Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination
Mehdi
Amin Razavi
Were there no love nor pain of
yearning for love Who would speak and who would hear such lofty words?
Were there no wind to steal the curl
of her lock
Who would unveil the face of the
Beloved to her lover?
Suhrawardi and the
School of Illumination
CURZON SUFI SERIES
Series editor: Ian Richard Netton
Professor of Arabic Studies,
University of Leeds
The Curzon Sufi Series
attempts to provide short introductions to a variety of facets of the subject,
which are accessible both to the general reader and the student and scholar in
the field. Each book will be either a synthesis of existing knowledge or a
distinct contribution to, and extension of, knowledge of the particular topic.
The two major underlying principles of the Series are sound scholarship and
readability.
BEYOND FAITH AND
INFIDELITY
The Sufi Poetry and
Teachings of Mahmud Shabistari
Leonard Lewisohn
AUHALLAJ
Herbert W. Mason
RUZBIHAN BAQLI
Mysticism and the Rhetoric
of Sainthood in Persian Sufism
Carl W. Ernst
ABDULLAH ANSARI OF HERAT
An Early Sufi Master
A. G. Flavan Farhadi
PERSIAN SUH POETRY
An Introduction to the
Mystical Use of Classical Persian Poetry
J. T.P. de Bruijn
THE CONCEPT OF SAINTHOOOD
IN EARLY ISLAMIC
MYSTICISM
Bernd Radtke and John
O’Kane
Suhrawardi and the
School of Illumination
by
Mehdi Amin Razavi
First published in 1997
by Curzon Press
To
Marylynn,
Mitra and Arya
Contents
Acknowledgements xiii
Introduction xv
1.
The Life and Works of
Suhrawardi 1
A.
Life 1
B.
Intellectual Context 5
C.
Works: A Survey of
Suhrawardi’s Works 7
1.
The Intimations 9
2.
The Opposites 11
3.
The Paths and the
Conversations 11
4.
The Philosophy of Illumination 13
5.
Treatise on Illumination 14
6.
Luminous Bodies 15
7.
Tablets of‘Imad al-Din 15
8.
Treatise of the Birds 17
9.
The Chant of Gabriel’s
Wing 20
10.
The Red Intellect 21
11.
A Day Among the Sufis 22
12.
On the State of Childhood 23
13.
On the Reality of Love 24
14.
Prayers and Supplications 25
15.
Conclusion 25
2.
Central Themes 31
1.
Ontology 31
2.
Existence and Essence 33
3.
On Necessary and
Contingent Beings 35
4.
Limit and Infinity 36
5.
God’s Existence 37
6.
Self-Body Problem 39
Suhrawardi and the School
of Illumination
7.
Life After Death 41
8.
Logic 44
9.
Angelology 45
10.
Physics 47
11.
Psychology 48
12.
Eschatology 49
13.
Hikmat vs. Philosophy 50
3.
Practical Sufism 58
1.
Suhrawardi’s Vision 58
2.
On the Nature of Man 62
3.
On the Spiritual Journey
and Ascetiscism 65
4.
Unity and the Final Abode 72
4.
Philosophical Sufism 78
1.
On Light and Its Varieties 78
2.
Angelology 81
3.
The Archetypal World: Mundus
Imaginalis 87
4.
Vision 89
5.
Vision and Intellection 90
6.
Knowledge and Presence 90
A.
Epistemology 92
1.
Knowledge by Definition 93
2.
Knowledge by Sense
Perception 96
3.
Knowledge Through Innate Ideas 99
4.
Suhrawardi’s Philosophy of
Epistemology 100
B.
Knowledge by Presence 102
1.
Arguments from “I/IT”
Dichotomy 103
2.
Arguments from
Pre-cognitive Mode of Knowledge 107
3.
Arguments from Attributes 108
4.
Conclusion 110
5.
Practical Consequences of
a Philosophical Historical Analysis 111
6.
A Critical Analysis of
Knowledge by Presence 113
5.
The Influence of
Suhrawardi on Islamic Philosophy 121
A.
The Greater Persia 122
1.
Ishraqi Philosophy Before
the School of Isfahan 123
2.
School of Isfahan 124
3.
Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra 128
4.
The Qajar Period 130
Contents
5.
Shaykhiyyah School 135
6.
Contemporary Period 135
B.
India 137
C.
Suhrawardi in Syria and
Anatolia 139
D.
Suhrawardi in the West 140
6.
Concluding Remarks 146
7.
Appendix: A
Translation of the Text and Commentary
of
the Chant of Gabriel’s Wing 150
Bibliography 166
NOTE
1. All translations are mine unless otherwise stated.
2. Diacritic marks are not placed on the following words since
they are repeated throughout the work: Suhrawardi, Ishraq, Sufi. Diacritic
marks have not been placed on the name of cities, countries and dynasties.
3. All dates are given first in the Islamic calendar year
followed by the common era.
I am indebted to Professor
Seyyed Hossein Nasr for his comments and guidance and Ms. Jacqueline Bralove
for reading the manuscript and providing me with editorial suggestions. I
would also like to express my appreciation to Lee Joanna Harper and Jason
Chipman for their assistance and Cindy Toomey and Harriet Brennan for their
administrative support.
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This work discusses the
mystical dimension of Shihab al-Din Yahya Suhrawardi, the philosopher-mystic
and the founder of the School of Illumination (ishraq) in the tradition
of Islamic philosophy.
Suhrawardi is one of the
most influential figures in the history of Islamic philosophy, because of the
significance of his intellectual contributions and because of the impact he
had on his successors, in particular later Islamic philosophy which culminated
in the “School of Isfahan”.
Despite the existing
diversity of intellectual inquiries within Islam which range from the
rationalistic philosophy of the peripatetics (mashshd’is) and the
intellectual intuition of the illumi- nationists (ishraqiyyun) to the
ascetic and inner journey of the Sufis, there have been few philosophers who
have made an attempt to synthesize these diverse schools of thought into a
unified philosophical paradigm.
Amirak Muhammad ibn Shihab
al-Din Suhrawardi, the Persian philosopher of the 6/12 century and an advocate
of what he called “ancient wisdom” (hikmat al-‘atiq), made an attempt to
unify various schools of wisdom in order to demonstrate the universal truth
that lies at the heart of all divinely revealed religions. Unlike earlier Sufis
and gnostics in Islam, Suhrawardi maintained that philosophical discourse was a
necessary training for those seeking to pursue the path of illumination. This
was quite revolutionary since Sufis rejected rationalistic philosophy as
exemplified by the Peripatetics who in turn rejected Sufism. The significance
of Suhrawardi becomes more clear when he is viewed as a gnostic who advocates
both philosophical discourse and asceticism as an essential part of the path of
illumination. He also incorporates various elements from such traditions of
wisdom as the Egyptians, Greeks and Persians in order
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination to bring a rapprochement between rationalistic philosophy,
intellectual intuition and practical wisdom.
The foremost difficulty in
writing on Suhrawardi’s school of illumination, as with any visionary
mystic/philosopher, is to find the qualified person who can comment from an
insider’s point of view. The heart of the visionary’s brand of mysticism, is to
have an intuitive knowledge of or an inner experience of, truth. By definition,
then, commentators and authors of such a work would be qualified to explain
this inner experience if they can relate to this message on an experiential
basis and therefore can speak as an insider.
The above poses a problem
for this author since on one hand I am to comment on a philosopher/mystic whose
thoughts have drawn and engaged me for a number of years, while on the other
hand I do not stand within the illuminationist tradition of the luminous world
of lights, angels, archetypes and the interconnected web of ideas that
Suhrawardi puts forward. In fact, Suhrawardi goes so far as to tell us that
unless one has fasted for forty days, he will not understand his major work, Hikmat
al-ishrdq (The Philosophy of Illumination). An insight of the luminous
world of Suhrawardi therefore, is not a “live option” for me, to use William
James’ term.
This volume presents not
so much a discussion concerning the validity or soundness of Suhrawardi’s
specific ideas but an exposition of the mystical dimension of his rather broad
and varied school of thought. As an outsider to a school of thought whose
thrust remains the attainment of truth through a special mode of cognition, all
an author can do is to engage himself in a close textual analysis and attempt
to put them in coherent and well defined concepts. It is towards this aim which
I have embarked upon an exegesis of various symbols used in Suhrawardi’s
mystical narratives as well as the decoding of the dense language which he uses
to keep the esoteric secrets from those who are not among the “brothers in
purity”.
The present work,
therefore, undertakes a study of the mystical dimension of Suhrawardi’s
thought. It is imperative to note that while mysticism remains one of the
salient features of Suhrawardi’s philosophical school, he was not only a Sufi
nor was his school of thought only mystical. Suhrawardi was a system builder
and like many others of the same stature (i.e. Ibn Sina), he comments on
various traditional philosophical topics, i.e. metaphysics, ontology,
epistemology, logic, etc.
In recent years there has
been a discussion among the scholars of Suhrawardi as to the true nature of his
teachings and the nature of his specific contributions to Islamic philosophy.
These discussions have led to the emergence of three distinct interpretations
of Suhrawardian philosophy. Before embarking on an exposition and analysis of
Suhrawardi’s mystical ideas, it is necessary to briefly discuss these trends
since it will enable us to place the mystical thoughts of Suhrawardi in an
appropriate context.
1.
SUHRAWARDI THE LOGICIAN:
This view, primarily held
by H. Zia’i,1 argues that the salient feature of Suhrawardi’s
philosophy is his Peripatetic writings and in particular his commentaries on
logic and his critique of the peripatetic view of definition as a means of
cognition. Zia’i, who considers the non-Peripatetic writings of Suhrawardi to
be of secondary value hardly ever refers to his mystical narratives.
Zia’i’s interpretation of
Suhrawardi’s thought is rather narrow and does not present the comprehensive
nature of Suhrawardi’s philosophy of illumination as one that is inclusive of
rationalistic philosophy but is not limited to peripatetic philosophy. I do not
wish to provide an extensive response to the above view but this much should
suffice, that even a brief examination of the corpus of Suhrawardi’s writings
reveals the extent to which he went beyond the fashionable philosophical school
of his time, namely the sort of logical analysis that was carried out by the
Peripatetics. Furthermore, to ignore the vast body of Suhrawardi’s mystical
narratives also ignores the reason he wrote these mystical treatises. If
Suhrawardi did not consider them to be necessary, he would not have composed
them with such care or given repeated instructions to his companions to
safeguard them. The mystical narratives of Suhrawardi should be regarded as
part and parcel of the doctrine of illumination and it is in such treatises that
he offers the second component of the ishraqi school of thought, namely
practical wisdom, something that the above interpretation completely ignores.
n. SUHRAWARDI THE
NEO-AVICENNIAN:
The view held by some of
the prominent scholars of Islamic philosophy such as Mehdi Ha’iri and Sayyid
Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, regards Suhrawardi as a philosopher who remains
essentially
xvii
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination within the Ibn Sinian philosophical domain despite his innovations
and deviations from the Peripatetic view.
A neo-Ibn Sinian reading
of Suhrawardi takes a broader look at his philosophy and considers both
Suhrawardi’s commentaries on logic and metaphysics and his ishraqi
writings to be of great philosophical significance. Suhrawardi accordingly is
regarded as one who by drawing from various sources, interprets Ibn Sina from a
Neoplatonic view point, thereby synthesizing Aristotle, Plato, Pythagoreans and
Hermeticism.
The above view in my
opinion is more valid than the previous one but it too lacks emphasis on the
mystical writings of Suhrawardi. Such notions as the attainment of knowledge
through mystical experience and Suhrawardi’s explicit emphasis on asceticism
as a necessary component of pursuing the wisdom of illumination is too often
ignored by a neo-Ibn Sinian interpretation of Suhrawardi. Proponents of this
interpretation, too do not pay the attention that the Persian writings of
Suhrawardi deserve, often regarding them only as fine works of literature. The
mystical narratives of Suhrawardi present in a metaphorical language that which
the language of rationalistic philosophy often fails to achieve. Even Ibn Sina
himself relies on the use of a symbolic language in his visionary recitals to
propogate certain philosophical notions that ordinary language of peripatetic
philosophy can not convey.
HI. SUHRAWARDI THE
THEOSOPHIST:
This interpretation of
Suhrawardi as a theosophist (hakim) is also advocated by a number of
prominent Suhrawardi scholars such as Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Henry Corbin. The
thrust of this interpretation is the multidimensional aspect of the
Suhrawardian philosophy. According to this interpretation, rationalistic philosophy
is prerequsite to the study of ishraqi philosophy and an integral component
of it.
Unlike the former two
interpretations, however, Nasr and Corbin argue that the role of rationalistic
philosophy is a limited one according to Suhrawardi because it demonstrates the
limitations of reason to bring about knowledge of an existential nature. The
intellect that yearns towards the absolute, transcends reason and through
intellectual intuition (dawq) embraces the Divine truth. The faculty of
intellectual intuition which exists potentially
in man can be actualized
if one is engaged in inner cleansing and purification which makes one receptive
to divine wisdom. In one of his lengthiest treatises, Suhrawardi himself
alludes to the practical as well as the theoretical dimension of hikmah
and states:
He [God] is hikmah
in that hikmah is of two divisions: one is pure knowledge and the other
one is practical. Knowledge is to conceptualize the reality of the existent
beings but praxis is the structure of action emanating from the essence of the
doer.1
In numerous places
throughout his treatises, Suhrawardi explicitly addresses the role and place of
the practical dimension of the ishraqi school by discussing in great
detail specific Sufi rituals, components of an ascetic path and their spiritual
consequence for the sdlik (he who is on the path).
I adhere to the third
interpretation since it does not negate or exclude the first two alternative
interpretations but gives appropriate credit to Suhrawardi’s mystical
dimension as well. Since this study will focus on the Sufi aspects of
Suhrawardi’s school of illumination, emphasis is placed on the mystical
elements of his thoughts.
It is obvious that
Suhrawardi has written a variety of mystical narratives deliberately using the
traditional Sufi symbolism and metaphors. Furthermore, the number of these
treatises, the use of Sufi language and expressions, as well as explicit
emphasis on such notions as the spiritual path, the need for a master and
ascetic practices, all indicate one thing, namely Suhrawardi’s desire to
disclose the place and significance of the Sufi component of the school of ishraq.
It is therefore our view
that disregarding the Sufi elements of the Suhrawardian thoughts leads to a
misinterpretation of the school of Ishraq which is often followed by an
attempt to place Suhrawardi in one of the traditional schools of Islamic
philosophy i.e. peripatetics. It is the opinion of this author that Suhrawardi
did not rely on one methodology for the understanding of truth but that he made
full use of the possibilities that exist in the philosophical as well as the
practical aspects of wisdom.
A more comprehensive study
of Suhrawardi includes an extensive discussion of his ontology, epistemology,
angelology and logic. Since this study will focus on the Sufi aspect of
Suhrawardi and the school of illumination, our treatment of the peripatetic
aspects of
his thoughts are
necessarily rather brief. However, certain aspects of his angelology and
ontology that serve as the background for both practical and philosophical
Sufism have been treated more extensively than others.
In the first chapter, the
life and works of Suhrawardi have been discussed. Both Suhrawardi’s
philosophical and Sufi writings are briefly analyzed, particularly the
structure of his philosophical works. In the second chapter, the intellectual
context of Suhrawardi’s thought in his historical period has been alluded to
before a broad survey of the central themes and the essential components of his
school of ishraq are discussed. Finally, we have presented the
distinction Suhrawardi makes between philosophy in its rationalistic sense and hikmah.
A thorough understanding of this distinction is crucial for placing the
Suhrawardian thought in its proper context.
In the third chapter,
Suhrawardi’s views concerning practical wisdom are discussed. Sufism on a
practical level remains an integral part of Suhrawardi’s philosophy and he
describes the various elements of the spiritual path in great detail. In this
chapter such topics as mystical visions, the nature of man and carnal desires,
the role of the Sufi master and the spiritual journey of the soul as well as
the role of asceticism have been discussed. Finally, unity as the ultimate goal
of Sufis has been treated as the final stage of the spiritual path.
In the fourth chapter,
philosophical Sufism is extensively treated. The subject of emanation and the
hierarchy of light and their relationship with one another as well as
angelology, a derivative of Suhrawardi’s ontology, have been discussed.
Angelology in Suhrawardi represents an important aspect of his thought in that
he introduces various elements from other traditions, in particular the
Zoroastrian religion. Through angelology, Suhrawardi discusses the archetypal
world as well as the imaginal world as realities that stand opposite to the
world of imagination. Subsequently, Suhrawardi’s theory of vision in its
physical and spiritual sense as well as the relationship between knowledge,
presence, light and self have been discussed.
At the heart of Suhrawardi’s
school of illumination is a particular theory of knowledge known as “knowledge
by presence”. To offer an exposition of this theory, a critique of the more
conventional theories of knowledge such as knowledge by definition, sense
perception and innate concepts has first been offered in the
second part of this
chapter. Having presented Suhrawardi’s critique of the inadequacies of these
modes of knowing, his theory of knowledge by presence has been discussed. The
chapter concludes with a discussion concerning the practical consequences of
this theory and a critique of knowledge by presence.
In the fifth chapter, the
influence of Suhrawardi on Islamic philosophy in various parts of the Islamic
world as well as the West has been presented. Among the topics discussed are
the influence of Suhrawardi’s ishraqi thought in bringing about such
schools of philosophy as the “School of Isfahan”. We have noted Suhrawardi’s
influence in India and Pakistan and the extent to which his ideas were
instrumental in making the intellectual milieu of this region receptive to the
philosophy of Mulla Sadra. Finally, the possible influence of Suhrawardi in
such regions as Syria and Turkey have been alluded to and the limited influence
of Suhrawardi in the west, in particular in France, was briefly discussed.
I have brought the volume
to a conclusion by examining a possible relationship between Suhrawardi and
the Persian nationalistic movement known as Shu’ubiyyah.
In the appendix, my
translation into English of a partial commentary of a 7/13 Indian author on The
Chant of Gabriel’s Wing, one of the most important esoteric works of
Suhrawardi has been included. This translation is important: first, it
represents a sample of Suhrawardi’s esoteric writing; second, the commentary
elaborates on some of the more complex symbolism in this treatise; and
finally, it signifies the historical importance of Suhra- wardi as it
demonstrates how his writings have traveled from Syria to India only two
centuries after him.
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1
THE LIFE AND WORKS OF
SUHRAWARDI
Suhrawardi was born in a
village near Zanjan, a northern Iranian city. His full name is Shihab al-Din
Yahya ibn Habash ibn Amirak Abu’l-Futuh Suhrawardi, who also received the title
“Shaykh al-ishraq” (the Master of Illumination) and “al-Maqtul” (the Martyr).1
The date of his birth is not certain but his most notable biographer,
Shahrazuri,2 indicated that he was born in 545/ 1166 or 550/1171
while S.H. Nasr,3 a notable scholar of Suhrawardi, has stated the
date to be 549/1170.
At an early age Suhrawardi
went to the city of Maraghah, where he studied hikmat with Majd al-Din
Jili, and he then traveled to Isfahan, where he studied philosophy with Zahir
al-Din al-Qari and The Observations (al-Basd’ir) of ‘Umar ibn Salan
al-Sawi.4 He journeyed through the Islamic lands to meet the Sufi
masters while practicing asceticism and withdrawing for long spiritual
retreats. He tells us that he had looked for a companion with spiritual insight
equal to his, but he failed to find one.5
Having wandered through
Anatolia and Syria on one of his journeys from Damascus to Alleppo, he met
Malik Zahir, the son of the famous Salah al-Din Ayyubi (Saladin). Yaqut ibn
‘Abdallah al-Hamawi6 put the date of this journey to Syria at
579/1200. Shahrazuri, his contemporary and bibliographer, writes:
Malik liked the Shaykh and
he liked him. The ‘ulama of Syria gathered around the Shaykh and heard his
words. In discussions he clarified the thoughts of the hukamd' and
their validity and weakened the opinion of the opponents of the hukamd ’.7
It is not known whether
Suhrawardi did train a number of students or not, but it is known that he had a
circle of close friends and companions on whose request he composed The
Philosophy of Illumination (Hikmat al-ishrdq). Towards the end of this
book,8 he refers to his companions as “his brothers” and asks them
to preserve the book from the enemies of wisdom. This again alludes to the
existence of a certain group of friends or followers who knew him personally.
Perhaps for political
reasons Suhrawardi’s friends found it difficult to write his biography.9
Shahrazuri is the only one who speaks of him in a manner that suggests he had
met him personally, though this is highly unlikely because neither Suhrawardi
nor any other biographer of him makes reference to this point. It is possible
that Shahrazuri came to know of Suhrawardi through some individual who knew the
master personally.
Suhrawardi’s keen
intelligence, his vast and profound knowledge and finally his openness to
other traditions of wisdom as well as his esoteric orientation, brought about
hostility and antagonized the doctors of law at Malik Zahir’s court. Yusuf ibn
Taqhri- birdi in his book al-Nujum al-zdhirah Ji muluk misr wa’l-qdhirah,w
describes a meeting between himself and Suhrawardi in which he calls
him a “man with vast knowledge and a small mind”.11
In comparison to other
Muslim philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, he ranked himself as equal and
stated:
In discursive sciences I am equal, if
not superior, but in intellectual intuition (dhawq) I am superior.12
Having advocated a type of
wisdom which was inconsistent with the views of the orthodox jurists, they
finally asked Malik Zahir to put Suhrawardi to death for believing in heretical
ideas. When he refused they signed a petition and sent it to Saladin, who
ordered his son to have him killed. Malik Zahir reluctantly carried out his
father’s order and Suhrawardi was killed in the year 587/1208. Taqhribirdi
indicated15 that Suhrawardi’s death took place on the Friday of the
month of July (Dhu’l-hajjah). According to Shahrazuri, there are different
accounts of how he died. Shahrazuri writes:
... he was thrown in jail
and eating and drinking was denied to him until he died. Some say he fasted
until he joined with his Origin. Some are of the opinion that he was suffocated
and yet others believe he was killed
by the sword and there are those who say he was dropped from the wall of the
fortress and then burned.14
Suhrawardi’s death was as
mysterious as his life. Except for a number of works, he did not leave much
behind to shed light on his life. He shied away from people and only sought the
companionship of learned men. His manner of dressing is said to have varied
from day to day. One day he would dress in court style and the very next day he
would dress modestly.
In order to understand
Suhrawardi’s philosophy, the sociopolitical conditions under which he lived
must be understood. This is not to say that his philosophy is subject to
historicity, but that some of the issues involved in his death as well as
certain philosophical trends in his ideas may be further clarified if the
circumstances under which he lived are better known. As S.H. Nasr states:
The causes for Suhrawardi’s death can
not be truly discovered until the situation of the region, historically,
religiously, philosophically and socially is thoroughly investigated.15
Suhrawardi lived during a
turbulent period when northern Syria was undergoing a major change from being a
strong Shi’ite center to a Sunni dominated region. He came to Aleppo at a time
when this transformation was taking place and when Saladin was seen as the last
hope for Muslims as the strong man who could confront the Crusaders. In a
situation such as this the more exoteric jurists were not in any mood to allow
a young philosopher, perhaps with some Shi’ite tendencies, to “corrupt”
Saladin’s son, Malik Zahir, in whose court Suhrawardi lived.
In light of the above
factors, one can view Suhrawardi as a Persian who inherited a rich culture with
Zoroastrian elements in it, a philosopher well versed in Peripatetic
philosophy, and a mystic who tried to demonstrate that at the heart of all the
divinely revealed traditions of wisdom there is one universal truth. Perhaps
his desire to demonstrate such a unity had to do with the apparent hostility of
different religions to one another, in particular Christianity and Islam. At a
time when Christians and Muslims were engaged in a bloody war, Suhrawardi’s
message of unity was perceived to be a dangerous and even a heretical
doctrine.
There are several possible
explanations for Suhrawardi’s death which can be formulated as follows:
1.
Suhrawardi was advocating
a form of Persian nationalism16 which is generally considered to be
a reaction to the domination of Arabs over Persia. This view, which is often
supported by the presence of Zoroastrian elements in his doctrine, is in my
opinion incorrect since it is contrary to the spirit of his philosophy and
because Suhrawardi must have understood that the court of Malik Zahir, the
center of the Arab world, was not the best place to advocate Persian
nationalism.
2.
In his article, “The
Source and Nature of Political Authority in Suhrawardi’s Philosophy of
Illumination,”17 H. Zia’i argues that Suhrawardi advocated a
political doctrine which considered the “king philosopher” to be the rightful
ruler. This must have been offensive to both the Caliph in Baghdad and Salah
al-Din Ayyubi. As he states:
While Suhrawardi’s
categories of Divine philosophers-sages include a wide range of types, the most
general being composed of the type called Brethren of Abstraction ikhwan
al-tajrid) which includes the perfect philosopher referred to as God’s
vicegerent (khalifat Allah) who may be the actual ruler (ra’is)
of an era.18
Such an idea as advocated
in the beginning of Hikmat al-ishrdq must have been rather alarming to
the more orthodox elements in Malik Zahir’s court.
3.
It has been argued by
some, including Shahrazuri, that some of Suhrawardi’s companions called him “a
prophet of God” (Abu’l-Futuh Rasul Allah).19 If the above is true,
then it may have been the likely cause of Suhrawardi’s execution. One can make
a case for this by arguing that since Suhrawardi believed that he was the
unifier of two branches of wisdom, he must have assumed a role for himself
which was above and beyond that of a philosopher and mystic. The argument
becomes stronger when Suhrawardi tells us that wisdom as such began by the
prophet Hermes and then was divided into two branches. Suhrawardi then
implicitly argued that he was at least at the same rank as Hermes.
Suhrawardi lived at a time
when the influence and power of the Mu‘tazilite’s theology had been
substantially curtailed by the
Ash'rites. The result of
the Mu'tazilite’s rationalization was the Ash'arite Kaldm, which paved
the way for a more literary and exoteric interpretation of Islam. While the
debate among the advocates of intellectual sciences continued, philosophical
and theological schools were also challenged by the more experiential school of
the Sufis, whose epistemological methodology questioned the very foundation
upon which intellectually oriented schools had established their theories of
knowledge. Such Sufi sages as Bayazid and Hallaj, who influenced Suhrawardi,
were instrumental in the development of his mystical thought. Their reliance
upon purification and asceticism was an alternative to the more philosophically
oriented epistemological paradigms.
At this
historicaljuncture, Ghazzali, as the most prestigious master of Kalam
and learned man in the religious sciences, attacked the philosophers for their
reliance solely upon reason for the attainment of certainty. Ghazzali’s attempt
to demonstrate the above as exemplified in the Tahdfut al-falasifaK^
paved the way for Sufism to challenge the more philosophically oriented
schools of thought. Sufism, as a result of Ghazzali’s attack on philosophy,
came to be viewed in a different light as a school whose intellectual merit had
to be recognized and was not limited to outbursts of emotions embodied in
lyrics, poetry and the practice of asceticism. Considering the apparent
polarization between the Peripatetics and Sufis, the question on the
intellectual horizon of the time may have been whether it was possible to bring
about a rapprochement between these two opposing schools. Suhrawardi, as we
will see, demonstrated that such a synthesis was not only possible but
necessary and that a thorough familiarity with the Peripatetic philosophy was
the prerequisite for the understanding of the philosophy of illumination. This
attempt to create a bridge between the rationalistic tradition in Islamic
philosophy and a gnostic view of knowledge dominated philosophical activities
in Persia for several centuries.
At the center of these
controversies stood Ibn Sina with his allencompassing philosophical system.
Ibn Sina’s philosophy by the time of Suhrawardi had been interpreted in
different ways and this brought about a number of schools which were
essentially Ibn Sinian but each one emphasised certain aspects of his ideas.
First, there were those
sections of Ibn Sina’s philosophy which were purely Aristotelian in nature and
can be categorized as Peripatetic philosophy. The peripatetic tradition
flourished and it was this interpretation of Ibn Sina which was mainly opposed
to
Sufism. There were also
those such as the exponents of Kaldm who found Ibn Sina’s logic and
metaphysics to be a useful means of analysis and therefore adopted them. Such a
trend reached its climax in the works of Fakhr al-Din Razi who applied Ibn
Sinian logic and metaphysics to solve various problems in Kaldm.
Finally, there was the mystical aspect of Ibn Sina which received less
attention than his rationalistic writings. In these types of writings such as Hayy
ibn Yaqzan and the final chapter of the Ishardt, the Neoplatonic
aspect of Ibn Sina’s philosophy is most apparent. Suhrawardi was well aware of
such writings. For example, in his work al-Ghurbat al-qharbiyyah (The
Occidental Exile), he continues Ibn Sina’s story using some of the same
metaphors.
Suhrawardi therefore
appeared on the intellectual scene at a time when various interpretations of
Ibn Sina had resulted in the emergence of different schools which often were
antegnostic to one another.
To the existing
differences between various interpretations of Ibn Sina must be added the
influx of foreign ideas and philosophies. This intellectual diversity was the
result of the translation of Greek texts and the interaction of the learned
masters of such traditions as Neoplatonism, Pythagoreans, Hermeticism and Greek
philosophy within the Muslim intellectual circles. Suhrawardi, who saw himself
as the reviver of Sophia Perennis, also synthesized rationalistic
philosophy of the Peripatetics, the practical wisdom of the Sufis and
intellectual intuition of the ishraqis.
Suhrawardi’s ideas
permeated the tradition of Islamic philosophy and provided the Shi'ite
philosophers with the means to offer a more intellectually justifiable
explanation for the more esoteric aspects of Islam, in contrast to the more
scriptual or exoteric interpretation of Islam. Suhrawardi, as a thinker who was
to reconcile rationalism and mysticism within one single philosophical system,
bridged the deep division between two interpretations or approaches to the
message of Islam. The type of wisdom that Suhrawardi developed, known as al-Hikmat
al-ildhiyyah, (transcendental theosophy), encompasses rationalism and yet
goes beyond it by basing itself on a direct vision of the truth.
Suhrawardi carried out an
ecumenical analysis with Zoroastrian religion, Pythagorianism and Hermeticism
on an existential and esoteric level. Perhaps his major achievement is that he
pioneered what H. Corbin calls “Spiritual Hermeneutics,” which maintains
The Life and Works of Suhrawardi
ecumenical work has to be carried out by those who speak from within a
tradition and that their very being has become the manifestation of the truth
of the tradition in question.
C.
A SURVEY OF SUHRAWARDI’S
WORKS
Suhrawardi’s writings are
diverse and dynamic and he often moves from the exposition of a purely
philosophical argument to a profoundly mystical narrative. His works are
written in different styles, i.e. Peripatetic, mystical, and ishraqi. In
the last few decades, although many of Suhrawardi’s works were introduced to
the public by S.H. Nasr and H. Corbin,21 a number of Suhrawardi’s
works remain unpublished. Among the unpublished works of Suhrawardi we can
mention his writings on the natural sciences, mathematics and logic that are
included in the two major books al-Mutdrahdt (The Book of Conversations)
and al-Muqdwamdt (The Book of Opposites) as well as al-Talwihdt (The
Book of Intimations). Also, the complete Arabic texts of Alwdh ‘imddi
(The Tablets of ‘Imad al-Din), al-Lamahdt (The Flashes of Light) and al-Wariddt
wa’l-Taqdisdt (Invocations and Prayers) are not available.
H. Corbin in his 1‘Archange
empourpree has translated large sections of the Persian works of
Suhrawardi. Also, Corbin’s translation of all but the logic of the Hikmat
al-ishrdqf1 along with much of Qutb al-Din Shirazi and Mulla
Sadra’s commentary upon the Hikmat al-ishrdq, provides an excellent
source for the students of Suhrawardi. W.M. Thackston23 in the Mystical
and Visionary Treatises of Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardi has also translated
some of the Persian mystical narratives of Suhrawardi.24
Several attempts have been
made to offer a classification of Suhrawardi’s works. L. Massignon’s
classification of Suhrawardi’s works based on the period when he composed them
is as follows:25
1
Writings of Suhrawardi in
his youth (early works).
2
Peripatetic writings.
3
Writings which represent a
synthesis of Ibn Sina and Plotinus.
The problem which this
classification poses is that Suhrawardi did not live a long life, and most of
his works were composed when he was quite young. Also, how do we account for
such works as Alwdh ‘imddi, which is one of his early writings and yet
contains strong ishraqi elements? This work is dedicated to Prince ‘Imad
who ruled in 581/1181, and considering that Suhrawardi was killed in 587/
1181 he must have written
this book at roughly the same time as The Philosophy of Illumination.
S.H. Nasr and H. Corbin
have by and large agreed to a structural classification of Suhrawardi’s works,
which is as follows:26
1.
Suhrawardi wrote four
large treatises that were of doctrinal nature: al-Talwihdt (The Book of
Intimation), al-Muqdwamdt (The Book of Opposites), al-Mutdrahat (The Book of
Conversations) and finally Hikmat al-ishrdq (The Philosophy of
Illumination). The first three of these works are written in the tradition
of the Peripatetics although there are criticisms of certain concepts of the
Peripatetics in them.
2.
There are shorter works,
some of which are also of a doctrinal significance but should be viewed as
further explanations of the larger doctrinal treatises. These books are: Haydkil
al-nur (Luminous Bodies), Alwdh Tmadi (The Tablets of ‘Imad al-Din), Partaw
ndmah (Treatise on Illumination), Ptiqdd fi’l-hukamd (On the Faith of the
Theosophers), al-Lamahdt (The Flashes of Light), Yazddn shindkht (Knowledge of
the Divine), and Bustan al-qulub (The Garden of the Heart). Some of these
works are in Arabic and some in Persian. His works in Persian are among the
finest literary writings in the Persian language. Suhrawardi himself may have
translated some of these treatises from Arabic into Persian.27
3.
Suhrawardi wrote a number
of treatises of a esoteric nature in Persian. These initiatory narratives
contain highly symbolic language and incorporate Zoroastrian and Hermetic
symbols as well as Islamic ones. These treatises include:
‘Aql-i surkh (Red
Intellect), Awaz-i par-iJibra ’il (The Chant of Gabriel’s Wing), Qissat
al-ghurbat al-gharbiyyah (Story of the Occidental Exile), Lughat-i murdn
(Language of the Termites), Risdlah fi hdlat al-tufuliyyah (Treatise on the
State of Childhood), Ruzi bd jamd‘at-i sufiydn (A Day Among the Sufis), Safir-i
simurg (The Sound of the Griffin), Risdlah fi’l-mi‘rdj (Treatise on the
Nocturnal Ascent), Partaw- ndmah (Treatise on Illumination).
These treatises are intended to demonstrate the journey of the soul toward
unity with God and the inherent yearning of man toward gnosis (marifah).
4.
There are also a number of
treatises of a philosophic and initiatic nature. These include his translation
of Risalat al-tayr (Treatise of the Birds) of Ibn Sina and the
commentary in Persian upon Ibn Sina’s Ishdrdt wa’l-tanbihdt. There are
also his treatise Risdlah fi haqiqat al-'ishq (Treatise on the Reality of
Love), which is
based on Ibn Sina’s Risdlah
fi’l-'ishq (Treatise on Love), and his commentaries on verses of the Quran
and the Hadith . . .
Also, it is said that
Suhrawardi may have written a commentary upon the Fusus of Farabi, which
has been lost.28
5.
Finally, there is the
category of his liturgical writings, namely prayers, invocations and litanies.
Shahrazuri” calls them al-Wariddt wa’l-taqdisdt (invocations and Prayers).30
These important writings
of Suhrawardi, despite the extracts which appear in translation of H. Corbin’s 1‘Archang
empourpree, have received the least amount of attention.
In what follows, I have
offered a brief discussion of Suhrawardi’s works. Emphasis has been placed on
Suhrawardi’s mystical narratives, their significance and place in the school
of ishraq, since this volume undertakes a disccusion of Suhrawardi’s
Sufi and mystical views and not his Peripatetic writings.
1.
ALTALWIHAT (INTIMATIONS)
Suhrawardi wrote this book
in the tradition of the Peripatetics as a first step in establishing the
cornerstone of his philosophy of illumination. As he states:
. . . and I, before
writing this book (Hikmat al-ishrdq) and while doing this, when
obstacles prevented me from proceeding with this, wrote books for you in the
tradition of Peripatetics, and their philosophical principles have been
summarized in those books. Among them there is a short work known as al-Talwihdt
al-lawhiyyah al-‘arshiyyah, which consists of many principles, and, despite
its small volume, all the philosophical principles of the Peripatetics have
been summarized, and in the order of ranks it comes after the book al-Lamahdt.31
In this work, Suhrawardi
reinterprets the categories of Aristotelian logic by reducing them from ten to
four and introduces motion as a new category while arguing that it was not
Aristotle who discovered them but a Pythagorean named Akhutas (Archytas) .32
Arguing that quantity can be reduced to quality, (i.e. a short line is
“weaker” than a long one), Suhrawardi reduces quantitative differences into
qualitative ones.33
Among other topics of
discussion in the al-Talwihat are universals and particulars, the real
and the conceptual, and “being” (wujud) and “essence” (mdhiyyah).
Instead of supporting the principality of existence as Ibn Sina did,
Suhrawardi supports the principality of “essence”.34 Also, the
existence of necessary beings and Ibn Sina’s proofs for the existence of the
Necessary Being (wdjib al-wujudyt’ as well as offering an ishraqi
reading of Aristotle are among the topics discussed.
In the al-Talwihat,
Suhrawardi offers an account of his vision of whom he perceived to be the first
teacher, Aristotle, and his conversations with him.56 This encounter
of Suhrawardi, which took place in a state between dreaming and being awake,
had great influence on the development of his theory of the history of
philosophy and the distinction that he makes between hikmat and philosophy
in its discursive form.
The Aristotle to whom
Suhrawardi alludes to is the Aristotle of the Theologia, who is actually
Plotinus. Suhrawardi asked Aristotle if the Peripatetics like Farabi and Ibn
Sina were the true philosophers. Aristotle replied:
Not a degree in a thousand. Rather,
the Sufis Bastami and Tustari are the real philosophers.37
Suhrawardi then discusses
how hikmat and the “Science of Light” (‘ilm al-ishrdq) originated
with Hermes and passed on to such figures in the West as Pythagoras, Empedocles,
Plato, Agatha- daimons, Asclepius and so on until it reached him.38
In the East this science was transmitted through two main channels, namely the
ancient Persian priest kings such as Kayumarth, Faridun, Kay Khusraw, and such
Sufis as Abu Yazid al-Bastami, Abu Hassan al-Kharraqani and finally Mansur
al-Hallaj, who deeply influenced Suhrawardi.39
A person who needs it may
find it necessary to know prior to The Philosophy of Illumination in the
Intimations where I have stated the points on which I differ from the
Master of discursive philosophy, Aristotle.40
2.
