kept her something short of plumpness and corpulence. Hence, if she be- came plump and soft-bodied, like a camel (jamal)
fills out when it becomes fat, then they would refer to her as jamīla and jamlāʾ, ‘beautiful,’”
in Jabbur, Bedouins and the Desert,
trans. Lawrence Conrad (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1995), 237.
18.
Although as a
lexicographer Lane lists a number of meanings for jamāl, the first meaning he mentions is “beauty,” and the first he mentions for ḥusn is “goodness or goodliness.” His en-
try on jamāl reads
as follows: “Beauty,
goodliness, comeliness, or
pleasingness”; “goodness in action, or actions, or behav- iour”; “elegance, or prettiness; i.e.,
delicacy, or minuteness, of beauty.” Lane, Arabic-English
Lexicon, s.v. jamāl.
19. See Daniel Gimaret, Les noms divins en Islam, 215–17. Gima- ret also notes that both al-Qushayrī and al-Ghazālī associate al-jamīl with its counterpart, al-jalīl
(“the Majestic”), ibid., 216. However, it is worth noting that while al-Qushayrī does so in his al-Taḥbīl
fī al-tadhkīr, he does not mention al-jamīl
in the short list of divine names found in his much shorter treatise on Ashʿarite
dogma, al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl. See
Richard Frank, “Two Short Dogmatic Works of Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. Second Part: Edition and Translation of ‘Al-Fuṣūl
fī-Uṣūl,’” Melanges 16 (1983): 66–70. For Rūzbihān’s
discussion of jamīl as a divine name,
see the next chapter on his theology of beauty.
20. Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, V.120,
V.121, V.149.
21.
Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 2.74. A later
Ḥadīth scholar, al-Bayhaqī (d. 1066), who lived a century
before Rūzbihān, also records this ver-
sion of the ḥadīth in his Shuʿab al-īmān (Beirut:
Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2000),
#6201, V.162. After Rūzbihān’s time, an- other
variation of this ḥadīth can be found in both Sunni and Shiite collections: “Indeed God is
beautiful and He loves beauty, and He loves to have the trace of His blessing
seen
upon His servant” (Inna Allāh jamīl yuḥibb al-jamāl wa-yuḥibb an yurā athar niʿmatihi ʿalā
ʿabdihi). This is found, for instance, in al-Haythamī’s (d. 1404) Majmaʿ al-zawāʾid, a secondary col-
lection of unique ḥadīths occurring in the six books of Sunni Ḥadīth (Beirut: Dār
al-Fikr, n.d.), #8582, V.232; #8589, V.234; al-Suyūṭī’s (d. 1505) Jāmiʿ al-masānīd wa-l-marāsīl (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1994, #5324, II.269; #6716,
II.475); as well as the Shiite Ḥadīth collection by ʿAllāma al-Majlisī (d. 1698), Biḥār al-anwār
(Beirut: Muʾassasat al-Wafāʾ, 1984), 10.92.
22.
Rūzbihān Baqlī, Kitāb maşrab al-arvāḥ
va huva’l-maşhūr bi-hazār
u yak maḳām (bi-alfi maḳāmin va maḳāmin), ed. Naşreden Nazif M. Hoca
(Istanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaasi, 1974). Henceforth referred to as Mashrab
(in standard Arabic transliteration).
23. Ibid., 132.
24. Ibid., 132–33.
25.
Al-Maknūn fī
ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya, ed. ʿAlī Ṣadrāʾī Khuʾī, in Kitābkhāna-yi madrasa-yi fiqāhat (N.p.: n.d.), http://lib. eshia.ir/27484/1/293, #62, vol. 1, 293–94.
26. Mashrab, 133.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29.
It is in the
sense of “to approve” that istaḥsana is
considered the antonym of istahjana,
“to disapprove,” cf. Dakramanjī, Qāmūs
al-aḍdād al-kabīr, s.v. ḥ-s-n.
30.
Lane
translates its verbal form (with an added objective pro- noun, hu), istaḥsanahu,
as “He counted, accounted, reckoned, or esteemed, him, or it, ﺣﺴﻦ [i.e., good,
goodly, beautiful, comely, pleasing, &c.; he approved, thought well of, or
liked, him, or it],” in Arabic-English
Lexicon, s.v. ḥ-s-n.
31.
Rūzbihān
paraphrases al-Daylamī’s book in several works, especially in discussions of ʿishq.
A few scholars have pointed out al-Daylamī’s “influence” on Rūzbihān,
the earliest of which is Jean-Claude Vadet, who published the first critical
edition of the ʿAṭf (1962). He examines al-Daylamī’s influence on Rūzbihān in his introduction to the French
translation of the ʿAṭf (1980), Le traité
d’amour mystique d’al-Daylami (Geneva: Droz,
1980), 12–17. The most important and detailed study of the connection between
al-Daylamī and Rūzbihān is Masa- taka Takeshita’s “Continuity and Change in the
Tradition of Shirazi Love Mysticism,” Orient XIII (1987): 113–31. Carl Ernst compares the two thinkers’ views on various stages of love in “The Stages
of Love in Early Persian Sufism from Rābiʿa to Rūzbihān,” Classical Persian Sufism from its Origins to Rumi,
ed.
Leonard
Lewisohn (London: Khaniqahi Nimatullahi, 1994), 435–55. Joseph Norment Bell and
Ḥasan Maḥmūd al-Shāfiʿī discuss Rūzbihān’s familiarity with al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf in
the in- troduction to their English
translation of the ʿAṭf,
A
Treatise on Mystical Love, esp. lxvi–lxix. Nasrollah Pourjavady touches on this subject in his study of love and
argues that the first major influence of al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf on subsequent Sufism is found in the works of Rūzbihān: “The book ʿAṭf was
written in Shiraz at the end of the fourth or the
beginning of the fifth century [A.H.]. However important this book may be in
the history of Sufism in general, it did not have an extensive influence on Sufi
writers in the fifth and sixth centuries. In fact it seems that the first person in Shiraz to follow
Daylamī’s work by writing a book on ʿishq is Rūzbihān
Baqlī.” Pourjavady, Bāda-yi ʿishq: Pazhūhishī dar maʿnā-yi bādah dar shiʿr-i
ʿirfānī-yi fārsī [The Wine of passionate love: Study
on the meaning of wine in Persian Sufi poetry] (Tehran: Nashr-i Kārnāma,
1387/2008), 54–55.
32. Chapter 5 in ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, ed. J. Nūrbakhsh (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Yaldā-Qalam,
1380/2001), 35–44. All subsequent references
to the ʿAbhar in this study will be to the Nūrbakhsh
edition, which has eliminated many of the textual problems in the previous Corbin-Muʿīn
edition (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Manūchihrī, 1383sh/2004, originally published in
1958).
33. All “beauty” in this passage
translates ḥusn.
34.
Al-Daylamī, ʿAṭf, 10 (ed. Vadet); 23 (ed. Bell and
al-Shāfiʿī). Translation is mine,
in order to keep the translation of technical
terms consistent. For Bell’s translation, see Treatise
on Mystical Love, 15.
35.
As Bell and
al-Shāfiʿī note, al-Daylamī rarely names the sourc- es of the sayings
that he has compiled in the ʿAṭf.
Similar dis- cussions with the use of such philosophical terms as emanation (fayḍ) can be found, for instance, in Ibn Sīnā’s al-Risāla
fī al-ʿishq. See Fackenheim, “A Treatise on Love,” 212, 213, 223, 224; Fri- thiof Rundgren,
“Avicenna on Love: Studies in the ‘Risāla fī māhīyat al‘išhq’ I,” Orientalia Suecana 27–28 (1978-1979): 56.
36.
ʿAbhar, 41.
37.
Mashrab, 134.
38.
Ibid., 132.
39.
Ibid., 134.
40.
Rūzbihān, Ghalaṭāt al-sālikīn, 101, in Risālat al-quds
wa risāla-yi ghalaṭāt
al-sālikīn, ed. Jawād Nūrbakhsh (Tehran:
Yaldā Qalam, 1381sh/2002).
41. Ibid., 101–102.
42.
Mashrab, 73. I am reading maʿārif in
the first sentence
as ʿurafāʾ to make sense of the
passage. Elsewhere, Rūzbihān attributes virtually the same sentence found in
the middle of this pas- sage to another Sufi: “al-Nūrī said, ‘Things deemed
beautiful are beautiful through His self-disclosure, and things deemed ugly are
ugly through His being veiled,’” in Mashrab,
134.
43.
See, for instance, al-Qushayrī, Al-Qushayri’s Epistle
on Sufism, trans. Alexander Knysh (Reading: Garnet, 2007),
205–207. In a parallel discussion of riḍā,
Rūzbihān quotes part of this dis- cussion
by al-Qushayrī, whom he consistently refers to as “the
Teacher,” in Mashrab, 33.
44. ʿArāʾis al-bayān II.29 (Q 9:66).
45. Mashrab, 72–73.
46. Ibid., 73.
47.
The word is ḥadathān, from ḥudūth, “temporal origination” or “new arrival,” which is the
opposite of qidam, “eternity.” The
Persian equivalent for ḥadathān that
Rūzbihān employs is the unusual word, naw-āmadagān
(“newly arrived things”), cf., Sharḥ-i
shaṭḥiyyāt, 18.
48. Mashrab, 73.
49. Cf. Murata and Chittick, The Vision
of Islam, 40–42.
50. Mashrab, 72–73.
Chapter 3. The Theology of Beauty
1.
The poem
cited in the epigraph is recorded by Rūzbihān’s great-grandson, ʿAbd al-Laṭīf
b. Ṣadr al-Dīn Abī Muḥammad
Rūzbihān Thānī (d. 705/1305), in Rawḥ al-jinān fī sīrat
al-shaykh Rūzbihān, ed. M. Dānishpazhūh, Rūzbihān-nāma (Tehran: Bahman,
1347sh/1969), 340–41. The verse continues thus: “O far
removed from understanding, estimation, and imagination, / speaking in description of You is impossible. / In Your beauty (jamāl) the intellect is mad, / in Your majesty the spirit is a
moth.”
2.
Though widely known among Muslims and popular especially among Sufis, this saying is not
part of the standard six collec- tions of Sunni Ḥadīth but found for instance in al-Majlisī, Bihār
al-anwār, 84.198; 84.344. Slightly
after Rūzbihān’s time, Najm al-Dīn
Dāya Rāzī (d. 1256) centrally features the saying in Mirsād al-ʿibād, where he presents it to be God’s response to the prophet David when he asked Him why He created the
world. According to Chittick,
“Early authors do not suggest
that it
came from the
Prophet’s mouth, but attribute it rather to the corpus of stories handed down
about the prophet David.” He finds an early citation in the Rasāʾil of
Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ from the
tenth century, while
noting that Ibn al-ʿArabī
is the first author he knows of who explicitly attributes the saying to the prophet Muhammad. See Chittick, Divine Love, 439n6.
3.
Michael Sells, Mystical Languages of Unsaying (Chicago: Univer- sity of Chicago Press, 1994).
4.
One must note
that intermixture of the technical terminology of kalām, falsafa, and Sufism is nothing new, which may be best
represented by the works of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī
(d. 1111) be- fore Rūzbihān’s
time, and after him by the works of Ibn al-ʿArabī
(d. 1240). However, one major difference between Rūzbihān and these two thinkers—who may be considered “Sufi theoreti- cians”—is
that he makes no explicit attempt at systematizing his ideas through extensive
importation of technical terms from kalām
and falsafa nor does he make any visible
effort to make the task of
reading his writings
easier by defining
his terms. For a useful survey
of the interaction between dogmatic theology and Sufism, see Toby
Mayer, “Theology and Sufism,” in The
Cambridge Com- panion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 258–87. A case study of the complex nature of Sufi language
can be found in Martin
Nguy- en, Sufi Master and Qur’an Scholar:
Abū Qāsim al-Qushayrī and the Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
5.
Masataka
Takeshita, “Continuity and Change in the Tradition of Shirazi Love Mysticism”: 113–31. For an example of parallel
discussions in al-Daylamī’s ʿAṭf and
Rūzbihān’s writings, see the section on mustaḥsan
in the previous chapter.
6. Mayer, “Theology and Sufism,” 272.
7. Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī, 39.
8.
The position
of Masālik al-tawḥīd in relation to
the rest of Rūzbihān’s compositions is similar to that of al-Qushayrī’s Lumaʿ fī al-iʿtiqād and al-Fuṣūl fī al-uṣūl, two works of Ashʿarite dogma, in relation
to his other (mostly Sufi) works. Cf. Richard
Frank, “Two Short Dogmatic Works of Abū
l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. First Part: Edition and
Translation of ‘Luma‘ fī l-i‘tiqād,’” Melanges 15 (1982): 53–74; and “Two Short Dogmatic Works of Abū l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī. Second Part: Edition and Translation of ‘Al-Fuṣūl
fī l-Uṣūl,’” Melanges 16 (1983):
59–94. Ibn Khafīf, another Ashʿarite Sufi, whom Rūzbihān holds in
great respect through the intermediary of Abū
al-Ḥasan al-Daylamī’s trans- mission of his ideas, has a work of similar
nature, namely a
work of dogma called Muʿtaqad Ibn Khafīf, edited by Schimmel in the appendix to al-Daylamī’s Sīrat al-shaykh
al-kabīr Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad b. al-Khafīf
al-Shīrāzī. While both Ibn Khafīf and al-Qushayrī exerted influence on Rūzbihān’s
thought, the content of his Masālik al-tawḥīd is
closer to al-Qushayrī’s Lumaʿ than to Ibn
Khafīf’s Muʿtaqad.
9.