AL-MUQAWAMAT (OPPOSITES)
Al-Muqdwamdt,
which is written in the tradition of the Peripatetics and in the style of the al-Talwihat,
provides a much more specific
The Life and Works of Suhrawardi
explanation of ishraqi ideas. In the introduction to the al-Muqdwamdt
Suhrawardi states:
This is the summary of a
book known as al-Talwihdt and in this, necessary corrections have been
made in regard to what the ancients have said. The exposition of these
materials, due to the necessity to be brief, was not done in this book and we
have decided on the minimum amount of discourse . . . and for this reason we
have called it al-Muqdwamdt, and on God I rely and seek help.41
al-Muqdwamdt
should be regarded as an addendum to the al-Talwihat although it is less
expository in nature and more argumentative. Suhrawardi alludes to the fact
that al-Muqdwamdt is a guide to a better understanding of al-Talwihdt,*'2
and the Peripatetic doctrines are analyzed more fully therein.
3.
AL-MASHARI‘ WA
’L-MUTARAHAT (THE PATHS AND THE CONVERSATIONS)
This is one of the more
important works of Suhrawardi and his lengthiest work, which contains a mixture
of discursive and illumi- nationist arguments. In the introductory section, he
recommends this book to all those who have not attained mastery of the discursive
sciences and therefore have their path towards understanding of the higher
wisdom of illumination obstructed.
The introduction to this
book is of great importance since it explains the purpose and the place of this
work among other works of Suhrawardi and also alludes to the existence of a
circle of spiritual companions to Suhrawardi. As he states:
This book consists of
three sciences that I have written in accordance with the request of you
brothers and I have placed in them arguments and criteria. These arguments and
criteria cannot be found in other texts and are truly beneficial and useful.
They are the result of the inferences and experiences of my own intellect.
However, in these criteria I did not deviate from the sources of the
Peripatetics, and if I had put fine points and litanies in them, they are from
the honorable principles of ishraqi wisdom which undoubtedly is superior
to what the Peripatetics have brought. Anyone who would strive and be unbiased,
after meditating upon the
works of the Peripatetics,
will arrive at the same conclusion that others have reached. Anyone who has not
attained the mastery of discursive sciences, his path to the understanding of ishraqi
wisdom is blocked and it is necessary that this book be studied before The
Philosophy of Illumination and after a short work called Intimations.
It should be known that I, in this book, have not compiled (the issues)
chronologically, but the intention in this work is argumentation although we
may end up with (the discussion of miscellaneous) sciences. When the person who
desires discursive philosophy has properly understood this section and
established his knowledge in this regard, then it is permissible for him to
set foot in ascetic practices and enter ishraq so he can see certain
principles of illumination. The three forms of illumi- nationist wisdom are as
follows: ^ Et and knowledge of them comes only after illumination. The
beginning of illumination is detachment from the world; the middle way is the
observation of divine light; and the end is limitless. I have called this book The
Path and the Conversations.43
From the above, it is
apparent that this work of Suhrawardi is not only written in the tradition of
the Peripatetics, but that it also contains some of his mystical experiences.
In section seven of this
work,44 he leaves the discursive method to elaborate on such topics
as life after death, necessary beings, etc. The metaphysical and
epistemological issues which he deals with are elaborated on to a great extent
in his Magnum Opus, the Hikmat al-ishraq. On the significance of
the al-Muqdwamdt he states:
I recommend to you my
brothers to detach yourselves from everything and meditate upon God
continuously, and the key to this idea is in The Philosophy of Illumination.
These issues which we have mentioned have not been discussed elsewhere and to
set foot on this path we have prescribed a plan without revealing the secret.45
al-Mashdri‘ wa‘l-mutdrahdt is
one of the few places where Suhrawardi treats the subject of the language of
illumination, and is crucial for the understanding of The Philosophy of
Illumination and “the language of illumination” (lisdn al-ishraq) 46
In light of such analysis which is carried out within the context of light and
darkness, Suhrawardi goes so far as to evaluate his mystical experiences.
The Life and Works of
Suhrawardi
4.
HIKMAT ALJSHRAQ (THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ILLUMINATION)
This is the fourth
doctrinal work and the Magnum opus of Suhrawardi. It brings together
different elements of ishraqi tradition and was composed in the period
of a few months in 582/ 1182. Suhrawardi maintains that the content of this
book was revealed to him by the divine spirit. “These truths and secrets were
revealed to me at once by the spirit on a Strange day ... in only a few days.”47
The philosophical and
theosophical doctrines that are discussed in this book laid the foundation for
future developments in the field of “philosophical gnosis,” not to mention
their profound influence upon the formulation of the esoteric aspect of
Shi’ism.48
Despite numerous
commentaries on the The Philosophy of Illumination, such as those of
Qutb al-Din Shirazi and Ahmad Ibn al-Harawi,49 Suhrawardi’s own
introduction to his work is perhaps the most elucidating one. There he states:
And this book of ours
belongs to those who seek knowledge of both an initiatic and discursive nature.
Those who only seek discursive reasoning and are neither divine nor desire to
be, have no place in this book. We shall not discuss this book or its secrets
except with those who are theosophists or seek divine knowledge.50
The Philosophy of
Illumination ca.n roughly be divided into two parts,
the first being a discussion of Peripatetic philosophy, logic and other related
issues which have been regarded by many as less significant than the second
part. The second part consists of his ishraqi writings which are written
in a peculiar language and are unique in the history of Islamic philosophy. In
this work Suhrawardi provides a philosophical exposition of the journey of the
soul beginning with purification and ending with illumination. This part of the
book which is nevertheless discursive, disscusses many of the traditional
problems of philosophy in a language other than that employed by peripatetics.
Suhrawardi begins the
second part of The Philosophy of Illumination with a description of the
axiomatic nature of light and the classification of different beings in terms
of their transparency and the division of light into many different types, i.e.
necessary and contingent. Suhrawardi also tells us in this section about the
source of wisdom as that light which has illuminated various tradi-
tions of wisdom and which
ancient Persians called Bahman. Having discussed the longtitudinal and
latitudinal angelic orders, Suhrawardi then offers an ishraqi analysis
of vision and sight, the role of light and their relationship to illumination.
In The Philosophy of
Illumination, Suhrawardi is not consistent in that he often goes from
subject to subject treating the same topic in many places. For instance,
different types of lights and their relationships to one another often are
elaborated upon in numerous places throughout the book. Using an
illuminationist scheme, Suhrawardi discusses cosmology, in particular, movements
of the heavenly bodies and their relationship to light, sense perception and
the faculties that make up the human psyche.
Among the most important
issues disscussed in this section are the ishraqi epistemology known as
knowledge by presence, inner purification and asceticism. Suhrawardi, who
dismisses this in numerous places, offers an analysis of how it is that the
self comes to know of itself and how we can account for the direct and
unmediated nature of this knowledge. Towards the end of this book, Suhrawardi
reminds us that becoming recipient of this knowledge requires practicing
asceticism.
We shall now turn to a
summary treatment of his works in Persian that are not only crucial to the
understanding of Suhrawardi’s mysticism but also are amongst the finest
examples of Persian Sufi literature.
5.
PARTAW NAMAH (TREATISE ON
ILLUMINATION)
This work encompasses a
complete survey of major philosophical issues beginning with such subjects as
time, space, and motion and offers an argument which is strikingly similar to
Descartes “Cogito" or Ibn Sina’s “suspended man.”51
Suhrawardi’s philosophical
views in Partaw namah are generally analogous to those of Ibn Sina.
Having argued for the existence of the Necessary Being and the hierarchical
structure of existence and the relationship between ontology and the moral
worth of beings, Suhrawardi goes on to discuss the problem of evil, free will
and determinism within an ishraqi context.
Since the Necessary Being
is Pure Goodness and its nature is the most complete and most intelligent of
all beings, therefore, from Him emanates only pure benevolence. If there
occurs evil its good exceeds its evil.52
Suhrawardi argues for the
immortality of the soul, pleasure and pain, and their relationship with the
state of the soul after it departs the body. Finally, Partaw-ndmah deals
with prophets and prophecy, miracles and events of an unusual nature. This
section is written in the style of his ishraqi writings and is different
from the other chapters in that he makes extensive use of Zoroastrian
symbolism.
6.
HAYAMLAL-NUR (LUMINOUS
BODIES)53
This is one of his most
important and well known treatises in Persian. Some of Suhrawardi’s
commentators have suggested that extensive use of the word haykal is an
indication that Suhrawardi may have been influenced by Isma‘ilis.M
In the first section of Haydkil
al-nur55 he offers a definition of what an object is. In the
second chapter he discusses the mindbody problem, their interaction and the
nature of “I”, which is distinct from the body. He also pays attention to the
problem of “personal identity” and argues as to what it is that constitutes the
identity of a person. In the third chapter he discusses different concepts of
Being such as necessary and contingent. It is in the fourth chapter, however,
that Suhrawardi’s philosophical views are discussed with a much greater depth
and length.
He then goes on to discuss
the problem of eternity (qidam) and the creation (huduth) of the
world in time and God’s relation to it. Also, he investigates the relationship
between the movement of the celestial bodies, the qualities he attributes to
them, and the process of illumination. In the later part of Haydkil al-nur,
he investigates such issues as the immortality of the soul and its unification
with the angelic world after it departs the human body.
7.
ALWAH TMADl (TABLET OF
‘IMAD ALDIN)
In the introduction to
this work Suhrawardi indicates that this book has been written in the style of
the ishraqis.56 He begins, however, by a discussion on
semantics and then moves on to consider such issues as the soul, its powers and
its relationship with the light of lights. The first part of the book discusses
a number of philosophical issues such as the Necessary Being and its
attributes, the problem of createdness and eternity of the world and motion. In
so doing, he makes extensive references to Quranic verses and
Hadith. In
the later part of the book Suhrawardi is engaged in an exegesis of the ancient
Persian mythology and makes interpretations that are essential in the
formulation of his theosophical epistemology. This is especially apparent
towards the end of this work where the fate of the human soul is discussed in
such a way that the similarity of Islamic eschatology and Zoroastrianism is
demonstrated. Suhrawardi here argues that purification through asceticism is
the necessary condition for illumination. As he states: “Once the soul is
purified, it will be illuminated by divine light.”57
Suhrawardi then tells us
that asceticism and purification are like fire which, once applied to iron,
illuminates the iron. The iron, in this case, being the soul or the “I”, can
become illuminated not only because of the dominant character of the light of
lights but also because of the inner yearning of the human soul for perfection.
The light that functions as the illuminator of the body and the soul for
Suhrawardi is the incorporeal light which he calls Kharrah. It is the
presence of this light in the human soul that enables man to have the inner
yearning which is necessary for the pursuit of the spiritual path. Suhrawardi
describes the human soul as a tree whose fruit is certainty, or a niche that,
through divine fire, becomes illuminated.58 In his writings
Suhrawardi sees the encounter of Moses and the burning bush in this context and
uses the story to substantiate his ishraqi claim that it is only the
divine fire that can illuminate the human soul. Suhrawardi tells us that the
reason for writing this book is to expose the “origin” and destination of man.
He describes the origin as:
The principles which are
necessarily the case with regard to the knowledge of the origin of man’s
nature, are of eschata- logical nature. This is in accordance with the creed of
the theosophists and the principles (laid down by) the learned men of theosophy.59
At the end Suhrawardi
offers an esoteric reading of a story by Firdawsi, the Persian poet whose
monumental work, The Book of Kings, is an encyclopedia of Persian
mythology. A complete discussion of Suhrawardi’s reading of such figures as
Faridun, Zahhak and Kay Khusruw is such that he sees them as the manifestations
of divine light. On the significance of this work, S.H. Nasr states:
Alwdh ‘imddi is
one of the most brilliant works of Suhrawardi in which the tales of ancient
Persia and the wisdom of gnosis
of antiquity in the
context of the esoteric meaning of the Quran have been synthesized. Suhrawardi
has made an interpretation of the destiny of the soul which Islamic theosophy
and gnosis are in agreement with.60
8.
RISALAT AL-TAYR (TREATISE
OF THE BIRDS)
This work was originally
written by Ibn Sina and was translated and restated by Suhrawardi into Persian.61
It discloses a number of esoteric doctrines through the language of the birds
which Suhrawardi, ‘Attar and Ahmad Ghazzali had also used before him. The story
is about the fate of a group of birds, who, having fallen into the trap of
hunters, describe how their attempt to free themselves is faced with a number
of setbacks and how the birds overcome such obstacles. This work depicts the
spiritual journey of man from his original abode into the world of form and how
the attachments of the material world can obstruct one’s desire to reunite with
his spiritual origin.
In this work, Suhrawardi
alludes to how human faculties that are directed to the sensible world obstruct
the soul from its spiritual journey and the attainment of illumination.
Suhrawardi describes the dangers of the mystical path as follows:
Oh, brothers in truth,
shed your skin as a snake does and walk as an ant walks so the sound of your
footsteps cannot be heard. Be as a scorpion whose weapon is on his back since
Satan comes from behind. Drink poison so you may be born. Fly continuously and
do not choose a nest, for all birds are taken from their nests, and if you have
no wings crawl on the ground. ... Be like an ostrich who eats warm sand and
vultures who eat hard bones. Like a salamander, be in the middle of fire so no harm
can come upon you tomorrow. Be like a moth who remains hidden by day so he may
remain safe from the enemy.62
Suhrawardi uses the above
symbols to offer a set of practical instructions for those who are on the Sufi
path. For example, the shedding of one’s skin refers to the abandoning of one’s
ego, and walking like an ant alludes to the way one ought to walk on the path
of truth so that no one will know it. Drinking poison symbolically indicates
the endurance of the pains and frustrations which one is to experience on the
spiritual path. By using the
prophetic hadith “love
death so you may live,"63 Suhrawardi refers to the spiritual
death. The Sufi concept of annihilation is the death and rebirth that
Suhrawardi himself describes in a poem:
If thou die before death.
Thou hast placed thyself in eternal
bliss.
Thou who didst not set foot on this
path.
Shame be upon thee that broughtest
suffering upon thyself.64
Suhrawardi illustrates
various hardships of the path by alluding to them as the eating of hot sand by
the ostrich or the eating of sharp bones by the vultures. Enduring such pain is
necessary if one is to progress and achieve any station on the spiritual path.
Suhrawardi’s use of a salamander has different levels of interpretation. The
Salamander is the symbol of gold in alchemy and gold is the symbol of Divine
Intellect. He could be referring not only to Abraham who was thrown into fire,
but also to the fire within man. The popular myth maintains that if a
salamander goes through fire, and does not burn, it becomes resistant to everything.
Therefore, those who are consumed by divine love, which burns like fire, have
cast their impurities into the fire. They have swallowed this fire and become
purified.
Finally, Suhrawardi tells
us that we ought to be like a moth that flies at night and remains hidden by
day. Night represents the esoteric, the hidden aspect, and day the exoteric. In
this way Suhrawardi uses the symbols of traditional Sufi literature with night
symbolizing the esoteric and the spiritual milieu, providing the sacred space
which allows man to fly.
In the Risdlat al-lay^5
Suhrawardi describes the spiritual journey of man by recounting the tale of a
number of birds who were “flying freely” but fell in the trap of the hunters.
“Flying freely” here symbolizes the condition in which man lived in the eternal
state prior to creation, and falling into the trap denotes coming into the
domain of material existence. This change signifies the transition from the
formless to the world of forms. Having become prisoners of the material world,
often identified in Persian literature as the “prison of the body,” those who
are conscious of this imprisonment can begin their journey towards their
origin.
The bird who finds himself
a prisoner symbolizes the worldly man. However, because of the forgetfulness of
human nature he becomes used to the attachments of the material world. This
adaptation and the
acceptance of the condition is the greatest danger in one’s spiritual journey,
according to Suhrawardi. In the language of the birds, Suhrawardi states:
We focused our attention
on how we could free ourselves. We were in that condition for a while until our
first principle was forgotten (freedom) and settled with these chains, giving
in to the tightness of the cage.66
Suhrawardi’s description
of the spiritual journey in the “Treatise of the Birds” continues with the
flight of the birds when they free themselves from some of the bondages. To
translate this into Sufi language, it can be said that men who have fallen into
the world of forms can partly free themselves through their willpower; however,
to remove all the chains of attachments they would need the guidance of a
master. While the potentiality for man to become illuminated exists, the
process will not take place without the inner yearning and the will to make the
journey. This point becomes clear when the main character of the story begs the
other birds to show him how they freed themselves.
Having pursued the path of
asceticism and endured hardships, the birds arrive at different states and
stations of the path where they think it is time to rest. Suhrawardi warns us
against the desire to rest in one place, although the beauties of the path
which he describes as the “attractions that remove the mind (‘Aq[) from
the body" are extremely tempting.67 Finally, their desire to
stay is overcome by divine grace, exemplified as a voice calling upon them to
continue. Suhrawardi then describes their encounter with God, whose presence he
describes as a blinding light. The light of lights tells the birds that he who
has placed the chains must remove them as well and God sends a messenger to
oversee the removal of these chains.
The following principles
can be inferred from the Risdlat al-tayr.™
1.
The earthly human state is
a prison for the human soul.
2.
There is a necessity for
the soul to journey towards the Light of Lights.
3.
The grace that is attained
through such an experience helps the Sdlik to remove the final
attachments to this world.
4.
The experience of the
light of lights can be achieved if one is able to free himself from the prison
of the material world.
It is important to treat
Suhrawardi’s narratives and their peculiar literary style as part and parcel of
the ishraqi doctrine. Whereas in The Philosophy of Illumination he
offers the doctrinal analysis of ishraqi thought, in his Persian
writings he is disclosing the practical aspect of his ishraqi doctrine,
without which his theosophical system would not be complete. Suhrawardi’s
epistemological system ultimately relies on the type of wisdom that is attained
through practicing the ishraqi doctrine and that is precisely what he is
trying to demonstrate in his mystical narratives. In fact, his instructions for
the attainment of truth in some of his other works are even more direct and
specific.
9.
AWATA PAR-IJIBRAIL (THE
CHANT OF GABRIEL’S WING)
This highly esoteric work
is about a seeker of truth who goes to a khandqah (Sufi house) which has
two doors, one facing the city and the other one the desert. Having gone to the
desert, he meets ten spiritual masters and questions them with regard to the
mystery of creation, the stations of the path, and the dangers therein.
The conversation which
follows reveals the essential elements of the ishraqi doctrine and the
initiation rite which is necessary if one is to understand the esoteric
knowledge of the Quran. . . In the Awaz-ipar-iJibra’il,which has come to
be known as a classical work of Persian literature,69 Suhrawardi
discusses the essential elements of his theosophical epistemology. There he
states: “Most things that your sense perception observes are all from the chant
of Gabriel’s wings.”70
In this most esoterically
oriented treatise, he makes full use of the traditional symbolism of
gnosisticism and a number of other symbols which are uniquely employed by him
and cannot be found in the classical Persian Sufi literature. The thrust of the
work is stated in the beginning:
. . . Abu ‘Ali Farmadi,
peace be upon him, was asked, “How is it that those who are clothed in black
call certain sounds the sound of Gabriel’s wing?” He replied, “Know that most
things that your faculties observe are from the sound of Gabriel’s wing.”71
One can say that
Suhrawardi’s theory of knowledge is discussed in this mystical tale. In
metaphorical language Suhrawardi provides us with a map for developing a
faculty within us that is capable of
The Life and Works of Suhrawardi gaining
knowledge directly and without mediation. Relying on the traditional symbolism
of Sufi poetry and prose, Suhrawardi elaborates on the contention that exists
between empiricism, rationalism and the gnostic mode of cognition.
10.
‘AQL-I SURKH (THE RED INTELLECT)
In The Red Intellect,12
the story begins with the question of whether birds understand each other’s
language. The eagle, who initially says yes, is later captured by hunters and
her eyes are closed, only to be opened gradually. The eagle meets a red-faced
man who claims to be the first man who was created. He is old since he
represents the perfect man who existed in the state of perfection before the
creation,73 the archetype of man, and he is young since
ontologically he is far removed from God who is the eternal and therefore the
oldest being.
Suhrawardi then uses the
Zoroastrian symbolism of the Qaf mountain, the story of Zal, Rustam and other
epic heroes as exemplified in the Shah-ndmah.14 Qaf is the
name of the mountain on whose peak Griffin (Simurgh), the symbol of
divine essence, resides. Zal, who was born with white hair representing wisdom
and purity, was left at the bottom of Qaf mountain. Simurgh took Zal to his
nest and raised him until he grew up and married Tahminah from whom Rustam was
born. Rustam, the hero of Shdh-ndmah, who often is perceived as the soul
of epic Persia, is a man who has ultimately overcome his own ego. Whereas
Firdawsi, the author of Shdh-ndmah emphasizes the epic and historical
aspects of the Persian mythology, Suhrawardi focuses on its mystical and
esoteric connotations.
In this work Suhrawardi’s
theory of knowledge is expressed in a symbolic language similar to that of Awdz-ipar-iJibrd’il.
Using a new set of symbols, Suhrawardi brings forth some of the classical
issues of Islamic philosophy and mysticism, such as the distinction between the
rational faculty, which he calls the “particular intellect”, (‘aql-i juz’i)
and the Intellect which he calls “universal intellect,” (‘aql-i kulli).
In doing so he relies heavily on Zoroastrian symbolism and sources from ancient
Persia. It is precisely the interaction between the minor and major intellects
that is the basis upon which one can gain knowledge. Like other works of a theosophical
nature, Suhrawardi hides his theory of knowledge behind
a maze of myth and symbols
which can only be disclosed if one is familiar with the traditional Sufi
symbolism.
11.
RUZl BA JAMA‘AT-1 SUFTYAN
(A DAY AMONG THE SUFIS)
The story begins in a khanaqdh,
where several disciples speak of the spiritual status of their masters and
their views regarding the creation.75 Suhrawardi, who speaks as a
master, objects to such questions which merely seek to explain the nature of
the universe and the structure of the heavens. Suhrawardi considers them to be
shallow and maintains that there are those who see the appearance and those who
understand the science of the heavens. Finally, there are those who attain the
mastery of the celestial world, the true men of knowledge. Suhrawardi then goes
on to give specific instructions which are essential in actualizing the power
of the faculty which enables men to gain cognition without mediation. As he
states:
All that is dear to you,
property, furniture and worldly pleasures and such things . . . (throw them
away) ... if this prescription is followed, then the vision will be
illuminated.76
Amidst a mixture of myth,
symbolism and traditional Islamic metaphysics, Suhrawardi continues to put
emphasis on the relationship between pursuing the attainment of esoteric
knowledge and the practicing of asceticism. Practicing asceticism will open the
inner eye, which for Suhrawardi is the mode of cognition that is essential if
one is to gain knowledge of the esoteric dimension of Islam. According to
Suhrawardi, true knowledge is possible when empiricism and rationalism end. As
he states:
Once the inner eye opens,
the exterior eye ought to be closed. Lips must be sealed and the five external
senses should be silenced. Interior senses should begin to function so the
person, if he attains anything, does so with the inner being (Batin),
and if he sees, he sees with the inner eye, and if he hears, he hears with the
inner ear. . . . Therefore, when asked what one would see, (the answer of the
inner self is that) it sees what it sees and what it ought to see.77
Therefore, closure of the
five external senses for Suhrawardi is a necessary condition for the opening of
the internal senses which are essential for the attainment of the truth. This
work alludes to
different states and
stations of the spiritual path and how the spiritual elite can achieve purity
of heart and clarity of vision. In this work, Suhrawardi describes his
conversations with a group of Sufis and what their Masters have told them
regarding the attainment of truth and how Suhrawardi’s vision compares with
theirs.
This brief work contains
some important references to allegorical and metaphorical concepts and how
different stages of the spiritual path can be described through them. In this
highly symbolic work, the relationship between one’s purity of heart and the
degree to which one can gain knowledge, as well as the relationship between
asceticism and epistemology, is discussed by using Sufi symbolism.
12.
RISALAH FI
HALATAL-TUFULIYAH (ON THE STATE OF CHILDHOOD)™
In this work, Suhrawardi
describes having met a master who reveals the divine secret to him and he in
turn discloses it to men of exoteric nature.
The master punishes him
for “casting pearl before the swine.”79 Suhrawardi also alludes to
the difficulty of communicating the esoteric message to those who stand outside
of the tradition. Since Sophia Perennis is attained through other means
than sense perception, it is difficult to communicate this mode of knowledge
to those who may not be ready to receive it.
The Salik, then, having
repented, finds the master who tells him a number of secrets such as the ethics
of the spiritual path and the rituals that are involved in the Sufi path such
as Sama' (Sufi music and dancing). The exposition of many fine mystical
points reveals Suhrawardi’s thorough familiarity with the intricacies of the
Sufi path. Suhrawardi expresses this in a symbolic conversation between a bat
and a salamander whose passage through fire is supposed to have protected him
against all harms. The bat is describing the pleasure of drinking cold water in
the middle of winter, while the salamander is suffering from cold. Each one
could provide a different interpretation of “cold water” in accordance to
their experience.
So far, Suhrawardi has
drawn an outline of the esoteric instructions needed for a seeker to pursue
the path of spirituality, which begins by an inner yearning and continues with
ascetic practices under the guidance of a master. This book intends to
illustrate the spiritual path and the journey of the seeker (salik) from
its begin-
ning, which Suhrawardi
symbolically identifies as childhood. The significance of having a spiritual
master to avoid the dangers on the path, as well as different stages of inner
development, are among some of the issues that Suhrawardi elaborates upon. The
core of the spiritual teachings of this book is a practical guide for pursuing
the spiritual path.
13.
RISALAlnHAQIQATAISISHQ
(TREATISE ON THE REALITY OF LOVE)
This work of Suhrawardi
not only represents one of the most sublime examples of Persian literature, but
it also contains some of his most profound philosophical views. He begins by
quoting a verse from the Quran and then goes on to talk about knowledge and its
relationship with the Intellect.
Know that the first thing
God, praise be upon him, created was a luminous pearl called Intellect (‘aql).
God first created Intellect and gave it three features: knowledge of God,
knowledge of self and knowledge of that which was not and then was.80
This treatise reaches its
climax when Suhrawardi offers a spiritual map of the universe in the sixth
chapter. It has been argued that this work was written on the basis of Ibn
Sina’s Risdlat al-'ishq.*' However, it has to be noted that this work is
different both in form and content from that work. Since the rest of
Suhrawardi’s works in Persian contain the same elements as the other works
which we have considered, I will not expound upon them, although in our study
of Suhrawardi’s epistemology frequent references will be made to them. Such
works include Bustdn al-qulub or Rawdat al-qulub (Garden of the
Heart)*2 which is a more philosophically oriented work in which
Suhrawardi addresses such issues as metaphysics, space, time and motion.
This work, along with Yazddn
shindkht (Knowing the Divine) are both written in the style of the
Peripatetics and not only contains a discussion of the classical problems of
philosophy, but also occasional discussions regarding the theosophist’s mode
of knowing. Finally, in his book Language of the Termite^* Suhrawardi
describes the nature of the knowledge needed to come to know God. Self and the
creation are among topics which “they [Peripatetics] all disagree upon as long
as the veil is not removed and knowledge by presence is not attained.”84
Once this knowledge is attained, the
“crystal ball” (jdm-iJam)
is at your disposal and “whatever you want can be studied and you become
conscious of the universe and the unseen world.”85
14.
AL-WARIDAT WA’L-TAQDISAT
(PRAYERSAND
SUPPLICATIONS)
These writings, due to
their devotional nature, are distinct from other writings of Suhrawardi both in
terms of form and content. Despite their significance for the formulation of
Suhrawardi’s angelology, they have not received the attention they deserve. In
these writings Suhrawardi describes the relationship of the planets and their
characteristics with that of the inner forces of man. His praise of the great
“Luminous Being” (al-Nayyir al-a‘zam), whose power and glory demand
submission, addressing the heavenly sun Hurakhsh, as well as the
relationship between the Zoroastrian angels and spiritual entities, are among
the issues that Suhrawardi discusses in these works. It is important for the
reader of Suhrawardi not to view his writings as isolated and separated books,
but rather as an interrelated and elaborate set of ideas in which every part
can only be properly understood in regard to the whole while the whole derives
its validity from its parts.
An extensive discussion of
Suhrawardi’s books requires a separate work. I will, however, consider some of
these works at length in the forthcoming chapters.
In the foregoing
discussion, a summary of Suhrawardi’s doctrinal and the esoteric works has been
presented. Suhrawardi wrote the majority of his works in a period of a few
years and therefore the distinction of “early” and “later” works cannot be
made. His thoughts, all of which form a paradigm, are not systematic if viewed
individually. However, if they are viewed in their totality, they form a
consistent and coherent philosophical system within which various truth claims
become valid and meaningful. A close study of Suhrawardi’s writings in Persian,
with emphasis upon their epistemological aspect, reveals the existence of a
theory of knowledge generally known as “Knowledge by Presence” (al-‘ilm
al-huduri). The intertwined and elaborate web of myth and symbolism in
Suhrawardi’s philosophy intends to articulate his theory of knowledge, an
important and fundamental
subject in the ishraqi
school of thought. Suhrawardi, who claims to have first discovered the truth
and then embarked on a path to find the rationalbasis of his experiential
wisdom, represents a thinker who made an attempt to bring about a rapprochement
between rational discourse and inner purification. Therefore, a comprehensive
interpretation of Suhrawardi’s school of ishraq should include the two
distinct dimensions of his philosophical paradigm, the practical and the
philosophical.
Notes
For more information
concerning Suhrawardi’s life and biography see Ibn Abi ‘Usaybi’ah, ‘Uyun
al-anba'fi tabaqdt al-atibbd’, ed. Muller, (Koningsberg Press, 1884); Ibn
Khallikan, Wafaydt al-a‘ydn, ed. I. ‘Abbas, (Beirut: 1965); and Shams
al-Din Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwdh wa rawdat al-afrdh Ji tdnkh al-hukamd
wa’l-falasifah, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, vol. 2 (Haydarabad: 1976).
Hereafter I shall refer to
this work as Nuzhat al-arwdh. Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwdh wa rawdat
al-afrdh Ji tdnkh al-hukamd’ wa’l-faldsifah, ed. S. Khurshid (Ahmad, 1976),
119-143.
Suhrawardi, Opera
Metaphysica et Mystical 3, with an introduction by S.H. Nasr (Tehran:
Institute d’Etudes et des Recherches culturelles, 1993, 12. S.H. Nasr, 'IhreeMuslim
Sages (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1964), 60. Shahrazuri, Nuzhat
al-arwdh, 122.
Yaqut al-Hamawi, Mujam
al-udabd’vol.19, no 20, Ciro 626.
Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwdh,
125.
Suhrawardi, Opera
Metaphysica et Mystical 2, with an intoduction by Henry Corbin (Istanbul:
Maarif Matbaasi, 1945), 259.
The political reason might
be the nature of his thoughtsand openness to other traditions or perhaps
because he may have claimed to be a prophet. See Shahrazuri, Nuzhat
al-arwdh, 126.
Ibn Taqhribirdi and
Abu’l-Mahasin Yusuf, al-Nujum al-zdhirah Ji muluk misr wa’l-qahirah,
vol. 6 (Cairo, al-Mu’assasah al-Misr-iyah Press, 1963), 114.
Ibid., 115.
Ibid., 30.
Ibid., 114.
Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwdh,
126.
S.H. Nasr, “Suhrawardi:
The Master of Illumination, Gnostic and Martyr,’ trans. W.Chittick, Journal
of Regional Cultural Institute 2, no. 4 (1969): 212.
Persian nationalism {shu’ubiyyah)
was a movement in the 3rd century A. H. During this period a movement by
Persian intellectuals began as a protest against Arab domination. For more
information see the conclusion of this work.
H. Zia’i, “The Source and
Nature of Political Authority in Suhrawardi’s Philosophy of Illumination”, in Political
Aspects of Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992)
304-344.
Ibid., 10.
Shahrazuri, Nuzhat al-arwdh,
126.
Chazzali mentions twenty
reasons for the fallacy of the philosopher’s opinion. al-Ghazzali, Tahdfut
al-faldsifah, trans. S.A. Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress,
1963), 11.
For more information see
H. Corbin, L'Archange empourpree (Paris: Fayand, 1976).
For more information on
this translation of Corbin see: Shihaboddin Yahya Suhrawardi, Le Livre de la
sagesse orientale, traduction et notes par by H. Corbin, (Paris: Verdier,
1986).
23 Thackston has also translated part of the 17th century
Persian translation of the Nuzhat al-arwdh by ‘Ali Tabrizi into
English. See: Thackston, Mystical and Visionary Treatises of Suhrawardi
(London: the Octagon Press, 1982), 1-4.
24 Thackston’s translation of Suhrawardi is generally criticized
by the scholars of Suhrawardi. It is based on the text which is edited by Spies
and this is a not a good edition of Suhrawardi. Also, the literary style of
Thankston does not do justice to the beautiful mystical narratives of
Suhrawardi in Persian.
25 For more information on L. Massignon’s classification see Recueil
de textes inedits concernant Thistoire de la mystique en pays d’Islam
(Paris: 1929), 113.
26 For S.H. Nasr’s classification see Three Muslim Sages,
58. For H. Corbin’s classification see the Prolgmena, Opera 1, 16ff.
27 S.H. Nasr argues that on the basis of the unity of style
between the Bustdn al-qulub and his other works it can be concluded that
this work does belong to Suhrawardi himself. For more discussion on this see
M.M. Sharif, A History of Muslim Philosophy (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasso-
witz, 1963), 375; and the introduction to Surawardi, Opera 3, 40.
28 Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 150 no. 16.
29 Ibid., 58.
30 The invocations and prayers have been published in M. Mo’in, Majala-yi
dmuzish wa parwarish, (Tehran: Ministry of Education Press, 1924), p.5ff.
These writings represent Suhrawardi’s angelology, relationship to the spiritual
entities of the planets and their correspondence with the Zoroastrian
archangels. For example, in the two most important prayers, the heavenly sun,
Hurakhsh, is being addressed. Also, Suhrawardi expounds upon the qualities of
the Great Lumious Being (al-Nayyir al-a‘zm), who is the incorporeal
equivalent of an earthly king, and whose qualities are such that they demand
submission.
31 Suhrawardi, Opera Metaphysica et Mystical, 2, with an
introduction by H. Corbin (Istanbul: Maarif Matbassi, 1954), 10.
32 Suhrawardi, Opera 1,12.
33 For a discussion on this see: Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 87,
88.
34 For more discussion on this see Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani’s
commentary in Lahiji, “Risalah Nuriyyah dar ‘alam-i mithal,” in Majilla-yi
ildhiyyat wa ma'arif-i isldm (Iran: Mahhad University, 1972).
35 For more discussion on this see Suhrawardi, Opera 1,
34ff.
36 Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 70.
37 Ibid.
38 S.H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 62.
39 For political
significance of this claim concerning the transmission of knowledge see: H.
Zia’i, The Source and Nature of Political Authority in Suhrawardi’s Philosophy
of Illumination” in The Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 304-344.
40 Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 484.
41 Ibid., 124.
42 Ibid., 192.
43 Ibid., 194-195.
Ibid., Sec.7.
Ibid., 505.
Ibid., 494.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 259.
S.H. Nasr “The
Relationship Between Sufism and Philosophy in Persian Culture,” Hamdard
Islamicus 6, no.4 (1983): 33-47.
Harawi’s commentary, Anwdriyyah,
is particularly interesting since he has offered an ishraqi reading of
cetain aspects of Hindu philosophy. The text represents one of the early
examples of comparative philosophy. For more information see: M. Sh.
al-Hirawi, Anwdriyya, ed. H. Zia’i (Tehran: Amir Kabir Press),
1358A.H.S.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 12-13.
Ibn Sina, al-Shifd’:
kitdb al-nafs, ch.6 and al-Ishdrdt wa’l-tanbihdl, final chapter.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 60-61.
For more information see: S.J.
Sajjadi, Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi wa sayri darfalsafa-yi ishrdq (Tehran:
Falsafah Press, 1984).
For more information on Suhrawardi’s
emphasis on “seven bodies” and haydkil see above, 114-115.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 84.
Ibid., 110.
Ibid., 184.
Suhrawardi often refers to
the famous Quranic verse that equates God with Light within a niche. See:
Quran, XXIV: 35.
Suhrawardi, OperaS, 110.
S.H. Nasr’s Introduction to Opera
3, 45.
Suhrawardi, OperaS, 198.
Ibid., 199.
This is a hadith by
the Prophet of Islam. Suhrawardi has used this hadith in various places
to argue for the doctrine that “spiritual death” is the necessary condition for
“spiritual birth.” Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 395.
Ibid., 198.
Ibid., 200.
Ibid., 202.
Ibid., 198-205.
This work has gained
widespread fame both for its literary style and the mystical symbolism in it.
As early as the 15th century for example, one can find a commentary on this
work written in Persian by an unknown Indian author. For more information on this
com- mentary see: “Sharh-i awaz-i par-i Jiba’il,” ed. M. Qasemi in Ma'drif 1
(March-May 1984).
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 209.
Ibid., 208-209.
Ibid., 242.
Ibid., 228.
Suhrawardi has employed
the symbolism that Firdawsi has used in the Shdh-ndmah to formulate his
angelology. There are those who argue
that the Shdh-ndmah is a
profoundly mystical work and make an esoteric reading of this book.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 242.
Ibid., 248.
Ibid., 249.
Ibid., 252.
This saying of Christ from
an ishraqi point of view alludes to the esoteric knowledge that should
not be revealed to the common people and to the fact that only initiates are
allowed to know the secrets of the spiritual path.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 208-209.
Nasr, 'I'hree Muslim Sages,
59.
In his introduction (55)
to Opera 3, Nasr indicates that this work has been attributed to a
number of people such as Sayyid Sharif Jurgani, Ibn Sina, Khawjah Nasir al-Din
al-Tusi, Baba Afdal-i Kashani and finally *Ayn al-Qudat Hamadani. However, it
is his opinion that, on the basis of the form and content of the book, it
belongs to Suhrawardi.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 297-299.
Ibid., 297.
Ibid., 298.
2
Suhrawardi has commented
on numerous subjects, often making original contributions in each field. As to
his predecessors and their influence upon him, he was influenced by Ghazzali
and his famous work Mishkdt al-anwdr that was of such great significance
in formulating the ishraqi doctrine. He was also influenced by Hallaj
and Bayazid, whom he quoted so often, and who for Suhrawardi were the perfect
representations of true philosophers. Finally, there was Ibn Sina, the master
of Peripatetics, whom Suhrawardi criticized but nevertheless adhered to certain
strands of his philosophical structure such as Ibn Sina’s concept of hierarchy
and emanation. Despite his own contributions Suhrawardi accepted the logic of
the Peripatetics as a useful means of analysis. Let us elaborate on some of the
areas where Suhrawardi’s contributions are more substantial.
Suhrawardi adhered to the
traditional ontology as far as the hierarchical structure of reality is
concerned. Within the context of levels of being, he sought to offer an
exposition of various philosophical and mystical issues. He retained the
notion of hierarchies of being but changed the matrix of this Ibn Sinian
ontology from one of “being” to one of “light.” It was precisely this kind of
fundamental change that allowed him to offer an exposition of mystical and
esoteric doctrines as well as many of the traditional philosophical issues, in
particular the relationship between essence and existence. According to
Suhrawardi, the nature of light is axiomatic in that all things are known
through it. Light is made up of an infinite succession of contingent dependent
lights
and each light is the
existential cause of the light below it. The ultimate light, which is the same
as the Necessary Being (wdjib al-wujud), is for Suhrawardi the light of
lights (nur al-anwdr), which he regards as the ultimate cause of all
things.
Although Suhrawardi’s
ontological scheme was later criticized by some of his successors, such as
Mulla Sadra and Hajji Mulla Hadi Sabziwari, it nevertheless provides a means by
which ontological issues can be analyzed. As S.H. Nasr puts it, for Suhrawardi:
The ontological status of all beings,
therefore, depends on the degree in which they approach the supreme light and
are themselves illuminated.1
For Suhrawardi, just as
light has degrees of intensity, so does darkness. Although he classifies light
in accordance to the degree that it exists, by necessity his criterion for
determining the ontological status of lights is whether or not they are
conscious of themselves. Therefore, self-awareness becomes a criterion for
higher ontological status, which in the ishraqi system means a more
intense degree of light.
For Suhrawardi it is
ultimately awareness of one’s true nature that elevates a person’s ontological
status. To demonstrate this, he employs Zoroastrian symbols of light and
darkness to depict the contradictions and the inner strife that exists within
man. The key to the existential dilemma resulting from this inner struggle
between the ego (nafs), which in the Zoroastrian Weltanschauung is darkness,
and man’s divine self, light, is knowledge or awareness of the reality of
oneself.
Suhrawardi arrives at his ontology
of light in two ways. First, he offers us philosophical arguments to establish
the axiomatic nature of light by stating that light is the most apparent of all
phenomena since everything else is recognized and defined in terms of it.
Suhrawardi argues that light is the necessary condition for things to be
observed and therefore it is light and not being that should be the constitute
element of an ontology.
Suhrawardi tells us that
the principality of light and its ontological significance came to him first
through ishraqi means. In the Hikmat al-ishrdq he says:
The issues and truths
therein (Hikmat al-ishrdq) first came to me not through rational
inquiry, but their attainment was through a different means. Finally, after
understanding
them, I sought their rational basis
in a way such that if I ignore them, nothing can make me doubt their validity.2
It is therefore imperative
that in any discussion concerning Suhrawardi’s ontology one has to realize the
visionary nature of this ontology and that ultimately his philosophical
analysis is based on his mystical experience.
For Suhrawardi, to know
something is to know its essence and not its existence. Let us now see how
Suhrawardi argues for this position and what its ishraqi implications
are.
Contrary to the
Peripatetics, Suhrawardi maintains that existence is a mere concept and has no
external reality or manifestation.3 His argument for the
principality of essence (asdlat al-mdhiyyah), which distinguishes him
from most of the Muslim philosophers, undermines the role of existence as that
upon which the reality of a thing depends. In The Philosophy of Illumination4
he argues that all beings exist equally and it is not the case that some
existent beings exist more than others, an indication that existence is a
universal concept. The problem which follows from this is that such things as
“whiteness” are also of a universal nature which nevertheless are regarded to
be universal essence as well. If “existence” were not pure “whiteness” or
“sweemess”, then it would not be a universal concept, but would be a
particular. But, if they were the same, then, it would be the same as essence.
This means every existing being would have its own particular existence.
Suhrawardi seems to argue that if this be the case then this “particular
existence” would be equivalent to the essence of the thing. From this,
Suhrawardi concludes that existence is a purely mental concept, whereas the
particular essence has an actual existence which makes a white or black object
be white or black. On this he states:
Attribution of existence
to blackness, essence, man and horses are regarded to be the same, and
therefore the concept of existence is a concept that is more universal than
each of them. The same is true of the concept of essence in its absolute sense
and the concept of truth and the nature of beings in their absolute sense.
Therefore, we claim that such categories (existence and universal essence) are
pure mental concepts since if we (assume) that existence consists only of pure
blackness,
necessarily the same will
not hold true with whiteness and (together) cannot include whiteness and
essence.5
Suhrawardi goes on to
further argue for the principality of essence by concluding the following:
1.
Existent objects and
existence are two separate things.
2.
Existence can be conceived
only in respect to an existent being.
3.
Existent beings precede
existence in their order of coming into existence.
Since existence as a
universal concept requires an existent being in order for it to manifest
itself, and since existent beings require an essence in order to be, then
essence must precede existence in the order of actualization. In other words,
since essence is needed for an existent being to exist and existence is contingent
upon an existent being, then existence is contingent upon the essence.
Suhrawardi offers two
types of arguments, the support for both of which is based on the impossibility
of the existence of an infinite succession of contingent dependent beings. He argues
that existence can exist if and only if existent beings exist. He states this
in a very complicated argument which is as follows:
If we say that whenever
something is non-existent, its existence is necessarily not-actualized, then
its existence is nonexistent. This is because with the assumption that its
existence is non-existent, whenever we conceive of existence and say that it
does exist, it becomes necessary that the concept of existence be different
from the existent object.6
Suhrawardi in the above
argument seeks to demonstrate that existence has no actual reality and as a
concept it is contingent upon the existence of the existent beings and
therefore its presence is derived from the existence of the existent objects
which themselves owe their existence to essence. This is the first argument
for the principality of the essence (asdlat al-mdhiyyah) which became
the basis of the ishraqi doctrine.
Suhrawardi’s second
argument for the principality of the essence is based on the fallacy of a teleological
argument. On this Suhrawardi states:
Therefore, if we say that
what we assumed not to exist came into existence and the existence of that
which was not and then was created, we realize that coming into being is
different from existence.
It becomes necessary that existence should have existence and we have to define
existence by existence, and this continues ad infinitum. [It was stated
that] an infinite succession of beings is impossible.7
In the above, Suhrawardi
argues that if existence had actually existed, i.e. a table, and yet was
different from essence, then it must have an existence and so on. This process
could go on ad infinitum, which is absurd.
Suhrawardi’s view on the
principiality of the essence is absolutely crucial in the understanding of his
philosophical views. To know something, for Suhrawardi, is to know its essence
and that cannot be done through the senses, since senses can only perceive the
appearance. Therefore, either we cannot know anything, which is absurd, or
there is an alternative explanation. Suhra- wardi’s explanation of what this
alternative is will be elaborated upon in the section on “Knowledge and
Presence.”
3.
ON NECESSARY AND
CONTINGENT BEINGS
Having argued for the
principality of essence over existence by maintaining that essence is a
necessary being and existence is contingent upon it, Suhrawardi goes on to
equate essence with light.
Having argued against an
infinite regress of contingent dependent beings, which is crucial for the
validity of Suhrawardi’s ontological frame work, Suhrawardi offers a complex
argument that all existent beings except Light are of a contingent nature.8
To argue for this,
Suhrawardi offers an argument in two parts. In the first part he argues that
while no being exists by necessity (except the light of lights), all beings
exist necessarily. His argument goes as follows: Things either exist by
necessity or they are contingent. Contingent entities exist because of the
presence of their cause and, should their cause be absent, the effect, which is
the entity in question, would not exist either. Therefore, the existence of
existent objects is due to the existence of their cause, and from this
Suhrawardi concludes that objects, whether they exist or not, are contingent
since they are caused. On the other hand, since every event has to have a cause
and this process can not go on for ever, one can conclude that there has to be
an ultimate cause whose existence is necessary.
The second part of
Suhrawardi’s argument is more complex. He states:
If, as some have assumed, it is true
that existence excludes the contingent from its contingency and makes it
necessary, then it is necessary that non-existing should exclude the
non-existent from non-existence and make it not-possible which means there
cannot be such a thing as contingent being.9
Suhrawardi’s argument
maintains that if that which comes into existence loses its contingent nature
and becomes necessary, then by a logical inference its opposite, which is
non-existent by virtue of its non-existence, should make all non-existent
entities not-possible. From this it follows that it is not logically possible
for anything to be contingent.
1
PD~~P
2
PDCP
The converse would also have to be
true.
1
~PD~P
2
~PDD~P
However, Suhrawardi has
already maintained in the first part of his argument that all existing objects
are contingent, which is contrary to the conclusion of the above argument. In
the above arguments, Suhrawardi not only criticizes the ontological views of
the Peripatetics which he elaborates upon in numerous places in The
Philosophy of Illumination, Intimations, Opposites, and Conversations, but
also strengthens his own ishraqi views through the implications of the
arguments.10
The discussion concerning
limit and infinity for Suhrawardi has bearing upon his epistemology. While
Suhrawardi argues against the existence of an infinite series of contingent
dependent beings, he maintains that an infinite divisibility within a limited
set with a beginning and an end can exist. The process of divisibility,
however, will never come to an end and thereby the existence of such a set
remains within the domain of logical possibility. Suhrawardi states:
Know that in each
succession (of beings) within which there is order, however they may be
arranged. If they are within the domain of existence, they necessitate a limit
or an end. Between each integer of this succession and another integer
there exist infinite
integers. Then it is necessary (for infinity) to be limited to these two
integers and this is impossible. If in that succession two integers cannot be
found in such a way that the numbers between them are not unlimited, then it is
necessary that there be no unit unless (integers) between that and every other
integer that is conceived in that succession be finite and therefore it will
be necessary that all that succession be finite."
This is a rather unusual
approach to the problem of infinity. Suhrawardi’s argument goes as follows:
Either it is the case that the principle of infinite divisibility between two
beings, i.e. two integers, is true or not. If it is true, then there must be an
infinite set of numbers between two different integers. For example, between
the numbers 2 and 3 there exists an infinite number of integers i.e. 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, etc. From this it can be concluded that infinity exists, but its existence
is contingent upon the existence of a beginning and an end. Suhrawardi uses
this argument both in a philosophical and mystical context and applies this
conclusion in a number of Sufi doctrines as will be discussed later.
In the ishraqi
school God is equated with the light of lights from Whom emanate the lower
levels of light, the angelic order and the archetypes. Therefore, the existence
of God is fundamental for the validity of the philosophy of illumination and in
particular the emanationistic scheme.
Suhrawardi argues that
every event has at least one cause whose existence is necessitated if or when
that cause is present. However, an effect is often a compound entity, and,
therefore, when A causes B, it should be regarded as the cause of all
its individual components. Since B, by virtue of being an effect, is a
contingent being, all its components are contingent. The reverse is also true;
that is, if individual members of a set are caused, then the set itself must
be caused. From the above argument Suhrawardi concludes that:
The cause of contingent
beings cannot be contingent, because that will then be one in this set.
Therefore, (the cause) must be something that is not contingent or nonexisting
and thus, the cause and the source of the existence of all the contingent
beings must be a Necessary Being.12
Suhrawardi’s argument
again rests on the principle that an infinite chain of cause and effect is not
possible and therefore the cause of an effect must be a Necessary Being. Having
argued that the cause of all things is a Necessary Being, Suhrawardi then tries
to respond to the possibility of having several necessary beings by offering
the following:
If there be more than one
Necessary Being, (i.e. A & B) then one of the following cases will occur:
1. A and B have nothing in common.
2. A and B have everything in common.
3. A and B have something in common i.e. C.
The first one can not be
true since A & B at least have one thing in common, their property ofbeing
a Necessary Being. Therefore, it is not possible for several Necessary Beings
to exist without sharing at least one common property.
The second alternat ive
can not b I e the case either because if A & B had everything in common,
then they would be the same. What makes A & B to be two different things is
that they must have at least one difference between them. Therefore A & B
can not have everything in common; otherwise they would be the same, which they
are not.
The third option implies
that A & B have something in common, and yet there are differences b •
etween them. This possibility is not a viable one either. As Suhrawardi
states:
If that which is their
difference were not, then none of them would have existed. And ifthat which
they have in common were not, then each one would not exist.13
Suhrawardi’s arg1ument
requires further elaboration: If A+C is a Necessary Being, then C
cannot be a contingent part of this Neces-
sary Being. A Necessary Being
by definition cannot have a contingent element in it. The same holds true with
regard to B+C. If C is a Necessary being and a part of A
and B, then we will arrive at the second alternative which we have
already excluded.
Suhrawardi offers similar arguments
in various places throughout his works.14 For example, in the Alwdh
‘imddi, he summarizes his views on the existence of a Necessary Being and
its attributes as follows:
Since there is no other
Necessary Being, He has no match and because there is no force equal to Him in
power and might, there is nothing to oppose Him. Since He has no location, He
has no negation like the negation of whiteness that is black. All the power is
emanated from Him and therefore nothing is His enemy. He is the Truth, meaning
He exists because of His own essence and everything other than His essence is
not real (bdtil) since in their own essence they are not worthy of
existence by necessity. Therefore, their truth comes from the ultimate truth
and not of their own essence.15
By demonstrating that the
existence of all beings is contingent, Suhrawardi has also prepared the path
which leads to his ishraqi views where he equates God with Light and
Light with Being.
One of the central
problems of philosophy has been to argue for the existence of “self” or “soul”
and its relationship with the body.
In Partaw-ndmah^1
he begins by offering several arguments for the existence of an independent
“self” from the body. His first argument goes as follows: We often refer to
ourselves and say “I” did this or that. If I would separate a part of myself
(i.e. my hand) and put it on the table, I would neither refer to it as “I” nor
would I be any different as far as my personality is concerned. On this basis
he concludes that “I” or “self” is different from the body and therefore it has
to be immaterial.
There are basically two
problems with Suhrawardi’s arguments. First, he argues that “self”, which he
calls “na/s”, is above and beyond the body. On the other hand, he implies
that there exists a correlation between them. For example, in Partaw-ndmah,
he states:
Know that nafs
(soul) was not present before the body. If it were present prior to it, it
would not have been one and many
since this is impossible.
The reason why a variety of souls (selves) could not have existed before the
body is because all things when they share in the same thing, i.e. soul, are
one, and when they become numerous they become different.18
Suhrawardi then offers his
own view which is the instantaneous creation of the body and the soul. On this
point he states:
Therefore it becomes
apparent that the soul cannot exist before the body and that they come into
existence simultaneously. Between them there is attraction, love and anxiety
but not like the attraction of beings and their accidents.19
With regard to dualism, a
theory that maintains mind and body are two different and distinct entities
which interact with each other, Suhrawardi argues that this distinction is a
superficial one.
Suhrawardi in a number of
treatises such as Partaw-ndmah20 and Haydkil al-nwP
alludes to the dichotomy between a changing body and an immaterial self and
states:
All the parts of the body
change and if your “self” consisted of these parts of the body, they would also
be in a continuous state of change. (Thus) your self yesterday is not the same
“self” as today, but each day your self is other than itself and this obviously
is not the case. And since your knowledge is continuous and permanent it is not
all body nor part of the body, but it is beyond all this.22
The problem Suhrawardi
alludes to, however, is that for him the body is nothing but the absence of
light, the lowest level on the ontological hierarchy of light. Therefore, a
relationship between the “I” and the body is a relationship between light and
its absence, which is not possible. Whereas the “I” is the seat of wisdom, the
body handles lower functions. Therefore, that self and body are essentially of
the same ontological texture. The only difference between them is their
“intensity” which signifies they belong to different ontological statuses.
From the above, Suhrawardi
concludes that the self and body are different aspects of the same phenomenon
whose interactions are in accordance with the principles of mahabbah
(love) and qahr (domination).23 The body, belonging to a
lower order, has an innate love and yearning for the higher order, light,
knowing that the higher order dominates what is below it. In the ultimate
analysis, however, various
levels are of the same source and thus there exists a kinship between the mind
and the body. This theory is neither dualistic nor epiphenomenalistic, in that
the mind and body are viewed in a different context all together. It can be
called “spiritual monism” since it is based on the interaction of different
manifestations of the same thing, namely light.
Suhrawardi’s theory can be
viewed from two ontological perspectives. Looking at it from below, the self
and body are two different entities, since the lower order, to which the body
belongs does not include the higher order, to which the category of the self
belongs. However, looking at the same ontological hierarchy from the above, the
self-body problem fades away since body is contained within the self whose
nature is only a more intense light than the body.24
Suhrawardi offers two
types of arguments for the existence of life after death and the status of the
soul after it departs the body. His first argument is an ishraqi one and
the second a philosophical one. We shall consider the ishraqi view
first.
Suhrawardi offers a
profound eschatological analysis of an ishraqi nature, which can be said
to be a “Neoplatonization” of Ibn Sina’s view on eschatology with some original
contributions of his own.25 In books 4 and 5 of Hikmat al-ishrdq 26
he begins a discussion on eschatology, prophecy and transmigration of the soul
based on his ontological views. Adhering to basic Ibn Sinian doctrine of the
gradations of beings, Suhrawardi goes on to argue for the transmigration of the
human soul on the basis of the inner qualities that he attributes to various
ontological statues. As he states:
Objects are in need of the
lordly light which has a relation- ship with the body. This interestedness [of
lordly light] is due to the inherent poverty of it (body) and its yearning
towards the higher is due to its illuminationist relation. It, meaning body, is
the epitome of receptivity and contains lights.27
In the above argument
Suhrawardi demonstrates the mechanism by which the lower beings ascend towards
a higher ontological state, the gate through this ascendence ultimately being
man himself.
The gate of all gates is
the human body since it consists of that which other gates precede it such
that, entering through it is required first.28
The question that arises
now is what happens to the soul when one dies. The entire section 4 of Hikmat
al-ishrdq provides an ishraqi analysis in light of which the above
is answered. In a section entided “On the Status of the Human Soul After its
Departure From the Body,”29 Suhrawardi is explicit in putting
forward his eschatological doctrine. There he argues that the status of the
human soul after death depends on the degree to which one is able to ascend on
the ontological hierarchy before death. In this regard, Suhrawardi considers
pursuing a balanced life based on knowledge and action to be a key in
determining one’s status after death. On this he states:
The good fated ones who
are balanced in knowledge and action and the ascetics who are pure and virtuous
once departed from their bodies, join with the archetypes which are the origin
of their bodies.50
With regard to the fate of
those whom Suhrawardi does not consider to be living a “balanced life” he
says:
The masters of cruelty and
misery who have gathered around hell... transmigration be true or not, once
they depart from their corporeal bodies, they will have deprivations and
absences from the archetypes {suwar-i mu'allaqah) in accordance with
their character.31
Establishing a
correspondence between one’s deeds in this world and the status of one’s soul
in the hereafter is not a new concept. Suhrawardi’s orginal contribution is the
use of the concept of suwar-i mu'allaqah, literally meaning the
“suspended forms,” in elaborating on his eschatological doctrine. Suhrawardi
reminds us that these forms are different than Platonic archetypes and
describes them as follows:
The suspended forms are
not the same as the Platonic forms (muthut), because Platonic forms are
luminous and are in the world of intellectual enlightenment which is immutable.
However, these are forms(suwar) that are suspended in the world of
transcendence, some of which are dark and some luminous.32
The above is perhaps the
original contribution of Suhrawardi, since in his archetypal world there are
inherently evil things which he identifies with “darkness.” Perhaps this is
where Zoroastrian dualism is best exemplified in Suhrawardi’s thought since the
“benevelant God” (Ahuramazda) and the “malevolent God” (Ahriman) have their own
good and bad angels who are necessary beings. It is precisely introducing of
this type of dualism into the archetypal world of traditional Platonic ideas
and the relation of it to life after death which is a significant contribution
of Suhrawardi to the ongoing eschatological debates in Islamic philosophy. It
is a concept which is certainly not shared by many of his successors. In
Suhrawardi’s world of suspended forms (suwar al-mu ‘allaqah), there are
also perfect forms of evil which he identifies with darkness.
Finally, Suhrawardi
concludes his eschatological doctrine by establishing a relationship between
his ontology, angelology and his doctrine of the suspended forms. He argues
that in fact the souls of those who have lived a balanced life give rise to an
angelic order who in turn determine different gradations of the ishraqi ontology.
Furthermore, he concludes that the ontological status of individuals is
determined on the basis of this hierarchy and states:
From the souls of the
balanced people who possess the suspended forms and their manifestations which
are the heavens, different levels of angels are created whose numbers are
unlimited. They have different status in accordance with different levels of
the heavens upto the state of the purified ones and theosophers. That status is
higher and more noble than the world of angels. ’3
His arguments follow those
that are typical of the Peripatetics, in particular Ibn Sina. One of his
arguments has to do with the immortality of the cause of the self or soul. On
this he states:
Know that the self remains
and death for it is not conceivable because its cause is the Active Intellect,
which is immutable. Therefore, the effect will remain immortal because of the
immortal nature of the Cause.34
However, Suhrawardi fails
to adequately demonstrate that if a given cause is immortal, the effect too
becomes immutable and immortal, a relationship which he seems to take for
granted. It is true that there has to be an affinity between a cause and its
effect, but to establish a necessary relationship between a cause and its
effect and to ascribe the
existential attributes of the cause to its effect is unfounded.
Suhrawardi offers a number
of other arguments, especially in the 'Alwdh-i ‘imddi™ and Partaw-ndmah,
for the existence of life after death which generally follow the same pattern,
namely by establishing the existence of an immaterial and independent “self’
from the body.
Suhrawardi classifies all
knowledge on the basis of whether it is acquired through the sense perception
or whether it is innate. He argues that the knowledge that is attained through
innate ideas is beyond logical analysis. Therefore, logic as such can be
applied only to the category of acquired knowledge.36 So far,
Suhrawardi has remained within the logical paradigm of the Peripatetics as
exemplified by Ibn Sina’s book of Healing (Shifd)?[1]
Logic for Suhrawardi is only a tool for analysis, and in that capacity it is
subservient to philosophy. H. Zia’i summarizes Suhrawardi’s views on logic as
presented in the al-Mutdrahdt in the following three principles:
1.
Semantics
2.
Principles of proof
3.
Errors of formal and
material logic
On this Zia’i states:
This new structure may be
an attempt on the part of Suhrawardi to recognize the traditional Organon
according to his general bipartite division of logic into expository propositions
and proofs.40
In the forthcoming
chapter, I will demonstrate how Suhrawardi applies logic to comment on such
topics as knowledge by definition, sense perception, etc. Suhrawardi’s use of
logic can best be seen in his semantical analysis and his criticism of logic as
applied by the Peripatetics, which he argues can only lead to a partial
discovery of truth.41
Having used the symbolism
of light and darkness, Suhrawardi then goes on to develop an elaborate
angelology based on Zoroastrian angels. He achieves this by identifying
different grades of lights with various angelic orders. Between the light of
lights and total darkness, there are levels upon levels of light with different
degrees of intensity such that each level corresponds to an angel.
The new schemata of angels
changes the traditional view of angels as the force behind the movement of the
heavenly bodies. According to Suhrawardi, angels serve a number of functions,
the most important of which is their intermediary role between the light of
lights and man. For instance, an angelic order identified as the “lordly light”
(al-nur al-isfahbadt) is defined by Suhrawardi as that which is “within
the soul of man” such that “everywhere its signs are manifested and all things
attest to its presence.”42
Suhrawardi’s ontology and
its byproduct, angelology, are meant to map out the interior reality of man
rather than to provide a logical explanation for such things as angels “out
there.” The Peripatetic view of the function of angels, especially that of Ibn
Sina and Farabi, who simply saw the angels as beings who perform certain
functions out there in the universe such as rotation of the heavens, was
criticized by Suhrawardi. While Suhrawardi accepts the view that angels have
realities, he maintains that the number of angels are equivalent to the number
of the fixed stars, meaning
Suhrawardi and the School of Illumination
a virtually unlimited number of them, a departure from the traditional
Peripatetic view.
From the hierarchy of
angels arise two angelic orders: a longitudinal (tuli), and a
latitudinal (‘aradi) order with two separate functions. The longitudinal
angelic order represents the vertical axis or hierarchy of light similar to a
ladder. The latitudinal angelic order for Suhrawardi is where the “archetypes”
or “forms” reside. Suhrawardi goes on to argue that at the top of the
longitudinal order of light there stands the supreme light which he calls by
its Quranic and Mazdean names, al-nural-a‘zam (the Supreme Light) and Vohuman
(Bahman). From this light of lights, issues the lower order that is
illuminated by the light above it and the process of one light issuing a lower
one continues until it reaches darkness. The higher light, which is marked by
intensity, dominates (qahr) the lower order and the lower order is
marked by yearning and love for the higher one.43 This process
remains valid for the entire succession from the nur al-anwdr to
darkness. As we will see later, Suhrawardi applies this scheme to offer his
epistemological view which for him can replace the Aristotelian categories as a
means of epistemic analysis.
For Suhrawardi there
exists a veil between each level of light which acts as a “purgatory” or Barzakh
and allows the passage of only a certain amount of light. The primordial,
original and allencompassing nature of this system, through which Suhrawardi
expresses a number of esoteric doctrines, is such that he calls it al-ummahat
(the mothers), since all that exists originates from this hierarchy and
therefore it contains within itself the “ideas” (a'ydn al-thdbitah)
whose unfolding is the world.
In his attempt to equate
the angels of ancient Persia with the Platonic forms or archetypes, Suhrawardi
considers the longitudinal order to have given rise to a latitudinal order and
that to him is none other than the Platonic forms or ideas. Each being in the
world has its own archetype (arbdb al-anwd) within the latitudinal axis
which Suhrawardi identifies with the Zoroastrian angelo- logy. For example, he
identifies water with the Mazdean angel Khurdad, fire with Urdibihisht,
vegetables as Murddd, and minerals as Shahriwar. These angels and
many more are the archetypes whose actualization or manifestation from the
archetypes (al-a‘ydn thdbitah) appear in the material forms mentioned
above.44
Suhrawardi considers the heavenly
bodies and the more visible and materialized aspect of the angelic order to
have come from the longitudinal order, while the latitudinal order gives rise
to more esoteric phenomena such as the lordly light.
Since Suhrawardi knows
that in the final analysis the ultimate truth to which he is alluding lies at
the heart of all the divinely revealed traditions, the use of various symbols
from different traditions becomes secondary. Therefore, symbols, be they
Mazdean or Quranic, allude to truths which are profoundly Islamic as well as
Zoroastrian.
Suhrawardi’s angelology45
relies on the symbolism of many traditions in order to provide a map of man’s
interior. It is a cosmological doctrine which alludes to the presence of a
unifying element in all the traditional religions of man, namely a universal
truth.
In putting forth his views
on physics,46 Suhrawardi begins with a discussion regarding the
nature of the universe, which from his point of view is pure light. The views
of the Ash'ari’te Atomists, who were one of the predominant intellectual
schools of the time, were based on the principality of form and matter and
therefore the study of physics for them became the study of matter. Suhrawardi
argued against them by saying that since material bodies are constituted of
light, the study of physics is the study of light.
Having defined the nature
of things as light, Suhrawardi goes on to classify things according to the
degree of their transparency. For example, all those entities which allow light
to pass through them, such as air, are in a higher ontological category than
those which obstruct light, such as the earth.
In explaining
meteorological phenomena, Suhrawardi follows Ibn Sina and Aristotle, but he
rejects their views with regard to the occurrence of change within the nature
of things. For example, Aristotle argues that boiling water is due to the
coming in contact of the atoms of fire and water. Suhrawardi states that
boiling is because there exists a quality in water such that when it comes
close to fire this potentiality is actualized. He argues that fire does not
come in contact with the water, nor does the volume of water change. Therefore,
the only conclusion one can draw is to argue for the existence of a special
quality or attribute within water. As he states:
Qualitative change is due
rather to the coming into being of a quality which is intermediate between the
qualities of the original bodies and which is shared by all the particles of
the new compound.47
It is obvious that such a
theory has implications not only for the field of physics, but also as an
esoteric doctrine that seeks to explain how the association of different things
may bring about a qualitative change. This principle is one of the crucial
elements in the development of spiritual alchemy which appears in Islamic
esoteric writings.48
Suhrawardi’s views on
psychology are closely related to his concept of epistemology, which in turn
is directly related to the ontological hierarchy that serves as the foundation
of his philosophy. The following diagram helps to demonstrate this connection:49
DOMINANCE—
Light of lights— Angelic order—
Souls— Heavens— Bodies of lights Universal Intellect— Intelligence— Souls—
Heavens
— LOVE
Such a hierarchy
influences the human psyche in the following manner: The ontological status of
a being necessitates a certain psychological apparatus, and how the psyche and
the faculties of this being function depends on their place within the
hierarchical structure of the universe.
Suhrawardi’s view of
psychology, though influenced by Aristotle’s psychology as discussed in the De
Anima, does not follow Aristotle’s classification, and in fact is closer to
Ibn Sina than to Aristotle. Suhrawardi classifies all beings into three
categories: vegetable, animal and human. The only major difference between his
view and the Peripatetics lies in his notion of body as the theurgy of Ispahbad.
According to Suhrawardi,
the classification of different faculties can be illustrated by the following
diagram50:
Feeding (ghddhiyyah) Attraction (jddhibah)
Vegetable Soul Growth (ndmiyyah) Retention (mdsikah)
Reproduction (muwallidah) Digestion (hddimah)
Repulsion (dafiah)
( |
Power of motion (muharrikah)
Power of lust (shahwah)
Power of desire (nuzu ‘iyyah)
Power of anger (ghadhab)
Sensus Communis (hiss mushtarik) The center where all the
information and data of the external world is collected. The location is in the
front of the brain.
Fantasy (khiydb) The place where sensus communis
is stored. It is located in the back of the cavity.
Apprehension (wahm) Governs sensible things which the
senses are not capable of gathering and it is located in the middle cavity.
Imagination
(mutakhayyilah) Often identified with apprehension
but its function goes further and it synthesizes and analyzes.
Memory (hdfizah) The place where apprehension is
stored. It is located in the back of the middle cavity.
12. ESCHATOLOGY
Suhrawardi’s notion of
eschatology is derived from his notion of psychology.51 He
concludes that the goal of man is to become illuminated and return to his
origin in the other world. The other world is only a continuation of this one,
and the status of the soul in the hereafter depends on the degree to which a
person is purified here and now.
Suhrawardi identifies
three groups of people with respect to the degree of their purity and
illumination and establishes a causal connection between their purity and their
ontological status in the other world. These three groups are:
1.
Those who remained in the
darkness of ignorance (ashqtyd).
2.
Those who purified
themselves to some extent (sudad).
3.
Those who purified
themselves and reached illumination (muta ’allihun).
In his book Yazddn
shindkht,52 he demonstrates the type of connection that he establishes
between one’s ontological status in this world and that of the other world. He
argues that regardless of the degree of one’s purity, the soul is in essence
immortal. This argument is as follows:
Know that the soul
remains; it is inconceivable for it to perish since its cause (of coming to be)
which is the active intellect, is eternal; therefore, it remains eternal
because of its cause (which is eternal).55
13. HIKMATVERSUS PHILOSOPHY
Like many other Islamic
philosophers, Suhrawardi makes a distinction between philosophy and hikmat
which is crucial for the understanding of not only ishraqi doctrine but
also the post- Suhrawardian philosophy, especially in Persia and the
sub-continent of India. The distinction between philosophy and hikmat
which is held by a great number of Islamic philosophers is believed to have
been advocated even by such peripatetics as Ibn Sina, who after reaching the
zeinth of his philosophical maturity demonstrated ishraqi tendencies. In
the introduction to mantiq al-mashraqiyyin* he tells us that “there are
branches of wisdom that do not originate from the Greeks.”55 In his
book al-Mashdri' wa’l-mutdrdhdt,’^’ Suhrawardi tells us that while most
of Ibn Sina’s writings are devoid of any theosophical significance, there are
references to the existence of a type of wisdom other than the Greeks and their
discursive method.
Suhrawardi may have
believed that, due to the circumstance under which Ibn Sina lived, he had to
remain silent in regard to his ishraqi ideas. Therefore Suhrawardi feels
that he not only has to disclose the ishraqi tendencies of Ibn Sina but
also to continue them. For example, in his work “The OccidentalExUe”
(al-Ghurbat al-gharbiyyah), Suhrawardi picks up the story where Ibn Sina
had ended his short work, Risdlat Hayy ibn yaqzdn.57 Both of
these stories are highly symbolic and demonstrate the spiritual stages of the
inner being of a seeker of truth and his relationship with the active
intellect, which Suhrawardi identifies as the “glorious old master” (Pir-i
Burna).
Ibn Sina was well aware of
the dangers of popularizing the wisdom of illumination, and his silence in this
regard may well be attributed to this very point. In the al-Ishdrdt
waTtanbihdt, he says,
If you corrupt this
wisdom, God be the judge between you and me.58
If it was Spinoza who
said, “God is not so mindless as to create a two legged creature and leave it
to Aristotle to make him rational,” Suhrawardi would add to this: “and to make
Aristotle the only gate through which truth can be attained.” This is because
Suhrawardi neither considers Aristotle to be the founder of rationality nor can
the type of wisdom he advocates be the only one that leads to truth. As S.H.
Nasr states:
He [Suhrawardi] believed
that this wisdom is universal and
Perennial, the philosophia
perennis and universalis, which existed in various forms among the ancient
Hindus, Persians, Babylonians and Egyptians and among the Greeks up to the
time of Aristotle, who for Suhrawardi was not the beginning but rather the end
of philosophy among the Greeks who terminated this tradition of wisdom by
limiting it to its rationalistic aspect.59
The inherent distinction
between philosophy and hikmah for Suhrawardi is a natural one and
emanates from the fact that the faculty of intellectus and praxis are two
separate faculties.
In his work Yazddn
shindkht, Suhrawardi alludes to this distinction and argues that there lie
two powers within the soul: one apprehends and the other one generates action.
Suhrawardi then goes on to make the functioning of these two faculties be
contingent upon each other and states:
Theoretical (faculty), for
example, is such as knowing that the world is created, and practical [faculty
for example] is to know that oppression is evil . . . theoretical is subject to
discursive science and from practical (faculty) a knowledge is required to know
what should become known.60
This is not to say that
Suhrawardi opposed a rational approach to philosophical issues, nor was he
“anti-philosophy,” as Ghazzali and some other Sufis were. In fact, reasoning
and independent judgment are an essential part of one’s quest for the pursuit
of truth. Suhrawardi’s respect for a rational process of reasoning goes so far
as to say: Do not follow me or anybody else and know that the only criterion is
reason.61
Therefore, whereas
philosophical speculation for Suhrawardi is important, it however originates
from a faculty that is subservient to intellectual intuition (dhawq).
Suhrawardi goes so far as to cate-
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination gorize different knowers in accordance with their mastery of
rationalistic philosophy and hikmat. His classifications go as follows:
1.
Those who have mastered ishraqi
wisdom but are not well versed in discursive reasoning, (i.e. Bayazid,
Kharraqani)
2.
Those who have mastered
discursive reasoning but yet lack ishraqi inclination (i.e. Farabi)
3.
Those who have mastered
both discursive reasoning and ishraqi wisdom. These are perfect
philosophers and are entitled to be the “vicegerents of God” (khalifat
Allah).
While it is clear that
Suhrawardi recommends the study of the Peripatetic philosophy first, especially
in the al-Talunhat and al-Mashari wa ’l-mutarahat,62
he puts the study of discursive philosophy in perspective.
Having defended the study
of discursive philosophy as a prerequisite to the understanding of ishraq,
Suhrawardi then tells us of the unique characteristics of the type of wisdom
that he is propagating.
Suhrawardi considers
himself to be the unifier of what he calls “al-Hikmat al-laduniyah"
(Divine Wisdom), a tradition that begins with Prophet Hermes (khidr) and
has persisted throughout time in various forms. As to the source of this wisdom
he argues:
The light of the path
which stretches into the past is the substance of Pythagoras . . . and was sent
down upon Tustari and his followers. The substance of Khusrawanian
[wisdom] has been sent down to Kharrqani and Sayyar Bastami.63
Therefore, Suhrawardi is
arguing that while philosophy and hikmat issue forth from the same
source, they nevertheless are distinct in that philosophy is the necessary
condition and theosophy the sufficient condition for the attainment of truth.
Suhrawardi, as the unifier of different traditions of wisdom, considers
philosophy and theosophy to be two types of wisdom, each of which is suitable
for a purpose. Truth for Suhrawardi ultimately should rely on knowledge that
is attained through illumination, while it has to sustain the scrutiny of logic
and rational reasoning and be compatable with them.
On the relationship
between philosophy and hikmat, Suhrawardi in the introduction to The
Philosophy of Illumination states:
. . . This book is of a
different methodology, and a path (of truth) that is nearer than the other one
(discursive) .... Its
truth and other enigmas
first did not come to me through thinking or discourse but its attainment was
of a different nature. Finally, when I attained the truth, I questioned its
rationale in such a way that if I ignore the reasoning process, no doubt can
come upon me.64
Suhrawardi claims to have
first discovered the truth which he calls hikmat, and then he embarked
on a path to find the rational basis of his experiential wisdom. It is certain
that philosophy in Suhra- wardi’s thought plays a different role from
theosophy, and so does the means by which one comes to attain mastery of each
type of wisdom. These two traditions of wisdom for the master of ishraq
are not only different in their form and their content but also originate from
two different sources. Discursive philosophy comes from the rational faculty,
whereas ishraqi wisdom is issued forth from the faculty of intuition.