Rūzbihān, Kitāb masālik al-tawḥīd, ed., Ballanfat, Quatre traits in- édits de Rûzbehân Baqlî Shîrâzî, 167–90.
Henceforth referred to as Masālik.
10. Ballanfat, Quatre traits inédits de Rûzbehân
Baqlî Shîrâzî, 38–39.
11. Masālik, 171.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 170.
14.
Tafakkarū fī kulli shayʾin wa-lā
tafakkarū fī dhāti Allāh. This ḥadīth in this exact wording
is not included in the standard six books
of Sunni Ḥadīth. Among the early sources that record it are: Hannād b. al-Sarī al-Kūfī,
Kitāb al-zuhd, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ʿAbd al-Jibār
al-Farīwāʾī (Kuwait: Dār al-Khulafāʾ li-l-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1986), II.469; Abū al-Muẓaffar Manṣūr b. Muḥammad al-Samʿānī, al-Intiṣār li-aṣḥāb
al-ḥadīth, ed. Muḥmmad
b. Ḥusayn
b. Ḥasan al-Jīzānī
(N.p.: Maktabat Aḍwāʾ al-Manār,
n.d.), I.9; Shīrawayh b. Shahrdār al-Daylamī al-Hamadhānī, al-Firdaws bi-maʾthūr al-khiṭāb, ed. al-Saʿīd b. Basyūnī Zughlūl
(Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1986), II.56. Among the well-known scholars of Ḥadīth in the later generations, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) records this ḥadīth in slight variations. In his Jāmiʿ al-masānīd wa-l-marāsīl, al-Suyūṭī records, “Reflect upon every thing, but do not reflect
upon God’s essence”
(4:112); “Reflect upon God’s creation, but do not reflect upon God” (4:111,
112, 114); “Reflect upon God’s bounties, but do not reflect upon God”
(4:111). The second version is also recorded by Shiites, e.g., al-Majlisī
in Bihār al-anwār, 54:348.
15.
Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/355,
#183, vol. 1, 355. The print edition
is incomplete and omits some of the sentences
(surrounding the saying of Abū Bakr) translated above; cf. ʿArāʾis al-ḥadīth aw al-maknūn fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya, ed. ʿAlī Ṣadrāʾī Khuʾī (Tehran: Sāzmān-i Tablīghāt-i Islāmī,
1389sh/2010), #188, 241–43.
16. ʿArāʾis al-bayān, III.261 (Q 42:11). Henceforth abbreviated as
ʿArāʾis.
17. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/355, #183, vol. 1,
355. This
part is also omitted in the printed edition; cf. ʿArāʾis al-ḥadīth aw al-maknūn fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim
al-nabawiyya, #188, 242.
18.
Mashrab, 215.
19.
ʿArāʾis, I.368 (Q 6:59).
20.
Cf., ʿArāʾis, I.368 (Q 6:59) and Mashrab, 6.
21.
This echoes
the biblical verse,
No one shall see me and live
(Exodus 33:20).
22. Arāʾis, I.465 (Q 7:142).
23.
Mashrab, 150. In addition, Rūzbihān uses ʿayn interchangeably with dhāt when
he writes “ʿayn, ṣifa, and fiʿl,” with ʿayn replac-
ing dhāt, the more standard term in such a list, in Mashrab, 162.
24. Arāʾis, I.465 (Q 7:142).
25. Masālik, 171.
26. Ibid., 173.
27. Ibid., 170–71.
28.
My translation. Richard Frank, “Two Short Dogmatic
Works of Abū Qāsim al-Qushayrī.
Second Part: Edition and Translation of ‘Al-Fuṣūl fī l-Uṣūl,” 60. For Frank’s
translation, see ibid.,
76.
29. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/355, #183, vol. 1, 355.
30. Masālik, 174.
31.
ʿArāʾis, I.268 (Q 4:94).
32.
Ibid., I.345
(Q 6:1).
33.
Ibid., I.516 (Q 8:10).
34.
Ibid., I.465 (Q 7:142).
35.
Mashrab, 133.
36.
See the section on mustaḥsan
in chapter 2 and Mashrab, 132.
37. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī,
al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliyya fī al-ʿilm
al-ilāhī, ed. al-Saqqā (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1987), vol. 3, 246. He writes, “The fifth name: dhāt. Know that this expression was put
down to indicate the specification of a thing by another thing. They say ‘a woman possessing (dhāt) money’ and ‘pos- sessing beauty’.…It is impossible to define [the essence] except by its attributes….It is what the attributes are attributed to (hiya mawṣūfa bi-l-ṣifāt).”
38.
Masālik, 170.
39.
Ibid., 178ff.
40.
Ibid.,170.
41. See Gimaret, La Doctrine d’al-Ashʿarī, 260 and 276-81. For a concise discussion
of the history of the problem of taʿṭīl, or
di- vesting God of attributes, see Josef van Ess, “Tashbīh wa-Tanzīh,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
42.
Gimaret, La Doctrine
d’al-Ash‘arī (Paris: Editions
du Cerf, 1990), 259.
43. Mashrab, 269.
44. Ibid., 270.
45. See Gimaret, La Doctrine
d’al-Ash‘arī, 323–28.
46. Mashrab, 258–59.
47. ʿArāʾis, I.441 (Q 7:54).
48.
In a useful
survey of the history of jamāl and jalāl as terms in Muslim theological
discourse, Parwīz Sulaymānī points out how these terms were understood by early
dogmatic theolo- gians and were further developed by Sufis, in Dānishnāma-yi jahān-i islām, s.v. “Jalāl wa jamāl,” http://rch.ac.ir/article/
Details/9813. The complementarity of God’s beauty and maj- esty is the central
subject of Sachiko Murata’s The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender Relationships in Islamic Thought (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1992).
49. ʿArāʾis, I.16 (Q 1:1).
50.
This ḥadīth
is widely accepted and reported by numerous Ḥadīth scholars, including such
major scholars as al-Bukhārī, Muslim, Ibn Ḥanbal, and al-Tirmidhī. Ninety-nine
is also the number of beads in the Muslim rosary for the purpose of invok-
ing (dhikr) God’s names. While Rūzbihān did not write a treatise enumerating the divine names, some preceding Sufi-theolo-
gians did, such as al-Qushayrī and al-Ghazālī; cf. al-Qushayrī, al-Taḥbīr fī al-tadhkīr li-Abī al-Qāsim ʿAbd al-Karīm b. Hawāzin al-Qushayrī, ed. Muḥammad Amīn b. ʿAbd al-Hādī al-Fārūqī (Ḥimṣ: Dār al-Maʿārif,
n.d.); al-Ghazālī, al-Maqṣad al-asnā fī sharḥ maʿānī asmāʾ Allāh al-ḥusnā (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1971).
51. ʿArāʾis, III.381
(Q 55:78).
52. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 4.170; Abū Dāwūd, Sunan, 3.132, 4.302;
al-Tirmidhī, Sunan, 9.372,
9.375, 10.10; Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad,
1.155, 1.243,
7.87, 7.287; Mālik
b. Anas, Muwaṭṭaʾ, 2.37.
53. ʿArāʾis, III.381
(Q 55:78).
54. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/276, #22, vol. 1, 276.
55. ʿArāʾis, III.381
(Q 55:78).
56.
This ḥadīth
is found in Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad,
3.632; Abū Dāwūd, Sunan,
4.363; al-Nasāʾī, Sunan al-Nasāʾī
bi-sharḥ al-Suyūṭī wa-l-Sindī,
ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad Sayyid, et al. (Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadīth, 1999), 1.386 and
3.59, among others. A brief discus- sion of al-ism
al-aʿẓam can be found in Chittick, Sufism:
A Short Introduction (Oxford:
Oneworld, 2000), 56.
57.
The Arabic
is ṣifāt al-khāṣṣa, which I am reading as al-ṣifāt al-khāṣṣa.
58. ʿArāʾis, I.498 (Q 7:180).
59.
For this reason, it is also possible to regard this fourth category of names as “the names known
to the elect,” reading khāṣṣa as a noun (“the elect”) rather than
an adjective (“specific”).
60. Mashrab, 232.
61.
The idea that
ḥusn is a wider notion of beauty than
jamāl by encompassing both jamāl and jalāl solves the conundrum dis- cussed by Elaine Scarry regarding
Kant’s bifurcation of the sublime and the beautiful in her book, On Beauty and Being Just (83–85), where the sublime seems to
correspond roughly to jalāl and the beautiful to jamāl.
Scarry laments: “The sublime occa- sioned the demotion of the
beautiful” (84); and “The sublime (an aesthetic of power) rejects beauty on the
grounds that it is diminutive, dismissible, not powerful enough” (85). Had the
notion of ḥusn been
put into the picture, there
would have been nothing to lament about, as ḥusn is by definition that which is and transcends the dichotomy between
the beautiful/jamīl and the sublime/jalīl that belongs only to the temporal
realm.
62.
Mashrab, 132.
63.
Ibid.
64.
Corbin, En Islam iranien, vol. 3, 21.
Chapter 4. The Anthropology and Cosmology of Beauty
1. Rūzbihān, Sharḥ-i shaṭḥiyyāt, 166.
2.
Rūzbihān, Kitāb sayr al-arwāḥ, ed. P. Ballanfat, Quatre traits inédits de Rûzbehân Baqlî
Shîrâzî (Tehran: Institut français de recherche en Iran, 1998), 6.
3. Mashrab, 6.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., 7.
7. Ibid., 9.
8. See, for instance,
ibid., 306.
9. Ibid., 9.
10.
Ibid., 85. Rūzbihān devotes
the seventh chapter
of Risālat al-quds to discussing the purpose and effect of samāʿ, which has been translated into English as “On Listening
to Music,” in Ernst, Teachings of Sufism (Boston: Shambhala, 1999), 97–103.
11. Mashrab, 10.
12. Ibid., 43. I have translated khiṭāb al-khāṣṣ
as “a specific
address” as Rūzbihān often drops the first
al- in an adjectival phrase, e.g., al-khiṭāb al-khāṣṣ. However, if the iḍāfa construction was intentional, then the phrase would
mean “an address for the elect.”
13. Ibid., 85.
14.
ʿAyn al-Quḍāt Hamadānī, Tamhīdāt, ed. ʿAfīf ʿUsayrān (Tehran: Manūchihrī, 1380sh/2001), 106.
15. Mashrab, 28.
16. Ibid. Cf. ʿAbhar, 9.
17. ʿAbhar, 129.
18. Mashrab, 307.
19.
Aḥmad Ghazālī, Sawāniḥ. Also see Pourjavady, “ʿIshq-i azalī wa bāda-yi Alast” [“Eternal passionate love and the wine of Alast”], in Bāda-yi ʿishq, 215–38;
and Chittick, Divine Love, 32–35 and 43–49, on the ideas
of beginningless love and the Covenant ac- cording to Anṣārī, Samʿānī, and
Maybudī.
20. Mashrab, 9–10.
21.
Encyclopaedia
of the Qurʾān, s.v. “God and his Attributes.” Rūzbihān’s
commentary on the above verses can be found in the corresponding sections in
his Qurʾān commentary, ʿArāʾis al-bayān.
22. Mashrab, 10.
23. Ibid., 11.
24. Ibid., 12.
25. ʿArāʾis, III.199 (Q 38:72).
26. Mashrab, 176.
27. ʿAbhar, 38.
28. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/46, #225, vol. 2, 46.
29. ʿArāʾis, III.239 (Q 40:64).
30. Ibid., I.418 (Q 7:11).
31. Ibid., III.470 (Q 75:22–23).
32. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/63, #261, vol. 2, 63.
33. ʿArāʾis, III.487 (Q 80:40–41).
34. Ibid.
35.
Mashrab, 85. A similar
idea is expressed in the biblical tradition: “from the greatness and beauty of
created things comes a cor- responding perception of their Creator” (Wisdom of
Solomon 13:5), cited by Frank Burch Brown in Good Taste, Bad Taste, and Christian Taste: Aesthetics in
Religious Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 100.
36. Mashrab, 85.
37. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/327, #137, vol. 1, 327.
38.
Mashrab, 133. Rūzbihān’s likely
source for Dhū al-Nūn’s say- ing is al-Daylamī’s Aṭf, 135, where this statement is
presented as Dhū al-Nūn’s response when he was asked “about the rec- ognizers’ state of seeking
intimacy.” Al-Daylamī’s teacher,
Ibn Khafīf also seems to have had a similar inclination toward ap-
preciating beauty in creation, as he is reported to have said,
“The spirit’s
pleasure lies in three things: good smell, beautiful voice, and gazing,” in Abū al-Ḥasan al-Daylamī, Sīrat al-shaykh al-kabīr Abū ʿAbd Allāh
Muḥammad b. al-Khafīf al-Shīrāzī, 214. This passage is discussed in Leonard
Lewisohn, “Sufism’s Reli- gion of Love,
from Rābiʿa to Ibn ʿArabī,”
in The Cambridge Com- panion to Sufism, ed. Lloyd
Ridgeon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 162–63; and Bell and Shafie,
A Treatise
on Mystical Love, xxxix. Thus, it is possible to trace Rūzbihān’s strong appreciation of beauty in creation to al-Daylamī (ca. 1000), Ibn Khafīf (d. 981), and Dhū
al-Nūn al-Miṣrī (d. 859), all of whom Rūzbihān held in great
respect.
39. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/304, #88, vol. 1, 304.
40.
Rūzbihān, Manṭiq al-asrār, ed. Mojtaba Shahsavari,
unpub- lished critical edition, 57, paragraph 112. I am grateful to the editor
for sharing this extremely important unpublished text. The saying by the
Prophet is also quoted in Mashrab,
133.
41.