A major problem that is
often alluded to is that whereas the results of logical analyses are
verifiable, such is not the case in regard to various truth claims that are of
an ishraqi nature. Suhrawardi argues that his views can be verified only
by those who have been initiated into the science of ishraq through a
spiritual master who has become the vicegerent of God on earth (khalifat
Allah).65 On this he states:
Of course, it is not feasible for one
who has not referred to a sage who is the vicegerent (of God) and possesses the
knowledge of this book to gain access to the secrets of this book.66
Often Suhrawardi is very
explicit in his instructions as to how the types of wisdom he advocates can be
attained. For Suhrawardi Hikmat al-ishrdq is a blueprint for those who
wish to have an experience of illumination. It is crucial to realize the
importance of asceticism and practical wisdom to the ishraqi doctrine as
a whole, even though this is contrary to some of the later interpreters of
Suhrawardi who put more emphasis on his intellectual and philosophical aspects.
The prime concern of
Suhrawardi’s entire philosophy is to demonstrate the journey of the human soul
towards its original abode. One begins by gaining an awareness of the path that
he ought to follow. Having followed the teachings of a master who can direct
the disciple through the maze of spiritual dangers, one reaches a state where
spiritual knowledge can be obtained directly without mediation. In this state,
Suhrawardi considers knowledge
to come from the divine
soul (nafs al-qudsiyyah), a mode of cognition distinct from that of the
Peripatetics. To demonstrate the spiritual journey of man, Suhrawardi
establishes a tightly woven web of ideas and concepts, the validity of which
depends on the entire system, which itself rests upon the principality of
light.
Notes
Nasr, Three Muslim Sages, 69.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 10.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 46.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 64.
Ibid., 64.
Ibid., 65.
Ibid., 65.
Suhrawardi’s arguments can also be
found in Opera 2, 106ff.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 62.
For more information on
Suhrawardi’s ontology see: H. Zia’i, Knowledge and Illumination
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 125-187. Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 63.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 33.
Ibid., 34.
Suhrawardi’s views on the
existence of a Necessary Being, essence and existence as presented in his
Persian works can be found in Alwdh ‘imddi, 134-153; his arguments are
basically the same as those presented in Partaw-ndmah. The arguments
prestented in his Arabic works, especially in the al-Talwihdt, 33-39,
are also similar to those of Alwdh ‘imddiyah and Partaw-ndmah.
Such arguments are based on the impossibility that the chain of causality could
go on for infinity.
Suhrawardi, Opera3, 141.
Suhrawardi’s argument for
the existence of the self and its relationship with the body can be found in
the al-Talwihdt, 68, and 80-82; and Bustdn al-qulub, pp.342-387.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 23-24.
Suhrawardi, Opera
3, 25. Suhrawardi in this section uses the words “self” and “I” interchangably.
However, in all these cases he is alluding to what constitutes the identity of
a person.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 26.
For more information on
Suhrawardi’s theory of Personal Identity, see Partaw-ndmah, 26-31.
It is argued that
Suhrawardi’s choice of the word Hdyakil is influenced by the Isma’ilis,
who use this term extensively. This also may have been one of the likely causes
of his death since salah al-Din Ayyubi was highly antagonistic towards
Isma’ilis.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 85-86.
For more information see:
H. Corbin, En Islam iranien, vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1971-1972),
107-110.
Suhrawardi’s view on the
existence of a self in his Persian works can be found in the following works: Haydkil
al-nur, 4—92; Alwdh ‘imddi, 116-165; Bustdn al-qulub,
342-387; and Yazddn shindkht, 412-444. In his Arabic works he discusses
the issue in the al-Talwihdt, 68, 81, 82. However, most of the arguments
are derivations of the argument that I have discussed.
For more information on a
“spiritualized” reading of Ibn Sina, see:
J. Michot, Dieu el la
destinee de rhomme ma'dd chez Avicenne, (Peetrs: Louvain Pub., 1987).
26 Suhrawardi, Opera 2, ch.4,
5.
27 Ibid., 216.
28 Ibid., 217.
29 Ibid., 229.
30 Ibid., 229.
31 Ibid., 230.
32 Ibid., 231.
33 Ibid., 235.
34 Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 65.
35 For more information on Suhrawardi’s view on the existence of
life after death, see Alwah ‘imddiyah, 155ff.
36 Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 1-4.
37 Shifd 1, 2-4.
38 H. Zia’i, “Suhrawardi’s Philosophy of Illumination” (Ph.D.
Diss., Harvard University, 1976), 53-54.
39 Ibid., 57.
40 Ibid., 82.
41 For more information on Suhrawardi’s logic see: H. Zia’i, Knowledge
and Illumination (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992).
42 Ibid., 70.
43 It is not until Mulla Sadra’s time that the mechanism by
which beings yearn for the higher order is thoroughly discussed. His notion of
“Transsubstantial motion” (harakal al-jawhariyyah) explains the inner
yearning of beings towards a higher ontological status.
44 Hidaji, in his commentary upon Sabziwari’s sharh-i
manzumah, offers a complete list of the words and phrases of the ancient
Persian sages which Suhrawardi refers throughout his writings. For more information
see Hashiy-yi hidaji (Tehran), 283.
45 For further discussion of Suhrwardi’s angelology, see H.
Corbin’s introduction to Suhrawardi, Opera 2, and G. Webbs, Suhrawardi’s
Angelology, (Ph.D. Disst: Temple University, 1989).
46 For a discussion of Suhrawardi’s physics, see H. Corbin’s
introduction to Opera 2.
47 A History of Muslim Philosophy,
vol. 1, ed M.M. Sharif (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1963), 391.
48 For more information on alchemy and its spiritual symbolim,
see S.H. Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1968); and T. Burkhardt, Alchemy. Science of the Cosmos,
Science of the Soul, trans. W. Stoddard (Olten: Walter, 1974).
49 For a more complete discussion, see H. Corbin’s introduction
to Opera 2.
50 I have followed the outline presented by S.H. Nasr in A
History of Muslim Philosophy, ed. M.M. Sharif, p. 216.
51 In the later part of the Hikmat al-ishraq, Suhrawardi
devotes a major section to the discussion of eschatology using the language of
illumination. See Opera 2, 216.
52 Suhrawardi, OperaS, 419-422.
Ibid., 65.
Ibn Sina, Mantiq
al-mashraqiyyin (Tehran: Ja’fari Tabriz! Pub., 1973), 63ff. '
Ibid., 63.
Suhrawardi, Opera
1, 194-197.
Ibn Sina, Risdlat Hayy
itm Yaqzdn, ed. Ahmad Amin (Egypt: Dar al-Ma‘arif Publication, 1966).
al-Ishdral wa'l-tanbihdl,
419.
S.H. Nasr, Three Muslim Sages,
61.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 422-423.
Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 140.
Ibid., 194.
Ibid., 502-503.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2,
10.
This notion, which may
also have political connotations according to some scholars, has been
instrumental in the latter developments of Shi'ite political thought. For more
information see: H. Zia’i, “The Source and Nature of Political Authority in
Suhawardi Philosopy of Illumination,” in Political Aspects of Islamic
Philosophy, ed. Butterworth (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
Suhrawardi, Opera
2, 259.
3
The beginning of the
mystical traditions is often traced back to the vision of their founders, and
the mystical dimension of Suhra- wardi’s thought is no exception. Suhrawardi in
The Philosophy of Illumination' tells us that in “a strange day”, the
truth and the secrets of the Divine were revealed to him. Having had a vision,
he then sets forth to write down the principles of his transcendental theosophy
for those philosophers who are well versed in esoteric sciences as well as
discursive philosophy.
In his introduction to The
Philosophy of Illumination, Suhrawardi tells us that the content and truth
of this book were not attained through discursive reasoning. Having attained
the truth “in another way,”2 he goes on to say that he then sought
the justification of his findings in a more discursive context. Suhrawardi
further tells us that the certainty that is attained through this direct means
of cognition is such that it stands independent of the process of logical
reasoning that also leads to the same conclusion.3
Since for Suhrawardi it is
this special mode of knowledge that differentiates between those who truly know
and those who do not, he goes on to categorize the seekers of wisdom
accordingly.4
1.
Those who are immersed in
theosophia and do not concern themselves with discursive and rationalistic
philosophy.
2.
Rationalisitc philosophers
who do not concern themselves with theosophy.
3.
Learned men who have
benefited both from theosophy and discursive philosophy.
4.
Theosophers who are
neverthless mediocre or weak in discursive philosophy.
5.
Rationalistic philosophers
who are mediocre or weak in theosophy.
6.
Students of theosophy and
discursive philosophy.
7.
Students of theosophy
alone.
8.
Students of discursive
philosophy alone.
What is the nature of the
knowledge of a theosopher which enables him to know the truth and to attain the
certainty that is not part of discursive knowledge? Clarification of this
crucial point in Suhrawardi’s philosophy requires a lengthly disscusion concerning
Suhrawardi’s epistemology.
It should be first
mentioned that there is a difference between this special mode of knowledge and
what is commonly known as “mystical vision” or mystical experience. Suhrawardi
tells us that he himself was puzzled as to how one comes to know a thing. He
ponders upon this question and finally in a state of utter frustration he has
a vision of Aristotle who tells him what the solution is:
Aristotle: If
you turn to your own self (dhdt) and inquire, you will certainly find your
answer.
Suhrawardi: How
is that?
Aristotle: Is
it not the case that you understand yourself? Is this understanding of the
self, or is it the understanding of the self through something other than the
self? If it is the case that the understanding of the self is through something
other than the self, for your self there is another self who understands you
and it is no longer you who understands yourself. Now that this is the case,
necessarily one questions this new self that is the true element for the understanding
of the self. Does this self understand itself, or does it need something else?
If this be the case, then it goes on ad infinitum, which is impossible.
The other assumption is that you come to know of your self through the effect
or an idea that you attain the truth of your self and that the truth of your
self can never be understood without any mediation.
Suhrawardi: I
agree that I can never know myself directly and it is only through the picture
or the idea of a self that I can know myself.
Aristotle: If
what you say were the case, then if this idea or picture does not correspond
with your self, it does not represent your self, and because this idea is not
an indication of your self then you have not understood your self.
Suhrawardi: Suppose
this idea corresponds to my self. If this idea comes to my mind through my
“self”, then it is precisely repre-
sentative of my self and
no other thing. Do you still believe that one’s self cannot be understood
through such a thing?
Aristotle: This
idea certainly corresponds to your self but does it correspond to the universal
self or to your particular self that has specific characteristics and
attributes?
Suhrawardi: I
assume the latter by saying that the pictorial idea corresponds with my “self’
that has certain characteristics and therefore represents my self.
Aristotle: Every
picture that forms in the mind is of a universal character, and as much as you
limit these concepts to having attributes, etc. yet, since they are of multiple
nature, they are still universal. If in case due to an obstacle in the outside
world, the validity of a universal concept is violated because of the
particular characteristics of an individual, it nevertheless remains universal
at a conceptual level. The inevitable fact is that you understand your unique
self, a self that is truly free from any sharing or commonness. The result is
that this particular understanding that you have of your unique and uncommon
self cannot be understood through a picture or idea. Therefore, understanding
of the self is never through the “idea” (or picture).5
Suhrawardi in his state of
dream-vision asks Aristotle if the Peripatetic philosophers are the true
masters of wisdom. Aristotle tells him that such figures as Bayazid and Hallaj,
the masters of the Sufi tradition, are the true philosophers and not the
Peripatetics, presumably because they came to know their “self” first.6
Aristotle’s advice to
Suhrawardi is that to know anything one must first “know himself.” This
knowing, which for Suhrawardi takes place both on a practical and a
philosophical level, is a central theme of ishraqi philosophy. On a
practical level, the “I” is the source of all sublime desires veiled by the
temptations of the corporeal dimension of man. On a philosophical level, Suhrawardi
considers the “I” to be the foundation of the illuminationist epistemology.
It is precisely this
illuminationist epistemology that can lead to the visionary experience of
fifteen types of lights by those who are on the spiritual path. Suhrawardi tells
us those who disengage themselves from the world of matter are able to arrive
at the “eighth heaven” (aqlim al-thdmin), which he identifies with the
archetypeal world (‘dlam mithdl).7 Suhrawardi mentions such
figures as Hermes, Plato and the prophet Muhammad to be among those who have
had a vision of these lights, each of which
Suhrawardi identifies with
a particular attribute. According to Suhrawardi, these fifteen lights, some of
which have peculiar descriptions are “the purpose of the path of knowledge.”8
These visionary lights which emanate from the world of intellect are the
essence of power and knowledge and he who experiences these lights also attains
the power to rule over the material world. The necessary condition for this
experience is, however, separation (tajrid) from one’s corporeal body.
These lights are:9
1.
A light which shines upon
the novice and is pleasant but not permanent.
2.
A light that shines upon
others and is more like a lightningbolt.
3.
A light that is soothing
and enters the hearts of the gnostics. It is as if warm water is poured on you,
a pleasant sensation is then experienced.
4.
A light that descends upon
the hearts of the men of vision and lasts a long time. This is a dominant light
which induces a form of intoxication.
5.
A light of extreme grace
and pleasure which is induced through the power of love.
6.
A light that burns and is
induced through knowledge that is attained through intellection.
7.
A light which at first is
luminous and is more intense than the light of the sun.
8.
A luminous and pleasant
light appearing as if it comes from the hair and lasts a long time.
9.
An emanating light which
is painful but pleasurable.
10.
A light coming from some
figures and lies in the brain.
11.
A light that emanates from
the self (nafs) and shines upon the entire spiritual components.
12.
A light whose attainment
is marked by intensity.
13.
A light that gives birth
to the “self’ and appears to be suspended. The incorporeality of the self can
be observed through this light.
14.
A light which induces a
special heaviness such that it exerts a pressure beyond one’s ability.
15.
A light that is the cause
of the movements of the body and the material self.10
Suhrawardi tells us that
he has “seen” and experienced these lights and that they are the reason sages are
able to perform miracles." As he states:
Suhrawardi and the School
of Illumination
He who worships God with
sincerity and dies from the material darkness and frees himself from the
corporeal body and abandons the consciousness of the material issues will
witness that which others are incapable of seeing.12
Vision for Suhrawardi is a
mode of being whose epistemological significance is to provide the knower with
a mode of cognition that is attained through the pursuit of the spiritual life.
The many components of the spiritual life, however, are discussed in a more
secretive and esoteric manner in his various works but the ultimate purpose of
them remains the same: the experience of illumination through seeing the
separation of the self from the body and the material world.
Suhrawardi adheres to the
traditional distinction between the body and the soul. Body for him represents
darkness, an absence or a lack of light to which he refers as
“body"(ZzayAaZ).
Know that the “I” (nafs
ndtiqah) is of a Divine substance which the powers and engagements of the
body withdrew it from its abode. Whenever the soul is strengthened through
spiritual virtues and the body is weakened through fasting and not sleeping,
the soul is released and unites with the spiritual world.13
Suhrawardi, who repeatedly
offers arguments for the existence of an independent self from the body,
follows a Neoplatonic scheme by considering the body to be a veil that prevents
man from seeing the intelligibles:
Know that it is matter
that prevents intellection since until you have abstracted something from
matter and what is in matter, you can not be the subject of intellection.14
Corporeality by nature is
the antipode of intellection or thinking, which he regards as belonging to the
incorporeal world. The self, constitutes the true identity of a person, “a
living substance which exists by necessity of its own essence.”15 On
the contrary, the body has a tendency towards the lower world, and, relying on
sense perception, denies the more transcendental pleasures and seeks the
highest of the attainable pleasure of each senses.
Suhrawardi, who follows
the hierarchical structure of Islamic ontology, explains the place of self and
body in this context. Identifying the self with light, Suhrawardi tells us that
the self has a higher ontological reality for which the body, being lower, has
a natural yearning. Suhrawardi’s analysis of the place, nature and types of
light is an elaborate one which will be discussed at a later point, but this
hierarchical structure puts in place a mechanism whereby the need, yearning and
desire for man to follow the spiritual path becomes a necessary and natural
process. No wonder Suhrawardi argues that all beings involuntary yearn for light
rather than the inferior status of darkness.
All beings by nature seek
perfection, which explains why even animals are drawn to light.16
The ontological necessity of the spiritual ascendance is illustrated in the
mystical narratives of Suhrawardi, in particular through the language of the
birds. The nature of man is such that in encountering the worldly pleasures, he
is overcome by forgetfulness. In the Risdlat al-tayrhe tells us:
With God’s grace, he who
can remain steadfast in his determination at the time when lustful desires
attack, is superior to angels and if one is overcome by them, is inferior to
animals.17
Suhrawardi begins his Risaldt
al-tayr describing the journey of a group of birds who in their flight to
their original abode fall in the trap of the external beauty of the world and
become prey to hunters. Identifying the self with one’s body as a mistake that
the ego makes is a central theme in many mystical traditions, in particular
Islam and Hinduism. Suhrawardi tells us due to the forgetfulness of human
nature, we become accustomed to the corporeal world to the point of considering
it to be our natural abode.
Speaking as one of the
birds, Suhrawardi tells us that he was reminded of his original condition when
he saw that some of the birds had partialy freed themselves. Through the
guidance of his peers he too is partially freed and begins his flight while his
legs are still in chains. The birds’ entrapment represents the human condition,
trapped in the world of forms, chained by our lustful desires, hunted by our
own ego and afraid of the hardships of the spiritual path. A few, however, are
able to remember man’s origin and destination.
The birds continue their
journey until the eighth city which symbolizes the archetypal world. The man in
charge of the city tells
them that they must
proceed to the top of the mountain where His Majesty resides. The Birds finally
arrive at the Divine throne, only to hear Him say that only he who has chained
you can free you from bondage. Suhrawardi symbolically alludes to the fact that
it is man who has condemed himself to his condition, suffering and bondage, and
only he can free himself. The question now is how man can overcome his
condition.
Suhrawardi’s answer to
this question is two-fold. On the one hand, man’s condition is due to his
weakness and giving in to his lustful desires. On the other hand, this is not
the fault of man since our condition is derived from an ontological reality in
which matter is the lowest part which constitutes the body. However, man does
possess the potential consciousness to understand the exalted status of our
“self’, which can then break the chains and free us.
In The Red Intellect,'8
Suhrawardi discusses the forgetful nature of man through another narrative. A
bird who has also forgotten his origin meets a red-faced man who tells the bird
he is the first man of creation. But he too is a prisoner of the material world
which Suhrawardi identifies with darkness. The red-faced man explains how man
in his original Adamic state is white and luminous, but when mixed with the
darkness of the created domain he has turned red. The first son of creation
describes man’s condition of fallenness by alluding to the wonders he has seen
around the world.
I asked, from the wonders
of the world, what have you seen? He said: “The Qaf mountain, the Tuba tree,
twelve workshops, David’s shield, the sword of Blark, the fountain of life.”19
The immensely rich symbolism
Suhrawardi employs here provides us with a spiritual map which aids the sdlik
to find his path. The Qaf mountain is our original abode from which everything
comes and to which all things return, a place that Suhrawardi refers to as “ndkujd
dbad” (the nowhere but prosperous land). The luminous pearl is the first
object of creation, the intellect which is the cause of illumination but whose
misuse can lead to disasterous results. The Tuba tree symbolizes life and its
fruits are the archetypes. It is upon this tree that the Simurgh
(griffin), symbol of divine unity, has its nest. The twelve workshops are the
levels of reality or being, each of which is the existential cause of the one
below it. The lower level of this hierarchical scheme is where the Davidian
shield is woven. David, the Prophet of the old testament and the Quran
alike, is known to have
had a legendary shield known for its impenetrability. This shield symbolizes
the attachments of our world which have made a prisoner of us all.
The shield of attachments
is cut loose only by the sword of Blark, the power of will (himmah).
Suhrawardi tells us that through determination, one should seek the fountain of
life which he identifies as Sophia perennis. Having overcome oneself and
the temptations of the body, the fountain of life is then attained.20 Suhrawardi
expresses this concept in a beautiful ode:
I am the falcon who hunters are in
search of at all times.
My prey are the black eyed Gazelle
Who emanate from themselves hikmah
I am far from word play, to me it is
the meaning that matters.21
3.
ON THE SPIRITUAL JOURNEY
AND ASCETICISM
Much has been written on
the spiritual journey of man and the Sufi encounter with the path of love and
knowledge. Suhrawardi follows the traditional views of the spiritual path and
man’s quest for gnosis (ma'rifah). What is different in Suhrawardi’s
approach is the symbolism he employs to allude to the centrality of various
components of the Sufi path in particular asceticism.
In his A Day Among
Sufis2,2 Suhrawardi describes the conversation of a Sufi master
and a novice in a Sufi house (khdniqdh). Following a series of questions
and answers between master and disciple that offers a concise and profound
understanding of the medieval cosmology, the master indicates that he regards
all such conversations as vain. Using astronomy as an example, the master
indicates three different modes of knowing, two of which are not relevent to
one’s spiritual path.
Those who reflect upon the
heavens, the master says, are of three types: a group of them see the cosmos
through the external eyes and see a dark sheet with several white dots on it.
These are the commoners and this much the animals see too. Another group see
the cosmos through the eyes of the cosmos and these are astronomers . . . but
there are those who do not see the secret of the heavens and stars through
intellection [reasoning] (istidldl), these are seekers.23
The sdlik asks the
master how “the eye” opens with which one can see reality. In one of the most
unique examples of Sufi
symbolism and an exquisite
literary style, Suhrawardi offers a prescription for asceticism. Because the
significance of this passage further establishes the role and place of
asceticism in the overall school of ishrcuj, we present the translation
of the entire section.
I asked the Shaykh, “I do
not have that insight. What is the solution?” The Shaykh said, “You have
indigestion. Fast for forty days and then drink laxative so you may vomit and
your eyes may open.” I asked, “What is the prescription for that laxative?” He
said “The ingredients of that are attained by you.” I said “What are the
ingredients?” He said,” Whatever is dear to you from wealth, property,
possessions and the pleasures of the body and such things are ingredients of
this laxative. For forty days eat pure but little food .... If you must use the
bathroom soon, then the medicine has been effective, your sight will be
illuminated, and if the need arises, for another forty days fast and use the
same laxative so it may work this time too. If it does not work, apply it time
and time again, it will work . . . .”
I asked the Shaykh, “Once
the inner eye is opened, what does the seer see?” The Shaykh said, “Once the
inner eye is opened, the external eyes and lips should be shut and the five external
senses should be silenced. The inner sense should begin to function so that if
the patient grasps, he may do so through the inner hand and if he sees, he sees
with the inner eye and if he hears, he hears with the inner ear and if he
smells, he smells with the inner sense . . . [then] he sees what he sees and
when he sees.24
In this most interesting
analogy, Suhrawardi clearly shows the integral relationship between the
spiritual yearning, the role of the master and his supervision to cure the
disease of the soul and the place of asceticism in this. In the above narrative
the seeker’s inability to open his inner eye is analogized as indigestion. In
the forty days of fasting, known among the Sufis as chillah, an attempt
is made to contain the desires of the ego (nafs). This attempt is
regarded by most Sufis to be the cure of spiritual illnesses and so is
analogized as a laxative, that which flushes out impurities. To allude to the
worldly attachments which prevent openning of the intellect, Suhrawardi uses
the image of indigestion.
Perhaps the most important
part of the passage is the allusion to the existence of a relationship between
the external and
internal senses. For
Suhrawardi the attainment of knowledge begins by sense perception and as the
process of inner purity continues, one begins to understand through the inner
senses. Suhrawardi identifies the external senses with the “women’s quarter”
and the limitations of the sense perception as bondages of the children’s
world. He who frees himself and penetrates the women’s quarter, Suhrawardi
tells us, may arrive at the “man’s quarter,” a condition that is necessary for
the understanding of the incorporeal world (‘dlam-i tajarrud) 25
In his work, On the
State of Childhood,26 Suhrawardi continues this theme and
equates his past - when he attained knowledge only through sense perception -
with childhood. Alluding to the necessity of initiation, a child meets a
master who teaches him the esoteric sciences. However, the child reveals the
secrets to the uninitiated, thereby casting the pearl of esoteric sciences
before the swine of unpreparedness which results in the loss of what he had
learned. Self-guarding remains an essential part of the spiritual path,
necessary to the transition from the childhood and the acquisition of knowledge
through the senses.
Again in the treatise,
Suhrawardi calls for the abandonment of all attachments and he considers
worldly desires to be a veil and a hindrance to the awakening of the inner
senses. Acknowledging the difficulty of detaching oneself from wealth,
position, etc., Suhrawardi states:
I asked the Shaykh if
there is any one who can give up all that he has Shaykh answered, “A true human
is he who can.” I asked “if he has nothing how does he live?” Shaykh replied
“He who thinks like this does not give up anything, but he who gives up
everything does not think like this.”27
Knowing the truth
therefore requires the functioning of the inner senses which does not happen
unless one detaches himself from his worldly possessions. To explain the nature
of the knowledge that is attained by the inner senses, Suhrawardi gives the
example of the inability of a child to understand the pleasure that is derived
from sexual intercourse.28 Just as physical maturity is needed for
sexual intercourse, spiritual maturity is required for the attainment of
knowledge through the inner senses. On the Sufi path, spiritual maturity comes
through initiation, ascetic practices and observance of the moral codes of
Islam. The pleasures of experiencing the incorporeal world through the inner
senses (‘dlam
al-dhawq) are
so great that the inner self of the Sufi yearns to burst open. It is this inner
joy which is the basis of Sufi music, dancing (sama*), poetry and art.
To explain Sufi dancing
through the inner senses, Suhrawardi says:
The soul took away that
ability from the ears, it [the soul] says, you [ears] are not worthy to hear
this music. The soul deprives the ear from hearing and hears itself since in
the other world, hearing is not a function of the ear.29
It is man’s inner yearning
for the transcendent that makes him wish to dance like a bird who wants to fly
while taking its cage with it. The Sufi, too, in his attempt for spiritual
flight, carries his body with him.
In the latter part of On
the State of Childhood,x Suhrawardi goes through various Sufi
practices such as shaking of the sleeves, throwing away of the Sufi garment,
fainting during sama' and drinking water following the sama'. In
each case, Suhrawardi offers his interpretation by means of neo-Platonic
scheme.
According to Suhrawardi,
the spiritual journey and the states and stations of its path arise from three
phenomena: virtue (husri), love (mihr) and reflective sadness (huzn).
In his On the Reality of Love,3' Suhrawardi attributes virtue
to the knowledge of God and love to the knowledge of the self and finally to a
sadness which comes from “the knowledge of what was not and then was.”32
The knowledge of God is a virtue, a good, indeed the summum bonum, whereas
the knowledge of the self leads to the discovery that the self is divine,
resulting in the love and yearning that Sufis experience. Finally, there is
the sadness that is experienced by reflecting on the created order, for it
signifies separation of man and his departure from his original abode.
In the treatise On the
Reality of Love, where the language of esoteric symbolism reaches its
climax, Suhrawardi describes the story of creation by first refering to the
first object of creation,33 the intellect. Having stated that the summum
bonum, knowledge, love and sadness, or the pain of separation, are three
aspects of creation, Suhrawardi goes on to describe how each one came from the
other one. Using such Sufi symbolism as “city of the soul” (shahrastan-i
jdn), “young-old master” (pir-ijawdri), “the nowhere but prosperous
land” (ndkujd dbdd), and perennial wisdom (jdwiddn khirad), Suhrawardi
goes through the sacred journey in great detail, offering the
spiritual topography34
of this journey. Various realms, domains and dangers of the journey of the soul
towards the “eternal city” (shahristdn-i azat) are discussed and once
again at the end of this treatise, Suhrawardi concludes that until “the cow of
ego is slaughtered, one does not set foot in that [eternal] city.”35
The centrality of
eradicating the ego and the lustful desires of the flesh through ascetic
practices is a common theme in the Sufi doctrine which is echoed time and time
again in various treatises of Suhrawardi. The consistancy with which Suhrawardi
argues for this is a clear indication that classical Sufi beliefs and practices
are an inherent part of the ishraqi school of thought and are not
marginal in Suhrawardi’s philosophy as some have suggested.
Suhrawardi brings this
treatise to an end with an emphasis on the dual nature of truth, the practical
and theoretical, and their relationship with the nafs of he who chooses
not to engage in an inner effort, jihad, against his nafs . . . .
Neither through the iron
of asceticism does he plow the ground of the body so it may become worthy to
plant the seeds of action, nor [does he] use the vehicle of thought to extract
knowledge from the well of thought so [he] may arrive from the known to the
unknown. He wanders in the desert of self-infatuation . . . not every cow(ego)
is worthy to be slaughtered and not in every city is there such a cow and not
everyone has the heart to sacrifice this cow and the chance to do so is not
bestowed upon one at all times.36
Time and time again the
theme of the spiritual journey and its essential components are discussed in
various treatises, and interestingly, in each narrative a new set of symbolism
is employed to allude to the traditional Sufi concepts. In his The Language of
Termites^ as in many other writings, Suhrawardi identifies the nafs as
the enemy that stands between the divine self and the experience of
illumination. He states:
Whatever hinders good is
evil and whatever blocks the [spiritual] path is infidelity (kufrj. To
be content with whatever one’s sensual self (nafs) presents and to
adapt oneself to it is impotence on the path of mystical progression (dar
tariq-i suluk). To look with delight upon oneself, even if one has God in
mind, is renunciation. Liberation (khalds) is to turn one’s face utterly
towards God.38
Suhrawardi’s writings are
not only rich with symbolism but also with his many references to the Quran and
hadith as well as poems by himself and others. All of these provide us
with an insight into the sacred universe in which Suhrwardi himself had his
mystical flight like Simurgh, the bird whose spiritual biography is
elaborated upon in The Chant of Simurgh.39 In this treatise
Suhrawardi is most explicit about the significance of ascetic practices and
their relationship to having an experience of various lights, each of which
represents a type of mystical experience. Suhrawardi tells us that “all
knowledge comes from the chant of Simurgh"*0 and on that
basis he divides the chant of Simurgh which he equates with scientia
sacra, into three parts: on the virtues of this unique knowledge, on what
is relevant to “brethren of purity” (ahl-i tajarrud) and finally on
inner peace (sakinah).
On the virtues of this
knowledge and its superiority over other types Suhrawardi tells us that the
desired end of this knowledge is truth and furthermore it is based on vision
and observation. It is self-evident that “witnessing is stronger than
reasoning,”41 for one can always question the process of reasoning
but not a direct and un mediated relation to the object of one’s knowledge.
Suhrawardi offers a philosophical analysis of how this is possible, which will
be discussed in the forthcoming chapter.
As to what is manifested
to the knower of the particular mode of knowing, Suhrawardi tells us that from
this incorporeal world lights descend upon the soul (rawdri) of the
brethren of purity. These lights come like lightning and last only a few
moments, Suhrawardi says, and they are heart warming and pleasant. Often they
stop and “when ascetic practices are intensified, lights come in abundance
until they reach a level where whatever people look at, reminds them of the
stature of that [incorporeal] world.”42 Those who are not engaged in
austere and serious ascetic practices do not see the lights even when they
might come to them. Ascetic practices refine the character and make a person
receptive to having a vision of these lights. Suhrawardi offers the analogy of
beating on a drum at the time of war or riding on a horse, which induce
emotions in a person even if one is not ready for the experience.
When the intensity and
duration of the vision of these lights reach their climax it is called sakinah,
which is a feeling of inner peace unlike any other experience. Referring to
Quranic verses where the notion of sakinah is discussed, Suhrawardi
considers it to be a station
where the Sufi “from the
heaven hears sublime and soft voices and receives spiritual correspondence and
attains certainty.”43
We conclude our discussion
of Suhrawardi’s view on the spiritual journey of man and its integral part,
asceticism, with a brief reflection on the concluding section of Suhrawardi’s Bustdn
al-qulub.^ Having discussed a number of traditional philosophical issues in
the Bustdn al-qulub, Suhrawardi then changes the theme and the language
to one that borders poetry and prose and concludes this treatise with a summary
of the essential components of the practical aspects of the Sufi path, which
are as follows:
1
Fasting: Suhrawardi first
discusses the centrality of fasting and hunger, which he identifies as the
foundation of the ascetic path. He states:
Know that the foundation
of asceticism lies on hunger ... if he who wants to pursue spirituality does
not experience hunger, nothing will be achieved. All [spiritual] illnesses are
due to being full and overeating.45
2
Staying awake: The second
instruction of Suhrawardi is to reduce sleeping to its minimum. Arguing that
God is always awake and that the Quran tells us to become “God-like,”46
he concludes that lack of food reduces sleeping time and causes other human
passions to be reduced as well.
So, the less they [Sufis]
eat, the more they will become subjects to divine attributes and also, the less
they eat, the less they sleep.47
Suhrawardi maintains that
where and when possible, one should remain awake during the night and if that
is too burdensome, one should remain awake in the latter part of the night and
even if one finds this to exceed one’s ability, then one should observe the
sunrise, for there is much benefit in remaining awake.
3
Invocation: The invocation
of divine names (dhikr) brings an inner change which prepares the human
psyche to become receptive to illumination. He goes so far as to say that even
the Prophet Muhammad before receiving revelation was engaged in ceaseless
invocation. Suhrawardi tells us that invocation begins on a verbal level and
then the Sufi reaches a point at which his entire being invokes the divine
name. The Sufi at this stage remains silent.
First it is the invocation
by tongue, then by heart. When the soul (Jari) begins invocation, the
tongue remains silent.48
4
Spiritual Master: Although
invocation is important, Suhrawardi is quick to remind us that a spiritual
master is needed to give the mantra (wird). The spiritual master is
necessary if one is to be guided properly on the Sufi path and the initiate should
give himself to the master. As Suhrawardi states:
When master (pir)
meets the seeker and knows that he has the potential the [master] encourages
him to perform the invocation that he deems necessary. . . . Every day [the
master] comes to the initiate [murid] so he may interpret events or
dreams that have occured to the initiate.49
Suhrawardi explicitly
states that “without a master one does not get anywhere,” and considers one of
the most important responsibilities of the spiritual master to be the overseeing
of the spiritual retreat of the sdlik for forty days.
Not less than forty days
the initiate has to observe a retreat (khalwah) and if one khalwah
does not open [the salik], then a second, third ... should be done.50
5
Moral Virtues: Observing
such moral virtues as truthfulness, humility, compassion, honesty, and not
being jealous of others are also essential parts of the Sufi path. Even such
details as using good perfume and reciting poetry as one goes through daily
life are recommended by Suhrawardi.
4. UNITY AND THE FINAL DESTINATION
The spiritual journey and
its essential components, initiation, spiritual master, asceticism, etc., are
only means through which one becomes the Simurgh, the symbol of unity.
Any ordinary man who like hudhud (hoepoe) would throw away his
comfortable life and pluck his own feathers, and aim at the Qd/mountain, he too
becomes a Simurgh whose chanting reawakens those who are sleeping,
thereby giving them spiritual birth. The sdlik whose endeavors have born
fruit and who has endured much suffering on his quest for illumination now has
become the possessor of the esoteric truth whose spiritual flight in the sacred
cosmos transcends the world of form and therefore looks upon it with
domination.
This Simurgh flies
without moving and without wings . . . He is colorless and in the east lies his
nest and the west is not devoid of him . . . his food is fire . . . and the
lovers of the secrets of the heart tell him their inner secrets.51
Simurgh
represents the perfect man (al-insdn al-kdmil) whose intellect has been
elevated to the worlds above and has become receptive to illumination. In The
Chant of Simurgh Suhrawardi devotes the latter part of the treatise to
thorough discussion of the end of the spiritual path, when one is no longer on
the path but is “the truth, the way and the light.” Sufis are rarely as
explicit as Suhrawardi in revealing the esoteric truth.
Suhrawardi divides the
final state of the Sufi path into three modes, first on annihilation (Jana),
second on knowledge and perfection, and third on love. Fand for
Suhrawardi is a state of being in which one transcends even spiritual ecstasy
and is marked by total loss of consciousness, to which Suhrawardi refers as
“the greater fand" (fand’-i akbar). Once one is annihilated and
also annihilates the consciousness of his annihilation, the highest possible
station in the Sufi path, “annihilation of annihilation” (fand dar fand),
is attained. As long as man is happy with [his] knowledge, he is imperfect ...
he attains perfection when knowledge is lost in its object.52
Unity and annihilation,
Suhrawardi argues, have many connotations ranging from the common
understanding of annihilation to what the spiritual elites understand by that
concept. Suhrawardi tells us that there are five interpretations of fana
beginning with “there is no deity except God,” which Suhrawardi considers to be
the common understanding of unity. The second group, and a more profound
understanding, is “there is no ‘he’ except ‘He.’” This group sees God as the
Beloved and experiences the immanent aspect of the transcendental. The third
group are those for whom God is not a “He” but a “You,” a more personal
reference which also indicates presence and vision. The fourth group of Sufis
are those who say “there is no ‘i’ except I” and those are few who are superior
to others for they have transcended duality, be it “He” or “You” as pronouns
indicating the nature of their relationship with God. This group knows that the
only reality is that of God and that their “I-ness” is due to the only true “I”
which is God. Finally, there is a fifth type of unity which only a few Sufis
have attained. This manifests itself in the very being of those whose souls
testify that “all things perish except His face.” In this non-dual state of
being, one sees God not as
a “He” or a “You” or even an “I” but sees nothing for there is no one thing to
see. This for Suhrawardi represents the highest possible station for a Sufi.
The second mode of the
final stage of the path is that of knowledge. In a section entitled “He who is
more knowledgable is more perfect,” Suhrawardi discusses the second
characteristic of one who has achieved unity.
This knowledge, Suhrawardi
tells us, is attained through presence.53 He who attains it gains
access to the secrets of the heavens and then the earth. Suhrawardi is
extremely cautious regarding the secretive nature of this knowledge and
considers revealing it to be forbidden. Since it is through love that one comes
to unite with God and God is omniscient, then he who unites with God in a sense
also becomes omniscient. We will elaborate on this in more depth in the
forthcoming chapter.
The third aspect of the
final mode of being is love. Suhrawardi’s exposition of love is most
interesting in that loving something requires a lover and a beloved and this
implies duality. Love in its ultimate sense is an absorption, a perfection, a
state of not desiring for where there is desire, there is imperfection. He who
knows he has his beloved desires nothing more. This state of transcending
desires and living with the beloved is the perfection of the consciousness “for
when the consciousness attains that [knowledge of God], the highest of its
perfection is from the illumination of the light of truth.”54 “He
who seeks the fountain of life will wonder much in darkness if he belongs to
those who are meant to find the fountain,”55 but Suhrawardi tells
us that the Sufi has to set foot on the spiritual path like Seth. Refering to
the concept in the Bustdn al-qulub, he states:
He who comes to know of
himself, inasmuch as his ability allows, attains knowledge of God, and the more
he endures ascetic practices the more he becomes perfect and his knowledge
increases.56
In one of his lengthiest
treatises, Yazddn shindkht,57 Suhrawardi elaborates on
eschatology with regard to two types of death, namely physical and “spiritual
death.” His treatment of physical death is brief but his exposition of
spiritual death and rebirth, which is the natural consequence of practical
wisdom, is in-depth.
Practical wisdom,
Suhrawardi argues, brings detachment of the “self” from the bodily desires so
that the presence or absence of the body does not make any difference. This
state of being which is to
be achieved in this world
is similar to the natural death in that the body is left behind except that in
spiritual death one can have a vision of the incorporeal world.
The self (nafs), which is not
simple and is complete and pure, when departed from the body unites with the
world of intellect and spiritual substances which it resembles in perfection.58
Suhrawardi maintains that
language is incapable of expressing what is observed, for the vision of these
spiritual substances is ineffable and analogy is not helpful either since there
is nothing to analogize it to. The power of the purified self at its peak is
such that it can learn a great deal in a short time. A person of this stature
does not learn through sense perception and other intermediaries, but learns
directly from the sources of knowledge. The power of initiation of a sdlik,
now a learned master who learns without a teacher or text, does not think or conceptualize,
but it is as if truth is revealed to him. Such people are rare, Suhrawardi
says, but he who attains this stature becomes vice-gerent of God (khalifat
alldh). Referring to pure and practical wisdom, Suhrawardi says that
although some are stronger in pure and some in practical wisdom, if they
achieve perfection they become one in their being perfect. Having alluded to
the distinction between pure and practical wisdom on numerous occasions, he
goes on to elaborate on the necessity of having a prophet (nabi). Suhrawardi
considers men of vision to be prophets of a sort:
There is a need for a
person who is an avatar (nabi) and a spiritual guardian (wall) . . .
the need for such a person is more than the [need for] having eye lashes or
eyebrows . ..”
Suhrawardi’s description
of the vak is similar to Plato’s philosopher and the guardians which in
Shi’ite Islam are refered to as the “spiritual jurist guardian” (wali-yi
faqih). He is the culmination for which man was created and through Gabriel
he comes to know of divine secrets by virtue of his unmediated and direct
knowledge. Suhrawardi then warns that although “from the time of Greeks until
now, no one from the great and righteous sages has revealed these secrets,”60
but he has briefly alluded to them in the Yazdan shindkht so it may
encourage the restless soul. The safeguarding of the esoteric doctrines is so
central that Suhrawardi sees the solution in transmitting them in the form of
oral tradition. Suhrawardi tells us that Aristotle said, “Divine wisdom should
never be revealed or written except that it be transmitted orally from person
to person.”61
Notes
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 258-259.
Ibid., 10.
Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 70-71.
Suhrawardi’s choice of
such Sufi masters as Bayazid and Hallaj as true philosophers is also a further
argument against those whose reading of Suhrawardi’s philosophy is a
Peripatetic one.
Suhrawardi, Opera2, 252.
Ibid.
Ibid., 253.
Suhrawardi regards these as “the
principles of the eighth heaven” within which are mysterious beings. See ibid.,
254.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 254.
Ibid., 255.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 107.
Ibid., 139.
Ibid., 140.
Ibid., 182.
Ibid., 199.
Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 229.
Ibid., 237-238.
Ibid., 238.
Ibid., 242.
Ibid., 247.
Ibid., 248.
Ibid., 263.
Ibid., 252.
Ibid., 259.
Ibid., 263.
Ibid., 264.
Ibid., 263-266.
Ibid., 268.
Ibid.
Suhrawardi is referring to
the Hadith: “In the beginning God created a precious pearl and called it the
intellect.” For more information on this see Paul Ballanfat, L ’ itineraire
des esprits, note 233 and note 528. This is a term first used by Henry
Corbin. For more information see: Henry Corbin, La Topographie spirituelle
de I’lslam iranien, ed. Darius Shayegan (Paris: Editions de la Difference,
1990).
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 290.
Ibid., 291.
Ibid., 294.
Ibid., 310.
Ibid., 314.
Ibid., 315.
Ibid., 317.
Ibid., 320.
Ibid., 323.
Ibid., 396-401.
Ibid., 396.
Suhrawardi is referring to the famous
Quranic verse “takhallaqu bi-akhlaq allah." For more information see the
new edition of the Lahiji’s Sharh-i gulshan-i rdz, ed. by M.R. Barzegar
Khaliqi and ‘A. Garbasi. Also see Kashf al-asrdr, Vol.2, p.186.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 397.
Ibid., 399.
Ibid.
Ibid., 400.
Ibid., 315.
Ibid., 324.
For more information on this see:
Mehdi Ha’iri, The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy:
Knowledge by Presence (New York: SUNY Press, 1992).
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 330.
Ibid., 330.
Ibid., 377.
Ibid., 404.
Ibid., 439.
Ibid., 454.
Ibid., 457
Ibid.
4
Suhrawardi’s philosophical
Sufism is the application of the Neoplatonic scheme to traditional Sufi
concepts in an attempt to provide rationally justifiable answers to such
questions as the inherent yearning of man towards transcendence, the role of
asceticism in intensifying this yearning and the nature of mystical experience.
Suhrawardi, who has consistently argued that hikmat has two dimensions,
practical and theoretical, also tells us that what the intellect can
understand, the heart can see. “Know that the human self has two powers: one is
that which finds out, the other is the one that which does things.”[2]
In the previous section,
the practical aspect of Sufism has been discussed. We will now turn to a
discussion of the more philosophically oriented aspects of his mystical
thought.
Philosophical Sufism
intensity. All things in
existence are therefore various degrees and intensities of light and darkness.
The most important of these created beings is the rational self (nafs
ndtiqah), which Suhrawardi refers to as nur Isfahbadi, arguing that
due to its purity it is independent of matter. Since all the beings in the
hierarchy influence that which is below them and are influenced by what is
above them, the influence of a soft light is soft and a hard one even harder.
Suhrawardi tells us that there are several types of lights with different
attributes; they are as follows:
The light that subsists by itself.
The light that depends on something
other than itself.
It is that whose true nature is
darkness.
The type of darkness that depends on
something other than itself and requires space and has the accident of
darkness. An object or an object-like entity that hides and reveals the lights.
There is intrinsic
yearning (mahabbah) on the part of the lower members of this hierarchy
towards the higher ones that is marked by love and adoration whereas the
relationship between the higher members to the lower ones is one of dominance (qahr).
The lower want to go higher and all of them ultimately aim at uniting with the
light of lights.
If all beings are made up
of light then what accounts for their difference? Certainly their essence being
light is not the differentia but what is in common among them all (md
bih’il-ishtirdk). In other words, light is that which at the same time
unites and differentiates (md bih’il-imtiydz) among all existing beings
through its intensity and weakness. As Suhrawardi states:
All lights inherently and
from the point of their “light-ness” have no difference; their only difference
lies in their perfection or shortcoming or matters outside their essence.3
Suhrawardi, who considers
the attributes of an object to be shortcomings and absences of light, then
goes on to equate God with light, which explains why his mystical experiences
have all come to him in the form of “divine flashes” (bdriqa-yi ildhi).
Light here is
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination equated with God because it is the phenomenon by which and through
which things are known. Suhrawardi offers the following as a justification of
his argument:
If you seek the reason for
a criterion for the incorporeal light, it is this: light is a thing which in
its nature is obvious and reveals all other things. It is inherently more
obvious than anything else whose appearance is added {iddfah) to its
truth.4
The light of lights which
exists by necessity {wdjib al-urujud) is the source of all existence to
which Suhrawardi refers to with a variety of names, i.e. all-encompassing (al-muhit),
the supreme (al-a‘zam), the sacred light (al-muqaddas) and the
all-victorious {al-qahhdr) 8
Following the Ibn Sinian
classification of beings into necessary, contingent, and impossible, Suhrawardi
goes on to say that lights are either self-subsistent, in which case they are
“substantial light” (nur jawhari), or incorporeal light (nur
mujarrad), both of which Suhrawardi says are rich (ghani). There is
the contingent light that is referred to as accidental light {nur ‘aradi),
which is revealed to be indigent (faqir) or poor. Finally, there is
darkness which is nothing other than the absence of light6 which he
refers to as darkness (zulamdt), obscurity (ghdsiq),1
form (hay’ah)8 or barzakh which he defines as body.
Suhrawardi’s exegesis of
the corporeal world as an inherently indigent phenomenon and his analysis of
corporeality in terms of light is fundamentally related to the spiritual
journey of man. In a sense, Suhrawardi lays the philosophical foundation for
the explanation of the journey of the soul from the darkness of the corporeal
world to the luminous world of the incorporeal light and the light of lights. A
thorough reading of the dense philosophical arguments of the second part of the
Hikmat al-ishrdq reveals a firm mystical doctrine. In a section entitled
“Principles On How Unity Emanates Multiplicity,” Suhrawardi states:
Since between the lower
light and higher light there is no veil, necessarily the lower light sees the
higher light and the higher illuminates the lower [one]. Therefore, from the
light of lights a beam of light shines upon the lower.9
Each of these incorporeal
lights receives a direct emanation from the light of lights as well as the
light that is directly above it. So, every light receives two levels of light
simultaneously, but this
Philosophical Sufism
process does not continue ad infinitum. In the process of emanation light
solidifies until it reaches corporeality which Suhrawardi divides into many
different parts.10 Suhrawardi, in the Hikmat al-ishrdq, using
a peculiar and dense philosophical language, offers a detailed account of the
various types of light, their interaction with one another and their final
destination, which is full integration, or to use a Sufi term, annihilation
into the light of lights. In a section entitled “On the Freeing of the Pure
Lights and their Transfer to the Luminous World,”11 Suhrawardi tells
us:
Whenever the regent light (nur
mudabbir) is not overcome by its engagement in corporeality, its yearning
for the heavenly world of lights is more than his yearning for obscurity (ghdsiq)
and as its luminous status is increased, so is its love for the dominary lights
. . . and thus it is freed from the human body and returns to the world of
pure-light and resides amongst the heavenly lights and due to the purity of the
light of lights, it becomes pure too.12
Suhrawardi’s ontological
views based on light and its varieties and the emanationistic scheme are
interwoven into his angelology with each angelic order performing an
ontological task, which gradually helps the sdlik to find his original
abode by providing him with spiritual topography of the sacred world and its
many paths and pitfalls.
Suhrawardi’s angelology
represents an intricate web of lights, elements and symbols, a great number of
which are drawn from the Zoroastrian tradition. His view of the function and
the role of angels is radically different from Ibn Sinas which attributed rotations
and many other functions to the heavenly bodies and astronomical issues. For
Suhrawardi, angels are means through which his metaphysical doctrine as well as
esoteric views can be expressed and therefore the language with which he puts
forward his angelology, sometime philosophical and sometime symbolic, is one
that borrows heavily from other traditions.
Suhrawardi says that from
the light of lights arise two angelic orders, the latitudinal and longitudinal.
The latitudinal order for him is the same as Plato’s archetypes to which
Suhrawardi refers as “masters of the species” (arbdb al-anwd“) and whose
definition of them is somewhat similar to Plato’s. "The form of material
species
has to be in the
illuminative world and be necessary, permanent and unchangeable.”13
The various angelic orders
which themselves give rise to other angelic orders are as follows:
1.
The longitudinal (tuli)
order represents the archangels and is the first emanation which Suhrawardi
identifies with Bahman from the Zoroastrian tradition. This order, which is
referred to as the nearest light (nur al-aqrab), is a direct emanation
of the supreme archetype (hurmuzd).
2.
The latitudinal (‘aradi)
order which arises from the masculine aspect of the supreme hierarchy
represents Plato’s archetypes. Suhrawardi uses Zoroastrian names for these
forms such as Urdibihisht for fire, Khurddd for water, Murddd
for plants Shahriwar for minerals and Aspanddrmaz for love. The
elements of this order do not bring one another into existence as the
longitudinal order does. Since all things in the world are manifestations of
these latitudinal archetypes, Suhrawardi refers to them as “theurgy” (tilismdt)
or icons (sanam). He calls these archetypes the “masters of species”
since each one has its celestial domain over which it rules and exercises its
particular influence in the created order.
3.
From the feminine aspect
of the longitudinal order, which is characterized by love and receptivity,
comes the solidification of the angelic order which manifests itself as fixed
stars and heavenly bodies. These observable bodies, which in a sense are
absences of light, are ontologically distant from the light of lights.
4.
Finally, Suhrawardi tells
us of another angelic order which is effused from the latitudinal order. This
intermediary angelic order, which is called lordly light (al-anwdr
al-isfahbadiyyah) or regent light (al-anwdr al-mudabbirah), consists
of the angels of mercy and the guardians of the earth and all its inhabitants.
The lordly light which
exists within the soul of every man is represented by Gabriel, the archetype of
humanity (rabb al-naw‘ al-insdn), which Suharwardi identifies as the
“holy spirit” (ruh al-qudus), equating it with the spirit of the Prophet
Muhammad. In addition to this angelic entity, Suhrawardi tells us that every
man has his own guardian angel who resides in the angelic world and who divides
in half before entering the human body. Half of it remains in the angelic world
and the other half enters the prison
Philosophical Sufism of body from
which it always seeks its release in order to become united with the other
half.
Suhrawardi’s angelic scheme
is significant not only because it unites his ontology and metaphysics but also
because it demonstrates that Islam, the Zoroastrian religion and for that
matter all the divinely revealed religions, allude to the same truth when they
are viewed from an esoteric point of view. Suhrawardi enters into a hermeneutic
discussion of the sacred meaning of the Zoroastrian angels to explain how they
fit within the metaphysical doctrine of Islam. The Zoroastrian fire, Suhrawardi
argues, is the divine light and farwahar as archetype of the human souls
which descends upon the human body after it is conceived.14
Another application of
Suhrawardi’s angelology lies in his epistemological doctrine and the problem of
knowledge. Having argued that angels are independent realities in the world, he
then follows an Ibn Sinian scheme to say that angels are also representations
of man’s inner forces that have been externalized. The externalization serves
as a spiritual map of the inner guides. He who learns how to follow them properly
will be led to the heart of the ishraqi doctrine, that is, “To know
everything, one has to first know himself.”15 Knowledge of the self
and self-knowledge therefore are necessary conditions for anyone in his
spiritual quest who seeks certainty. In the words of Henry Corbin,
self-knowledge is necessary “for all those who are called to a direct and
unmediated relationship with the divine world.”16
The power of guidance
helps us to overcome our fundamental alienation from ourselves which in the ishraqi
school is denoted as ignorance of oneself. In its epistemological context,
Suhrawardi’s angelology provides us with means through which God guides us to
self-knowledge and, eventually, knowledge of the Divine itself.
Zoroastrian angels,
however, are not simply ‘aspects’ of the supreme divinity, but Seven Powers (Amshdspands),
the Seven Avestan Amerta Spenta, the holy immortals. Their holiness is
an active and activating energy that communicates and grants being to all
things.17
Suhrawardi introduces the
Zoroastrian angels amidst the exposition of his metaphysical arguments in order
to show the fundamental harmony between the Weltanschauung of the
Islamic and Zoroastrian religious universes. The following shows Suhrawardi’s
use of the
Zoroastrian angelology of “Persian
theosophers” (hukamd^yiFars) and their compatability with Islamic
metaphysical principles.
Minu= Giti= Hurqalyd= Surush=
Farvadin= Gawhar= Bahrdm= Incorporeal world
Corporeal world
Archetypal world
Gabriel
The lower world
Pure essence
Victory, which often appears in the
form of a mad ox, white horse or sometimes a hen.
Hurakhsh=
Shahriydr= Isfahbad= Kiyan kharrah= Sun
Archetype of species
Light in the body
The incorporeal light which descends
upon those who have attained the divine wisdom. The priest-kings of the ancient
Persia were considered by Suhrawardi to have attained Kiyan kharreh, the wisdom
that is necessary for being a wise king.
Suhrawardi
describes the above as follows:
Once the soul becomes illuminated and
strong through the rays of divine light, it reaches the throne of kiyani and
becomes fully grounded in power and prosperity.18
As we have discussed,
Suhrawardi’s angelology unites his ontology, metaphysics and cosmology. This is
nowhere more evident than in his mystical narratives. Once again we see that
Suhrawardi’s analysis is elaborated upon in the language of mysticism and
practical reasoning. Because philosophical discourse alone does not fulfill the
spiritual thirst of the seeker, Suhrawardi translates his philosophical and ishraqi
analysis of angelology into the language of practical wisdom, as we see in such
treatises as The Chant of Gabriel’s Wing and The Bed Intellect.
In The Chant of
Gabriel’s Wing, we see a discussion of Suhrawardi’s cosmology and ontology
within the context of a seeker’s quest for truth. When the sdlik leaves
the pleasures of the body and enters the desert, he sees ten old men (frirs)
whose beauty and glory are mesmerizing. Having been asked where they come from,
the old man who represents an angelic order says, “We are a group
Philosophical Sufism of incorporeals
and come from the ‘nowhere but prosperous land’ (ndkujd dbdd). ”19
The ten old men, whose
hairs are white and have substance but do not occupy space are the ten levels
of light which correspond to the Ibn Sinian levels of intellect. The seeker
then asks, “What is your occupation?” to which the old man responds, “We are
tailors.” The angelic function is to “sew” the world below them, that is, the
world of generation and corruption, the corporeal domain. They are the
intermediaries between the pure and the corruptable world of ours. In highly
symbolic language Suhrawardi writes:
I asked, “Why are the old men that
are above you observing silence?” He replied, “Because they do not mingle with
your types. I know their language and they do not speak to you.20
The old man is the
archangel Gabriel who explains to the sdlik that due to his limited
spiritual accomplishment he can not understand the language of the beings
residing in the spiritual world.
Suhrawardi uses analogies
from nature to explain how creation takes place and what the function of each
of the levels is. Whereas the creation of the other nine old domains is not
easily observable due to their softness, Gabriel’s creation is more solid and
thus more visible.
The relationship between
the ten angelic orders is one of the spiritual unity and oneness. Gabriel tells
the sdlik that the old man whose mantle is on the top is the spiritual
master of the second one and so on until the ninth master who trained him and
gave him his Sufi cloak. Here, the emanationistic ontology of Suhrawardi is
explained in terms of a chain of initiation emanating from Ibn Sina’s first
intellect (al-‘aql al-awwal) or Suhrawardi’s Bahman (al-nur
al-‘aqrab), the closest light to the light of lights.
Suhrawardi’s visionary
narrative continues with the sdlik questioning the relationship between
the old man and the world. “Do you have children, property and the like?” the sdlik
asks.21 Gabriel responds by saying that he does not have mates but
each of them has a child who works at a mill while they are staring at him with
one eye and at the mill with the other eye. Suhrawardi uses the imagery of
children to allude to each angelic order giving birth to or emanating a lower
level of reality down to the tenth level which is pregnant with the created
order. Gabriel then tells the sdlik, “When the time is proper, they come
to me and do not leave again and new children go there.”22 Those who
have purified themselves
Suhrawardi and the School
of Illumination and have become what Suhrawardi calls “brothers of purity” can
return to the angelic order where they belong. As to the problem of the
unchangeable and immutable nature of the angels and the very act of emanating,
which implies the occurrence of motion in angels, the sdlik asks how
they came to have children. The sdlik poses a rather old philosophical
issue, namely the relationship between change and sameness in the created
domain. The old master offers an explanation whereby he impregnates “a black
slave,” who symbolizes the corporeal world, without a change occurring in him.
Having questioned the tenth angelic order’s relation with the corporeal world,
the sdlik then questions its relation with God and whether the old
master praises God. The old master replies:
Absorption in divine presence does
not allow for praising [Him], and if there be praise, it is not by virtue of
tongue; no motion or movement is associated with it.'-3
The old man Gabriel, the
archangel of revelation and the intermediary between the corporeal and
incorporeal world, then teaches the sdlik the esoteric secrets necessary
to understand the true meaning of the Quran which is none other than the
secret of creation.
In a esoteric phrase, the
old master tells the sdlik that “everything in the four corners of the
world is due to the wing of Gabriel.”24 Referring once again to the
emanationistic scheme of lights, the old master indicates that God’s words are
so luminous and profound that from them comes a lower word and so on until the
“last words which are the words of Gabriel and the spirits of man (arwdh)
are from this last word.”25 The relationship between words and
spirits as realities in the archetypal world will be elaborated on in the
forthcoming section, but it suffices to say that Suhrawardi uses various
Quranic references as well as other sacred scriptures to allude to the two-fold
function of angels as entities between the world of light and the world of
darkness. It is noteworthy that Suhrawardi considers the luminous nature of
angels to be an added relation (iddfah) not inherent to angels. The
angelic order are contingent beings, from the closest to the light of light,
Bahman, to the last one, Gabriel.
Gabriel has two wings: the
right wing is pure light and the entirety of that incorporeal wing is a
relation (iddfah) of his existence to God. And there is a left [wing]
with a mark of
darkness on it . . . that
is a sign of its existence which has one-side to non-existence. If you view its
existence from a relational point with God, it exists [because of] His
existence.
If you view its essence,
it is worthy of non-existence.26
3.
THE ARCHETYPAL WORLD: MUNDUSIMAGINALIS
In his numerous treatises
and in particular The Chant of Gabriel’s Wing, Suhrawardi alludes to the
archetypal realities which illuminated human faculty can witness. The nature of
the archetypal world is such that human consciousness can have a vision of
these abstract and incorporeal beings. Imaginal beings are realities that
transcend place and time but are as real, if not more real, than the corporeal
world.
Suhrawardi, speaking as a salik,
asks Gabriel to discuss his original abode. Their conversation goes as follows:
I asked from which
direction have you, the exalted ones, come. The old man who was at the corner
replied that they are a group of incorporeals who have come from “the nowhere
but prosperous land” (nakuja abad). I did not understand that, so I
asked to which region that city belongs? He said “It belongs to the domain
where the index finger can not point to.” So I came to know that the old master
knows [the secrets].27
Describing the archetypal
worlds, Suhrawardi uses several terms that are uniquely his own such as
“nowhere but prosperous land” (nakuja abad), “ruinous but prosperous
land” (kharab abad) and “the city of the soul” (shahristan-i jan),
all of which he identifies as the eighth domain (iqlim-i hashtum). Henry
Corbin refers to this domain as mundus imaginalis and considers it to be
a level of reality that has no external existence and yet is real, in fact,
more real than the external world, the seemingly real. This real world therefore
is the “imaginal” as opposed to “imaginary” which implies both non-real and
non-existence.
First, let us see what the
nature of this imaginal domain is which Suhrawardi considers to be the
ontological origin of the corporeal world. Suhrawardi considers the
existential cause of the archetypal world to be the “accidental intellects”
which have come to be in a variety of forms. Although these intellectual
entities are subject, quality, quantity and many other accidental attributes,
they are independent of
matter. It is imperative to know that for Suhrawardi these “suspending
archetypes” (muthul mu'allaqah) are different than Plato’s forms or
archetypes which he regards to be in the fixed world of archetypes. The
suspending archetypes which are between the corporeal world (‘dlam-i
barzakh) and the angelic world ('dlam-i qahriah) are not only
numerous but also independent of place and time which explains why the
external senses are unable to see them except in rare and small glimpses.29
The imaginal world is the
spiritual topography of a domain that can only be seen by those who have turned
away from the sensus communis and rely on spiritual hermeneutics (ta’wil),
a profound issue which he discusses both in the al-Talunhdti0
and Alwdh-i ‘imddi.^ Seeing the archetypes requires transcending all
obstacles in order to go beyond what Suhrawardi symbolically refers to as the
Qd/mountain. Then one reaches the mysterious cities of the world of suspending
archetypes where such spiritual entities reside.
In the Hikmat
al-isbrdq,32 Suhrawardi mentions several cities of the imaginal
world, all of which belong to the eighth domain. They are Jdbilqd, Jdbirsd
and Hurqaiyd, the cities which are “nowhere”. According to Suhrawardi, in
the last one, wonders exist. As he states: “And there are eight domains therein,
Jdbilqa, Jdbirsd and Hurqaiyd, the substance of wonder.”33
For Suhrawardi, Hurqaiyd
represents the archetypes of the heavenly bodies whose harmonious functioning
produces a sublime music that only those who are discoverers and seekers of the
truth can hear.34 In fact, the beauty of the wonders of Hurqaiyd which
those who have purified themselves can only experience through the inner
senses, represents the sacred world of the Sufis whose journey has reached its
climax. Suhrawardi analogizes the status of this perfect man with God since both
the Sufi master and God can create archetypes, a state of being Suhrawardi
calls “Be” (kun), referring to the Quranic verse in which God creates
the world by saying, “Be”, and it was.
And the brothers in purity have a
special status in that they are able to create archetypes that are self
dependent, and that state is named “Be.”33
Suhrawardi concludes by
saying that the outward beauties, shapes and forms of this world have their
ontological roots in the mundus imaginalis, a world which is real but
accessible only to a few. Nowhereland, therefore, is the place which transcends
the world
of forms, time and space. It is a
land only reached by the seeker of truth who has suffered on the path and whose
psyche has been opened to the unseen worlds.36
Suhrawardi formulates a
theory of vision based on his illuminationist ideas. According to him,
knowledge by presence, the epistemological basis of the ishraqi school,
provides a framework which explains vision, in both its physical and its
intellectual sense. Suhrawardi argues that “vision” (mushdhadah) can
only take place in accordance with the principles of illumination. He first
refutes the existing theories of how vision occurs and then offers his own
view.37 According to the first theory, a ray of light comes from
the object of perception and in meeting the eye leaves an impression which we
call the act of seeing. The second theory takes the opposite angle by saying
that a ray of light emanates from the eye and meets the object and that
constitutes the very act of seeing. Suhrawardi rejects both views and offers
his own theory which is as follows:
Once you see that sight is
not the correspondence of the observed in the eyes and is not the exiting of a
ray from the eye, then except for the encounter of the lit object with the
healthy eye, it is not anything else .... And the result of this encounter in
regard to sight is due to the absence of the veil between that which sees and
that which is seen.38
Suhrawardi’s argument can
be better formulated as follows: The existence (wujud) of an existent
object has a presence that the “rational self” (al-nafs al-ndtiqah)
comes to realize once it is within the domain of its presence. Threfore, in
seeing something, it is not the case that the subject sees the object but that
it is the presence of the self that comprehends the presence of the object once
it is in its domain. In order for this interaction to take place, there has to
be the absence of a veil (hijab) between the knower and the known. Since
the subject, being the self (which for Suhrawardi is light), comes into contact
with the object that is also illuminated, then the self “witnesses” (shahid)
the object. To clarify the issue, one can give the example of a room with
several people in it; however, because the room is dark they cannot see each
other. It is only after the light is turned on that they are able to see one
another.
Since self for Suhrawardi
is light and observation as such requires the presence of light, then in a
statement such as “I know P,” “I” as the knower and “P” as the object of
knowledge both depend on light as the necessary condition for the “I” to know
“P.”
In conjunction with the
explanation concerning the very act of seeing, something has to be said about
vision in its intellectual context. For Suhrawardi, intellection is a form of
vision (mushdhidah) through which one sees the archetypes in the
imaginal world. In fact, to think in the authentic sense is to think of the
archetypes which do not lend themselves to speculation but whose reality can
only be “seen” through intellection. This is an extremely profound point which
Suhrawardi raises since the very act of intellection necessitates the existence
of an intellectual world whose residences are the archetypes. It is noteworthy
that Suhrawardi distinguishes between these archetypes and Plato’s archetypes
and states:
These suspending forms are
not like Plato’s in that Plato’s forms are fixed luminaries in the luminous
intellectual world . . . but these archetypes are suspending and do not have a
place so it is allowed for them to become the manifestations of this world.39
As we discussed, objects
of the intellectual world had themselves been “seen” with the eyes of the
universal intellect (‘aql-i kulli), a vision that is only possible for
the “brethren of purity.” This is equivalent to “presence,” a form of being
before an object or seeing of an object. This presence or mode of knowledge
which belongs to the intellectual elite is only attained after one has come to
know one’s self. This point will be further elaborated upon.
6.
KNOWLEDGE AND PRESENCE: HE
WHO KNOWS MORE “IS” MORE?
Since Suhrawardi takes the
concepts of the self, light, and consciousness to be equivalent, it follows
that when the self is more illuminated, the domain of its presence increases.
As such, when the ontological distance of a being to the light of lights
decreases, the power of one’s presence increases and so does the domain of
one’s knowledge. He who
knows more is therefore ontologically speaking closer to God and therefore
“is-more.” This “is-ness” or presence is not only a status which is to be
gained through the pursuance of intellectual wisdom but also requires
practicing the Sufi path.
The following formula
demonstrates Suhrawardi’s view of the relationship between knowledge and
presence:
Existence (wujud) =
Presence (hudur) = “revealedness” (zuhur) To argue for position,
Suhrawardi first demonstrates that “I” is nothing but pure light in its
onotological sense. He then uses this conclusion in order to formulate his
theory of knowledge by presence. In a section entitled “He Who Perceives His
Essence as Being Incorporeal Light”, Suhrawardi states:
Everyone who has an
essence is not ignorant of it, nor is he in the dark as to the appearance of
his essence to him. And it is not a dark corporeality (ghdsiq) in others
since luminous corporeality also is not a light in its essence, let alone darkness.
So, he is pure incorporeal light which has no spatial location.40
As I have discussed
previously, by “light” Suhrawardi means that phenomenon of which nothing more
apparent can be conceived. Defining the self in terms of light and light in
terms of apparentness allows Suhrawardi to draw the following conclusion: The
self is a simple, single and indivisible entity, since if this were not the
case, it would have to be defined in terms of its components. That implies the
components would have to be more axiomatic than the self, which is contrary to
our definition of the self.
Suhrawardi’s argument can be
demonstrated as follows:
1.
Knowledge of the self is
the same as the very reality of the self.
2.
The reality of the self is
light.
.'.3. Knowledge of the self is light.
4.
Light can be understood
only by being in its presence.
5.
Knowledge of the self can
only be understood by its very presence.
Although Suhrawardi does
not present his arguments systematically and often does not make clear the
relationship that exists between light, self, presence and knowledge, his
arguments can be constructed in a number of ways. For example, on the basis of
the following statement we can offer a different version of the argument.
He who can understand his own nature
will be incorporeal light.41
Based on our foregoing discussion, it
follows that:
1
God is light.
2
“I-ness” is light.
3
“I-ness” is God.
4
He who knows himself,
knows God.
God or the light of
lights, omnipresent and omniscient, makes seeing possible by virtue of being
“the light of heavens and earth,” as the Quran says. In the external and
physical sense, the light of lights provides the necessary condition for
observation whereas in the case of inner senses omniscience and omnipresence
stand in direct relationship with one another.
The knowledge crucial to
the attainment of the particular mode of being which Suhrawardi refers to as
presence is specifically selfknowledge. Knowledge of the self, as the divine
substance bestowed upon us, is fundamentally knowledge of the Divine. God
therefore becomes the focal point where the concepts of self, light, presence
and knowledge come together into a unified whole. It is in lieu of such a view
that Suhrawardi offers his epistemology both in its practical domain and its
purely philosophical and intellectual sense. Knowledge of the self can be
attained through the Sufi path which we have described in the previous chapter.
Knowledge of the self and how it is that the self knows itself is the subject
of Suhrawardi’s philosophical epistemology to which we now turn.
Suhrawardi’s theory of
knowledge consists of two segments. First, there is the deconstructionist
segment in which Suhrawardi criticizes various theories of knowledge, in
particular knowledge by definition, sense perception and a priori
concepts. He first offers a series of arguments to establish the fact that none
of the existing theories of knowledge lead to certainty. Arguing that although
each theory of knowledge leads to one aspect of reality, they all fail to
explain how knowledge is actually possible. Peripatetics therefore offer at
best a limited theory of knowledge.
Second, having offered his
critique of the Peripatetics, Suhrawardi goes on to offer his own
epistemological view known as
Philosophical Sufism
“knowledge by presence” which explains how knowledge of the self is attained.
We will first discuss
Suhrawardi’s critique of the Peripatetics and then analyze his theory of
knowledge by presence.
Traditionally,
“definition” has been a means through which knowledge of the external world
can be attained. This method, which was primarily developed by Plato and often
referred to as the “Socratic Method”,42 is based on a dialogue in
which a “thing” is defined and redefined until we can know what that “thing”
truly is. Aristotle elaborates on this theory of knowledge by definition when
he argues that definition should reveal the true identity of a thing by
disclosing its essential nature. As he states “Definition is held to concern
essential nature and is in every case universal.”43
Suhrawardi’s theory of
knowledge by definition is a rapprochement between Plato’s and Aristotle’s
position. It is an attempt to reconcile the Peripatetic philosophy of Aristotle
and the intellectual intuition of Plato into a single and unified theory of
knowledge. Suhrawardi’s notion of knowledge by definition, despite his
disagreement with the Peripatetics, remains rather similar to theirs. However,
he attempts to offer the view that an adequate definition is one that not only
tends to capture the essence of a thing and its relation to its attributes, but
also brings about a harmony between Aristotle’s views and those of Plato.
In his book The
Philosophy of Illumination, Suhrawardi offers his criticism of the
Peripatetics in a chapter entitled “Destruction of the Peripatetics’ Rules of
Definition”44 by arguing that Peripatetics, in distinguishing
between “general essence” (jins) and “specific difference” (fast),
have made a grave mistake.
It is important to realize
that despite Suhrawardi’s criticism of the Peripatetics on the subject of
definition, he does not discard definition as an entirely invalid means of
attaining knowledge. What he is trying to do is allude to the limits and
inadequacy of definition in arriving at certainty. As we will see in his other
works, he elaborates on these problems and argues the conditions under which
definition could act as a means of attaining knowledge. Let us now turn to examine
Suhrawardi’s view of definition in order to formulate his theory of definition.
Suhrawardi in The
Philosophy of Illumination*5 as well as the Conversation^6
and The Intimations*1 devotes a chapter to the analysis of
the theory of definition. In the second chapter of The Intimations he
argues that it is not sufficient for a definition of an existent being to
disclose only the essential nature of that thing, since other attributes of a
thing should also be considered as part of the identity of a thing even though
they may be of an accidental nature. Therefore, a definition should include not
only the essence but other elements as well.
A formula (qawl) is
indicative of the essence of a thing and combines (yajma} all of its
constituent elements. Regarding the principle realities, it [the formula] is a
synthesis (tarkib) of their genera and differentia.48
This is a radical
departure from the Aristotelian approach since its underlying assumption is
that the identity of a thing not only consists of its essence but includes its
other attributes which are also important. The other significance of this
approach is that if the differentia or “the particular essence” (fast),
is not known, then the definition of that thing remains incomplete. On the
basis of Suhrawardi’s argument we can arrive at the following two conclusions:
1
Since we can never know
all the “constituent elements” of a thing, it can never be defined properly and
adequately and therefore it cannot be known by definition.
2
If a definition should
include not only genus but also all the differentia and other constituents of a
thing, that necessitates an a priori knowledge of the differentia since
the differentia are an exclusive property of an existent being.
Suhrawardi’s treatment of
the topic of definition in The Intimations, which is done in three
sections, “Essential Nature,” “Description,” and the “Fallacies in the
Construction and Use of Definition,”49 is followed by an even more
extensive treatment of the topic in the al-MutdrahaL What follows is a
brief review of Suhrawardi’s view as illustrated in twelve different sections
of the al-Mutdrahat.50
Having defined five
different types of definition, Suhrawardi continues to analyze the very
complicated issue of the relationship between mental concepts and their
corresponding objects in the external world. He argues that while it is
conceivable to define a thing so that its genus and differentia remain united,
it is not possible to do so in regard to the class of those things whose genus
and differentia are one
and the same, such as colors.51 A color, he says, is not like “Man
is a rational animal” in that there would be a concept of man and a rationality
so that the latter is a predicate of the former. Color is a genus without a
differentia, therefore, no definition of it can be offered such that it would
encompass its genus and differentia.
From the above argument
Suhrawardi concludes the following:
1
Peripatetics are wrong in
assuming that definition can be used unequivocally and without any
qualification as a means to attain knowledge. In this case alone, (i.e.,
colors) we clearly realize the limits of definition in that it is only capable
of defining certain things.
2
Color can never be known
by definition since color can not be defined by something other than itself.
In The Conversations,52
Suhrawardi once again stresses that a definition which is able to include the
sum of all the differentia and other characteristics of the thing in question
would be an accepted mode of cognition. In stating this, he implicitly is
arguing that since it is not possible to define all the attributes of a thing,
any attempt to define a thing would be in vain.
Suhrawardi, in some of his
works in Persian such as Partaw- ndmah,5i and Haydkil
al-nur,54 makes reference to the problem of definition but does
not discuss it in as much detail as he does in some of his Arabic works. In The
Philosophy of Illumination, he summarizes his views regarding the
Peripatetic view of definition by saying:
He who mentions a number
of essentials cannot be certain that there may not be another essential which
he has ignored. Commentator and critic should inquire (of his certainty), and
if he says that were there another essential, we would have known it, (we
should say) there are many attributes that are unknown to us ... . The truth
of things is known only when all of the essentials are known, and if there be
another essential that we are unaware of, then knowledge of that thing is not
certain. Thus, it becomes clear that the limits and definitions (hadd)
as the Peripatetics have accepted will never become possible for man. The
master of the Peripatetics [Aristotle]55 has confessed to this
existing difficulty. Therefore, the limit and definition cannot exist
except in regard to those items whose
collective body56 is an indication of particularity.57
Suhrawardi in the above
argument has demonstrated that the differentia of a thing is an exclusive
property of that thing (i.e. the purring of a cat). Then, if we do not know
what that property is, we will never know the identity of the thing through
definition. The purring of a cat in this case has to be defined through another
definition, and this definition in turn needs to be defined through another
definition which for Suhrawardi is absurd. There ought to be an axiomatic
principle so that everything else is defined in terms of it. In fact,
Suhrawardi, in his The Philosophy of Illumination,58
maintains that knowledge by definition is possible if and only if there be a first
principle so that everything else is measured against it and yet itself is not
subject to any definition because of its axiomatic nature. This axiomatic
phenomenon for Suhrawardi is light and its derivative presence that underlies
the very foundation of his epistemology.