ʿAbhar, 37. The closest
that comes to this saying is recorded by a later author, al-Suyūṭī:
“Three things clear up sight: gaz- ing at greenery, flowing
water, and beautiful
faces,” in Jāmiʿ
al-masānīd wa-l-marāsīl, IV.157. Lewisohn presents a similar discussion in
Rūzbihān’s Sharḥ-i shaṭḥiyyāt (150),
in Lewisohn, “Sufism’s Religion of Love, from Rābiʿa to Ibn ʿArabī,” 155–56.
42. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/322, #124, vol. 1,
p. 322.
43.
Ibid.
44.
Ernst, Rūzbihān Baqlī, 35.
45.
Ballanfat, Quatre traités, 184–201.
46.
Mashrab, 208.
47.
Ibid., 236.
48.
See for instance Rūzbihān’s discussion of tafriqa in
Mashrab,
149.
49. ʿArāʾis, III.173 (Q 36:78).
50. ʿAbhar, 42. Corbin discusses the extended passage
in En Islam iranien, vol.
3, 96.
51. ʿAbhar,
42. Elaine Scarry argues against various attempts at banishing beauty from
modern human life and refutes a simi- lar attack on the contemplation of human
beauty in modern discourse in On Beauty
and Being Just, 72ff. A common
theme that runs through both Scarry’s contemporary example and Rūzbihān’s
is the fear that some people feel toward beautiful people—either because
they are susceptible to being harmed or
because they impart harm to their perceivers, through the sus- tained gaze.
Underlying this fear is the recognition that beauty
has power: either to guide or misguide people.
52. ʿAbhar, 42.
53.
Uṭlubū al-khayr
ʿinda ḥisān al-wujūh. This saying is not found
in the six books of the canonical Sunni Ḥadīth, but it is recorded in a number of secondary Ḥadīth collections
after Rūzbihān’s time, such as al-Haythamī, Majmaʿ al-zawāʾid, #13730, VIII.355; #13732, VIII.356; and al-Suyūṭī, Jāmiʿ al-masānīd
wa-l-marāsīl, #3204, I.462; #3205, I.463. Also see Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Beauty in Arabic
Culture (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1999), 64.
54. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/337, #156, vol. 1, 337.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/39, #208, vol. 2, p. 39.
57. Ibid., http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/337, #156, vol. 1, 337.
58. Ibid., http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/46, #225, vol. 2, 46.
59. Ibid.
60. ʿAbhar, 41.
61. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/63, #261, vol. 2, 63.
62. Ibid., http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/345, #162, vol. 1, 345–46.
63. Mashrab, 133.
64.
Muḥammad Taqī
Mīr, Sharḥ-i ḥāl wa āthār wa ashʿār-i
shaykh Rūzbihān-i Baqlī-yi Fasāʾī-yi Shīrāzī (Shiraz: Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i
Pahlawī, 1354sh/1975), 88.
65. Cf. Muslim, Ṣaḥīḥ, 14.142;
Ibn Ḥanbal, Musnad, 2.483,
2:496,
2:620, 3:224, 3:326.
66. ʿAbhar, 12. I am taking the alternative reading of bāl as bāgh.
67.
Although Rūzbihān
does not discuss “two eyes” per se, his contrast between the eye of gathering and the eye of separation seems more or less analogous
to Ibn al-ʿArabī’s discussion of the two eyes, consisting of imagination and
intellect, that is, one that combines and another that separates, or one that
sees tashbīh and another that sees tanzīh. Cf., Chittick, The Sufi Path
of Knowledge: Ibn ‘Arabi’s
Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989),
356–81.
68.
Henry Corbin
and Muḥammad Muʿīn, introduction to Le
jasmin des fidèles
d’amour (Kitâb-e ʻAbhar al-ʻâshiqîn): Traité de soufisme en person (Tehran: Institut
français de recherche en Iran, 1987),
97ff.
Chapter 5. The
Prophetology of Beauty
1.
Mashrab, 133.
2.
Rūzbihān does
mention Jesus’s beauty but does not discuss it extensively. This is probably
because of his attention to Jesus’s
strong association with spirit, which highlights his incompa- rability (tanzīh) more than his similarity (tashbīh) to the rest of
creation. However,
Rūzbihān’s discussion of prophetic beauty primarily focuses on the prophets’ imitability for the rest of hu- manity as their role models.
3. Corbin, En Islam iranien, vol. 3, 81.
4. Mashrab, 87.
5. Ibid., 156.
6. ʿArāʾis, I.412 (Q 7:1).
7. Ibid., I.143 (Q 3:33).
8. Ibid., I.419 (Q 7:11).
9. Ibid., I.418 (Q 7:11).
10.
Ibid., I.419 (Q 7:11).
11. ʿAbhar, 43.
12.
Ibid.
13.
Ibid., 42. Cf., ʿArāʾis, I.41 (Q 2:30).
14.
ʿArāʾis, I.132 (Q 7:18).
15.
Ibid., I.41 (Q 2:30).
16.
Cf., ʿAbhar, 119; ʿArāʾis, II.148 (Q 12:4).
17.
Cf. Muslim,
Ṣaḥīḥ, 2:170; Ibn Ḥanbal,
Musnad, 3:616; 4:203.
18. ʿArāʾis, II.147 (Q 12:3).
19.
For a study
of the theme of love in the story of Joseph in Sufi in- terpretation, see Jalāl Sattārī,
Dard-i ʿishq-i Zulaykhā: Pazhūhishī dar qissa-yi Yūsuf (Tehran:
Intishārāt-i Tūs, 1373sh/1994).
20. ʿAbhar, 36.
21. Ibid.
22. ʿArāʾis, II.148 (Q 12:4).
23.
ʿAbhar,
36.
24.
ʿArāʾis, II.148 (Q 12:4).
25.
Risālat al-quds, 24.
26.
ʿAbhar,
36.
27.
Arāʾis, II.147 (Q 12:3).
28.
Ibid., II.146 (Q 12:3).
29.
ʿAbhar,
36.
30.
Ibid., 37.
For various thinkers’ approaches to interpreting Jo- seph’s beauty, see Afrāsiyābpūr, Zībāʾī-parastī dar ʿirfān-i islāmī, 66ff.
31. ʿArāʾis, II.155 (Q 12:19).
32. See, for instance, Ritter, “Chapter
Twenty-Six: Religious Love of a
Beautiful Person,” The Ocean of the Soul,
448–519.
33. ʿAbhar, 36.
34. ʿArāʾis, II.155 (Q 12:19). Rūzbihān
makes this point
by way of quoting a certain Jaʿfar.
35.
Ibid., II.155 (Q 12:20).
36.
Ibid., II.160 (Q 12:24).
37. Ibid., II.168–9 (Q 12:31).
38. Ibid., II.169 (Q 12:31).
39. Ibid., II.168 (Q 12:31).
40. Ibid., I.465 (Q 7:143).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., I.174 (Q 3:96).
45. Mashrab, 133.
46. ʿArāʾis, III.84 (an interpretation of Q 20:39 provided under Q 28:25).
47. Ibid., I.376 (Q 6:76).
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., I.376–77 (Q 6:76).
51. Mashrab, 72–73.
52. Ibid., 73.
53. Ibid. This is a supplication often ascribed
to Muhammad in Sufi literature.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid., 134.
57. Ibid.
58. Kashf al-asrār, 35 (section 67). Cf., al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.
ir/27484/1/283,
#33, vol. 1, 283, whose incomplete excerpt is found in ʿAbd al-Laṭīf
Rūzbihān Thānī, Rawḥ al-jinān, 262.
59. ʿArāʾis, II.148 (Q 12:4).
60. Mashrab, 66. Cf., Mashrab, 73; ʿArāʾis, I.106.
61. Mashrab, 66.
62. ʿAbhar, 42.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 125.
65. ʿArāʾis, I.107 (Q 2:260).
66. Ibid., II.148–49.
67. Kitāb al-ighāna, 108–109.
68. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/2/50, #237, vol. 2, 50.
69. Ibid.
70. ʿArāʾis, III.444 (Q 68:4).
71. Ibid., III.445 (Q 68:4).
72. Ibid., I.159 (Q 3:79).
73. Sayr al-arwāḥ, 33.
74. ʿArāʾis, III.358–59 (Q 53:11).
75. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/327, #137, vol. 1, 327.
76.
Mashrab, 149.
77.
Ibid.
78.
ʿAbhar, 126.
79.
Mashrab, 133.
80.
ʿAbhar,
37.
81.
Ibid.
82.
Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/322, #124, vol. 1, 322.
83.
Ibid.
84.
Ibid.
85.
Versions of this ḥadīth
are found in al-Nasāʾī, Sunan, 5:280;
Ibn
Ḥanbal, Musnad,
3:581, 4:54, 4:201.
86. Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/328, #137, vol. 1, 328.
87.
This ḥadīth
is found in secondary collections such as Abū Dāwūd, al-Marāsīl (Riyadh: Dār al-Ṣamīʿī, 1422/2001), 499 and 500; and
Haythamī, Majmaʿ al-zawāʾid, 5.39.
88. Mashrab, 134. Cf., al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/328, #137, vol. 1, 328; al-Daylamī, A Treatise on Mystical Love, trans. Bell and Shafie,
16; al-Ghazālī, Iḥyā, 2.165.
89. ʿAbhar, 41.
90.
Ibid.
91.
Al-Maknūn, http://lib.eshia.ir/27484/1/345, #162, vol. 1, 345.
92.
Ibid.
93. Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, Mathnawī-yi
maʿnawī, verse 4 (Tehran: Nashr-i Būta, 1381sh/2002), vol. 1, 7.
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GENERAL
INDEX
Abaser (mudhill), 64; abasement, 67
ʿabd, 139n21
Abraham,
20, 82, 101, 116–21,
122, 124, 125
Abrahamov,
Binyamin, 132n8 absolute (muṭlaq), 45, 78, 105,
125; beauty, 23, 44; good 21;
nonexistence, 44; ugliness,
44, 105
accident (ʿaraḍ),
57
acquisition (kasb,
iktisāb), 57, 60,
61
act (fiʿl), 56, 57, 60–64, 67, 72, 73,
75, 76, 79, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91,
93, 94, 97, 99, 103, 106, 114,
117, 118, 120, 121, 124, 126;
attributes of, 65, 67, 72, 73,
84, 85, 126; clothing
of, 119,
124; creative, 60, 77; general,
90, 125;
names of, 70; of severity and gentleness, 43, 119; specific, 90, 114, 117, 118,
125; creatures
as divine acts, 76, 90
Actor (fāʿil),
61, 62
ādāb, 19
Adam, 66, 67, 83, 84, 85, 93, 97,
98, 101, 102–107,
108, 109,
112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 120,
122, 135n1; as shāhid, 98;
children of, 80, 106, 112;
second, 107, 109; Adamic
beauty, 92–93, 107; Adam’s
beauty (see beauty)
ʿadam, 47
address (khiṭāb), 80–83, 86, 88, 146n12; specific, 81, 146n12
ʿadl, 16
adorning,
34, 133n20
aesthetics, 2, 4, 13, 16, 129n5;
aesthetic
experience, 13, 18,
25, 88, 131n2; theory, 26, 131n2; of power, 146n61;
Aesthetica, 4
affliction, 33, 136n7
afterlife,
87
Aḥmad b. ʿAṭāʾ.
See Ibn ʿAṭāʾ.
aḥwāl, 22
akhlāq, 19; akhlāq Allāh, 21
Alast, 80, 135n1, 147n19
Alexandria,
6, 130n16
alienation,
24, 76
alignment,
15
All (al-kull), 78
Allāh, 12, 21, 34, 51, 57, 64, 67, 68,
139n21, 143n14
allusion (ishāra), 68, 69, 90, 120,
125, 127
ambiguity,
51, 53, 57
171
ʿāmm. See general.
amphibolie, 91
analogy (qiyās),
23, 46, 53, 67, 104
anāniyya, 67, 68
angel (malak, malakūtiyān), 3, 12,
84, 102–107, 108, 109, 111, 112,
115, 120; angelic, 21; archan- gel, 31. See also sovereignty.
anger, 20, 123
animal (ḥayawān), 3, 21, 25, 32,
33, 83, 138n17;
soul, 18, 21,
25
annihilation (fanāʾ),
35, 54, 58–59,
63, 69, 89, 118
Anṣārī, Khwāja ʿAbd Allāh, 147n19
anthropology, 5, 29, 73, 75
anthropomorphist, 33; anthro-
pomorphic,
55, 66
apophasis, 53; apophatic, 52, 60 Aristotle, Theology of, 11;
Aristotelian psychology, 21
arrogance (kibr), 34
art, 2, 4, 13, 24; [God’s] art (ṣunʿ),
94, 97, 98; Artist (ṣāniʿ), 62,
97, 98
artifact (ṣanīʿat), 62, 98
artisanry (iṣṭināʿ), 42, 47
Āṣaf (b. Barakhyā), 123 ascension, 18, 20, 55
asceticism, 2; ascetics, 92–93;
ascetic life, 6
Ashʿarism, 5, 54, 56, 60, 61, 65,
71; Ashʿarite, 33, 52, 55, 56,
57, 60, 64, 65, 66, 71, 138n19,
142n8
assaults (saṭawāt), 58, 87, 114
ʿAtīq mosque,
1, 6
atom (dharra), 42, 47, 113, 119
ʿAṭṭār, Farīd al-Dīn, 4
attraction, 16, 24, 25, 111; attrac- tive
appearance, 107; force, 94
attribute (ṣifa), (defined), 64–68; (mentioned), 14, 16–17, 37,
49, 56–57, 59, 60, 62–63,
69–73, 75–82, 84–85, 88,
90–94, 99, 103–104,
106–11,
114–27, 133n12, 133n20,
144n37, 144n41, 147n21;
anthropomorphic or revealed,
66; beautiful and majestic, 67, 68, 72, 78, 81, 84, 85;
beginningless (azalī), 70,
115; clothed in, 91; 109, 117,
119, 120, 125; clothing
of, 62, 123; divesting God
of, 144n41; eternal (qadīm), 36, 56, 66, 72, 76; mirroring
full range of divine, 92; light of God’s, 81, 90, 110,
117, 118, 122–23, 124, 125;
Muʿtazilites
and Ashʿarites on, 56, 65; names of, 70; ninety-nine, 65; of act (or active attributes), 65, 67, 72,
73, 85, 126; of essence
(or
essential
attributes), 65, 66,
67, 72, 73, 85; positive
and
negative, 17; seven, 56,
65–67; specific,
66, 71, 104; vision of, 106; witnessing
of, 117; world of, 84; world reflecting God’s, 35; ḥusn as divine attribute, 36, 43, 72; jamāl as divine attribute, 34, 73, 111
audition (samāʿ),
52, 80, 88
auditory, 12,
53, 80 Avicenna. See Ibn Sīnā. awe, 37, 112
āya, 35
ʿayn, 59–60, 144n23; ʿayn
al-ʿayn, 59; ʿayn al-riḍā, 42
azal, 61; azalī,
65
ʿaẓama, 59
badness, bad (sūʾ),
29, 117, 136n6, 136n7. See evil.
bākūra, 126
Ballanfat,
Paul, 5, 6, 8, 9, 55, 56,
90
Bamū, Mount, 6
baqāʾ, 66
Baqlī. See Rūzbihān Baqlī.