2.
KNOWLEDGE BY SENSE
PERCEPTION
Suhrawardi’s view of sense
perception is difficult to formulate in that his views in this regard are
scattered throughout his various writings. Qutb al-Din Shirazi, the famous
Avicennan commentator of Suhrawardi, in his work Sharh-i hikmat al-ishraq,59
argues that Suhrawardi believes in five internal senses and five external ones.
Qutb al-Din Shirazi60 maintains that Suhrawardi not only believes
that the five senses are for the attainment of knowledge of the outside world
but also that there is a hierarchy of senses that begins with the sense of
touch and ends with sight.
The internal senses for
Suhrawardi are of five types, and their existence helps to synthesize the
information that the external senses has attained. If these senses did not
exist, then all the knowledge acquired through the senses could not have been
interpreted in our mind.
In a section he entitles
“On the Evidence that Peripatetic Principles Necessitate that Nothing be Known
or Defined,” in the Hikmat al-ishraq,6} Suhrawardi criticizes
the Peripatetics in regard to their views on sense perception. His argument as
presented in this chapter can be summarized in the following points:
1.
“Substance has unknown
differentia.”62
2.
“Essences are defined by
negation.”63
3.
“The Soul and other mental
concepts have unknown differentia.”64
4.
“Accident, e.g.,
blackness, has been defined as a ‘color that is observable to the eye’, and the
totality of sight is an accidental concept, and now that you know color, it
becomes necessary that accidents cannot even be conceived of.”65
5.
“Of course, the concept of
being, that for them (Peripatetic) is the axiomatic principle, is now known.”66
6.
“If it is perceived that
knowledge of things is through their non-essential attributes and that those
attributes have attributes and the same continues, then this becomes
problematic since according to this assumption it becomes necessary that in the
world nothing can be known.”67
The first three principles
have been discussed in the previous section and they only demonstrate the
inadequacy of the Peripatetics insofar as they rely on definition for the
attainment of truth. In the fourth principle, Suhrawardi argues that there are
objects in the external world which can only be perceived but not defined, i.e.
colors. These types of phenomena he calls “simple truths” (haqd’iq basitah)
which neither can be known through knowledge by definition, nor be grasped by
sense perception.68
As to the “compound truth”
(haqd’iq murakkabah), Suhrawardi argues that this category of things can
be reduced to its essential components, which are the simple truths, and to
know them one has to see them. For instance, a building or a tree can be
reduced to a number of forms and colors that can only be the objects of
perception.
The above view is part of
the response that Suhrawardi provides in his sixth principle against the
Peripatetics, who maintain that a thing can be known through its attributes and
accidents. The problem is that an attribute has to be defined by another, which
means the process can go on ad infinitum, and nothing can be known,
which is absurd.
Suhrawardi’s view of the
function of sense perception can be better understood if we examine some of the
consequences of his argument. Suhrawardi further argues that the data attained
through sense perception is non-verifiable in that one can never know if others
are experiencing the same data. Therefore, he
concludes that the nature
of the knowledge attained through sense perception is private and exclusive. As
Suhrawardi states:
It should be known that
your ideas and others’ are not the same as long as your ideas and those of
others are not attained through the same means of cognition.69
So far, from the first two
arguments of Suhrawardi, the following conclusions can be drawn:
1 Only the simple truth
can be known through sense perception. 2 Knowledge of the simple truth is
private, exclusive and non- verifiable by outsiders.
What Suhrawardi has not
made clear yet are the sources of these concepts. In the The Philosophy of
Illumination,™ we find an argument which is the key to the understanding
of this problem. There, Suhrawardi argues that there are those who maintain
that in order to know something one has to have prior knowledge of it;
otherwise, how would one know it even if he came across it? This problem was
first raised by Plato himself and has since been repeated by many philosophers.
The implication of Suhrawardi’s response to this objection also provides the
key to solving the problem regarding the sources of knowledge. Suhrawardi
states that this problem can only be raised in a circumstance under which
something is unknown. If something is completely unknown or completely known in
all its aspects, it can not be known. Something can be known if it is
partially known and partially unknown. It is only then that the unknown part
can be known through an inference from known to the unknown.
If the desired entity is
completely unknown, then it cannot be known, and it is the same if something is
completely known but that it has to be known in some aspect and not known in
others so the unknown can become known through it.71
Now, since simple truths
exist only in their pure form, i.e colors, and are not made up of several parts
as forms and shapes are, they can be either completely unknown or entirely
known. If the former is the case, then we can never come to know of colors,
which is not the case. If it is the latter, the question then arises as to how
it is that we know them in their entirety since neither definition nor sense
perception can tell us what a color or simple form or shape is.
While Suhrawardi alludes
to this in various places, he does not treat the subject in detail. What he
does say is that we have a pre-knowledge of certain things, which are axiomatic
in nature. These axiomatic phenomena, resembling Kant’s a priori
concepts, are what Suhrawardi refers to as Jitriyyah. These are the
concepts that allow us to recognize something when we see it. For example,
recognizing that one line is shorter than another one without measuring it is
due to the presence of these innate ideas although the act of cognition begins
with our senses.
To recapitulate on
Suhrawardi’s view of knowledge by sense perception, the following can be said:
Existent beings for Suhrawardi are either single or compound. If single, then
they have no differentia and therefore we can not know them by their accidents (lavdsim).
Sense perception can be helpful to decipher the simple from the compound and
further to realize and reduce the compound to its essential elements which are
simple. The knowledge of the simple can neither be defined nor be grasped
through the senses without the aid of innate ideas.
3.
KNOWLEDGE THROUGH INNATE
IDEAS
Suhrawardi, both in his
critique of the Peripatetic view of definition and in the problems associated
with sense perception, argued for the necessity of an innate knowledge that can
serve as the foundation for various modes of cognition.
In The Philosophy of
Illumination,12 he discusses the notion of innate ideas by
mentioning four modes of cognition and the place of innate ideas among them.
His argument, briefly stated, is as follows: Some types of knowledge are either
innate or not. In order for one to know a thing, one has to rely on that which
is already known to him, and this process can go on ad infinitum, a
process Suhrawardi maintains is impossible. Therefore, attainment of knowledge,
at least partially, requires having pre-knowledge of that which one seeks to
know, and this knowledge can only be innate. As Suhrawardi states:
Human knowledge is either
innate (Jitriyyah) or it is not.
Whenever in recognizing an
unknown, if focusing one’s attention [i.e. sense perception] and referring to
one’s heart is not sufficient, and if it is not an affair that can be known
through the vision (mushdhidah) that is a characteristic of the
great hakims, then necessarily
in knowing we need pre-given knowledge ... and the process, if carried out in
certain order will lead to the innate ideas.73
Suhrawardi seems to be
suggesting that innate ideas are a necessary condition if sense perception and
even definition is to be possible. In other words, if knowledge by sense
perception is not going to lead to an infinite succession of beings, each of
which makes the other object known, then innate ideas have to exist. It is,
therefore, reasonable to conclude that innate ideas for Suhrawardi are the
necessary condition if some knowledge is to be attained through definition or
perception.
4.
SUHRAWARDI’S PHILOSOPHICAL
EPISTEMOLOGY
As I have demonstrated, it
is difficult to identify Suhrawardi’s epistemology with any particular
epistemological paradigm (i.e. empiricism, rationalism, etc.). While Suhrawardi
argues that ultimately one can attain certainty only through the knowledge
which is attained by illumination, he does not discard the possibility of
attaining knowledge through other modes of cognition.
Suhrawardi’s philosophical
epistemology as has been discussed is made up of the following three elements.
1.
Definition
2.
Sense Perception
3.
Innate Ideas
To summarize Suhrawardi’s
view on the shortcomings of the above means of cognition, the following can be
said: Suhrawardi maintains that definition is problematic because it has to
define not only the essentials of an existent being as Aristotle indicates, but
all its attributes and accidents as well.
This is necessary since
they are as much a part of a thing as the so-called essentials are and defining
all of them is impossible. Suhrawardi attributes this problem to the following
reason:
All definitions inevitably lead to
those a fmori concepts which themselves are in no need of being defined;
if this were not the case there would result an infinite succession.74
Contrary to the less
significant place that definition has in Suhrawardi’s philosophical
epistemology, sense perception is much
more significant. This is
partly because most things that cannot be defined can be known through the
senses. It is for this reason that he says: “Thus, knowing and recognizing of
some items becomes a task of the senses.”75
Sense perception,
Suhrawardi tells us, is able to distinguish between the simple and compound
entities. Despite this ability, our senses cannot escape the same problem that
definition faced. That is, when faced with a compound entity, they can come to
know it by its simple constituents, but how do we know the simple elements? It
is at this point that either there has to be an axiomatic principle in terms of
which a simple thing can be known or we again have the problem of knowing one
thing through another ad infinitum. On this Suhrawardi states:
There is nothing more
apparent than what can be sensed .. . since all our knowledge comes from the
senses; therefore, all that is sensed is innate and can not be defined.76
Finally, there are the
innate ideas that Suhrawardi considers to be necessary in order to connect the
other two elements of his philosophical epistemology. The existence of innate
ideas provides the necessary link between Suhrawardi’s view of knowledge by
definition and sense perception which enables him to offer a coherent and
consistent theory of knowledge. The nature of these ideas and their structure,
be it Kantian or Platonic, remains somewhat unclear in Suhrawardi’s
philosophical writings; what is clear is that for Suhrawardi they have a
limited role and function.
Suhrawardi’s concept of
philosophical epistemology, therefore, is based on the idea that while
different modes of cognition and schools of epistemology are useful in some
domains, ultimately certainty comes through illumination, which is the type of
knowledge that is attained without mediation. In the beginning of the Hikmat
al-ishrdq Suhrawardi summarizes his view towards his theory of “knowledge
by presence.” He states:
As we observe the sensible
world, through which we gain certainty of their states of affairs, we then base
a thorough and precise science on this basis (math, astronomy). By analogy, we
observe certain things in the spiritual domain and then use them as a foundation
upon which other things can be based. He whose path and method is other than
this will not benefit from this and soon will be plunged into doubt.77
What Suhrawardi has
clearly been trying to argue for is that philosophy in general and
epistemology in particular have to have an ishraqi foundation. In
Suhrawardi’s epistemology, light becomes the substance of knowledge and
knowledge the substance of light.
If there be anything that
needs no definition or explanation, it has to be obvious by nature, and there
is nothing more obvious and clear than light. Thus, there is nothing that needs
no definition except light.™
Having argued for the
limited role of conventional modes of cognition, what has not been answered yet
is how knowledge as such is possible. What is it that makes knowing and
cognition feasible?
We can now proceed to
consider Suhrawardi’s answer to these questions, known as the theory of
knowledge by presence.
The fundamental principle upon
which Suhrawardi’s ishraqi epistemology is based is that the “self* is
capable of knowing certain things directly and without mediation by virtue of
its very presence. Man, Suhrawardi says, can know himself only through himself,
and that which is other than himself cannot be used to arrive at the knowledge
of the self. He offers several arguments to prove that the self has the ability
to know directly and without any mediation, beginning with the knowledge of the
self.
The question Suhrawardi
poses is, how does the self know itself? It is precisely the answer to this
question which constitutes the core of his ishraqi epistemology, and it
can be formulated as follows: There is a special mode of cognition which
attains knowledge directly and without mediation, thereby transcending the
subject/ object distinction. This mode of cognition, which has come to be
called “knowledge by presence” (al-‘ilm al-huduri), is, as I will
demonstrate, the only plausible explanation as to how the self can know itself.
The arguments that
Suhrawardi offers in support of his claim that the self can only know itself by
virtue of the very presence of itself are expressed by Suhrawardi through his
writings in two different styles. In his Persian writings, which I have
discussed in the previous chapter, this view is expressed symbolically, whereas
in his other works, especially in his tetralogical works, he is more
philosophical.
The significance of the
present discussion for Suhrawardi’s mysticism lies in the concept that true knowledge,
and for that matter the foundation of kowledge, is an ontological issue (i.e.
presence) as opposed to an epistemological one. Knowledge is a question that is
directly related to the question of being and existence and not an abstract
epistemological issue. Furthermore, Suhrawardi’s argument implies that
certainty depends on the direct nature of the epistemic relationship between
the subject and the object.
Mysticsm in general as
reflected in the perennial tradition, Sophia perennis, and in particular
in the Sufi tradition, for Suhra- wardi is distinguished from other traditions
of wisdom by the directness of the experience of the knower of the known. The
higher the status of the knower, ontologically speaking, the more intense and
direct is the experience. This point will be elaborated on further in the
forthcoming section.
Suhrawardi offers three
arguments to prove that the self can only know itself through the reality of
its presence. We will proceed to consider these arguments.
1. ARGUMENT FROM “I/IT” DICHOTOMY
Suhrawardi presents his
first argument by asking, “When I know P, do I also know myself?” If I
do, then how did I come to know myself? Either I knew myself directly or
through some other means. If I know myself through an intermediary, then the
following problem arises:
A thing that exists in
itself (al-qd’im bi’l-dhdt) and is conscious of itself does not know
itself through a representation (al-mi that) of itself appearing in
itself. This is because if, in knowing one’s self, one were to make a
representation of oneself, since this representation of his “I-ness” (and’iyyah)
could never be the reality of that “I-ness,” it would be then such that
that representation is “it” in relation to the “I-ness,” and not T”. Therefore,
the thing apprehended is the representation. It thus follows that the
representation apprehension of “I-ness” would be exactly what is the
apprehension of “it-ness” (huwa), and that the apprehension of the
reality of T-ness” would be exactly the apprehension of what is not “I-ness.”
This is an absurdity. On the other hand, this absurdity does not follow in the
case of apprehension of
external objects, for the
representation and that to which that representation belongs are both “its.”79
According to this
argument, one either knows himself through himself or something else i.e. a
representation. If the latter be the case, then “self" A is known
through a representation {mithdl) B. Suhrawardi then argues that
knowledge of A which is attained through B is really not knowledge
of A, but is seeing A through B. Suhrawardi’s argument
allows for knowledge of the outside world to be attained through a
representation (mithdl), which is rather similar to Hume’s notion of
“ideas” and “impressions.” However, knowledge of the self which is to be
attained through anything other than the self is not knowledge of the self, but
knowledge of that which is other than the self. Suhrawardi goes on to argue
that if I am to know A through B, then in a sense I am equating
my understanding of B with A, which is an absurdity. How can my
self be the same as my understanding of B, through which A is
supposed to be known? In other words, if I am to understand the self through
something other than itself, then the problem arises that the understanding of
something is the same as the thing itself.
Let us examine
Suhrawardi’s argument further. When one says “I know P,” he is saying that
there exists an “I”, such that I knows “itself" and also this “I” knows
“P”. This implies that, when one claims to have any type of knowledge, one is
implicitly saying that I know myself before knowing anything else. Therefore,
in claiming that one knows something not only is knowledge of the self
assumed, but that “I" seems to be the object of its own knowledge. It
seems to be the case that in the statement “I know myself" the knower,
which is the “I,” and the known, which is the “self,” and the relationship
between them is one and the same. If this were not the case, then there would
be an “I” versus “it” which is the self. Now, either this “it” is made up of
the same substance as the “I” (i.e. unchangeable), or it is not. This “it” is
either identical to the “I" or “it” is something totally different. M.
Ha’iri80 argues that “If we accept this argument of Suhrawardi, then
the “I” and its representation “it” would then be both identical and different
in one and the same respect,”81 which is a logical contradiction and
therefore an absurdity.
An analysis of how
Suhrawardi arrives at this conclusion is as follows: If “I” did not know “it”
directly and without mediation, then “it” has to know itself through
objectifying itself which would
be called “it.” On one
hand, “I” and “it” are the same, since “it” is a representation of the “I”; on
the other hand, they are not the same since if they were the same, there would
not have been an “I” and an “it”. Therefore, “I” and “it” are different since
they stand in a subject/object relation, but they are the same since “it” is a
substitute for the “self” in the statement “I know myself.” According to
Suhrawardi, the following propositions would then have to be the same if the
“I” were not the same as the “self.”
1.
I know myself.
2.
I know it.
3.
It knows myself.
4.
“It” knows it.
Therefore, if it is the
case that the “I” comes to know itself through its representation, then the
above contradictions arise which maintain “I” and “it” are the same and
different at the same time. That is the absurdity which Suhrawardi demonstrates
in his first argument.
To summarize the views of
Suhrawardi on the basis of his first argument we can classify his first
argument into the following three categories:
A.
Epistemological
B.
Logical
C.
Semantical
A. Epistemological
If “I” can only know
myself through a representation of myself, then I know myself through what is
not myself which is an absurdity. This is to say that my understanding and
apprehension of something are the same as the thing in itself. Therefore,
either the self cannot be known or it has to be known by itself. We all know
ourselves; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that we can know our “self”
only through our “self.”
B. Logical
If the “I” is to know
itself through its representation, then either the “I” and its representation,
the “it,” are the same or not. If they are the same, then there cannot be two of
them and therefore, “I”
and “it” have to be one
and the same. On the other hand, if they are different, then how can “it” be a
perfect representation of the “I”? This is a logical contradiction which arises
if we are to accept the “I/it” distinction.
M. Ha’iri in his work The
Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, maintains that there is
a realm of “I-ness” and “It-ness."81 I-ness naturally can only
be known by itself and if it is represented by something other than itself,
then “it” becomes “not I”, whereas it should be nothing but “I”. According to
Ha’iri, the “I” and the “it” are not the same, but “it” exists because of the
“I”. If the self comes to know of itself through the idea or representation of
the self (mithdl) then it clearly can never know itself since according
to Suhrawardi and Ha’iri mithdl does not represent the “I” but
demonstrates the “it.” In fact, if two things are identically the same, then
they can not be separated. Therefore, by virtue of the distinctness of the “I”
and its representation, the “it”, we can conclude that knowledge of “it” is not
the same as the “I.” If this were not the case, then the “I” and the “it”
should have been the same and yet different at the same time, which is an
absurdity.
C. Semantical
When I say “I know
myself,” if by “myself’ I am referring to the representation of the I, then I
am actually saying that “I know it.” However, since “it” is “not I,” then I am
also saying that “I know not I,” which is another way of saying “I do not know
I.” This too is an absurdity. According to Suhrawardi, then, if “I” is known
through its representation, then the statement “I know myself’ means “I do not
know myself’, which is contradictory and therefore absurd since I know myself.
Several conclusions can be
drawn from the above arguments, which are among Suhrawardi’s original
contributions to Islamic philosophy. First, is that he seems to have succeeded
in establishing the existence of a being that can only be understood by
itself, but also that this understanding takes place by virtue of the reality
of its presence. The second conclusion is that since “self” can only know
itself by the reality of itself, any other thing is foreign to it and thereby
will never know it as it really is. M. Ha’iri states this as follows:
In this prime example of
presence - knowledge, the meaning of knowledge becomes absolutely equivalent
with the mean-
ing of the very being of the self,
such that within the territory of T-ness” to know is to exist and to exist is
to know.82
The third remarkable
characteristic of Suhrawardi’s argument, which can be regarded as an original
contribution in the Islamic epistemological tradition, is that he has offered
a theory of knowledge without relying on such notions as essence, appearance
and reality. Instead, he argues that if the “I” understands itself by virtue of
its presence, then its existence is its primary mode or its essential
character. The very fact that the self can know itself by its mere presence
leads to the conclusion that self is pure existence or pure presence.
2.
ARGUMENT FROM
PRE-COGNITIVE MODE OF
KNOWLEDGE
Suhrawardi offers two
arguments in support of the view that our knowledge of ourselves requires the
existence of a pre-cognitive mode of knowing and that can only be possible through
knowledge by presence. In his first argument, Suhrawardi attempts to
demonstrate the absurdity of not accepting the argument. Through the use of reductio
ad absurdum, in a very difficult passage he states:
Indeed, if that which is
unknown to you becomes known, then how do you know that it is what you sought?
For inevitably either [your] ignorance remains, or [your] prior knowledge of
it existed so that it could be known as such [. . .] For that which is sought,
if it is unknown form in all aspects, it could have never been known.8’
In the above argument
Suhrawardi maintains that if I am to know A through B, then I
must have come to know that B, in some sense, represents A.
However, if we say this, then it is necessary for a person to first know A,
and then the fact that B represents A. How can I begin to know
myself through something other than myself, if I do not already know myself?
This argument originally goes back to Plato, who argued that in searching for
truth, we in essence must know the truth or else, even if we do find it, how
will we recognize it? Suhrawardi is applying the same concept with a great
deal of emphasis on the precognitive mode of knowledge. Therefore, prior
knowledge of A is necessary if A is to know itself through B,
otherwise any object of one’s reflection may be a representation of A.
Suhrawardi’s second
argument for having precognitive knowledge is as follows: If A knows
itself through its representation B,
then the question arises
as to how it knows that B represents A? If A does not know
itself directly, then it must have come to know B through C, and
this process goes on ad infinitum. In other words, either A knows
itself directly or else there will be an infinite chain of representations,
each of which is known through the other one. This, according to Suhrawardi, is
impossible. From this he concludes that A knows itself directly and
without mediation or representation. Suhrawardi is careful to point out that
this process is true only in regard to the knowledge of the self of itself and
not of the objects of the external world.
Finally, Suhrawardi offers
an argument that is based on the primacy of the essence over the accident. The
primacy of the essence over the accident is the underlying philosophical
principle upon which the argument is based, despite the fact that Suhrawardi
does not use the concepts of essence and existence explicitly to argue for his
position. This view, which has come to be known as the “principality of
essence” (asdlat al-mdhiyyah), as opposed to the “principality of
existence” (asalat al-urujud) held by the Peripatetics, is an integral
part of the ishraqi school. To know something is to know its essence,
and if one is to know the essence of a necessary being through its accident or
in this case its predicate, then it is as if one were to know a major premise
through a minor one. To argue for his position, Suhrawardi relies on the method
of reductio ad absurdum by assuming that we know ourselves through the
representation of the “I.” On this he says:
Indeed the thing which
necessarily exists and which is selfperceived does not know itself from a
representation of itself in itself. If it knows [itself] through its
representation, and the representation of I-ness is not itself, then in regards
to it [I-ness], it is the one perceived and it is the representation at that
time. The perception of I-ness must be, by itself, the perception of that which
it, itself, is, and must be the perception of itself, by itself, just like the
perception of other than itself - and that is impossible - in contrast to the
externals, representation and that which it has of it are both it. Moreover,
if it is through a representation, it, itself, did not know it was a
representation, and thus it knew itself through
representation. And how
was it not? It imagines that it knows the very thing by that which is
attributed to itself from outside. It is an attribute of it. If it is judged
according to every super-added attribute to itself, then it is a knowledge of
other than itself. It already knew itself before all attributes and the like.
It did not know itself through attributes which are super- added.84
The above argument seeks
to establish the reality of the knowledge of the self by itself through an
examination of the attributes of the self. The argument is based on a key
concept, which is that if one is to know himself, then he must have had prior
knowledge of himself. If this were not the case, then how could one realize
that the thing which is supposed to be the representation of the self does
actually represent the self? The representations of one’s self, which in this
case are the attributes of the self, are useful in recognizing the self if and
only if those attributes truly represent the self. This too, however; requires
having a pre-knowledge of the self. Thus, it can be said that if one is to know
oneself through his attributes, then he has to know that these attributes are
actually the attributes of the self. To know this, one has to have
pre-knowledge of his own “self”, which implies the “self” knows itself through
itself as has been argued for in the first two arguments.
In the second part of this
argument Suhrawardi maintains that one knows himself either directly or
indirectly. In the first case, the problem is solved. However, if A is
to know itself through its representation B, then it is reasonable to
conclude that it cannot know B except through its representation Cand
this process can go on ad infinitum. . . . Therefore, it can be
concluded that A can never know itself through its representation.
Suhrawardi considers this to be an absurdity on two grounds. First, it leads to
an infinite series of contingent dependent beings, which, he argues, is
impossible for there is an end to everything. Secondly, we know ourselves,
while the above argument indicates that we cannot know ourselves, an absurdity
Suhrawardi rejects.
Suhrawardi has made an
assumption here which is that the self knows itself. What if this is not the
case and that the self is ignorant of itselP Suhrawardi does not reply to this
point since our knowledge of ourselves is so certain and appears to be so
“clear and distinct,” as Descartes would say, that one may not mistake his
notion of self with the actual self as it really is.
The above objection, in my
opinion, is a shortcoming in Suhra- wardi’s philosophy. There is no question
that the self knows itself. However, there is every reason to doubt that this
knowledge of the self is the self as it really is. For example, it is true that
my relationship to my headache is marked by certainty and directness. However,
my concept of my headache and its characteristics, though certain to me, should
not be mistaken for the true nature of that headache which may never be known to
me. I have an idea of my “self”, but how do I know this is my actual self or
that my knowledge of it corresponds to the actual self? Suhrawardi would reply
to the above by saying that the mode of cognition with which the self knows
itself is such that it does not lend itself to any logico-semantical analysis.
Therefore, it is not a proper analogy to compare one’s relationship to one’s
headache and the knowledge of the self of itself. The problem with this
argument is that Suhrawardi leaves no room for any verification of his claim by
an outsider.
The above problem is one
that Ha’iri also notices, but he does not elaborate on it and in fact considers
it to be an issue open for further study. However, having offered a discussion
of the concept of “awareness” and “presence”, Ha’iri concludes that our knowledge
of ourselves is one that goes beyond the “noumena” and “phenomena”
distinction. As he states:
The most outstanding
feature of knowledge by presence, however, is that the immediate objective
reality of the thing as it is, is its being known.85
Having demonstrated in the
last three arguments that the self cannot be known by anything else except
itself and that it is only through the sheer presence of the reality of the
self that the knowledge of the self becomes possible, Suhrawardi goes on to
conclude the following:
You cannot be absent from
yourself (dhdtika), and from your realization of it, and since awareness
is not possible through representation or super-addition, in your awareness of
yourself you only need yourself which is visible to itself and not absent from
itself, and nothing else. The awareness of the self itself must be by itself
and cannot be absent from it such as the organs of the heart, the liver, and
the brain, and all
matter and material
darkness and light is not implied in your awareness of yourself. Your
self-awareness is not an organ nor is it materiality and unless you are absent
from it, you have awareness of yourself, continuously and permanently.86
Two conclusions can be
drawn from Suhrawardi’s theory of knowledge by presence. First and foremost is
that the self can only be known by itself, and therefore to know a thing is
equivalent to gaining knowledge of an object so that the relationship between
the object and the self is the same as the relationship between the self and
itself.
The second conclusion is
that whatever is not known through the presence of the self is therefore beyond
the epistemic domain of the self. Consequently, gaining certainty with regard
to those objects that are beyond the epistemic domain of the self is not
possible.
5.
PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
A PHILOSOPHICAL
ANALYSIS
With regard to the
foregoing discussion, it can be said that the first step in Suhrawardi’s
epistemology is to argue for the existence of a self which is an immaterial and
immutable substance. The proof for the existence of the “I” is the task of discursive
philosophy. Suhrawardi, as a skillful philosopher, carries out the task of
establishing the very existence of an independent self which, however, has
many attributes that are attached to it. These attachments are the basic
constituents of the human ego (nafs) whose existence is too obvious to
argue for and include desires of the flesh.87
Suhrawardi holds the view
that the self often appears to be nothing but a sum of desires towards wordly
attractions and not two separate entities, a metaphysical “I” to which desires
of the flesh are supper-added. In order to make this crucial distinction,
Suharawrdi calls for further philosphical analysis to firmly establish that
the “I” and its attributes are not the same. It is only then that we can see
that whereas the nature of the “I” is divine and belongs to the luminous world,
its attachments are ontologically rooted in the corporeal world. Rationalistic
and discursive philosophy in this context is called for in order to establish
the distinction between the self and its attributes.
Suhrawardi’s third step in
dealing with the self would be to go beyond the separation of the self from its
attributes. At this stage
Suhrawardi argues that in
order for the self to be able to reveal itself, the “veiling” attributes of the
self should be destroyed. To do so, Suhrawardi prescribes practicing asceticism
and he goes on to illustrate in great detail the type and nature of these
practices as was discussed previously. Such practices eliminate the nafs
and the attributes of the self begin to vanish one by one. As this process goes
on, the self, whose relation to its attributes is like the relationship
between accidents to essence, begins to reveal its “I-ness.” This process will
have to continue until the annihilation of the attributes of the self is
completed, and once this process has been finished, the self will remain in its
entirety without any veil from itself.
When you have made a
careful inquiry into yourself, you will find out that you are made of
“yourself’, that is, nothing but that which knows its own reality. This is your
own “I-ness” (and’iyyatuka). This is the manner in which everyone is to
know himself and in that, everyone’s “I-ness” is common with you.88
The methodology of
bringing the self to its fullness and thus enabling it to reveal itself can be
summarized as the following:
1.
Realization of the
distinctness of the self from its attributes.
2.
Separation of the “I” from
its attributes, both philosophically and practically.
3.
Employment of asceticism
as a means for destroying attributes and leaving the self in its pure form.
4.
The self in its pure form
is a single and self-evident phenomenon from which nothing more apparent can
exist.
5.
That from which nothing
more apparent can exist is light.
6.
Self is light. (F4,5)
7.
Things are known by coming
into the mere presence of light.
8.
Things are known by the
presence of the self. (F 6,7)
It is in regard to the
above epistemological scheme that philosophy and asceticism have their own
place and in fact are able to become integrated into a tradition of wisdom that
brings about a rapprochement between discursive philosophy, intellectual
intuition and practical wisdom.
For Suhrawardi, the
concept of knowledge by presence is therefore defined as an awareness or
presence of the object before its essence. He reminds us that this essence,
which he considers to be the same as the self, light, and knowledge, is such
that by virtue of its presence bridges the subject-object distinction.
Since all things are
ultimately made up of light, and because it is absurd to say that one needs
light to find another light, in order for an epistemic relation to occur the
veil that is separating the subject and the object has to be removed. In this
case, self or light, which are equivalent in Suhrawardi’s philosophy, is
knowledge as well. ‘To know is to exist and to exist is to know’ therefore constitutes
a major epistemological theme and one of the important contributions of
Suhrawardi to Islamic philosophy.89
6.
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
KNOWLEDGE BY PRESENCE
Despite Suhrawardi’s
genius, there are a number of objections that can be raised against some of his
specific arguments. Here I wish to discuss several problematic points implied
by the theory of knowledge by presence. Suhrawardi argues that after he
thoroughly mastered the Peripatetic philosophy, he realized the inadequacies of
such a philosophical methodology. He then improved certain aspects of the
Peripatetic philosophy by adding and omitting certain arguments. At that point
he had done what any brilliant philosopher would do. He then tells us that
through asceticism and initiation he had a vision of the truth. He reminds us
on numerous occasions that the path of spiritual realization requires ascetic
practices.
What is problematic in
Suhrawardi’s claim is that through spiritual vision he has realized the
validity of the philosophical principles which he advocates. This is exactly
what distinguishes gnosis (‘irfdn) from philosophy. The problem is as
follows: What if there exists an argument or a set of arguments in the works of
Suhrawardi that are clearly false? In order to falsify Suhrawardi’s
philosophical paradigm it is only necessary to find one instance in which
Suhrawardi advocates a false argument. There are indeed such instances.
Basing the validity of a
philosophical argument contingent upon spiritual realization creates the
following problems:
1.
All the philosophical
arguments must be sound, or else the spiritual vision of Suhrawardi is not
authentic.
2.
All the philosophical
arguments are sound regardless of their apparent fallacies and therefore
the vision is authentic.
As I indicated above, in
the first case, it is not very difficult to find an argument of Suhrawardi with
apparent flaws. How Suhrawardi can defend this position is puzzling. If I
present a philosophical
argument of Suhrawardi
which is by any account fallacious to him, then he either has to admit that his
spiritual vision was not real or that the validity of philosophical arguments
is not necessarily related to one’s mystical vision. Since Suhrawardi has based
his views on the premise that the truth of philosophical arguments can be
realized through one’s illumination, then separating the validity of the
arguments and spiritual vision would be a violation of the fundamental principle
upon which the ishraqi school is established. Suhrawardi obviously will
not grant that his mystical experience has been a false one since that would
place the ishraqi school in a dilemma.
It follows that Suhrawardi
will have to adopt the position that all the arguments which he has presented
have been checked by his spiritual realization and are correct, regardless of
their apparent fallacy. The falsification of his arguments is therefore of no
consequence since he knows that ultimately these principles are sound. This
argument does not go very far and, in fact, brings about even a more
fundamental problem. There have been many eminent philosophers of the ishraqi
tradition who have refuted each other’s arguments. Let us take only two of the
greatest masters of this tradition, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra.
Mulla Sadra is by all
accounts a man of superior intellect and profound vision whose spiritual and
philosophical acumen is comparable to Suhrawardi’s. Mulla Sadra takes issue
not only with Suhrawardi’s ontology, but in his commentary upon The
Philosophy of Illumination he criticized specific arguments of Suhrawardi.
One can say that the
apparent inconsistency between Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi exists only within
the philosophical domain and that on an esoteric level they remain in
agreement. This would have been acceptable if Suhrawardi and other ishraqisages
had not derived the validity of their philosophical propositions from the
authenticity of their spiritual vision. Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi both claim
to know the truth and both claim that the validity of their philosophical views
is derived from the knowledge they have acquired directly in the form of
revelation. Since they disagree with one another, one of the following
alternatives must be the case:
1.
The existing
inconsistancies indicate they both are false.
2.
The existing
inconsistancies indicate one of them must be false.
3.
They both are right.
One way of determining
whose claim is correct is to apply the standard means of analysis and
evaluation that philosophers have relied upon to determine the validity of
their arguments. Those who do engage in such an analysis will soon find out
that there are fallacies in the works of Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi as well as
their commentators.90 The problem to which I am alluding is a
serious one, since if the validity of philosophical arguments is subject to the
truth of one’s vision, then philosophy becomes subjective and relative and one
has to accept that Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra and their opponents are all
correct, which is not possible because they contradict one another.
One may reply to my
objection by arguing that truth is relative to the spiritual state of an
individual, and while only the absolute truth can be known absolutely,
knowledge of all other beings of the absolute truth is relative. Therefore, the
existing differences between Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi are superficial and
ultimately they are in agreement even though they do not know it.
The above reply is not
convincing in that philosophical principles, especially those of a
rationalistic nature, do not lend themselves to exegesis and interpretation in
the same way that mystical assertations do. To further clarify the above, let
us consider the following example. Suppose Suhrawardi argues that the following
argument is correct and Mulla Sadra argues it is false.
1.
All men are mortal.
2.
Socrates is a man. (A) .'.
3. Socrates is mortal.
Assuming Suhrawardi and
Mulla Sadra both had a genuine experience of truth, then they must necessarily
agree with A, since the conclusion of the above argument is true and their
philosophical view is derived from the authenticity of their spiritual vision.
Then how are we to account for their disagreement in this regard? In such
instances as the description of truth, God, or even the nature of a mystical
experience, inconsistencies can be explained by the fact that one’s
understanding of truth is relative to his spiritual state. In cases such as A,
however, we have a clear and simple argument that is clearly either true or
false. This creates a problem which is typical of those who have offered a
philosophical analysis based on their mystical vision.
‘Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji, one
of the most celebrated commentators of Suhrawardi, in his book Gawhar
murdd,91 argues that the
conclusion one arrives at
through discursive reasoning is the same as that which is attained through
illumination, with the only difference being the degree of clarity. Lahiji
raises an important issue which Suhrawardi has left unanswered, and that is,
what if the knowledge attained through illumination is contradictory to the
well established principles of knowledge? This is a question that Suhrawardi
seems to take for granted by assuming that illumination and philosophical
analysis, if carried out “properly”,92 will lead to the same
conclusion. Lahiji realizes that neglecting the validity of a logical principle
at the expense of an esoteric judgment may lead to anarchy, since the
authority of the judgment itself is not verifiable.
Lahiji’s response is a
clever one. He maintains that if the result of one’s discovery through
illumination were contrary to the principles of logic, then the person should
not claim to be illuminated. Although this principle guards the rational
principles from subjective judgments, it gives priority to the discursive
domain. As Lahiji states:
Therefore, a Sufi9’
would either be a theosopher or a theologian. Without a firm grasp in
theosophy or theology, and without benefiting from the men of vision, in
accordance with the words of the ‘ulamd or its contrary, any claim to
Sufism is pure forgery.94
To further clarify the
distinction between the principles of rationalistic philosophy and hikmat,
Lahiji makes a distinction between knowledge of the scientific principles
versus metaphysical beings.95 Whereas the scientific principles lend
themselves to philosophical inquiries, ishraqi wisdom does not.
To summarize, there exists
a fundamental problem at the heart of the school of illumination, which arises
when Suhrawardi makes the validity of the philosophical principles contingent
upon one’s mystical vision. My proposed solution is that instead of arguing for
a correlation between the spiritual realization and philosophical truth,
Suhrawardi should separate them. It is perfectly justifiable for a mystic to
remain ignorant of the science of biology and chemistry while claiming to know
the truth. Accordingly, Suhrawardi has to differentiate between scientific and
philosophical truth. He must then place them within a different category from
truth that is attained through a mystical experience. Suhrawardi should say
that knowledge of one category should not have any
bearing upon the other one
if he is to resolve the problem which I have discussed above. Suhrawardi should
continue to consider philosophical training and especially mastery of
Peripatetic philosophy to be a prerequisite for the pursuance of the ishraqi
tradition. This is justifiable if Suhrawardi considers it to be a necessary
training and nothing else. However, it would be a fatal mistake for him to say
that the validity of all the philosophical principles, especially those
contained in The Philosophy of Illumination, have been derived from his
mystical experience, since some of those principles and arguments are clearly
regarded as fallacious even by such giant commentators of Suhrawardi as Mulla
Sadra, Lahiji and Sabziwari. Regardless of this objection, Suhrawardi’s
philosophical arguments and mystical narratives are important and have their own
merit. Within the philosophical domain, his works should be regarded as a
brilliant commentaries on Ibn Sina’s philosophy, with major differences in the
fields of epistemology and ontology.