Basā, 5
basil, sweet (rayḥān), 39, 95
basīṭ, ʿaql al-,
78
bāṭin, jamāl al-,
36
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb, 4
beasts, 21
beautiful (jamīl, ḥasan), 32, 73;
animal, 138n17; beautiful (jamīl) attributes, 67, 68, 72,
73, 78, 84, 85, 99; beloved,
11, 81; creation,
60, 76; cre-
ator, 25, 31, 36, 40, 45, 64, 73,
75, 99; deemed beautiful
(mustaḥsan), 37–43, 45, 46,
88, 89, 96, 104, 105, 108, 116,
119, 120, 126, 141n42; deem-
ing beautiful (istiḥsān),
37–38, 42, 46, 104, 118–19;
doing what is beautiful (iḥsān), 12, 31; example,
31,
101, 127; face, 89–90, 92, 94,
95, 98, 125, 148n41; garment
and sandals, 34; God as, 1, 2,
12, 16, 19, 25, 33, 34, 35, 63,
64, 75, 86, 88, 92, 99, 127, 128,
138n21; human being, 91, 99,
107, 113, 123, 127; image, 25;
intention,
12; literature, 13;
manner, 33, 120; object,
13–14, 23, 38, 39, 88–89; par-
doning, 33; patience, 33;
prophet,
101, 107, 116, 122,
125; script, 15; traits, 20; voice, 15, 148n38; writing,
11, 29; youth,
98; most beau-
tiful form (aḥsan ṣūra), 32, 36,
55, 85, 86, 89, 98, 124, 125,
129n5, 137n15; names (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā), 16–17, 21,
24, 31, 47, 49, 68, 70–73, 75,
78, 79, 99, 103, 132n8; of cre-
ators (aḥsan al-khāliqīn), 12, 31, 32, 36, 40, 45, 64, 73, 75,
99; of tales or stories (aḥsan
al-qaṣaṣ), 23, 107, 108, 113;
speech (qawl),
89; stature (aḥsan taqwīm), 12, 31, 75,
85, 97
beauty (ḥusn,
jamāl, nīkūʾī, zībāʾī), 29–40, 73, 136n9, 138n17, 138n18, 146n61;
absolute, 44; Adam’s, 93,
102, 107, 108, 109, 112, 113;
Adamic, 92, 93, 107; adora-
tion of, 4, 99; all-encompass-
ing, 85; anthropology of, 29,
75; and
recognition, 104; as inseparable from love, 22, 111, 116; as perennial beloved, 22; as perfection of being, 14, 16, 132n8; associ- ated with pleasure, 22–23, 89,
125, 132n8; associated with sorrow, 23–25; banish- ing of from modern life, 2, 148n51; beginningless (azalī), 108, 109, 111, 123; cosmic, 5,
75, 90, 91, 92, 93, 99, 101; cos-
mology of, 17, 29, 75; effect
on human soul,
14, 82, 112,
116; equated with being, 11,
17, 47; eternal,
81, 98, 109;
excellence (faḍīla) of, 38; experience of, 12, 18; exter-
nal, 11, 36,
107; eye of, 22; general (ʿāmm) and
specific (khāṣṣ), 90, 91, 93, 99; God’s,
19, 34, 42, 45, 47, 50, 63, 72,
73, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83,
86–89, 94, 96, 101 104–106,
108, 111, 113, 115, 119, 120,
124–27, 145n48; highest,
14,
21, 26; human,
4, 85, 90, 91,
92, 93, 94, 98, 99, 101, 102,
111, 122, 148n51; innate
human nature of, 101, 102;
inner, 36, 37, 94, 95; intelligi-
ble, 21, 23; Jesus’s, 149n2;
Joseph’s, 23, 107–13, 122,
150n30; lover of, 76, 81, 125,
126, 127; material, 3; mirror
of, 18, 95, 108, 109, 115,
127; Muhammad’s, 122–27; names of beauty (jamāl),
16; non-Adamic, 92; of character follows
upon beauty of cre- ation, 95; of creation, 32, 75,
95; of Creator, 97; of eternity,
91, 93, 114, 121; of form,
84,
85; of
intelligible world, 14; ontology or ontological analysis of, 14–16, 28, 31, 44,
45, 47; outer,
37, 86, 94, 95;
partial,
39, 44; people of, 101;
perception
of, 22, 23, 42, 45,
75, 111, 112; physical, 94;
prophetic,
101, 108, 111, 150n2; prophetology of, 101; psychology of, 21–24; quarry of, 126; relative, 44; search
for, 23, 25, 26, 88, 94; seeking,
25, 86, 88, 116; sensible,
18,
21, 23, 91; sensory means of
expressing,
12; shade of, 39;
source of, 25, 39, 40, 91, 94,
127; theology of, 49;
trace of,
111, 121; ultimate,
14, 25, 26;
universal,
38, 39, 44; utmost
limit of, 15; vision of, 42, 106,
116, 119, 123, 124; witnessing
of, 81, 83, 93, 121; beautifica-
tion, 11, 12, 14, 17, 20, 26, 99
Bedouin,
138n17 beginninglessness (azal),
61, 69,
83, 90, 97, 114; beginningless
(azalī), 61, 65, 66, 67, 70, 81,
101, 108, 109, 111, 114, 115,
123, 125, 147n19
being (wujūd, hast(ī)), 11, 14, 22,
44, 47, 51, 96, 125; beautiful,
23, 41, 98, 127; beginning-
less, 125; created, 70; engen-
dered being (kawn),
88, 92,
93, 126; fullness of, 45; defi- cient, 41; equated with beauty, 11, 17, 47; God’s, 65; hierarchy of, 106; imperfect, 15; impossible, 44; necessary,
14, 21, 22, 44, 51; perfect or
perfection of, 14, 16, 24, 26,
41, 45; possible,
44; quiddity
(māhiyya) of, 42, 47; realm of
being (kawn),
18, 43, 78, 92,
106; temporal, 66; ugly, 41.
See also existence.
Bell, Joseph Norment, 140n31, 140n35
beloved (maḥbūb, maʿshūq), 11, 19, 22, 25, 76, 81, 83, 96, 124,
126, 127
bewilderment, 22, 35, 58, 69, 112
biblical, 24, 111, 144n21, 147n35
bird, 97, 135n1
birth, 79, 83, 84
Black, Deborah, 13
body (jism),
23, 57, 82, 83, 84, 85,
86, 95; Adam’s, 67; celestial,
120, 122; disdain for, 23;
human, 83;
medicine for, 19; Muhammad’s, 124. See
also frame.
bounty (faḍl), names of, 16 Böwering,
Gerhard, 83
breath, 66–67
breeze from
the Real, 95 Brethren of Purity.
See Ikhwān
al-Ṣafāʾ. bride, God’s, 71
brilliance (sanāʾ,
naḍāra), 78, 87,
91, 123
bringer-of-existence or Existence-
giver (mūjid), 42, 61, 62
brothers,
24, 110, 112
burhān, 51
calligraphy, 29; calligraphers, 12
camaraderie, 20
camel, 32, 137n17
cataphatic,
52, 60
cattle (anʿām),
32, 63, 64
cause, 21, 23, 37, 81, 93, 95, 112;
chain of causes,
61; first cause (al-ʿilla al-ūlā), 14, 22,
51, 61
celestial, 18, 119, 120, 122
certitude (yaqīn), 35, 36, 61, 106
character or character trait
(khuluq), 21, 25, 85, 94, 95,
110, 123, 133n20
characteristic, specific (khāṣṣiyya), 93, 111
Chittick, William, 134n20, 137n14, 141n2
chivalry,
19–20
Christianity, 2; Christian theol- ogy, 1
clay, 66, 84, 85,
86, 123
clothing (libās),
15, 34, 36, 85, 91,
94, 97, 119, 123, 124; of acts, 62,
119, 124; of attributes, 62, 120,
123, 127; of ḥusn, 36; of love, 94; becoming clothed (iltibās), 90–91, 109, 117, 119, 121, 125
coincidentia oppositorum, 53
color, 15, 135n1; color symbol- ism, 137n16
comeliness (malāḥa), 88, 89, 94,
115, 116, 123
command (amr),
58, 77, 78, 79,
85, 102, 104, 106
companions, of Cave, 20; of
Muhammad, 12, 31
contemporary, 2, 46, 136n9, 148n51
contentment (riḍā), 42, 46, 78; eye
of, 42–43, 45–47, 118–19
convent, Sufi, 5, 6
Corbin, Henry, 6, 7, 8, 9, 72, 91,
98, 101, 130n10, 137n15
corporeality, 25; corporeal exis- tence, 18
corpulence,
138n17 cosmogony, 5, 14, 19
cosmology,
5, 13, 14, 17–19; of
beauty, 29, 75
cosmos, 17, 99; cosmic beauty, 5,
75, 90, 91–93, 99, 101; order,
24
covenant (ʿahd, mīthāq), 80–83, 86, 88, 89, 99, 147n19; of love,
81, 86, 88, 99, 126, 128
creation (khalq), 16, 19, 31, 35, 40,
44, 45, 46, 49, 51, 58, 67, 70,
89, 90, 97, 99, 101, 113, 114,
117, 122, 127, 143n14,
147n38,
150n2; as
becoming clothed by God, 91, 121; as clothing
God, 91; as deemed beauti- ful, 41, 43; as divine
act,
60–64; as mirror, 63; as God’s art, 97; as self-disclosure of God’s beauty, 19, 49, 73;
beauty of,
32, 75, 95; con- trasted with character (khuluq), 85, 95, 110; God as incomparable to, 57; initial stages of, 75–79; love as driv-
ing force for, 19, 73, 78; myth,
19; of heavens, 94; of human
being, 79–89, 92; realm of,
41, 58; six days of, 66
creator (khāliq), 2, 41, 61, 62, 64,
91, 93, 97, 114, 119, 121,
147n35; beautiful, 12, 25, 31,
36, 40, 45, 64, 73, 75, 99
creature (khalq), 19, 32, 33, 34, 35,
49, 58, 63, 69, 70, 76, 84, 90,
92, 95, 96, 102, 104, 106, 107,
109, 113, 114, 117, 120, 123
curtain (sitr), 41, 42, 97
Dānishpazhūh, Muḥammad Taqī, 7, 8
Dārā Shukūh, 27–28
darkness (qatara, ẓulma), 87, 118 David, 141n2
day (yawm, rūz), 81; Last Day, 31; of Covenant, 80–83; of Resurrection, 80; six days of
creation, 66
Daylamī, Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Muḥammad al-,
38, 39, 54, 139n31, 140n35, 142n5,
142n8, 147n38
death, 67, 88; death-giver
(mumīt),
16
deficiency, 14, 43, 72; realm of,
15, 26
delight, 18, 23, 87, 102, 126
demonstration (burhān), 51
depth (kunh),
58, 59
descent,
83
description (waṣf),
43, 49, 52, 87,
108, 114, 123, 141n1; most
specific, 36, 72
desert, 81,
122, 138n17
desire (irāda),
19, 24, 25, 56, 61,
65, 66, 73, 76, 77, 78, 99, 106,
117
dhāt, 16, 57, 64, 65, 143n14, 144n23, 144n37
dhawq, 53
dhikr, 145n50 diary, 8, 32, 55
disavowal (nakara), 104 disclosure. See self-disclosure. distance, 16, 39,
87
divine, 3, 5, 25, 26, 75, 122; custom,
34; decrees, 126; glory,
82; life,
84; longing for, 128; manifes- tation, 40; mercy
and wrath, 42; nurturing,
82; power, 110;
presence, 26, 102; proof
(burhān), 112; quarry, 95;
severity, 43; speech, 82; tre-
mendousness,
42; divinely- given (ladunī)
knowledge, 111, 122; divinity,
58, 90, 91. See also address,
beauty.
divorce, 33
dogma, Ashʿarite, 71, 138n19, 142n8;
dogmatic theology (see theology)
drinking place (mashrab), 35, 117
drunk(en) (mast), 82, 125
duality, of knower and known, 58; of subject and object, 19
dust (ghabra,
turāb, ghubār), 83, 87, 95, 119; dust mote, 34
earth (arḍ), 35, 66, 76, 83, 86, 88,
96, 103, 116, 118, 121; sev-
enth, 114; throne to, 58, 61,
96; earthly existence, 88;
form, 82;
pre-earthly life, 35 ecstasy (wajd),
28, 135n3; ecstatic,
5, 8, 28
ego, 20; alter-ego, 42; egoistic
desires, 25
Egypt, 24, 108, 111, 112
elect (khāṣṣa), 71, 81, 82, 145n59, 146n12
Elias, Jamal, 131n2
emanation (ṣudūr, fayḍ), 39, 40,
140n35
embodied,
79; existence, 35; life,
76, 86
embryo, 84
endless (abadī),
65, 66, 81, 114,
123
enjoyment (ghibṭa, ḥaẓẓ), 23, 124
enmity (ʿadāwa), eye of, 42
envy, 20, 112
Ernst, Carl, 8, 27, 28, 55, 90,
91, 130n20, 135n3, 139n31
eros, 38
essence (dhāt),
57–60, 61–73 et passim; as annihilating, 59, 63; associated with
Muhammad’s
beauty, 122– 23; associated with specific love or beauty, 76, 93; associ- ated with tremendousness, 91; relation to
attributes, 16–17, 64–65, 144n37;
attri-
butes of, 65–67, 72, 73, 84, 85;
Muhammad’s vision of, 122; names of, 70; needing cloth- ing, veil, or mirror,
62, 91,
114, 117; self-disclosure of,
62, 63, 78, 79, 85, 93, 104, 120,
126, 127; symbolized by sun,
108-109, 118; unknowability
of, 56–60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68,
69, 73, 77, 113, 114
estimation (wahm), 141n1. See
imaginings.
eternity (qidam), 59, 63, 66, 76, 77,
78, 79, 81, 88, 91, 93, 105, 109,
110, 114, 116, 118, 121,
141n47; of eternity, 59, 104.
See also beginninglessness. ethics (ʿilm al-akhlāq), 13, 14,
19–21; ethical, 2, 3, 31
etiquette (ādāb), 19 Ettinghausen, Richard, 132n8 evil (sūʾ), 29, 136n6, 136n7; eye of
(ʿayn al-sūʾ), 42; problem of,
9; traits (masāwiʾ), 42. See
badness.
exaltedness (ʿizza), 69, 81, 114
Exalter (rāfiʿ),
64; exaltation, 67
excellence (faḍīla), 38
exegesis, Qurʾrānic
(tafsīr) 6; exegete (mufassir), 55
existence (wujūd), 14, 17, 18, 21,
43, 56, 57, 58, 61, 69, 77, 78,
89, 95, 96,
119; bringer-of- existence or Existence-giver (mūjid), 42, 61, 62; created,
75; earthly,
88; eternal, 61, 65;
human, 82, 84, 99, 128; quid- dity (māhiyya) of, 119; subtle,
95. See being.
existent (mawjūd), 14, 23, 57, 62 Exodus, 144n21
eye (ʿayn, chashm), 22, 59, 77, 98,
99, 115, 116, 124, 127; begin-
ningless, 114; merciful, 124;
Muhammad’s, 126, 127; of
beauty, 22; of beholder, 46; of
contentment, 42–43,
45, 46, 47,
118–19; of desire, 117; of evil,
42; of gathering (ʿayn al-jamʿ),
90–91, 96, 97, 98, 119, 124, 125,
127, 149n66;
of intellect, 97, 98; of the Real, 126; of recog- nizers and witnessers, 41; of separation
(ʿayn al-tafriqa), 91, 98, 119, 149n66; of spirit, 96,
97, 98, 125; two (inner) eyes,
97, 149n66; eyesight, 124
face (wajh, rū), 1, 66, 81, 87, 109,
118; Adam’s, 93, 104, 105;
beautiful, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95,
98, 125, 148n41; comely,
94;
deemed ugly,
105; hand- some, 89; Joseph’s
110, 122; Muhammad’s, 122; of
eter- nal beauty, 109; severe, 105
faith (īmān),
12, 31, 46, 93, 121; man of pure faith (ḥanīf), 118,
falsafa, 11, 54, 142n4
Fārābī, al-, 14, 16, 23, 39, 133n12
Fārisī, Kamāl al-Dīn,
132n2 Farley, Edward, 1, 2
Fārs, 5, 56
Fasā, 5
fayḍ, 39, 140n35
fear (khawf), 16, 22, 35, 37, 106, 148n51
female, 38, 83,
112
fidèles d’amour, 7 fidelity, 135n3 fiqh, 38
fire, 83, 94
First (awwal), 14, 23, 24, 61;
Cause, 14, 22, 51, 61;
Principle,
17, 24
fiṭra, 61; fiṭrat al-ḥusn, 102, 107
fitting (lāʾiq), 15, 69; befitting
(zībanda), 136n9
foot (qadam), 66
Footstool (kursī),
122, 123
forbearance
(ḥilm), 31
forgivingness, 67
form (ṣūra), 31, 32, 83, 85, 91, 115,
117; Adam’s, 98; beauty of,
84, 90; bodily,
84; earthly, 82;
God’s, 85, 97, 98, 115; human,
79, 85, 91, 129n5; most beau-
tiful, 32, 36, 55, 89, 124, 125,
137n15; of beauty, 86; world of, 84
fountainhead (ʿayn), 60
fragrance (rāʾiḥa), 88, 125 frame(s), bodily (ashbāḥ), 94,
(haykal) 18, 95
freshness (ṭarāwa) of divine act, 93
friends (awliyāʾ), 127; friend-
ship (walāya), 82; intimate
friendship
(khilla), 117; inti-
mate friend (khalīl), 119, 121
fruit, first of season (bākūra), 126
futuwwa, 20
Gabriel, ḥadīth of, 12, 31, 137n14
garb (kiswa),
94, 95, 122, 123; of angels, 112; of His majesty and beauty, 115; of Lordship,
96, 109, 112. See garment.
garden (janna, bāgh), 21, 39, 97,
126, 127
garment (kiswa), 34, 35. See garb. gathering. See eye.
gaze (naẓar), 76, 84, 87, 89, 90, 96,
117, 121, 125, 148n38,
148n41,
148n51
general (ʿāmm), act, 90, 125;
beauty, 90, 91, 93, 99; con-
trasted with specific (khāṣṣ) 76, 81, 82, 90, 91, 93, 99, 124,
125; love, 76, 81
generosity (karam), 20, 94
gentleness (luṭf), 16, 24, 43, 67, 104,
112, 119, 127; names
of, 16
ghabra, 87
ghayb, 59
ghayba, 59
Ghazālī,
Abū Ḥāmid al-, 4, 11,
15, 16, 21, 30, 33, 132n8,
138n19, 142n4, 145n50
Ghazālī, Aḥmad, 4, 22, 27, 30,
83, 134n23
ghulām, 110
Gimaret, Daniel, 33, 132n9, 138n19
gloriousness (subūḥiyya), 109;
glories (subuḥāt), 114
glory (majd), 82 gnosis, 134n20 Gnosticism, 134n20
God, encounter
with, 12, 40, 52,
53, 55, 80, 88, 98, 99, 121; as
eternal shāhid, 82; image of, 107;
in His aloneness, 49;
transcendent,
53, 60; unknowable and hidden,
57; God-human relationship, 37,
38; God-given (ladunī)
knowledge,
111, 122 Gonzalez, Valérie, 131n2, 132n7,
135n26
good (khayr),
14, 94; absolute, 21; sheer, 51; good(ly) (ṭayyib),
88, 125, 148n38; goodness and beauty (ḥusn),
29–31, 119, 138n18, 139n30
grammar, Arabic, 5, 6
gratitude
(shukr), 46
Greek, 4, 17, 18, 26, 29, 39, 51
greenery (khuḍra), 90, 125, 148n41
grooming,
personal, 12
guide, 62, 71, 99, 117, 148n51
ḥadathān, 141n47.
See temporal origination.
Ḥadīth, 5, 6, 26, 28, 31, 32, 38, 50,
52, 54, 55, 56, 65; commen-
tary, 6, 58, 69, 89, 94, 124
Ḥallāj, al-, 7, 9
Hamadānī ʿAyn al-Quḍāt,
4, 22,
81, 135n3, 137n15
Ḥanbalī, 55
hand (yad),
66, 84, 85, 112
handsome (ṣabīḥ), 89 happiness (saʿāda), 30, 133n20
harmony, 24, 30
ḥasan, 30, 32, 34, 38, 42, 43, 71, 72,
89, 90, 105; ḥasana, 30, 31,
136n6; ḥasuna, 12, 30, 41. See
ḥusn, ḥisān. ḥayy, 64
He-ness (huwiyya), 68
hearing (samʿ),
56, 65, 66, 80
heart (qalb,
fuʾād, dil), 22, 25, 34,
70, 96, 135n1; Adam’s, 122;
Muhammad’s 122–24;
tight-
hearted (tang-dilān),
93
heavens (samāwāt), 18, 66, 93,
103, 108, 116, 118,
121
hermeneutics, 2, 52
hidden (makhfī), essence,
59, 69,
77; God, 57;
treasure (see treasure); hiddenness (khafāʾ) of beauty,
39; (pinhān), 97
hierarchy, 22, 36, 44, 106
ḥijāb, 117
Ḥijāz, 6
ḥilm, 31
ḥisān, 18, 92, 94, 149n53
Hoca, Nazif, 4, 8
holiness (quds),
69, 71, 90, 123;
holy (qudsī),
62, 82, 94, 103,
105, 109, 111
hope (rajāʾ),
22, 31, 35, 37, 106,
127
horse (faras),
15
ḥudūth, 57, 141n47
Hughes, Aaron, 13
ḥulūl, 126
human (being), acts, 56–57, 60–61; and
cosmic beauty, 90, 92; and God, 37, 38, 108;
cognitive
capacity, 26; con- duct, 33; face, 89, 94, 98, 105;
language,
52, 53; love, 22, 83;
mirroring
the divine, 92, 95;
best of, 106; and angels,
105–
107;
formation of, 85; origi- nal state of, 102; purpose of life, 4, 107; world,
98. See also creation, form, nature, perfection.
humbleness,
20
humility, 36
ḥusn (defined), 29–32, 36–37;
(mentioned) 3, 11, 15, 28, 34,
35, 38, 40, 42, 45, 64, 73, 101;
as eternal attribute
of God’s
essence, 72, 73; as belonging
to God alone,
43, 44, 45; as encompassing jamāl and
jalāl, 85, 146n61; as one of the most
specific descrip- tions of God, 72; associated with ʿishq, 83; associated with light, 39, 95; contrasted
with jamāl,
37, 47, 105; al-Daylamī’s explanation of, 39; identified with being, 47;
nīkūʾī as Persian transla- tion of,
136n9; interrelation with other terms, 39, 44, 72; Qurʾānic primacy of over jamāl, 37; aḥsan, 12, 31,
36, 45, 64, 72, 89, 102, 123;
aḥsan al-khāliqīn, 73; aḥsan
ṣūra, 32; aḥsana, 30, 31;
al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā, 16, 68, 71, 133n20; fiṭrat
al-ḥusn, 102, 107; al-ḥusn al-kullī, 39;
ḥusnā, 73, 78, 85, 123, 136n6;
shaṭr al-ḥusn, 107. See ḥasan, ḥisān.
huwiyya, 68
ḥuzn, 23
I-ness (anāniyya), 67–68
Iblīs, 9, 91, 103, 104, 112
Ibn al-ʿArabī, 4, 16, 20, 22, 142n2, 142n4, 149n66
Ibn ʿAṭāʾ, Aḥmad, 41 Ibn Dabbāgh, 132n8
Ibn Ḥanbal,
Aḥmad, 34, 52 Ibn Haytham, 131n2
Ibn Khafīf,
120, 142n8, 147n38, 148n38
Ibn Manẓūr, 29
Ibn Sīnā, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 39, 140n35
iconoclasm, Hebraic and Christian, 2
ignorance (jahl),
46, 67, 104, 105,
111
iḥsān, 3, 12, 30, 31
Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ,
17, 18, 142n2 ʿilla al-ūlā, al-, 51
Illuminationist (ishrāqī), 24, 30
ʿilm, 53;
contrasted with maʿrifa, 53, 134n20; ʿilm al-akhlāq, 19;
ʿilm al-nafs, 21
iltibās, 90, 109, 117, 121. See
clothing.
image, 53, 63; of God, 25, 107
imagery,
3, 50
imagination (khayāl), 141n1, 149n66
imaginings (awhām),
69, 70. See
estimation.
īmān, 12, 31, 46
imperfection, 26, 41, 72; imper-
fect being, 15
incapacity (ʿajz), 46, 58, 69
incomparability (tanzīh), 53, 57,
58, 67, 69, 76, 149n2
indwelling (ḥulūl), 126 infidelity, 135n3
infinite,
glory, 17; God, 53; plea- sure and splendor, 23; regress, 61
ingratitude (kufr), 46 initiation, tattered
cloak of, 5
inner (bāṭin),
11, 25, 26, 84, 86, 102; beauty (see beauty); cor- respondence between outer and inner beauty, 94, 95;
eyes, 97
insān, 102
inṣidār, 39
intellect (ʿaql),
23, 26, 52, 69, 79,
97, 112, 141n1, 149n66; eye of,
97–98; non-compound (basīṭ),
78–79, 97; partial, 97; singu-
lar, 79; universal, 78, 97; intel- lection, 13; intellective (ʿaqlī)
innate
nature, 62; pleasure, 17; world, 23
intelligible (maʿqūl), 12, 17, 21, 25; contrasted with sensible, 23; realm or world,
14, 18, 23,
25, 26; intelligibility, 22, 24,
25, 26
intermediary (wāsiṭa), 40, 63, 88,
113, 114, 118, 120, 121
intimacy (uns), 16, 71, 76, 89, 95,
127; station
of, 41; seeking
intimacy (istiʾnās), 11, 89–90,
95, 96, 116, 119, 120, 126,
147n38;
intimate friendship (khilla), 117;
intimate friend (khalīl), 119, 121
intoxication (sukr), 82, 98, 113,
121, 125, 135n1
invincibility (jabarūt), 82
Iran, 6, 8, 27
Iraq, 6
ʿIrāqī, Fakhr al-Dīn,
4
ʿirfān, 11, 134n20
Islam, 1, 2, 23, 46, 86, 107, 122;
islām, 12, 31
ism al-aʿẓam, 145n56; al-asmāʾ
al-ḥusnā, 16, 68, 71, 133n20; al-asmāʾ
al-ʿiẓām, 70. See name.