Suhrawardi and the School
of Illumination
Notes
1
Suhrawardi, Opera
3, 422.
2
Suhrawardi, Opera
2, 117.
3
Ibid., 119.
4
Ibid., 113.
5
Ibid., 121.
6
Ibid., 108.
7
For Suhrawardi, qhdsiq
is that which yearns to return to the real light.
8
For Suhrawardi, Hay’ah
zulamdniyyah belong to the categories of the accident.
9
Suhrawardi, Opera2,
133.
10 For more information on these divisons see, Ibid., 187.
11 Ibid., 223.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 144.
14 For more information on the Zoroastrian and Mazdean
angelology and Islam see H. Corbin, “Rawabit-i hikmat-i ishraq wa falsafa-yi
Iran-i bastan,” Majillay-i anjuman-i Iran shindsi, no.3, (1946): 34ff.
15 Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 70.
16 H. Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn
‘Arabi (Princeton: Princeton Press, 1969), 55.
17 R. Evans, “Henry Corbin and Suhrawardi’s Angelology," Hamdard
Islamicus 11, no.l (n.d.): 12-20.
18 Suhrawardi, OperaS, 186.
19 Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 211.
20 Ibid., 211.
21 Ibid., 213.
22 Ibid., 214.
23 Ibid., 216.
24 Ibid., 217.
25 Ibid., 218.
26 Ibid., 220.
27 Ibid., 211.
28 For more information
see Henry Corbin’s work on imagination: Mundus Imaginalis or the Imaginary
and the Imaginal, trans. Ruth Horine (Ipswich: Golgonooza Press 1976).
29 Suhrawardi, Opera2,
183-184.
30 Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 3-4.
31 Suhrawardi, OperaS, 191.
32 Suhrawardi, Opera 2,
254-255.
33 Ibid., 254.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 242.
36 Some of the advocates of the perennial view are of the
opinion that the imaginal world is also the source from which the forms and
patterns of Islamic art emanate. Among these can be named: S.H. Nasr, F. Schuon
and T. Burckhart. Also, for more information on Mundus imaginalis see:
Q.A. Di nani, Shu ‘d-i andisha wa shuhud darfalsafa-yi
Suhrawardi
(Tehran: Hikmat Press, 1985 A.H.S.); and D. Shayagan, “Henry Corbin: The
Spiritual Topography of Iranian Islam,” Iran Nameh X, no.2 (Spring
1992): 280-296.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 133-134.
Ibid., 133.
Ibid., 230, 231.
Ibid., 110.
Ibid., 110.
Socratic method as
exemplified throughout Plato’s writings, in pati- cular in the Meno and the Symposium,
intends to define and redefine a “thing” until one reaches an axiomatic
definition which is also a means of understanding the forms. The Socratic method
is related to the Platonic epistemology and the theory of “recollection” which
lies at the heart of it.
Aristotle, Posterior
Analytics (New York: Random House, 1941), 160.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 20.
Ibid., 29-36.
Opera 1,
17.
Ibid., 199. Throughout
this work, especially towards the end of this book, Suhrawardi criticizes the
Peripatetics on their concept of definition and categories.
Suhrawradi, Opera 1,14.
Ibid., 14.
For more information see Ibid.,
116ff.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 5.
Suhrawardi, Opera 1, 199.
Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 2.
Ibid., 85.
Aristotle, Posterior Analytics,
15.
What Suhrawardi has in
mind is the category of things whose genus and differentia are the same, such
as colors.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 21.
Ibid., sec. 9-14.
Qutb al-Din Shirazi, Sharh-i
hikmat al-ishraq (Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1951), 454-457.
Ibid., 455.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 73.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 74.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 54.
Ibid., 18.
Ibid.
Ibid., 104.
Ibid., 21.
Ibid., 104.
Ibid., 13
Ibid., 107.
Ibid., 111.
In The Principles of
Epistemology in Islaimc Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence, M. Ha’iri argues
that this is a case of logical contradiction when the law of subject-object
relation is violated. For a complete discussion see pp. 69-92.
Ibid., 77.
Ha’iri, The Principles
of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, (first edition), 142.
Suhrawardi, Opera2,
110.
Ibid., 111.
Ha’iri, The Principles of
Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy, 155.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2,
112.
This aspect of the “I” is
better discussed in the Persian works of Suhrawardi where he is very explicit
about such attributes. For more information see Suhrawardi, Opera 3,
170-191.
Suhrawardi, Opera 2,
112.
This concept has become
one of the central themes of hikmah and was treated extensively by the
masters of the School of Isfahan, Mulla Sadra in particular. For more
information see S.H. Nasr, “The School of Isfahan,” in A History of Muslim
Philosophy, ed. M.M. Sharif (Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1983), 904-932.
Proof for this would be
the existing commentaries and critiques on Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi by so
many eminent philosophers, e.g. Lahiji, Sabziwari, et al.
What distinguishes Lahiji
from other ishraqi philosophers is the fact that he argues that if one’s
vision does not correspond with the conclusions of logical analysis, then one
should not preach any of them. The best course of action then, according to
Lahiji, is pursuing truth until the spiritual vision and the result of
philosophical analysis correspond.
This argument of
Suhrawardi’s gives rise to a tautology since if one’s vision does not
correspond to philosophical principles, he has not carried out his analysis
properly. This argument makes the verification of an argument impossible by an
independent observer.
By “Sufi,” Lahiji is,
here, referring to those who opposed any intellectual activity towards the
attainment of truth. Sufis emphasize pure piety and asceticism at the expense
of intellectual knowledge.
Qummi lahiji, OawharMurad,
(Bombay: 1923), 16-17.
Ibid., 16.
5
INFLUENCE OF SUHRAWARDI
ON ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY
Suhrawardi’s ishraqi
school marked a turning point in the history of Islamic philosophy since it
changed the direction and nature of philosophical thinking from a purely
rationalistic approach to one that considered ascetic practices to be part of
its epistemological paradigm. Most of the schools of philosophy that came after
Suhrawardi were influenced by his teachings in one way or another. Some of
them, such as the Shaykhiyyah movement, which agreed with certain
strands of ishraqi thought, opposed others.
The school of illumination
was not only instrumental in reconciling the two traditions of wisdom that had
been in contrast with one another, Sufism and the Peripatetic philosophy, but
also brought about a harmony between them. The result was that purification and
asceticism became a necessary condition for the philosophical speculation,
which ultimately leads to the attainment of truth.
The following discussion
will demonstrate how Suhrawardi’s ideas spread to different parts of the
Islamic world and the different ways in which the ishraqi school played
a role in the development of subsequent philosophical schools. The purpose is
not to show specific links that exist between Suhrawardi and his successors by
way of textual analysis, but rather to show the influence of Suhrawardi on
various schools of thought.
By virtue of their
historical, cultural and intellectual backgrounds, it was greater Persia and
the sub-continent of India that became the cradle of the school of
illumination, from which the influence of Suhrawardi’s ideas spread in the
following geographical areas:
A.
Greater Persia
B.
Sub-Continent of India
C.
Syria, Anatolia, Spain and
North Africa D. The West
Suhrawardi’s school of
illumination left a profound and permanent influence on the tradition of
wisdom in Persia. Suhrawardi’s teachings and the bulk of ishraqi texts
became a powerful philosophical movement whose climax was the “School of
Isfahan.” The masterly ishraqi expositions and commentaries of the
teachings of Suhrawardi are still avidly studied today. Why was Suhrawardi so
well received by Persian philosophers of this period? Was it only because he
was a native of Persia? The answer lies in the rich and esoterically inclined
religious ambience of Persians themselves which made them receptive to
Suhrawardi’s ideas.
Another reason was that
the illuminationist school of Suhrawardi provided the basis upon which an
esoteric interpretation of Shi'ite Islam could be formulated.[3]
Shi'ite Islam puts a great deal of emphasis on intellect (‘aql) as an
instrument for the attainment of truth as well as acceptance of and adherence
to the presence of an esoteric knowledge that lies at the heart of the Islamic
message. Suhrawardi’s school of illumination considers both intellectual
discourse and the practice of asceticism to be the necessary components for
the attainment of truth.
It is not accidental that
Suhrawardi’s philosophy, which emphasizes the elements of knowledge as well as
practical wisdom, came to show itself during the Safavid period when Shi'ite
Islam was adopted as the official state religion. Shi’ite Islam, which
emphasized the twelve Imams as a chain of initiators through which the
Muhammadan light (nur Muhammadi) manifested itself, was naturally
receptive to ishraqi doctrine.
In addition to the
religious and intellectual elements that enabled Suhrawardi’s ideas to take
root in Persia, there are other important commentaries and expositions which
helped to consolidate his ideas. The most important work was the commentary
ofShahrazuri (680/1281) on Hikmat al-ishraq and al-Talwihdt. Also, the
commentaries of such masters as Ibn Kammunah (667/1269), ‘Allamah Hilli
(693/1293), Qutb al-Din Shirazi, Athir al-Din Abhari,[4]
Nasir al-Din Tusi and, finally, Mulla Sadra were influential in spreading the
ideas of Suhrawardi.
Abhari and Tusi are known
for their Peripatetic writings but were nevertheless highly influenced by
Suhrawardi. For example, in his work Kashf al-haqd’iq fi tahrir al-daqd’iq,
a perfect representation of Suhrawardi’s teachings, Abhari discusses a number
of philosophical issues from an ishraqi point of view. Before the
Safavid period, such figures as Sayyaid Haydar Amuli and Ibn abi Jumhur and his
major work Kitab al-mujli played a major role in allowing the ishraqi
school to reach its climax during the Safavid period. The religious ambience of
Persia, its historical and cultural characteristics, and the existence of an
essentially gnostic element in the Persian Weltanschauung, helped to
establish Suhrawardi as a figure with whom Persians felt at home. As S.H. Nasr
states:
By the beginning of the
eighth/fourteenth century the ishraqi school had become definitely
established in Persia and henceforth it remained an important element of the
intellectual life not only of Persians but also the eastern lands of Islam
where the Persian Islamic culture has been dominant.[5]
The powerful political
movement of the Safavids and the keen interest of the Safavid kings in
nourishing the intellectual and mystical life of Persia brought about the
culmination of the tradition of ishraqi wisdom in what has come to be
known as the “School of Isfahan.” Before embarking on a discussion of the
School of Isfahan, I will briefly consider those ishraqi philosophers
who paved the path for the emergence of this powerful paradigm.
A number of other
intellectuals of this period not only carried out an ishraqi reading of
Ibn Sina, but also paid attention to the gnosis (‘irfdri) of Ibn ‘Arabi
who was introduced to the Persians through the works of his student, Sadr
al-Din Qunawi. Among these figures we can name Ibn Turkah Isfahan! (8th/14th)
whose attempt to bring together philosophy and gnosis, as represented in his
major work, Tamhtd al-qawd‘id, influenced many of his successors, in
particular Sayyid Haydar Amuli. Amuli interpreted Shi'ite Islam in the light of
the writings of Suhrawardi, Ibn ‘Arabi, Ibn Sina and created a philosophical
synthesis. Amuli’s important work, Jdmi‘ al-asrdr, exemplifies the type
of spiritual hermeneutics (ta’wil) that is practiced by the ishraqi
masters.
Besides the previously
mentioned Ibn A’bi Jumhur, Rajab Bursi, who wrote Mashdriq al-anwdr stands
out among other figures of this tradition. He also attempted a synthesis of Ibn
‘Arabi’s gnostic doctrine, the works of the Peripatetics, and Shi'ite thought.
Concerning the attempt for
a unified and well-integrated philosophical paradigm by the important figures
of this period, S.H. Nasr states:
The integration of ishraqi
teaching into Shi’ism was . . . rapid and profound, with the result that during
later centuries most of the ishraqis have been Shi'ite. During the
period pre-dating the Safavids, such Shi'ite theologians as Sayyid Haydar Amuli
and especially Ibn Abi Jumhur prepared the ground for the integration of ishraqi
wisdom into the perspective of Shi'ism.4
Philosophical activity in
general and Suhrawardi teachings in particular which had gone through a period
of decline, were once again revived during the Safavid dynasty when the
intellectual, religious, mystical and artistic life of Persia reached its
climax.
The founder of the School
of Isfahan, Mir Muhammad Baqir Damad Husayni Astarabadi, known as “Mir Damad”,
and often referred to as the “third teacher”, {mu'allim al-thdlith), was
one of the most outstanding figures of this period. Mir Damad made an attempt to
revive and reconcile Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi. He was in a unique position to
revive philosophical activities since he was highly esteemed by the jurists as
well as the court, which protected him from the orthodox jurists’ accusation of
heresy.
He may be considered an ishraqi
interpreter of Ibn Sina’s metaphysics in the spiritual universe of Shi’ism.5
While Mir Damad defended
the rationalistic philosophy of the Peripatetics, he made a distinction
between rationalism and illumination. Whereas Suhrawardi distinguished between
Oriental and Occidental philosophy, Mir Damad distinguished between Yamdni,
the illuminative philosophy, and Yundni the discursive philosophy of
Greeks.6 Yamani being the Orient represents the illuminative,
while Yundni stands for discursive philosophy.
Mir Damad commented on a
number of philosophically significant topics, in particular the principality
of the essence (asdlat al-mdhiyyah). The thrust of his philosophy is the
relationship between the huduth (creation) and the qidam (eternity)
of the world. Mir Damad accepted Suhrawardi’s view of the principality of
essence over existence but argued that, contrary to the ishraqis who
consider the incorporeal world and the archetypes (al-mujarraddt) to
have been created in the “divine essence” (al-huduth al-dhdti), he
considers them to have “corporeal creation” (al-huduth al-dahri). He
argues that while the cause of the creation of these archetypes may be in the
divine essence, the event or effect occurs in the created domain (dahr).
In the Qabdsat,7 Mir Damad quotes Ibn Sina extensively and
interprets him in a way that supports his own view of the corporeal createdness
(al-huduth al-dhdti). There are those contemporary interpreters8
of Mir Damad who argue that some of his interpretations of Ibn Sina were purely
from an ishraqi point of view and therefore are not entirely accurate.
Mir Damad devotes a major
portion of his Qabasdt to a discussion of the principality of essence.
His complex argument, which is essentially similar to Suhrawardi, is as
follows: It is apparent that an existent being does not only exist by virtue of
its own existence but because of its “essence” (mdhiyyah). Now, either
the essence precedes the existence in the order of creation or vice versa. In
either case, the order can not be only a conceptual one in our mind or a random
arrangement made for the sake of convenience, but this order must be intrinsic
or innate to the ontological structure of the universe. From this, Mir Damad
concludes that the essence of an existent being must be the principal element,
since it is inconceivable to have an existent being which is made up of pure
existence (wujud) and no essence. Mir Damad’s unique contribution to Islamic
philosophy is his introduction of
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination the notion of time concerning the priority and principality of
essence over existence, which is perhaps the most important and complex part of
Mir Damad’s philosophy.9
Among the fifty works of
Mir Damad which are committed to the revival of Ibn Sina’s and Suhrawardi’s
philosophy from an ishraqi point of view, the following can be named: Qabasdt,
Taqwim al-imdn, al-Ufuq al-mubin, and Taqdisat. Mir Damad has also
written a number of works in Persian, among which are Jazawdt, al-Sirat
al-mustaqim and the collection of his works in Persian and Arabic entitled Mashariq
al-anwdr.
Despite Mir Damad’s
contribution to Islamic philosophy and Shi’ite gnosis as the founder of the
School of Isfahan, his greatest achievement was training a number of students,
some of whom came to dominate the intellectual scene and overshadowed the
teacher. Among the students of Mir Damad who played an important role in
continuing the ishraqi wisdom of Suhrawardi by teaching and authorship,
one can name Mir Damad’s son-in-law, Sayyid Ahmad ‘Alawi, the author of a
commentary on Ibn Sina, Qutb al-Din Ashkiwari, who also wrote a book on the
history of philosophy called Mahbub al-qulub, and Mulla Khalil Qazwini,
who wrote a commentary on Usui al-kdfi of Kulayni and is regarded as an
authority on Shi'ite jurisprudence. There were many other figures who are less
known, such as Mulla Shamsa Gillani, who wrote extensively on Mir Damad’s view
of creation and eternity and commented on Mulla Sadra.
The second outstanding
figure of the School of Isfahan and an ishraqi hakim with legendary fame
in Iran is Shaykh Baha’ al-Din Amuli, whose influence goes beyond the sphere of
philosophy and extends into architecture, jurisprudence, Arabic grammar and
poetry. Amuli, known as “Shaykh Baha’i”, is not only respected for the ninety
works he wrote in all areas of the Islamic sciences, but is also revered
because he became the teacher of many scholars who went to Isfahan. While he is
not particularly known for his works on hikmat, he nevertheless tried to
reflect the spirit of hikmat in his architectural designs. His Sufi
poetry written in the style of Rumi and reflected in his book Tuti-ndmah,
is perhaps the best representation of his mystical views.
The greatest achievement
of Shaykh Baha’i is the fact that he trained such scholars as Mulla Muhsin Fyd
Kashani, Sayyaid Ahmad ‘Alawi, and Mulla Muhammad Taqi Majlisi, all of whom
came to be prominent figures of the ishraqi tradition. It is for this
Influence on Suhrawardi on Islamic
Philosophy reason, as well as for his unique achievements in architecture, that
he has gained almost a mythical personality, so much so that performing
miracles has been attributed to him.
The third figure of the
School of Isfahan, Mir Abu’l-Qasim Findiriski is less known despite his
eminence and far-reaching influence. He traveled to India and had extensive
contacts with Hindu Masters to whom he alludes in a major work, Usui
al-fusuL Along with his commentaries on other traditional fields of Islamic
intellectual thought, his Risdlat al-harakah and Risdlah sand’iyyah can
be named. Mir Findiriski who offers a summary of hikmat in his book of
poetry called Qasidah, tried to express his “experiential knowledge”
through Ibn Sinaian philosophical categories as did other members of the School
of Isfahan. He also trained a number of fine scholars such as Mulla Rafi‘a
Gilani and Aqa Husayn Khunsari. His most famous student is Mulla Rajab ‘Ali
Tabrizi, the author of Kilid-i bihisht.'0 Another figure of
great importance in the School of Isfahan is Mulla Muhsin Fayd Kashani, the
best student of Mulla Sadra, who wrote over 120 works. Beside writing on
different religious sciences, he wrote extensively on such works as Ibn
‘Arabi’s al-Futuhdt al-makkiyyah and Rumi’s Mathnawi. Kashani’s
work represents Shi’ite gnosis at its best. His major work, al-Mahdjjdt
al-baydd’fi ihyd’ al-ihyd’ was based upon Ghazzali’s ihyd’ al ‘ulum
al-Din. “In fact, what Mulla Muhsin did was to revive the work of Ghazzali
in the Shi'ite circle by ‘Shi'ifying’ it.”11
Kashani brought the
integration of the school of illumination to its completion. He used the
rationalistic philosophy of Ibn Sina and the theosophical ideas of Suhrawardi
to offer an analysis of the twelve-Imam Shi'ite Islam.
There are two other
prominent figures of this school, Mulla ‘Abd al-Razzaq Lahiji and his student
Qadi Sa'id Qummi. Lahiji is best known for his contribution to the field of Kaldm
(theology), which he carried out within the matrix of hikmat. Influenced
by Mulla Sadra, he wrote a number of works of a purely ishraqi nature
such as Huduth al-‘dlam, and a commentary on Suhrawardi’s Haydkil
al-nur. Qadi Sa'id Qummi, who came to be known as the Ibn ‘Arabi of the
Shi'ite tradition, devoted his writing to the type of spiritual hermeneutics (ta
’wit) that was intended to elaborate on the esoteric meaning of the Quran
and other Islamic doctrines and rites.
Towards the end of the
Safavid period two events occurred. First, the Sufis, who had enjoyed relative
freedom, began to be viewed as having deviated from the Islamic rites (shari'ah)
by the more esoteric 127
jurists (‘ulama)
and therefore were persecuted. The second element was the weakening of the
central government and the consequential dominance of the more austere and
orthodox atmosphere. Despite this change, however, there were a number of hakimsviho
emerged at the end of the Safavid period and provided a transition between the
Safavid and the Qajar periods.
The first important ishraqi
figure who belongs to this period is Hasan Lunbani, (13/19 century), whose
philosophical Sufism did not sit well with the esoteric ‘ulamd’and who
was accused of being a Sufi. The second significant hakim of this period
was Mirza Muhammad Sadiq Ardistani, who taught hikmat and carried on the
tradition of Mulla Sadra. During this period, such figures as Ardistani and Mir
Sayyid Hasan Taliqani began to use ishraqi texts in the madrasah.
Taliqani, for example, taught Ibn ‘Arabi’s Fusus al-hikam and
Suhrawardi’s Hikmat al-ishraq whi\e being influenced by Mulla Sadra.
Despite an environment
hostile to Sufism and hikmat, both flourished until the Qajar period
when another upsurge of intellectual activity occurred, although it never
produced as many outstanding figures as the Safavid period did.
Before commenting on the
status of the school of illumination during the Qajar period, it is necessary
to say a few words about Mulla Sadra both because of the extent to which he was
influenced by Suhrawardi and because he came to dominate the philosophical
scene during the Safavid and Qajar period. Mulla Sadra’s monumental
philosophical corpus, a synthesis of Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi, shaped and
determined the course of philosophical activities in Persia even up until
today. Therefore, the ishraqi tradition and its impact on the Shi'ite
gnosis can be better understood if the intellectual relationship between these
two giants, Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra, is made more clear.
It is generally believed
that Suhrawardi’s dominance of Islamic philosophy was substantially curtailed
by Mulla Sadra, whose criticisms and expositions of Suhrawardian doctrine
established him as the foremost authority on transcendental theosophy (al-hikmat
al-muta‘aliyyah).
Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra
represent two distinct approaches to hikmat. Mulla Sadra’s philosophical
system includes that of Suhrawardi but he makes major changes so that it
incorporates Ibn
Sina’s Peripatetic
interpretations as well as Suhrawardi’s ishraqi ideas. The inclusive
nature of his ideas established Mulla Sadra’s dominance of Islamic philosophy
in Iran until the present day.
The most important
achievement of Mulla Sadra is that he reversed the Suhrawardian ontology from
one that was based on light to one based on the principality of Being. This
important change took place in such a way that the overall philosophical
structure of Suhrawardi remained intact with one exception: the predominance of
the principality of existence over Suhrawardi’s principality of essence.
Sadr al-Din Shirazi wrote
over fifty books which range from commentaries on the Islamic hadith,
such as the Usui al-kdfi, to his Peripatetic writings, as in the case of
Kitab shark al-hiddyah. There are also those works which defend the
principles of illumination, such as al-Shawdhid al-rububiyya, Hikmat
al-‘arshiyyah, his famous commentry upon Suhrawardi’s The Philosophy of
Illumination called Ta‘liqdt ‘aid shark hikmat al-ishraq, and
finally his magnum opus, al-Hikmat al-muta‘dliyyah fi’l-asfdr al-arba‘at
al-'aqliyyah.
Mulla Sadra’s philosophy
presents a unique synthesis of major intellectual currents in Islam. As S.H.
Nasr states, they are:
Kaldm,
Peripatetic philosophy, ishraqi theosophy, and ‘irfdn. In Mulla
Sadra we find elements of Ghazzali, Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi and particularly Ibn
‘Arabi. Moreover, there is Sufism especially in its gnostic aspect which serves
as the background for this whole synthesis.12
The central difference
between Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi lies in their ontological views. According
to Mulla Sadra, who advocated the principality of being and the gradations of
Being (tashkik), each existent being has a different ontological status.
Identifying pure Being as the absolute, Mulla Sadra maintains that there is a
unity amongst all the gradations of beings that emanate from Being. So far,
Mulla Sadra’s system is similar to that of Suhrawardi, with the difference
being that Mulla Sadra has substituted Being for Light.
What constitutes the major
difference between them is their account of the hierarchy they both advocate.
Mulla Sadra argues that gradation is applicable to the realm of existence (wujud)
and cannot include essence (mdhiyyah) .'* Suhrawardi takes the opposite
view by maintaining that gradation makes sense only if applied to essences.
Sayyaid Jalal Ashtiyani, in his book Hasti az
nazar-i falsafah wa ‘iifan
(Existence from a Philosophical and Gnostic View),14
offers a lengthy discussion of the contention between Suhrawardi and Mulla
Sadra’s view of Being and Existence. He summarizes Mulla Sadra’s view as
follows: ‘The existent being that has an essence must then be caused and
existence that is pure existence ... is therefore a Necessary Being.”15
Therefore, for Mulla
Sadra, existence precedes the essence and is thus principle since something has
to exist first and then have an essence. It is primarily this argument which
lies at the heart of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy.
According to Ashtiyani,
there is another reading of Mulla Sadra’s argument that goes beyond the
classical distinction between essence and existence. Ashtiyani maintains that
both in the Asfdr and the Masha ir, Mulla Sadra offers a middle
road theory that is a rapprochement between those who argue for the principality
of essence and those who advocate the principality of existence. Since all
existent beings are essentially different in respect to their place on the
hierarchy of existence, Ashtiyani argues, essence and existence become one and
the same in that every existent being has an ontological status which
determines its degree of existence and this status bestows upon it its identity
or essence.
It is in fact the above
argument that demonstrates the extent of Suhrawardi’s influence on Mulla
Sadra’s ontological structure. The argument presented by Mulla Sadra can be
called a “middle road position” which goes beyond the traditional essence/
existence distinction by arguing that they are two aspects of the same reality.16
A thorough discussion of
the differences between the two giants of hikmat is beyond the scope of
this work. It suffices to say that both figures left an indelible mark upon the
intellectual fabric of Persia, the sub-continent of India and in particular on
Shi'ism. Due to the hostility of the orthodox and esoteric jurists, Mulla
Sadra’s teachings were not taught in the intellectual centers for almost a
century. However, once they were revived, during the early part of the Qajar
period, their study came to the forefront of scholarship.
The Qajar period in Iran
also witnessed a prolific period of philosophical activity. These activities
can be divided into two major
Influence on Suhrawardi on Islamic
Philosophy trends, the majority who carried out the tradition of Suhrawardi and
Sadrian teachings and those who opposed them, such as Shaykhiyyah.
Perhaps for political
reasons, the teachings of Mulla Sadra and the Shi'a gnostic views did not
receive the attention they deserved until Mulla ‘Ali Nuri, who devoted himself
to the teaching and advocating of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. Nuri’s commentary
on the Asfdr and Mashd'ir and his training of so many scholars
made him one of the most prominent figures of the Qajar period.
Hajj Mulla Hadi Sabziwari
(13/19) is the main expositor of the ishraqi doctrine during the Qajar
period, and the revival of Suhra- wardi’s teachings is mainly due to his
efforts. Sabziwari, who adhered to Mulla Sadra’s teachings, studied with Mulla
Isma‘il Kushki and Mulla ‘Ali Nuri in Isfahan. His ascetic practices are one of
the reasons that have made a legendary figure of Sabziwari. His emphasis on
asceticism as a necessary element in philosophical training is most evident in
his poems17 and also important in the revival of the practical
aspect of ishraq. Although belittled by some of the post-Sadrian
philosophers, his emphasis on asceticism was important in the revival of the
practical aspects of ishraq.
The works of Sabziwari, in
particular Sharh al-manzumah,18 have become standard texts
for the students of Islamic philosophy in Iran. They present a complete
discussion of philosophy and logic and raise objections against Mulla Sadra’s Asfdr,
especially his doctrine of the unity of the knower and the known (ittihad
al-‘dqil wa’l-ma'qut) and the composition of form and matter. Although
Sabziwari primarily concentrated on Mulla Sadra’s philosophy, his works are
also regarded as expositions of ishraqi doctrine, especially his
commentary upon Mulla Sadra’s al-Shawdhid al-rububiyyah and his work in
Persian, Asrdr al-hikam. Sabziwari’s commentary upon the Asfdr of
Mulla Sadra, one of the most comprehensive commentaries written on this work,19
and his commentary upon Mulla Sadra’s Mafdtih al-ghayb, provide a
valuable set of work for the students of Mulla Sadra as well as the school of ishraq.
Sabziwari’s interest in Sufism is most apparent in his Sufi poems and in
his commentary on Rumi’s Mathnawi, a classical work of Persian Sufi
poetry. It is also said20 that Sabziwari wrote a commentary on the Ildhiyydt
of Ibn Sina, which has been lost.
Many learned scholars
consulted Sabziwari on some of the more difficult philosophical questions to
which he provided written answers. In one of the lesser known replies,
Sabziwari provided a brief
answer to seven questions
that were posed to him by a contemporary philosopher, Mirza Abu’l-Hasan
Razavi.21 Since the seventh question deals with the subject of
knowledge by presence and clearly demonstrates the extent to which Sabziwari
was influenced by Suhrawardi, we have translated the entire section. This
translation also indicates that the ishraqi theory of knowledge was of
great interest among the intellectual community of the time.
QUESTION NUMBER 7:
M.A. Razavi: “Is the
method of knowledge by presence,22 which the sages of the Sufi
tradition have promulgated, true or not? Is it accessible despite the
differences among the followers of this method of discovery, and how can
certainty of the truth of this theory be attained? As it (Quran) says: “
If you do not know it, ask the learned”, and also, “Remember that God gave
birth to you through your mothers and you did not know anything.” The prophetic
hadith says, “God did not make it necessary for people to answer but He
made it incumbent upon the learned to answer.”
I have dared to ask this
while I am depressed, and my inner being is in a tumultuous state. I am thereby
requesting that the answer be sent to me soon. May the prosperity of the two
worlds be yours, your soul be enlightened, your intellect be well and your
heart be free of every bondage.”
Sabziwari:
“Having a vision (mushdhidah)
is an authentic principle and it is spiritual in nature. Spiritual discovery is
a science through which knowledge of the self, knowledge of God and eschatological
issues are known, and one becomes intellectually certain in a manner that is
only attainable with regards to the domain of true knowledge. The mind proceeds
from the knowledge of truth (‘ilm alyaqin) to the beholding of the truth
(‘ayn alyaqin) and finally becomes the truth (haqq al-yaqin).
God Most High has
expressed the levels of certainty within the context of “fire” and has said:
‘You will know soon, through ‘ilm alyaqin, you will see hell, and you
will see it with
Influence on Suhrawardi on Islamic
Philosophy the eyes of certainty.’ Elsewhere He says, ‘Hell can only be
understood through knowledge by certitude.’
Therefore, the degrees of
knowing the divine light are similar to the degrees of knowing fire. For
example, if someone has never seen fire but has heard that whatever becomes
united with it gains its attributes, he thereby knows that it loses its
identity. Every candle and light are luminous from it and if it loses some of
itself, it is not reduced. Whatever departs from it becomes its opposite in
nature, such as smoke, which is dark. In darkness it is the master of all
incorporeal lights.
It [fire] is like a luminous
light that, if placed in a gathering, will illuminate everyone in colors, and
forms manifest themselves in the presence of this light. Not every precious
pearl that is placed in a gathering can do the same thing. Just as in
illumination and warming, the sun is superior to fire in that ‘there is not
motion or power except through God,’ and they call that being fire. There are
those who believe in it on the basis of the following (those who know) and some
who seek to believe because of its signs (smoke from fire), such as those who
believe in God on the basis of clear signs. There are those who reach divine
light and see existent beings through this light and see the essence of fire
when the veil is removed for them. In their knowledge of God, these people are
seeing the truth. People are like burning iron to whom the effects of fire
appear when they understand it. They are those who have become the truth in
their knowledge of God. Both of these types are men of true discovery and faith
in what is obvious to them and are transcendental theosophers. There are
different degrees amongst them and they know God but do not see God. Discovery
of forms is the disclosure of forms as a particular to the senses and is
divided in accordance to the five senses.
Therefore, discovery
through vision, like the seeing of incorporeal entities by the ascetics [who
see] a variety of lights, is an extensive discussion for another occasion.
There are forms, phenomena and chants which are most sublime, and words that
are pleasant and sounds that are fearsome and hopeful that are issued forth to
the disciples. God said: ‘The days of their life are like the divine breath,’
and the prophet
has said, ‘He shelters us,
feeds us and takes our thirst away’ and also he said, ‘God established balance
between one’s shoulders like the drink one has between meals,’
A formal discovery of the
principles [of philosophy] is the manifestation of the divine name which hears
all, sees all, and understands all things. A spiritual discovery of the principles,
however, is the disclosure of the divine name. Hardship and ease are therefore
apparent and following the Muhammadean tradition is difficult and can only
become easy through love and inner yearning.
The difference of opinion
among the men of discovery and vision should not be regarded as an obstacle on
the path of those who seek knowledge and practical wisdom, since differences
exist everywhere. Are there not inconsistencies in the appearance of God’s
words and in the truth and in the appearance of the prophetic sayings as well
as the sayings of the Imams?
May he who wants the
attainment of knowledge and sciences be successful.”23
Another figure of great
significance in propagating Suhrawardi’s teaching is Muhammad Rida Qumsha’i. In
the tradition of Sabzi- wari and other great masters of this period, he taught
Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra and Ibn ‘Arabi. In fact, it was his attempt to
integrate ishraqi tradition with Ibn ‘Arabi’s gnosis and Mulla Sadra’s
metaphysics that made him one of the foremost authorities of Islamic
philosophy in this period.
Towards the end of the
Qajar period, Mulla ‘Abdallah Zunuzi and his son, Mulla ‘Ali Zunuzi, wrote
commentaries on Sabziwari. They and Mirza Mahdi Ashtiyani came to be known as the
most important proponents of ishraq and Mulla Sadra. ‘Ali Zunuzi is
particularly important, not only because of his important commentary upon Mulla
Sadra ’s works, in particular the Asfdr, but also because he represents
the first encounter of traditional Islamic philosophy with European philosophy
in Persia. Ali Zunuzi was asked by a Qajar prince to provide a reply to modern
European philosophy, in particular Immanuel Kant. His response, the book Baddyi’
al-hikam, earned him a special place within the Qajar period.
Mulla ‘Abdallah Zunuzi
wrote an important book on ishraqi philosophy entitled Lama‘dt-i
ildhiyyah which indicates how Suhra-
Influence on Suhrawardi on Islamic
Philosophy wardi’s and Mulla Sadra’s teachings influenced the philosophers of
the Qajar period.
There are many followers
of Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra and their philosophical orientation who
transmitted the wisdom of transcendental theosophy to the modern and
contemporary hakims during the Qajar period. Among the outstanding
figures of this period we can name Muhammad Isma‘il Isfahani, Mulla Muhammad
Ja‘far Langarudi, Mulla Isma’il Khaju’i, Mirza Mahdi Ashtiyani and Mirza Tahir
Tunkabuni. They constitute one intellectual trend among other movements which
also reacted to Sadrian and ishraqi schools, among which the Shaykhiyyah
movement is most conspicuous.
Initiated by Shaykh Ahmad
Ahsai (1153/1753), the Shaykhis are another continuation of the ideas of
Suhrawardi and Mulla Sadra during the Qajar period in Iran.24 The
Shaykhis, who seem more influenced by Mulla Sadra’s doctrine than they admit,
reject many of Suhrawardi’s ideas as presented by Mulla Sadra.
While the Shaykkhis adhere
to Suhrawardi’s view of the hierarchical structure of the universe, they reject
his ontology based on light. Despite this, they accept the existence of an
intermediary realm between the angels and human souls, which they describe as
the domain of pure light. The Shaykhi’s attempt to reconcile their ishraqi
views with the more traditional theological themes is perhaps the root of their
conflict with Suhrawardi’s ishraqi school. Whereas Suhrawardi envisaged
the grades of the existent entities as different intensities of light, the
Shaykhis argued that both the corporeal and the incorporeal world, the hurqalyd,
are real.25 Despite their disagreements, almost all the prominent
figures in this movement, such as Shaykh Kazim Rashti and Kirmani, were
influenced by the teachings of Suhrawardi and their reformulation by Mulla Sadra.
The golden age of
philosophical activity during the Safavid period and its continuation during
the Qajar period did not abruptly cease, as might be concluded from certain
circles of Western scholars of Islamic thought. This tradition is still very
much alive
and active to this day.
The philosophy of Suhrawardi and his chief expositor Mulla Sadra become so
fully integrated into the fabric of Persian intellectual thought that they
remain to this day the cornerstone of traditional philosophical teachings in
Iran.
In contemporary Iran, the
teaching of hikmat has continued and flourished. Among the greatest
masters of traditional teachings and ishraqi doctrine is ‘Allamah Sayyid
Husayn Tabataba’i, the author of al-Mizdn, and ‘All wa’l-hikmat
al-ildhiyyah, Nihdyal al-hikmat and Biddyat al-hikmah. He has written
numerous commentaries on Mulla Sadra and the ishraqi doctrine, including
a new edition of theAsfar. Other disciples of ishraqi tradition
are Sayyid Muhammad Kazim Assar, who has written a major work on transcendental
theosophy entitled Thaldth rasd’ilfi’l-hikmal al-isldmiyyah, and Abu’l
Hasan Rafi‘i Qazwini, who has been the main defender of Mulla Sadra’s school
during the past half century. Qazwini has trained a number of fine scholars,
such as Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, perhaps the most prolific writer in the
field of traditional philosophy in Iran today. He has written extensively on a
number of the commentators and authors of the ishraqi tradition.26
The list of contemporary scholars who have kept the fire of hikmat alive
is a long one.
Since the establishment of
universities in Iran in recent years, Islamic philosophy and hikmat
began to be taught outside of the traditional madrasahs for the first time.
This was further facilitated by the appearance of scholars who have not only
mastered the traditional teachings but also have become well acquainted with
Western modes of thought. Among these scholars are Mirza Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi and
Seyyed Hossein Nasr.