ʿishq, 38, 54, 108, 110, 139n31;
beginninglessness
of, 83; contrasted with maḥabba, 37
ishrāqī, 24
istahjana, 139n29
istiḥsān, 38; istaḥsana, 37, 139n29, 139n30
iṣṭināʿ, 42
istiʾnās, 89, 116
Ivanow, Vladimir, 7
Izutsu, Toshihiko, 30, 31
Jacob, 23, 24, 33, 108–12,
120
jalāl, 16, 24, 39, 68, 72, 73, 85,
145n48, 146n61; jalāliyya, 73
jalīl, 64, 72, 78, 138n19, 146n61
jamʿ, ʿayn al-,
90
jamāl, (defined), 32–37; (men- tioned), 3, 12, 14, 15, 28, 30,
39, 43, 64, 67, 71, 76, 77, 82,
87, 91, 93, 98, 101–14,
120–26,
137n15, 138n18, 139n21,
141n1, 145n48;
as attribute of God(’s act), 34, 68, 72, 73; as
subsumed under ḥusn/ḥusnā, 72, 78, 85, 146n61;
etymolog- ical connection to camel (jamal),
138n17; contrasted with ḥusn,
37, 50, 105, 136n9;
contrasted with majesty (jalāl), 24, 138; covenant
as
unveiling of, 81, 88; names
of, 16; jamāl al-qidam,
63; jamāl al-ṣūra, 84; jamāl- parastī, 4, 99; jamāliyya, 73
jamal, 32, 137n17
Jāmī, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, 4, 28, 111
jamīl, 12, 33, 34, 35, 43, 45, 47, 72,
78, 104, 138n17, 138n19,
139n21, 146n61
Jawharī, Ismāʿīl
b. Ḥammād al-, 29
jealousy (ghayra), 118, 124
Jesus, 101, 123, 149n2
Jewish, philosophers, 13
jinn, 83, 84
Joseph, 20, 23, 24, 33, 101, 107–13,
115, 116, 120, 122, 123,
150n19, 150n30
journey, 86, 96, 102; of human
spirits, 7, 75, 76, 80, 102
joy (rajāʾ),
22, 25, 35, 37; (ṭarab),
118; joyous
(mustabshira), 87 Judgment, Day of, 86–88 jurisprudence
(fiqh), 5, 6, 11, 38;
jurist, 11, 98
justice (ʿadl), 16
juzʾī, 44
kalām, 6, 7, 11, 51, 54, 55, 142n4
kallos, 29
Kant, Immanuel, 146n61
kanz, 59
kasb, 60
kashf, 54, 90
Kaʿba, 108, 109
kayfa, bi-lā, 52, 55
keys (mafātīḥ), 59, 71, 103
khāfiḍ, 64
khalq, 19, 85, 95, 110
khayr, 149n53; al-khayr al-maḥḍ, 51
khirqa, 5
khiṭāb, 80, 146n12
khizāna, 59
Khudrī, Abū Saʿīd al-, 96
khuluq, 85, 95, 110
Kindī, al-, 39
kingdom (mulk), 40; of heaven (malakūt al-samāʾ), 18
Kirmānī, Awḥad al-Dīn, 4 kiss, 126–27
knowledge (ʿilm), 43, 51, 69, 78,
103, 106, 113, 122; Adam’s,
103, 105, 112; as divine attri-
bute, 56, 65, 66, 67, 133n12;
and beauty,
43, 111, 112, 122;
and love, 95; contrasted with recognition (maʿrifa),
53, 134n20; experiential knowl- edge (maʿrifa), 53, 122;
God’s, 53, 76, 77, 78; God-
given (ladunī), 111, 122; of
divine
essence, 63, 68; of divine names and attributes, 65, 71, 103–104; sources of,
51–52; unknown (majhūl),
122. See
also recognition. knower (ʿālim),
of God, 95; of
God’s
essence, 59; and known (maʿlūm), 14, 19, 58; contrasted with
angels, 106
kohl, 124
kufr, 41, 46
kullī, 44; al-ḥusn al-kullī, 39; al-ʿaql
al-kullī, 78
kun, 77
kunh, 59
Lane, Edward
William, 30 language, 7, 14, 27, 30, 39, 50; col-
lapse of, 53;
cryptic and flowery, 3, 135n1; equivocal,
9; Greek philosophical, 39;
inadequacy
of, 52–53; mythic, 49; of dogmatic the- ology, 51, 54, 55; philosophi-
cal, 26, 43, 44, 45, 51;
Qurʾānic,
16, 25, 25, 29–35,
54; Rūzbihān’s, 27, 28, 39, 45,
50, 54–55, 135n1, 135n3; Sufi,
53, 54, 142n4
Latin, 4
laudation (thanāʾ), 69–70, 125
legalism,
2
Lewisohn, Leonard, 148n38, 148n41
lexicographer, 29, 30
life (ḥayā), as divine attribute, 56, 64, 65, 66, 67, 84, 85, 133n12;
bringing back to, 120, 121,
125; embodied, 76, 86; human,
2, 17, 22, 26, 73, 75, 86, 88, 93,
99, 107; pre-earthly, 35;
Rūzbihān’s,
5–6, 7, 8; this life
and next, 86, 87, 127; life-giver
(muḥyī), 16; the Living, 64 light (nūr), 78, 122; as divine name,
64; beaming (sawāṭiʿ), 112; holy (qudsī),
109; of divine quarry (maʿdin ilāhī),
95; of election (ikhtiṣāṣ), 119; of eter- nity (qidam), 118; of faith, 93; of Footstool, 122; of general act (fiʿl ʿāmm), 90, 125; of God,
39, 71, 94, 95; of God’s act, 62,
120; of God’s
attributes, 81, 90,
110, 117, 118, 122, 123, 124,
125; of God’s beauty, 104; of
God’s essence,
59, 71, 81, 90,
118, 123, 124, 125, 127; of
God’s majesty and beauty, 85, 94; of God’s
self-disclosure, 93, 95; of Muhammad’s face,
122; of six
attributes, 67; of sovereignty of the All- Merciful, 95; of specific
act (fiʿl khāṣṣ), 90, 117, 125; of Throne,
122, 123; of
truthfulness, 119;
of
witnessing, 111, 115, 126; realities (ḥaqāʾiq) of, 122
litterateur (adīb),
4, 11, 12, 13
longing, 25, 128
Lord (rabb),
32, 36, 40, 62, 63, 66,
68, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89,
92, 103, 113, 116–27 passim,
135n1, 137n15; Lordship (rubūbiyya), 96, 105, 109, 112
loss, 2, 24, 33
love (ḥubb, ʿishq, maḥabba), 1, 9, 19,
22, 25, 31, 37, 38, 39, 49, 54, 93,
94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 106, 108, 112,
113, 119, 135n1, 139n31,
140n31, 150n19; and beauty, 3, 21–23, 81, 93, 111, 116; and
knowledge,
95; and sorrow, 23–24; as station on Sufi path,
35, 117; as voluntary
worship of God, 106–107;
beginning- less, 147n19;
cast on Moses, 115–16; clothing of, 94: com- mand of, 78; contrasted with faith, 93; covenant of, 80, 86,
88, 99, 126, 128; excessive, 124; general (ʿāmm) and specific (khāṣṣ), 76, 81–82, 90; God’s, 26,
93, 96, 127; for God, 26, 83, 92,
95–96, 99, 110, 124; for Joseph,
24, 110, 111; of beautiful faces,
89, 98; of beauty, 5, 12, 19, 25,
33, 34, 35, 36, 63, 73, 76, 78, 96,
125, 126, 127; tongue of, 118; ultimate object of, 21; source
of all, 22; unfulfilled, 24; lover, 8,
19, 22, 76, 77, 81, 83, 92, 93, 106,
119, 125, 127; of God, 25, 86, 92,
95–96, 113, 118. See also
beloved. lust, 20
macrocosm,
4
magnificence (kibriyāʾ), 69, 78,
81, 87, 114
maḥabba, 37, 78, 82, 111, 115;
maḥabbat-i ilāhī, 81. See love.
maḥbūb, 22
majesty (jalāl),
16, 17, 24, 37, 39,
58, 64, 67, 68, 69, 73, 78, 79,
81, 82, 83–88 passim, 94, 104,
109, 115, 118, 123, 127, 141n1,
145n48; the Majestic, 64
malaʾ al-aʿlā, al-, 18
malāḥa, 115
malakūt, 84
male, 83
malīḥ, 89
man, 34, 83, 96; of pure faith
(ḥanīf), 118; righteous, 110;
young (fatā),
20
manifestation (ẓuhūr), 19, 42, 47,
60, 62, 63, 73, 78, 80, 85, 117,
123, 135n1; of God’s acts, 77; of God’s attributes, 66–67, 73; of God’s beauty, 39, 40,
45, 49, 80–82, 84, 92, 98, 104,
113, 120; of God’s essence, 62
maqām, 35, 76
maʿrifa, 52, 53,
104, 134n20; contrasted with ʿilm,
53; contrasted with nakara, 104; ahl al-maʿrifa, 39; maʿārif, 141n42. See recognition.
martyr, 7
maʿshūq, 22
Masjid-i ʿAtīq, 1, 6
Massignon,
Louis, 7
Maybudī, Rashīd al-Dīn, 20, 147n19
Mayer, Toby, 55, 142n4 Mecca, 6
medicine,
2; for soul, 19
mercy (raḥma),
16, 24, 42, 61, 88;
merciful,
16, 24, 67, 95, 123,
124
messenger, 31, 96, 101, 122, 123,
127; messengerhood, 108
metaphor, 53, 54
metaphysics, 11, 13, 37, 39
microcosm,
4, 92
mineral, 25
miracles, 35, 108
miʿrāj, 20
mirror (mirʾāt,
āyina), 4, 18, 22,
35, 63, 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 101,
104, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115,
118, 120, 126, 127
Miṣrī, Dhū al-Nūn al-, 89, 147n38,
148n38
modern, 2, 4, 7, 27, 32, 37, 148n51
mold (kālbud), 93
monotheism,
80
moon (qamar),
108, 116, 117, 118,
119, 121
Moses, 40, 59, 60, 62–63, 82, 91,
101, 113–16, 120, 121, 123,
124, 125
mosque, 1, 6 moth, 141n1
mountain, 40, 59, 62, 63, 69, 113,
114, 115, 120; Mount Bamū, 6
Mughal prince, 28
Muhammad, 1, 12, 21, 31, 34, 36,
89, 101, 102, 107, 108, 110,
119, 122–27, 142n2. See
Prophet.
muḥsin, 30, 31
muḥyī, 16
Muʿīn, Muḥammad, 6, 140n32
mukāshafa, 54
muktasaba, 57
multiplicity, 17, 65, 79
mumīt, 16
munificence
(sakhāʾ), 94
Murata, Sachiko, 137n14, 145n48
mushāhada, 52, 54, 106, 121
music, 12, 17, 18, 146n61; of
spheres, 17 Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj, 34
mustaḥsan, 28, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43,
44, 45, 46, 116, 142n5
mustaḥsin, 116
mustaʾnis, 89
mustaqbaḥ, 28, 40–46
Muʿtazilism, 54, 56, 65; Muʿtazilite,
33, 52, 56, 65
nakara, 104
name (ism), divine,
16–17, 24, 25,
67, 68–73, 108, 132n9, 133n20,
138n19, 145n50;
ninety-nine, 16, 33, 65; known to the elect, 145n59; taught to Adam, 103;
tremendous, 70; most tre- mendous, 71; most beautiful (al-asmāʾ al-ḥusnā), 16, 21, 24,
31, 47, 49, 75, 78, 79, 99, 103;
relation to attributes, 64 nature (ṭabīʿa), 4, 119; (ṭabʿ), 76;
innate human
nature (fiṭra), 61, 62, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107,
113; natural beauty,
90; phe-
nomena, 35
naw-āmadagān, 141n47
naẓar, 51
negation (apophasis), 53, 54; neg- ative descriptions of God, 52 Neoplatonism, 17, 18; Neoplatonic
explanation of beauty, 39
Nguyen,
Martin, 142n4 niche (mishkā), 94, 95
night, 95, 116, 117, 118, 137n15
nightingale, 27, 135n1
nīkūʾī, 30, 92, 136n9
nisbī, 44
non-compound (basīṭ) intellect, 78, 79
nonbeing (ʿadam), 47. See
nonexistence.
nonexistence (ʿadam), 43, 44, 46,
61, 66, 77, 105, 109. See
nonbeing.
Nūrbakhsh,
Jawād, 6, 8, 130n21, 140n32
Nūrī, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-, 141n42 nurturing (tarbiyya), 82, 86, 117
nuṭfa, 83
Nwyia, Paul, 7
ocean (baḥr),
59, 69, 77, 81, 122
oneness (waḥda),
17, 20, 58, 65,
69, 105; the One (aḥad),
39
ontology, 14–17; ontological
analysis of beauty, 15, 28, 31,
44, 45, 47,
93; difference between human and cosmic beauty,
90; perfection, 14;
scheme, 28, 40–41, 44
optics, 12, 26, 132n2
order, 13, 15, 17, 24, 26, 36, 65, 66,
94; Rūzbihāniyya, 8
origin, 4, 18, 21, 25, 26, 75, 99,
111, 128; origination, 14. See
temporal origination.
outer (ẓāhir),
beauty, 37, 86, 94,
95; garment, 34, 35
Papan-Matin, Firoozeh, 8, 130n16
paradise, 34, 95, 102
paradox, 53, 54
pardoning (ṣafḥ),
33
partial (juzʾī), beauty, 39, 44;
intellect, 97
participation, 40
Pasā, 6
Pasargadae,
5
path, 20, 22, 26, 35, 62, 66, 92, 93,
96, 99
patience (ṣabr),
33
perception, 3, 18, 22, 23, 38–46
passim, 58, 60, 69, 75, 79, 91,
96, 105, 110, 111, 112, 113,
119, 121, 124, 147n35; defec-
tive, 46; two
eyes and their objects of, 97; incapacity in, 58,
69; perceiver, 37, 46, 89,
95, 125, 148n51; perceptible
things, 4
perfection (kamāl), 15, 25, 67, 87,
94, 101, 110, 132n8,
133n20;
human, 26, 101, 107, 127,
133n20; of beauty, 22, 43; of
being, 14, 16, 23, 24, 26, 41,
45; of God,
110; of Muslim faith and worship, 12; of original human state, 102
perfume, 96
Persepolis,
5
Persia, 5
philosophy, 2, 11, 13, 15, 21, 50,
51, 54, 55; philosopher, 4,
11–26 passim, 39, 50, 51, 52,
53, 78; philosophical lan-
guage, 43–45
piety, 31
planets (sayyāragān), 108
pleasure (ladhdha), 2, 17, 22, 23,
25, 77, 79, 82, 89, 125, 132n8,
148n38; pleasingness, 30, 138n18
plenum (malaʾ),
highest, 18 Plotinus, 11, 18, 133n16, 133n17;
Plotinian, 17, 19, 23, 133n16
plumpness, 138n17
poetry, 8, 11, 53; poetics, 11, 12,
13, 26; poet, 2, 4, 12, 22,
27, 50
political, 13, 28; politicized
Islam, 1
postmodern,
1, 2
Potiphar, 24, 111
Pourjavady, Nasrollah, 136n9, 140n31
power (qudra), as divine attri- bute, 56, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 92,
110, 111, 123; the Powerful
(al-qādir), 64
prayer, 95, 126
presence (ḥaḍra),
divine, 26, 35,
45, 60, 79, 82, 84, 102
prettiness,
30, 138n18
primordial,
80, 83, 86, 99, 107 property, ruling (ḥukm), 78;
specific (khāṣṣa), 115
prophet, 63, 70, 76, 77, 82, 99,
101, 102, 107, 109, 110, 111,
112, 114, 116, 120, 150n2;
Prophet (Muhammad), 20,
31, 32, 34, 36, 55, 58, 63, 69,
70, 89, 92, 95, 115, 122–27,
137n15, 142n2
prophetology, 5, 29, 101
proportion, 15, 18, 30, 38, 39
prostration, 102, 103, 104, 108,
109, 112, 115, 120
psychology (ʿilm al-nafs), 5, 13,
14, 21–24, 46
punishment,
87, 106
pupil, black, 94
purity (ṣafāʾ),
25, 94
Pythagoreanism, 17, 18
qādir, 64
qahr, 16
qalb, 22
qatara, 87
qibla, 93, 104, 115
qidam, 141n47; jamāl al-qidam, 63;
shāhid al-qidam, 110
quality (naʿt),
68, 69, 78, 81, 88,
89, 103, 126, 127
quarry (maʿdin), 39, 62, 66, 90, 95,
101, 109, 111, 117, 120, 126
qubḥ, 28, 29, 40, 43, 44, 47, 72, 105
quiddity
(māhiyya), 14, 42, 47,
119
Qurʾān, 5, 6, 29, 36, 38, 50,
54, 55, 65; commentators
(mufassirūn), 111, 116, 121; exegesis or commentary (tafsīr), 6, 7, 66, 67, 68, 108,
147n21;
language or termi- nology of, 16, 25, 29–35, 53,
54, 55, 92; rational interpre-
tation of, 52; recitation, 24;
reciters,
12
Qushayrī, Abū al-Qāsim al-, 16, 33, 61, 87, 138n19,
141n43,
142n8, 143n8, 145n50
rāfiʿ, 64
Raine, Kathleen, 2
rationalism, 52; rationalist, 25,
52, 61; rational
soul, 20, 21,
22; speculation (naẓar), 51,
52, 53
Rāzī, Abū Bakr al-, 20
Rāzī, Fakhr al-Dīn al-, 133n18,
144n37
Rāzī, Najm
al-Dīn Dāya, 141n2 Real (al-ḥaqq), 38, 59, 70, 81, 82,
88, 89, 90, 94, 95, 96, 109, 110,
113, 120–27 passim
reality (ḥaqīqa), 37, 58, 69, 84, 94,
96, 103, 104, 110, 113, 115,
118, 122; of
reality, 59 recognition (maʿrifa, shinākht),
(defined), 52–53, 134n20;
(mentioned), 14, 19, 36, 37,
49, 56, 68, 73, 75, 77, 78, 81,
88, 90, 94, 99, 105, 106, 111,
122, 125; and beauty,
41, 104;
and love, 96;
as limitless, 70; contrasted with disavowal (nakara), 104; folk of, 39;
incapacity in, 46, 58; of God,
61–62, 81, 119, 121; of God’s
acts,
attributes, and names, 62, 68, 79, 81; of God’s
essence, 57, 58, 62, 79; of one-
self, 92; preparedness for, 79; Yea (Q 7:172) as recognition
of God, 81–83
recognizer (ʿārif), 41, 42, 58, 59,
69, 70, 71, 91, 95, 96, 115, 126,
134n20, 147n38
recollection, 18, 89
regress, infinite, 61
relative (nisbī), 46; beauty, 44–45;
perfection,
15; things, 105; ugliness, 45; realm of relativ- ity, 101
religion, 1, 2, 12; religious
sciences (ʿulūm), 5, 51
remembrance (dhikr), 18, 31, 69,
70, 81, 127; rememberer
(dhākir), 70
reminder, 25, 88, 89
repentance
(tawba), 35, 62
return, 18, 35, 58, 75, 76, 99, 102,
128
Rhazes. See Rāzī, Abū Bakr al-. rhetoric, 12, 13, 26
riḍā, 42, 141n43 rosary, 145n50
rose (ward, gul), 27, 95, 126, 127, 135n1
Rūmī, Jalāl
al-Dīn, 4, 22, 128 Russell, George William, 2 Rūzbihān Baqlī, life of, 5–6;
ʿAbhar al-ʿāshiqīn, 6, 7, 8, 27,
38, 54, 81, 84, 90, 102, 108,
121, 124, 126, 140n32; ʿArāʾis
al-bayān, 6, 42, 116; Ghalaṭāt
al-sālikīn, 6; Kashf al-asrār, 6,
7, 8, 32, 55; Kitāb al-ighāna, 6,
7; Lawāmiʿ al-tawḥīd, 6;
Masālik al-tawḥīd, 6, 7, 50, 52,
54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 65, 66, 71,
142n8; al-Maknūn fī ḥaqāʾiq al-kalim al-nabawiyya, 6, 36, 143n15; Manṭiq al-asrār, xi, 6, 89, 148n40; Mashrab al-arwāḥ, 6, 7, 8, 20, 35, 36, 42, 58, 60,
66, 71, 72, 76, 77, 79, 80, 83,
84, 86, 88, 89, 102, 108, 115,
118, 119, 124, 130n21, 139n22,
141n42; Risālat al-quds, 6, 146n10; Sayr al-arwāḥ, 6, 76,
77; Sharḥ-i shaṭḥiyyāt, 6, 7, 76, 135n1, 148n41
Rūzbihān Thānī,
ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, 141n1, 151n58
Rūzbihān Thānī, Sharaf al-Dīn, 8, 129n1
Rūzbihāniyya order, 8
ruʾya, 32, 52
ṣabr, 33
ṣafḥ, 33
saints (awliyāʾ), 76, 77, 82; saint-
hood (walāya), 8, 111
Salghurid
dynasty, 5
samāʿ, 52, 80, 146n10
Samʿānī, Aḥmad, 16, 22, 147n19
samʿiyyāt, 56
sandal, 34
ṣāniʿ, 62, 97
ṣanīʿat, 98
Saqaṭī,
al-Sarī al-, 87 Saunders, Corinne, 2
Scarry, Elaine, 2, 146n61, 148n51 scent, 96
Schimmel,
Annemarie, 8, 27, 28, 135n1
script, beautiful, 15
secret (sirr), 59, 71, 94, 110, 121,
122, 124; of secrets, 122;
secret core (sirr),
22, 59, 69,
118
seeking, 22, 25, 58, 86, 88, 94, 116,
118, 120, 126, 128; seekers of
God, 98, 117. See also
intimacy.
self-disclosure (tajallī), 19, 40, 41,
42, 49, 54, 59, 63, 73, 77, 78,
79, 81, 85, 87, 93, 94, 95, 104,
109, 113, 117, 120, 122, 126,
127, 141n42
self-sacrifice, 20
Seljuk period, 5
Sells, Michael,
24, 53
senses, 4, 25, 53; sensory encoun- ter with beautiful objects, 88–89; means of expressing beauty, 12;
things, 18
sensibility, 13
sensible, beauty,
21, 23, 91; level,
13; phenomena, 98; realm,
24; things or objects, 15, 16,
18; world, 12, 15, 25, 26, 89
separation (tafriqa), eye of 91, 97,
98, 119, 149n66
servant (ʿabd),
61, 94, 96, 116, 124, 133n20,
139n21; servant- hood (ʿubūdiyya),
79, 112
severity (qahr), 16, 24, 43, 67, 104,
105, 119, 127
shade (sāya), 39
Shāfiʿī, Ḥasan Maḥmūd al-, 140n31, 140n35
shahāda, 106
shāhid, 82, 98, 110; shāhid al-qidam,
110; shāhid-bāzī, 98
shahwa, 111
Sharaf al-Dīn Rūzbihān
Thānī.
See Rūzbihān Thānī.
Shariah,
93
Shiite, 138n21, 143n14
Shiraz, 5, 6, 56, 140n31
shukr, 46
ṣifa, 64, 144n23; ṣifāt dhātiyya, 65;
ṣifāt al-dhāt, 65; ṣifāt al-fiʿl, 65 sight or seeing (baṣar), as divine attribute, 56, 65, 66,
90, 125, 148n41; seeing (raʾā) con- trasted with looking (naẓara), 114; seeing God, 81, 86, 87,
91, 97, 113–15, 117, 118, 119,
124, 126, 127, 137n15
sign (āya), 25, 35, 49, 86, 93, 108,
117, 118, 121
Sirāj al-Dīn Maḥmūd
b. Khalīfa
b. ʿAbd al-Salām
b. Aḥmad
b. Sālba, 5
Sirius, 117
sirr, 22, 59
sitr, 117
sky, 121
smell, 88, 89, 148n38
sobriety,
121, 125; sober eye of
separation,
98
solitude,
19
Solomon, Wisdom of, 147n35 son, 20, 24, 33
song, 135n1
sorrow (ḥuzn),
22, 23–24, 25
soul (nafs, jān), 14, 20, 21, 62, 95, 135n1;
angelic, 21; animal, 18, 21, 25; beautification of,
17, 20, 99; human, 20, 24;
medicine for, 19; rational, 20,
21, 22;
relation to rūḥ, qalb, and sirr, 22;
universal and particular, 18; vegetative, 21,
25
source (ʿayn), 60; of all (ʿayn al- kull), 43; of source, 59, 60
sovereignty (malakūt), 84, 95, 116,
121
specific (khāṣṣ), 36, 66, 93, 145n57,
145n59, 146n12; act, 90, 114,
117, 125; address,
81, 146n12;
attribute,
66, 71, 104; beauty,
90, 91, 93, 99; characteristic
(khāṣṣiyya), 93, 111; con- trasted with
general (ʿāmm), 76, 81, 82, 90, 91, 93, 99, 124,
125; descriptions, 36, 72; eye-
sight, 124; love, 76, 81–82, 90; names, 70; property (khāṣṣa),
115; tongue, 88
speculation, rational (naẓar), 51–53
speech (kalām), 56, 65, 66, 82, 88,
89, 116
sperm (nuṭfa), 83, 84
spheres, celestial, 18; music of, 17
spirit (rūḥ, jān), 7, 22, 31, 49, 66,
67, 69, 82–86, 95, 126, 135n1,
141n1;
Adam’s, 104; audi- tion of, 80; birth of, 79–80,
83; blowing
of God’s, 66, 84,
104; contrasted with intel- lect, 97; drunken
(mast), 125;
eye of, 96–98, 125; holy
(qudsī), 82, 94; Jesus’s associ- ation
with, 149n2; journey of, 7, 35, 75, 80, 102; manifes- tation of beauty to, 81; Muhammad’s, 123; of
lovers, 77, 81; of prophets and
saints, 77,
82; pleasure of, 148n38; stations of, 76; wit- nessing God, 83
splendor (bahāʾ), 14, 17, 23, 127
star (najm), 108, 116, 117, 118, 119,
120, 121
state (ḥāl), 5, 22, 35, 36, 82, 97, 98,
114, 119, 135n3, 147n38
station (maqām), 7, 27, 35, 36, 41,
42, 58, 76, 79, 80, 83, 84, 88,
90, 117, 119, 125; highest, 102;
1,001 stations, 35, 42, 76, 79
stature (taqwīm), most beautiful
(aḥsan), 12, 31, 75, 85, 97
sublime, 4, 146n61
submission (islām), 12, 31
submissiveness (khushūʿ), 36
subsistence (baqāʾ),
65–66, 77, 81,
89, 114
substance
(jawhar), 57, 95
subtle (laṭīf),
79, 95, 120
ṣudūr, 39
Sufism (taṣawwuf,
ʿirfān), lan- guage of, 50–55, 142n4;
Rūzbihān’s training in, 5–6; Sufi path, 35; Sufis, 11–26
passim, 39, 60
Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā al-Maqtūl, 22, 24, 30
Suhrawardī, Shihāb al-Dīn
ʿUmar, 20
Sulamī, Abū ʿAbd al-Raḥmān
al-, 20
Sulaymānī, Parwīz, 133n11, 145n48
sun (shams), 93, 108–109, 116,
118, 119, 121
ṣunʿ, 97 supplication, 151n53
sūʾ, 29, 136n7; sūʾā, 136n6;
sayyiʾa, 136n6 sweetness (ḥalāwa),
88, 116
symbol, 1, 3, 25, 53, 63, 102, 117;
color
symbolism, 137n16 symmetry, 30
Syria, 6
Syriac, 17
tafriqa, 91, 148n48
tafsīr, 7
taḥsīn, 29
tajallī, 4, 19, 40, 54, 63, 73, 113, 135n1
Takeshita,
Masataka, 54, 139n31
talbīs, 91
tanzīh, 53, 149n66, 149n2
taqwīm, 85
taṣawwuf, 11, 134n20 tashbīh, 139n66,
149n2 taste, human, 13
tasting (dhawq),
53, 117
taʿṭīl, 144n41
tawḥīd, 20, 122
tazyīn, 29
temporal origination (ḥudūth), 57, 76, 82, 90, 113–14, 121,
125, 141n47; realm of tempo- ral origination (ḥudūthiyya),
114; temporally originated,
42, 57, 58, 61, 67, 69, 70, 119;
temporal being, 66, 70; exis-
tence, 49; realm,
24, 146n61
temptation,
1
test, 86, 88, 116
theology, 5, 14, 16–17, 50;
Ashʿarite, 55, 60, 65, 71; apo-
phatic, 60; cataphatic, 60;
Christian, 1; dogmatic theol- ogy (kalām),
5, 6, 7, 11, 50, 52,
54. 55, 56, 61, 67, 142n4; of
beauty, 29, 49; Theology of
Aristotle, 11
theologian, 2; Ashʿarite, 64; dog-
matic (mutakallimūn), 11, 12,
14, 16, 17, 25, 26, 33, 50, 51,
52, 53, 57, 60, 86, 98, 126,
145n48; Sufi-theologians, 145n50
throne (ʿarsh),
122, 123; to earth,
58, 61, 96
trace (athar),
18, 26, 42, 82, 110,
111, 119, 121, 138n21
traits, 20, 42; evil (masāwiʾ), 42.
See character. transcendence, 53, 57, 58, 60, 68,
69, 73
transformation, 26, 118
transparent, 96, 97
treasure (kanz), 19, 59, 79, 111;
hidden, 19, 49, 73, 75, 76, 77,
79, 99; treasure house or
treasury (khizāna), 59, 71,
103
tremendousness (ʿaẓama), 42, 58,
59, 69, 87, 91, 106, 114, 118,
119; tremendous character,
123; name, 70,
71
tribulation,
112 tune, out of, 133n17 Tustarī, Sahl al-, 87
udabāʾ, 13
ugliness (qubḥ), 26, 29, 40–47, 72,
104, 105, 119; as nonexis-
tence, 43,
46; Plotinus on, 133n17; ugly character traits,
25; qualities, 20, 99; deemed
ugly (mustaqbaḥ), 40–45, 104,
105, 141n42
unbelief (kufr),
41, 46, 98
uncreated, 70, 90, 91, 98, 121
unicity (waḥdāniyya), 58, 59, 61,
67, 68, 78
union (wiṣāl, waṣl), 22, 77, 128 universal (kullī), beauty,
38–39, 44; intellect, 78, 97;
soul, 18
universe (jahān), 76. See also
world.
unseenness (ghayba), 59; unseen
(ghayb), 42, 59, 79, 88, 103,
111, 119
unveiling (kashf, mukāshafa), 49, 54,
71, 81, 90, 103, 110, 118,
122
ʿurafāʾ, 141n42
veil (ḥijāb),
79, 82, 87, 117
vengefulness (intiqām), 67
vice, 20, 46, 99
virtue, 14, 20
vision (ruʾya), 5, 32, 36, 42, 52, 55,
56, 59, 60, 79, 80, 81, 86–88,
120; visio beata, 55 vizier of Egypt, 24 voice, 15,
148n38
waḥdāniyya, 59, 67, 68
Wāsiṭī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad al-, 123
water (māʾ), 46, 77, 83, 90, 125,
148n41; water-carrier, 110,
111
witness(er) (shāhid,
mushāhid), 41, 98, 110, 113, 120; eternal,
82; witness-play (shāhid-
bāzī), 98
witnessing (mushāhada,
shuhūd), 52, 54, 63, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87,
88, 92, 93, 99, 106, 109, 110,
111, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121,
122, 124; lights of, 111, 126; mushāhada-yi ṣirf, 121; bear- ing
witness (shahāda), 106
woman, 1, 33, 126, 138n17,
144n37; of Egypt, 111, 112
womb, 84
world (ʿālam,
jahān), 2, 3, 7, 24, 39,
44, 45, 61, 98, 101, 108, 125; as
divine act, 56, 121; as mirror
of God, 35, 92; beauty
in, 2,
86, 88–89; creation
of, 19, 66,
73, 75, 77–78, 104, 141n2;
human, 98; intellective (ʿaqlī), 23; intelligible, 14, 18, 25;
observation of, 52, 92, 121; of divine act, 84; of divine
attri- bute, 84; of
form, 84; sensible,
12, 15, 25, 26, 89; two worlds
in human being, 92
worship (ʿibāda), 4, 12, 31, 80, 99,
106, 109, 137n15; in igno-
rance, 105; worshipper
(ʿābid), 105, 110; compulsory,
106
wrath (ghaḍab), 16, 24, 42, 88
wujūd, 57; mumtaniʿ
al-wujūd, 44; mumkin al-wujūd, 44; wājib al-wujūd, 44, 51
wujūh, ḥisān al-, 149n53
yearning (shawq),
18, 89, 90, 113,
117, 118
youth (fatā),
20, 98, 137n15
Zargar, Cyrus, 129n5
zībāʾī, 136n9; zībāʾī-parastī, 4, 99, 130n11
Zulaykhā, 24, 108, 111, 112
INDEX OF QURʾA NIC VERSES
1:1 In the name of God, the Merciful, the
Compassionate. 67 2:30–34 When
thy Lord said to the angels, “Indeed, I am placing
on earth a vicegerent”…. 103, 105
2:195 Verily God loves
those who do what is beautiful. 31
2:260 Show me how Thou bringest
the dead back to life.
82, 120, 121, 125
3:33 Verily God has chosen Adam and Noah. 103
3:59 He created him from dust. 83
5:54 He loves them, and they love Him. 76, 93
6:59 With Him are the keys of the unseen; none knows
them but He. 59
6:75–79 Thus We were showing Abraham….“This is my Lord.”…I have turned my face to Him….
116–21
7:11 We have created
you then formed
you…. 86, 104
7:143 “My Lord, show me so that I may look upon Thee.” He
said, “Thou shalt not see Me….” 40, 59, 60, 62, 63, 73, 82,
113, 114, 121, 125
7:172 Am I not your Lord? 80, 81, 82, 135n1
7:180 To God belong the most beautiful names. 16, 31, 49, 70, 71,
73, 78
8:17 Thou didst not throw when thou threwest,
but God threw.
124
12:3 …the most beautiful
of tales. 23, 107–108
12:4 O father, indeed I saw eleven stars, the sun, and the moon
prostrating to me. 108
12:19 Good news! Here is a boy. 110
12:20 They sold him for a paltry price. 108, 110, 111
12:24 She made for him and he would have made for her…. 111
12:31 God save us! This is no mortal; he is no other than a noble
angel. 111
193
15:29 I shaped him and blew into him of My spirit. 84, 85, 86 15:85 So
pardon thou, with a beautiful pardoning. 33
16:5–6 And the cattle….There is beauty in them for you…. 32, 63 17:110 To Him belong the most beautiful
names. 31
18:37 …who created you of dust, then of a sperm-drop, then shaped you in the form of a man. 83
20:8 To Him belong
the most beautiful names. 16, 31
20:39 I threw love upon thee from Me and that thou mightest
be made upon My eyes. 115, 116, 151n46
23:14 Blessed is God, the most beautiful of creators. 12, 31, 36,
40, 64, 75, 99
24:45 God created every
animal of water.
83
32:7 He who made beautiful everything He has created.
31, 43, 75
33:21 Surely you have a beautiful
example in God’s messen-
ger…. 31, 101, 127
33:28 I will set you free in a beautiful manner.
33 33:49 Set them
free in a beautiful manner. 33 35:11 …then
He made you pairs. 83
36:82 When He desires
a thing, His command is to say to it “Be!”;
then it is. 77, 78, 79, 85, 106
38:72 I blew into him of My spirit.
84, 85, 86
38:75 I created with My two hands. 84, 85, 86
39:18 …those who hear the speech and follow the most
beauti- ful of it. 89
40:64 He formed you then made your forms
beautiful. 31, 85,
98
42:11 There is nothing
like Him. 49, 58, 73
53:11 The heart did not swerve
in what it saw. 123–24 55:15 He
created the jinn from a flame of fire. 83
55:78 Blessed is the name of thy Lord, possessor of majesty and generous giving. 68
59:24 To Him belong
the most beautiful names. 16, 31
64:3 He formed you then made your forms beautiful. 31, 98
68:4 Verily thou art upon
a tremendous character. 123
70:5 So be thou patient with a beautiful
patience. 33
73:10 And bear thou patiently what they say and leave them
beautifully. 33
75:22–23 Some faces on that day shall be radiant, gazing
upon their Lord. 87
75:24 Some faces on that day shall be scowling. 87
76:2 We created the human being from a sperm-drop. 84
80:38–39 Some faces on that day shall shine, laughing
and
joyous. 87
INDEX OF QURʾĀNIC VERSES 195
80:40–41 On that day there shall
be dust on some faces,
overspread with darkness. 87
82:7–8 He who created thee then shaped thee and balanced
thee and composed thee in whatever form He willed. 85
95:4 Indeed We have created the human being in the most
beautiful stature. 12, 31, 75, 85, 97
INDEX OF H. ADITHS AND SAYINGS
Assume the character traits
of the All-Merciful. 123
Gazing at a beautiful face increases sight. 90, 125
Gazing at faces increases sight; gazing at greenery and flowing water increases sight. 125
God created Adam upon His form. 84–85,
97, 98, 115
God has ninety-nine character traits: whosoever becomes
character- ized by one of them will surely enter the Garden. 21
Greenery and beautiful faces
made him marvel.
125 He brought a fine beautiful she-camel. 138n17
He who prays much by night—his
face is beautiful by day. 95 He who recognizes himself recognizes
his Lord. 92
I do not
count Thy laudations before Thee; Thou art as Thou hast lauded Thyself. 69–70, 125
I saw my Lord in the most beautiful form. 32, 36, 89, 124, 125
I was a
Hidden Treasure, and I loved to be recognized. So I created the creatures so
that I may be recognized. 19, 49, 77, 78, 79
Iḥsān is that you
worship God as if you see Him, for even if you do not see Him, He sees you. 12,
31–32
Incapacity
to perceive is itself perception [Abū Bakr]. 58
Indeed God is beautiful and He loves beauty. 1, 12, 19, 33, 34, 35, 36,
63, 138n21
Joseph was given half of [all] beauty.
107, 108, 110
Let the most
beautiful in face among you lead you, for he is more likely to be the most
beautiful in character. 95
Lord, show us things as they are. 119, 125
Make use of beautiful faces and the black pupil,
for God is ashamed
to chastise a comely face in the Fire. 94
My
Lord—exalted and majestic is He—came to me at night in the most beautiful form.
137n15
197
O Muhammad, I
garbed the beauty of Joseph’s face with the light of the Footstool…. 122
Reflect upon everything, but do not reflect upon God’s essence.
57–58, 143n14
Reflect upon God’s bounties, but do not reflect
upon God. 143n14 Reflect upon God’s
creation, but do not reflect
upon God. 58, 61, 63,
143n14
The red rose is from the splendor
of God. 126–27
The red rose
is the master of the aromatic plants of the Garden after the myrtle. 127
Seek good in those with beautiful faces.
94
Surely the most beloved
of you to God is the most beloved of you to the people. 96
Then a fine
beautiful woman appeared before
him. 138n17
Three things
clear up sight: gazing at greenery, flowing water, and beautiful faces. 148n41
Three things
from your world were made lovable to me: good fra- grance and women, and my
delight is in prayer. 125–26
Three things
increase the power
of sight: gazing
at greenery, gazing at beautiful faces, and gazing at flowing
water. 90, 125
To God belong
ninety-nine names. 68
…the most tremendous name by which if God is called,
He answers.
70
Whoever seeks
intimacy with God seeks intimacy with everything comely and every handsome face
[Dhū al-Nūn al-Miṣrī]. 89
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