Ha’iri is a traditional
master of Islamic philosophy whose extensive experience with the West marks
one of the few examples of a serious encounter between traditional Islamic
philosophy and Western philosophical paradigms. Such an encounter is best represented
in his work entitled The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy:
Knowledge by Presence.'^
Seyyed Hossein Nasr is
another exponent of Suhrawardi’s philosophy who first edited the texts and
introduced the Persian writings of Suhrawardi to both the Persian world and
the West. His thorough familiarity with Western modes of thought as well as
traditional Islamic philosophy has enabled him to present the ishraqi
doctrine to the Western audience. Through his numerous writings and lectures,
he has established himself as the chief proponent of the ishraqi
doctrine in the West. Among his major works
in the English language
are An Introduction To Islamic Cosmological Doctrines and Sufi
Essays. His most important philosophical works include Knowledge and the
Sacred, Three Muslim Sages, Sadr al-Din Shirazi and His Transcendental
Theosophy, and Religion and the Order of Nature. 28
Besides Nasr’s major
contributions in spreading the traditional teachings of Suhrawardi, Mulla Sadra
and other Shi’ite gnostics, he has trained a number of fine scholars, such as
W. Chittick, the author and translator of many works on hikmah.
In India, Suhrawardi’s The
Philosophy of Illumination was translated into Sanskrit and welcomed
especially by the Zoroastrian community there. Besides the hakims and
learned individuals who traveled to India, the keen interest of Sultan Muhammad
ibn Tughlug (725/1325) in philosophical and intellectual discussions helped to
spread the school of ishraq. The Sultan, who had allocated large sums of
money for the building of a library, was particularly interested in the works
of Ibn Sina. Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi maintains in his book A
Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnd ‘AshariShiism in Indict that most
likely the works of Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi and Qutb al-Din Shirazi were
amongst the ishraqi texts that had been taken to India by the followers
of Suhrawardi. If Durrat al-Taj, the central work of Shirazi, were
available in India as Rizvi indicates,30 then it is likely that
other ishraqi works may have been available as well. Therefore, it
appears that the ideas of Suhrawardi may have been discussed amongst the
intellectual circles of India through the existing commentaries on the ishraqi
doctrine.
Another example of the
spread of Suhrawardi’s ideas can be seen in the fact that several theological
centers were established by Sand Nizam al-Din in the early fifteenth century.
His interest in these matters made the prominent ishraqi scholar, Jalal
al-Din Dawani, consider moving to the area. However, Dawani died while he was
waiting for two of his students who had gone to the area for further
investigation. Dawani, a famous commentator of Suhrawardi, wrote Lawdmi'
al-ishrdq Ji makarim al-ikhldq, and Shawdkil al-nur Ji sharh-i hayakil
al-nur, the latter is a commentary upon Suhrawardi’s Hayakil al-nur.
Although Dawani did not go to India, many of his students did. Such figures as
Mir Mu’in, Mir Shams
al-Din, and in particular
Abu’l-Fadl Kaziruni continued on the path of their teacher by propagating the
transcendental theosophy of Suhrawardi. Suhrawardi’s school continued to
flourish in India, and with the rise of Akbar to power, the spread of ishraqi
ideas reached its climax. Akbar’s enthusiasm and tolerance for new ideas
and religions provided the kind of ambience that the hakims needed to
freely teach the ishraqi doctrine, which had found a new home in the
rich spiritual landscape of Indian culture. It was for this reason that a large
number of hakims moved from Iran to India, where they settled in
numerous intellectual centers. Bada’uni, in his book, Muntakhab al-tawdrikh,
offers an account of some of these masters. There he says:
Some of the physicians in
this region were so learned in the theory and skilled in the practice of
medicine that they performed miracles like those of Moses and brought to mind
the miraculous breath of the Lord Jesus.31
Among the most notable
masters of the ishraqi school in this period were: Khatib Abu’l-Fadl
Kaziruni, who settled in Ahmad Abad, Shaykh Mubarak Nagori and his son Shaykh
Fadi, and finally Bada’uni himself. The tradition of hikmathas continued
to flourish in India up to the contemporary period, even in the most orthodox
centers.32 In fact, it was the result of the influx of so many hakims
that many works were written on Suhrawardi, the best example of which is the
commentary of Ahmad ibn al-Harawi, Anwdriyyah.3* This
commentary, which is a classical work on Suhrawardi written in Persian,
provides an overall account of Suhrawardi’s The Philosophy of Illumination.
Harawi, who lived in the 11/17 century in India,34 made use of other
commentaries such as those of Qutb al-Din al Shirazi and Shahrazuri, which
indicates that these commentaries must have been available in India at the time
through the followers of Suhrawardi.
Suhrawardi’s influence in
India went beyond the circle of ishraqi figures to become a profound
influence on the Sufi tradition of the Chisti order. There are a number of
other mystical schools that were influenced by Suhrawardi, such as the
“Khayrabadi” school with its strong logico-philosophical tendency. Also, such
grand masters as Shah Waliallah and Shaykh Ahmad Sirhindi and their mystical
schools came to be influenced by the illuminationist ideas of Suhrawardi,
although the link with Suhrawardi requires further exploration.
The intellectual scene of
Indian culture came to know of Suhrawardi in two separate periods. The first
was in the first two centuries after Suhrawardi’s death, as has been discussed.
The second encounter of India with the illuminationist ideas of Suhrawardi was
through the sages of the Safavid period, who belong to the school of Isfahan.
During this period many of
the great masters of the ishraqi tradition traveled to India. Some of
them who wrote important works on Suhrawardi and the doctrine of illumination
include Qadi Nurallah Shustari, who authored two major books on the philosophy
of illumination, Majdlis al-mu’minin and Ihqdq al-haqq, and
Muhammad Dihdar Shirazi, the author of Ishrdq al -nayyirayn. In addition,
there were such notable scholars as Mir Findiriski and Baha’ al-Din Isfahan!,
also known as Fadil-i Hindi, who not only taught the Peripatetic philosophy,
especially the Shifd’, but also knew the works of other commentators on
the ishraqi tradition. Gradually, the teachings of Mulla Sadra and his
teacher, Mir Damad, became extremely popular, even overshadowing the works of
Suhrawardi. For instance, Mulla Sadra’s book, Shark al-hiddyah, became
an official text in the traditional school (madrasahs) J*
The school of ishraq
and the texts that deal with the illuminationist doctrine are being taught
even today in the traditional centers of learning in the Indo-Pakistani
sub-continent. Outside of Iran, the sub-continent is the only region that is to
this day receptive to the teachings of Suhrawardi.
C.
SUHRAWARDI IN SYRIA AND
ANATOLIA
The existence of large
numbers of ishraqi manuscripts in Turkish libraries is an indication
that Suhrawardi was studied by Turkish scholars. In fact, the Turkish libraries
contain such an abundance of ishraqi texts of Ibn ‘Arabi and others that
such notable scholars as A.M. Schimmel and H. Corbin spent a number of years in
Turkey to complete their research on Muslim gnostics and other ishraqi
figures.
As far as the spread of
Suhrawardi’s ideas in Syria is concerned, his presence there and his numerous
students and companions in Syria may have been instrumental in the spreading of
his ideas. Suhrawardi does not mention the names of these associates but alludes
to them as those who repeatedly requested of him to write various treatises, in
particular The Philosophy of Illumination.™ In fact, towards the end of
this book he leaves a will asking his circle of friends to safeguard its
content.37 This
indicates the existence of a circle of ishraqis who benefited from the
esoteric teachings of Suhrawardi. It is reasonable to assume that they must
have continued his work after Suhrawardi’s death. One figure who may have been
among his associates was Shahrazuri. Although the date of his life makes it
possible that he might have known Suhrawardi himself, it is likely that he was
a disciple of one of Suhrawardi’s students.38 It is certain that
Shahrazuri’s commentary on The Philosophy of Illumination and the al-Talwihat
(680/1281) were among the texts circulating within the group of ishraqis
in Syria.
The discussions and
debates of Suhrawardi with the learned men of his time in Syria, the bulk of
his writing having been completed in Syria, and his circle of friends provide
reasonable grounds to conclude that his ideas may have been studied by the
intellectual community in Syria even though they were suppressed for political
reasons.
For uncertain reasons
Suhrawardi’s works were not translated into Latin and therefore his philosophy
remained unknown to the West. One could postulate three reasons as to why his
works were not translated. The first has to do with the existing philosophical
paradigm of the period, which was more Ibn Sinian in nature. Therefore, the
rationalistic philosophy dominant in the Western world created an intellectual
ambience that was not receptive to Suhrawardi’s ideas. The second reason could
have been that the great age of translation in Spain and the creative momentum
that existed in southern Spain had come to an end. Since the translation
houses (Dar al-tarjumah) were no longer productive, Suhrawardi did not
receive the attention that he deserved. In my opinion, the third reason could
have been Suhrawardi’s affiliation with Saladin’s son Malik Zahir. Although
Suhrawardi was not favored by the Saladin, he nevertheless may have been viewed
by the Christian West as a court philosopher at a time when Muslims and
Christians were involved in the Crusades. For this reason his works may have
been set aside and gradually forgotten, except by a group of close friends or
initiates.
S.H. Nasr attributes the lack of
interest by the West in teachings of Suhrawardi to a more fundamental problem,
the philosophical and geographical departure of the East and the West.
The West, which had been
in many ways an ‘orient’ in the ishrdqi sense of the term and had passed
a traditional civilization which . . . resembled the great oriental
civilizations, was now becoming an Occident, not only geographically but also
in the ishrdqi sense of concerning itself with the domain of
rationalization.’9
Despite the existing
intellectual currents which continued on their analytical and rationalistic
path, Suhrawardi may have influenced certain intellectual strands in the West.
S.H. Nasr argues further that one of the intellectual circles that might have
been influenced by Suhrawardi was the thirteenth century Oxford school of Roger
Bacon and Robert Grossteste. While both of these figures were proponents of an
empirical method of observation, their experiments were such that they were
not necessarily inconsistent with a gnostic interpretation of nature. In fact,
Nasr draws a parallel between the Oxford school of the thirteenth century and
Qutb al-Din Shirazi, the celebrated Muslim scientist and commentator of
Suhrawardi, who had also continued an empirical method. Bacon and Grossteste
used the kind of experimental method that considers the observation of nature
to be a necessary part of illumination. “Bacon wore the dress of the ishraqis
and lectured upon them.”40
It is, however, even more
likely that Suhrawardi had influenced certain intellectual circles in Spain
where the intellectual milieu might have been more receptive to his ideas. For
example, it is likely that Jewish Kabbalists who came to know of The
Philosophy of Illumination may have taken this text to southern Spain
where it was discussed among the Jewish mystics. It was this very text, some
have argued,41 that may have played an important role in the further
development of Jewish illuminationists, thereby attracting attention to people
who wrote extensively on illumination. Another indication that Suhrawardi’s
ideas did indeed travel into Spain is that Ibn Sab'in (7/13) of Spain, who
lived in Morocco, alludes to the al-Talwihdt of Suhrawardi in his book al-Risdlat
al-faqiriyyah. Although it is difficult to establish whether he came to
know of Suhrawardi while he was in Spain or in Morocco, it does demonstrate the
large geographical span reached by Suhrawardi’s ideas.
While illuminationist
movements have emerged from time to time, it is difficult to establish a
definite relationship between them and Suhrawardi’s school. Such movements as
the “Illuminated of
Bavaria,” founded by Adam
Weishaput, which was opposed to a religious hierarchy, or the ideas of
Schelling and Franz Van Baader, were not able to revive the illuminationist
movement in its authentic and traditional sense.
In the contemporary
Western world, the works of Henry Corbin have created a great deal of interest
in Suhrawardi’s school of illumination. Corbin’s early training was in Western
philosophy with a focus on medieval ontology, and his interest in Islamic
philosophy began with Ibn Sina. The focal point of his scholarship, however,
was the ishraqi tradition and the wisdom of ancient Persia. In the words
of S.H. Nasr, “Corbin has without doubt done more than anyone else, outside and
even inside Persia to revive the teachings of Suhrawardi.”42
Like many other teachers
of traditional wisdom, Corbin has contributed to the body of Islamic sciences
not only through his own writings but by training a number of fine scholars.
The following figures were either trained by him directly or influenced by his
writings: G. Berger and J. Danielou, G. Durand and A. Faivre, who belong to the
younger generation of the scholars in France. Also, the well known Jewish
scholar G. Scholem and biologist A. Portmann are among the important figures
who came under his influence.
In particular, Corbin’s
exposition of “oriental ontology”, in particular that of Suhrawardi, stimulated
much interest among the philosophical movement in France known as the “young
philosophers.” The main figure in this movement is Christian Jambet, who took
interest in the oriental philosophy of Suhrawardi with emphasis on “oriental
logic.”43
Finally, Corbin’s
influence in the Arab world, in particular the former French colonies, is
significant A number of Arab scholars were directly influenced by Corbin’s
writings, such as M. Arkhoun, the Algerian Islamicist The ishraqi school
of Suhrawardi, which contained both mystical and rationalistic concepts was
well received by both the Eastern and Western regions of the Islamic world. The
well established mystical traditions of the Indo-Pakistani sub-continent felt
at home with Suhrawardi’s esoteric doctrines. Persia and North Africa, centers
of rationalistic philosophy, were equally receptive to these elements of
Suhrawardi’s philosophy of illumination.
Notes
For more information on
the influence of Sufism and the esoteric doctrine of illumination on Shi‘ite
Islam see S. H. Nasr, “The Relationship between Suhrawardi and Philosophy in
Persian Culture,” Hamdard Islamicus 6, no. 4 (Winter 1983): 33-47.
For a more complete
discussion on Abhari, see H. Corbin, Prolegomena to Opera 1,21, note
29.
S.H. Nasr, “The Spread of
the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardi,” Islamic Quarterly 14
(July-September 1970): 113.
Ibid., 114.
S.H. Nasr, “Spiritual
Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safavid Period,” in 'I'he
Cambridge History of Iran, ed. P. Jackson, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1968- 1991), 67 2.
For more information on
this see: Muntakhabdt-i az dthdr-i hukamd-yi ildhi-yi Iran, ed. S. J.
Ashtiyani (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy) 3-61.
Mir Damad, Qabasdt,
(Tehran: Tehran University Press, 1367 A.H.s.), 2-4.
Muntakhabdt-i az dthdr-i
hukamd-yi ildhi-yi, Iran, ed. S. J. Ashtiyani, 9.
footnote no.l.
For more information on
Mir Damad’s view of the relationship between time and existence see: Ibid.,
40ff.
For more information on
Tabrizi and his students see, I-ahijani, Sharh-i risdlat, with an
introduction byj. Huma’i and S. J. Ashtiyani. Nasr, “Spiritual Movements,” 689.
Ibid., 681.
For more information on
Mulla Sadra’s concept of wujud and mdhiyyahsee: Muntakhabdti az
dthdr-i..., 99.ff; and S.J. Ashtiyani, Hasti az nazar-i falsa/ah wa
‘irfdn, 63-95.
Ashtiyani’s work, Hasti
az nazar-i falsafdh wa irfdn, provides an excellent exposition of the two
rival schools of Mulla Sadra and Suhrawardi by a traditional master. This work
is particularly interesting because there Ashtiyani provides different
interpretations of asdlat al-mdhiyyah and asdlat al-wujud.
Ibid , 67.
For more information on
Mulla Sadra’s criticism of Suhrawardi see his Sharh-i hikmat al-ishraq,
210.
Sabziwari in his poems has
stated some of the most profound philosophical issues in the traditional
symbolic language of Persian poetry. Most of his poems are ghazal and
the style is often that of mathnawi. For more information see:
Sabziwari, Diwdn-i ash'dr (Isfahan: Saqafi press, 1959).
Sabziwari, Ta'liqdt
Shark al-manzumah, Nasiri Edition (Tehran: Tehran University Press), 7.
Sabziwari’s commentary
upon the Asfdr does not include the sections on “essence and accident.”
Muntakhabdt-i az dthdr-i
hukamd-yi ildhi-yi Iran, p. 14.
Mirza Razavi was a learned
scholar and a contemporary of Sabziwari
who asked Sabziwari seven
questions known as the “Ajwibah masd’il Mirza Abu’l-Hasan Razavi.” For
more information see: Sabziwari, Yddhud-i sadumin sdl-i hakim (Mashhad
University: 1969), 35ff.
22 The word here is “Kashf
wa shuhud,” literally meaning “discovery and witnessing.” This is another
term that is often used to allude to the concept of “knowledge by presence.”
23 Sabziwari, Yddbud-i sadumin
sdl-i, 45^49.
24 For a more complete discussion on Shaykhi doctrine and their
differences from Suhrawardi, see H. Corbin, L’Ecole shaikhie en theologie
Shi'ite (Tehran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy, 1957).
25 Mangol Bayat, Mysticism and Dissent (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 1982), 44-45.
26 Ashtiyani has written numerous commentaries on Mulla Sadra
and Suhrawardi, including an anthology on the great hakims of the last
four centuries. His collaboration with H. Corbin and S. H. Nasr has produced a
number of texts on the traditional masters of Islamic philosophy.
27 The Principles of Epistemology in Islamic Philosophy is
a comparative work on epistemology in which M. Ha’iri demonstrates the
inadequacies of the existing epistemological theories.
28 For more information on S. H. Nasr’s bibliography see: M.
Aminrazavi and Z. Moris, The Works of Seyyed Hossein Nasr From 1958 Through
April 1993, (Malaysia, Islamic Academy of Science, 1994).
29 See also Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, A Socio-Intellectual
History of the Isnd ‘Ashari Shi'is in India, (Australia: Ma’rifat Pub.,
1986).
30 Ibid., 180.
31 Translated into English by H. Lowe.
32 For a more complete discussion on the history of hikmat
in India see: Rizvi, Isnd Ashari Shi’ism in India; and Bada’uni, Muntakhab
al-tawdrikh, vol.l, ed. George Ranking (Karachi: Karimsons, 1976-1978),
323-25.
33 H. Zia’i, who has edited this book, has also written a
valuable introduction to Anwdriyyah. There he argues that this work is
less significant than Shirazi and Shahrazuri’s commentary. Zia’i maintains
that the significance of Anwdriyyah is because Harawi has compared the
Indian traditions of wisdom with the ishraqi doctrine.
34 Ibid., 15.
35 The influence of Mulla Sadra is still present in India and
his works, especially the Asfdr, are being taught in many traditional madrasahs.
Suhrawardi’s influence, however, is strong among the Zoroastrian community.
This is because the ishraqi ideas were spread in India by the mysterious
12th century Zoroastrian priest, Azar Kaywan, who had gone to India from Iran.
36 Suhrawardi, Opera 2, 258-259.
37 Ibid.
38
For more information on
Shahrazuri see: M. Mo’in, Ta'liqdt-i chahdr maqdlah, Lyton Press, 211
and M. Mo’in “Hikmat ishraqi wa farhang-i Iran,” in Majmua'-yi maqdldl,
vol.l, 436, and in Kashf al-zunun, vol.l, 913. '
39 S. H. Nasr, “The Spread of the Illuminationist School of
Suhrawardi,” Islamic Quarterly 14, no. 1 (1970): 118.
40 Ibid., 119.
41 For more information on the presence of ishraqi ideas
in Aleppo and its influence on the development ofjewish illuminationist thought
see the work by Maimonides’ great-great grandson which is translated and
commented by Paul Fenton in Deux Trailes de mystique juive, (Paris:
1987).
42 S.H. Nasr ed., Jashn ndmah-yi Henry Corbin, (Tehran:
Imperial Academy of Philosophy, 1977), 100.
43 For more information on the influence of Corbin on the young
philosophers see the introduction that Christian Jambet has written to Corbin’s
introduction of the hikmat al-ishrdq.
6
Before concluding this work,
it is necessary to respond to the criticism of some scholars who have regarded
Suhrawardi’s works as having been strongly influenced by nationalistic
sentiments. They have gone so far as to accuse him of belonging to the
Shu'ubiyyah,1 a Persian nationalistic movement of the third century
A.H. This intellectual movement was led by a group of Persian poets,
philosophers, literary figures and scientists reacting to the Arab oppression
of Persians and their sophisticated cultural sensitivities during the Abbasid
dynasty. Later referred to as the Shu'ubiyyah, this movement intended to
confront Arab supremacy with the revival of the pre-Islamic Persian culture and
religious values. It has been argued that Suhrawardi’s ishraqi school
represents this stream of Persian nationalism for which it provided the
philosophical framework. It is true that there are those who accuse the Arabs
of inability to fully appreciate speculative thought such as we find in the al-Baydn
wa’l-tabyin2 of Jahiz or Sa'd ibn Ahmad, who in his book Tabaqdt
al-umam' argues that philosophical thinking has never been appreciated
among the Arabs. The most scathing attack comes from Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn 'Ali
Maqrizi, who wrote in his al-Khatat* that while Arabs might be capable
of appreciating philosophical discourse, their genius lies in other domains.
This view, which tends to
attribute a relative absence of philosophical tradition among the Arabs
compared to the Persians, is rejected by Ibn Khaldun who attributes the
interest or disinterest of a society in philosophical issues to its
socio-political and geographical location. There are also those Persians who
have defended the philosophical and cultural acumen of the Arabs. For instance,
Shahrastani, the celebrated rationalist, says in his book
Concluding Remarks
al-Milal wa 'l-nihal,5
that in fact, the Arabs possess a type of wisdom that is far superior to that
of other nations. This type of wisdom manifests itself in numerous narratives,
expressions, hyperbolic and metaphorical statements.
The unfortunate fact
remains that despite Suhrawardi’s praise for the other traditions of wisdom
which we have reviewed earlier in this work, he has been accused of being a
nationalist even by such famous scholars as Muhammad ‘Ali Abu Rayyan, who
states in his Tdrikh al-fikr al-falsafi ji’l-Islam that Suhrawardi has
been one of the Shu’ubiyyah.6
To accuse Suhrawardi of
nationalism is to misunderstand him completely. The school of illumination
which he advocated argues for the universality of truth to which everyone has
equal access, provided they are willing to undergo the process of purification
and illumination. Suhrawardi would argue that truth is not an exclusive
property of Persians, nor of anyone else, and to argue as such is contrary to
the spirit of the ishraqi school. In fact, Suhrawardi argues that hikmat
originated from Hermes and through Egypt came to Persia where it became united
with the other branch of wisdom of Persian origin. Suhrawardi’s use of Zoroastrian
symbolism, as well as the symbolism of other traditions, was intended to
demonstrate how all these traditions adhere to the same underlying reality.
Suhrawardi could have
argued for his philosophy of illumination within the context of Islam alone,
and for that matter Zoroastrian tradition only, but he chose to include other
traditions precisely to demonstrate the ecumenical and transhistorical nature
of ishraqi wisdom. This, plus the fact that Suhrawardi wrote most of his
treatises in Arabic, demonstrates that such objections are invalid and stem
from a misunderstanding of Suhrawardi’s philosophy.
* * *
It is difficult to write a
conclusion that does justice to the vast corpus of philosophical concepts,
theological arguments, mystical assertions and the profoundly esoteric and yet
rationally justifiable philosophical school of Suhrawardi. Rarely has such a
vast domain of ideas and concepts been synthesized into a philosophical
paradigm.
Suhrawardi first discusses
intricacies of the spiritual path in numerous mystical narratives in which he
uses traditional Sufi symbolism as well as his own metaphors. His message is
not an
exclusive theory of truth
accessible only to the followers of one path or tradition, but proposes to
describe that fountain of life whose origin lies within the realm of divine
sapience and runs through various civilizations to benefit all those who thirst
for wisdom. Suhrawardi’s vast synthesis of philosophy and science, myth and
ritual, as well as esoteric teachings and his integration of Hermeticism,
Pythagorianism and Zoroastrianism has indeed brought about a unified theory of
knowledge which has come to be known as the school of illumination. For these
reasons, Suhrawardi’s writings should be studied by students of comparative
philosophy and religion. Not only does Suhrawardi’s ontology provide ingenious
and original insights for the analysis of the traditional problems of
philosophy, but his mystical narratives offer a symbolic and profound view of
human nature.
Suhrawardi showed how the
wisdom of illumination includes discursive reasoning and asceticism but is not
limited to them. He is distinguished from the Muslim thinkers who came before
him by his synthesis of philosophy and mysticism, whose integration he considers
provides the human condition for the attainment of truth.
Concluding Remarks
Notes
1
Shu'ubiyyah was a 3/9
movement among Persian intellectuals, poets and artists who opposed the
domination of Persians by Arabs. This nationalisitc movement made an attempt to
revive Persian language, culture and Zoroastrian religion, which were
identified with the golden era of the Persian empire.
2
Jahiz, Al-Baydn
wa’l-tabyin, Cairo, 1984.
3
Sa'id ibn Ahmad, Tabaqat
al-umam, Beirut: Dar al-Ma‘arifah, 1912.
4
Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn ‘Ali
Maqrizi, al-Khatdt (N.P.).
5
Shahrastani, al-Milal
wa'l-nihal, Beirut: Daral-Ma'rifah Press, 1990, 253. ’
6
Muhammad ‘Ali Abu Rayyan, Tdrikh
al-Jikr al-falsaji Ji-Islam (N.P.), 18.
7
APPENDIX
This is the translation1
of a treatise called Sharh-i dwdz-ipar-iJibrd’il (A Commentary Upon
the Chant of Gabriel’s Wing).2 The commentary was written in
Persian by an unknown author of Persian origin who lived in India in the 14th
century.’ The text was written by the philosopher-mystic, Suhrawardi, in the
12th century and discusses metaphorically some of the medieval philosophical
themes such as the hierarchy of the intellects and its relationship with
angels, the problem of emanation of multiplicity from unity, form and matter,
and finally the relationship between philosophy and the spiritual path.
The present translation is
significant because it presents an example of Suhrawardi’s writings, in
particular one of his most esoteric treatises. This treatise also provides us
with an insight into the medieval cosmology, ontology and the
macrocosm-microcosm correspondance upon which Suhrawardi so extensively
elaborates. Second, the commentary of the author is important since it decodes
some of the esoteric symbols and brings out the intricacies and the more hidden
and unfamiliar symbols of this work. Thirdly, this commentary is important from
a historical point of view not only because it represents a 7/13 text but it
also indicates that as early as the 7/13, only two centuries after Suhrawardi’s
death, his works had traveled from Syria to India. This is an indication that
Suhrawardi must have had followers who propagated his philosophy after his
death and that his thoughts were well received by the intellectual communities
of the lands in between. This may also explain the presence of so many ishraqi
texts in the libraries of India, in particular in Petna.4
Appendix
TRANSLATION
Commentator: Once5
I was studying the treatise “The Chant of Gabriel's Wing,” which
is one of the Treatises of the learned discoverer, Shahab al-Din, the martyr;
peace be upon him. There are numerous mysteries and signs therein that not
everyone can undersand. [Since] those problems were solved for me, I wanted to
write a commentary so everyone may understand. May God help me.
Suhrawardi: I once
flew from the women’s court, and freed myself from some of the bondages of the
childhood court.
Commentary: I
became detached from impurities6 of the world of forms implies a
father-son relationship with this world, because this is a place of pleasure
and natural desires. When he said, “I freed myself from some of the bondages of
childhood,” he is referring to the external senses. By saying “some of”, he
refers to the internal senses since the internal senses are the means of
understanding and recollecting the universals through the particulars.
S:
One night darkness had
settled in sky and a darkness that had held the hand of the brother of
non-existence had been scattered around the lower world.
C:
The non-existence (‘adam)
and annihilation (Jana) of the sensible world can be understood by the
inner eye. Disappointment came after engagement since absence of engagement
is associated with night.
S: After sleep came upon
me, disappointment resulted.
D:
I became disillusioned
with sense perception in that being asleep is indeed being drowned in the
material attachments. Once awakened from that sleep, they [the senses] become
conscious of the incorporeal world, discover the unseen and master the true reality.
As Imam Ali, God’s grace be upon him, said: “People die so they may ascend.”7
Therefore, consciousness of the incorporeal world is contingent upon dying from
the world of form. The master of the worlds [Muhammad], peace be upon him, in a
famous hadith has said, “Die a true death before you die a natural
death.”8
If thou die before thy
natural death.
Be content that the
eternal heaven is yours.
S:
I was holding a candle.
C:
The candle is the
intellect which is the guide and the master of mankind. [It is] the light of
guidance that takes man from the depth of subsistence to the height of
prosperity as is indicated in various verses of the Quran, hadith and
the sayings of Imam ‘Ali that for the sake of briefness I have not mentioned.
S:
I aimed towards the man’s
abode and searched until dusk.
C:
Once I freed myself from
the abode of women, which signifies worldly attachments, I then aimed at the
mens court which alludes to the incorporeal and the angelic world.9
It is here that the path towards the incorporeal world begins, since the rising
of the morning sun requires divine grace and so is shining of the incorporeal
light.
S:
The yearning to enter into
the khdnaqdh (Sufi house) of father prevailed.
C:
In this khdnaqdh he
looks for his “self” and father as the existential cause of his being, which is
the intellect. After this search [he wants] to refer to the father as the cause
of his existence. Through entering the khdnaqah, he seeks esoteric
knowledge and contemplates his own ego (nafs).
S:
The khdnaqah has
two doors, one to the city and the other one to the desert. I went and closed
the door that opens to the city and then aimed at the door to the desert.
C:
These are the gates of
soul and body, just as truth has two doors: one door in the corporeal world and
the other one in the incorporeal world. The door that opens to the city
represents the world of objects and that which opens to the desert belongs to
the world of spirit. When it is said, “I closed the door that opens to the city
and went towards the desert,” he means he left the sensible world and turned to
the spiritual world.
S:
Once I looked, I saw ten
old masters of sublime beauty sitting in the courtyard.
C:
These ten old masters are
the ten intellects that are incorporeal substances and free from the
impurities of matter. The angels who are the companions of God and
intermediaries between the Necessary Being and the human souls were disclosed
to me.
S:
Their charisma and
greatness puzzled me and a sense of wonder came upon me such that I became
speechless.
C:
They were epitome of
beauty and their potential perfection had actualized. By the extent of their
charisma and beauty, I was perplexed.
S:
With great fear I put my
foot forward and went away.
C: I
was not worthy yet to unite and converse with them due to the material
attachments that remained a veil between us.
S: I
intended to greet one master who was in the corner. Due to the humility of his
character, he greeted me first and smiled at me such that his wisdom tooth
appeared.
C: The
old master in the corner is the “Active Intellect” and he is in the corner is
because his existence and status comes at the end of all other intellects and
he is called the “Final Intellect.”10 It is he who casts form unto
the elements and is an intermediary between the Necessary Being and the human
souls and in religion is called the “spirit of God” (Ruh al-qudus)or
“Gabriel.” His smile alludes to the discovery of knowledge, and the benefit
that one derives from this knowledge is in accordance to one’s talent.
S: I
asked: “Tell me, where did the noble men come from?” The old master in the
corner answered, “We are a group of incorporeal beings who have come from ‘the
nowhere but prosperous land’ (Ndkojd-dbdd}"
C: They
have proved their detachment from spaitiality since needing that is an
attribute of objects and they are pure spirits, free from substances and
heavenly elements. Therefore, “placeless” to which they have alluded, is an
attribute or an accident and a category among the ten categories.11
On “relation”, it is said that this is an attribute of things because of its
relationship with place.
S: I
did not comprehend it and asked, “To which place does this city belong?” He
said, “The place to which the index finger cannot point.”
C: That
which can be demonstrated by the index finger has a point of reference which
then must be an object, and as we said they are incorporeal.
S: Thus
it became known to me that the old master knows.
C: I
came to know of their wisdom through [their knowledge of] the substance of the
world.
S: I
said “For God’s sake, tell me how you spend your time?” He said, “Know that we
are tailors and guardians of divine words and that we travel.”
C: Through
“tailoring,” he wants to demonstrate how substances [are imposed] unto forms.
It is in accordance with the potentialities of these substances [that they]
clothe them as a shirt covers(the body) and the efficient cause is he [the
active intellect]. It is this tailoring that brings order to the chain of
beings, each one in accordance with its state. Through preserving God’s word,
Suhrawardi and the School of
Illumination sciences and knowledge are emanated from the Necessary Being. It
is through wondering that they [intellects] want to spread their grace to all
beings.
S: I
asked, “Why are those elders who are sitting on that high place, silent?” He
replied, “So people like you cannot mingle with them.” “I am their tongue,”
means your intellect is not worthy to be united with theirs. When he said “I am
their tongue,” he means through my mediation grace is bestowed upon you in
accordance with your capacity.
S: I
then saw an eleven-layered pot thrown into the desert with some water in it and
in the water were some pebbles around which there were a few animals.
C: By
the eleven layered pot, he alludes to the world, which has nine heavens and two
elements, air and fire, and both are limited by the heavens in as much as they
demand the water element. Some pebbles [refers to] the center of the earth and
the four elements. He did not say a thirteen layered pot so the substance of
water and the center of earth are not within that which limits them completely.
And he refers to these eleven layers due to their sphericity, continuity and dominance.
When he said a few animals were crawling around the pebbles, he meant the
animal species which have a multiplicity of genuses over them such as man, etc.
In every genus, there is a multiplicity of types such as Romans, Sudanese, etc.
Every type consists of a multiplicity of individuals such as Zayd, Bakr, etc.
who reside in the four comers of the earth.
S: On
each level of this eleven-layered pot from the upper nine layers, a glowing
ball is implanted in them except the second one in which there were many balls,
luminous as the path of the Sufis. The first level had no glowing ball.
C: On
each of the nine heavens there was implanted a glowing pearl except for the
eighth heaven, in which there were many pearls implanted,12 and the
ninth heaven was devoid of pearls, meaning the supreme heaven. The reason they
call it the first and second heaven is because it requires the eighth and ninth
heaven which is the zodiac. The supreme heaven, whose understanding comes
through the inner eye, is dominant over heavenly bodies. That which is the
ninth heaven for us is his [the old master] first one, etc.
S: Despite this, the
entity was more sphere-shaped than any sphere and on its surface there was no
crack or hole.
C: The
heavenly spheres were absolutely round and a straight line could not have been
[drawn] between them.
S: Those eleven levels
were colorless and due to their extreme fineness, what was in them could not be
veiled.
C: They
were colorless so their concave surface could be distinguished from convex in
that there are impurities in the concavity that prohibits vision from
occurring. We see all these heavens through the first heaven while they shine
from the eighth heaven that is zodiac. Therefore, it became apparent that the
absence of a veil among heavens is due to the fineness that exists in their
substance, that is their luminosity and colorlessness.
S: The upper nine
[heavens] should not be pierced and the two layers below should be peeled with
ease.
C: When
he said the nine should not be punched he wants no harm or damage inflicted
upon the heavens. The learned men have concrete reasons for why the nature of
heavenly bodies are irreparable and this short work is inadequate for this
discussion. When he says “The levels below are easily worthy to being torn” he
alludes to the coming together of the spheres of fire and air, for when can
softness accept divisibility?
S: I asked the Master,
“What is this entity?” He replied, “In the first one, whose mass is more
intense than other levels, the grand Master who is sitting above all has given
his order and on the second one, the second master and so on until it reaches
me. These companions and nine friends have done this due to their will to
create. The following two levels below (that contain) water and a piece of sand
are my creation.
C: Know
that the higher the level, the more superior [its corresponding] heaven is and
the master above this is the first intellect, whose effect is the supreme
heaven. The second level is emanated by the second intellect and so on.
Therefore, from this it became apparent that these nine heavens are emanated by
nine intellects and the lower heaven with water and sand is caused by the
active intellect.
Treatment (tanbih):
Know that the hakims have said that pure intellect existed in the
beginning and emanated from the Necessary Being and had three characteristics:
First, that its essence was its substance, second, that it was a Necessary
Being from a causal point of view, third, it is a contingent being from the
point of view of its nature. Therefore, due to the principality of its
substance, the first intellect came to be that which is called “universal
intellect.”
Due to its existence,
which is caused, the second intellect came to be and from the point of its
possibility that is due to its essence, the first heaven came to be which they
call “grand heaven”, “determinator of direction”, “universal body”, “sphere of
Atlas”, “mean longtitude”, “nobel throne”.
From the second intellect
a third intellect and soul and heaven appeared and so on until it reached the
last intellect. So, every intellect is the cause of three events, another
intellect, soul and heaven which belongs to it except the “active intellect”
which is the cause of the four elements which are the instruments of [the
coming into existence] of the created order and corruptions.
S: Since
their willpower is superior, their creation can not be destroyed, however, that
which is my creation can be damaged.
C: The
rotation of the heavens is due to their inner yearing such as the substance of
the elements which is explained elsewhere.
S: I asked,
“How are these masters related to you?” He said, “Know that the master whose
prayer rug is on the top, is the master of the second one who is sitting next
to him. The same with the second, third and fourth until myself. The ninth
master has initiated me, given me the khirqah'* and has taught me.
C: The
master who is on the top is the “first intellect,” and by referring to the
second master as the teacher, he is referring to the existential cause of the
second intellect and so on until it reaches the active intellect. And the one
who said the ninth master initiated him is saying that the master is the
existential cause of his presence.14
S: I asked,
“Do you have children, property and so on?” He said, “We do not have wives but
each of us has a child and a mill and we assigned each child to one mill so he
may look after it.
C: Absence
of wives is separation from matter, children are heavenly souls and the mill is
the ninth heaven and the four substances. Stating that each child was assigned
to a mill means each soul was placed in a heavenly body that is exclusive to
it.
S: Until
we build mills, we never looked at them.
C: The
reason for not looking at them is their incorporeal nature.
S: Each
of our children is working at a mill or a building. Each sees the mill with one
eye and sees the father with another.
C: Meaning
that each one influences his own work and due to their [desire] for subsistence
they are the cause of themselves and this is in accord with science and their
quiddity is influential in the
rotation of the heavens.
This is the reason its relation to ego (nafs)15 is like that
of a son to a father in that intellect is the cause of the existence of the ego
since its existence is contingent upon the existence of the intellect and not
vice versa. As in a father, also it is the case that the existence of one is
contingent upon the existence of the other one and not the reverse. In a father
and son it is refelected that [the term] father can be said only when there is
a son and son can only be if there is a father.
S: My mill has four levels
and my children are many and although they may be intelligent they cannot be
counted.
C: The
four levels are referred to as the four substances16 which are
emanated from the “active Intellect.” Various children represent the material
forms that seek to overcome the substances through the generation and the
corruption that uncovers one appearance and clothes another. There are many
things such as air that disown their own appearances and accept the form of
fire and vice versa or water that disowns its own form and accepts the form of
air. These various faces of appearance are beyond any limit.
S: Whenever I have a child
I send him to my mill and each one is given a period to be in charge of the
place. Once they serve their time, they come to me and do not leave me and the
new children that are attained go there.
C: These
children are the appearances that are to be imposed upon the substances of the
world. Limited time means the duration that these appearances remain [imposed]
unto the substances. The appearance of each form of a substance from [existing]
substances and its duration upon matter is determined in that its subsistence
depends on its elevation beyond obstacles and the sum of its conditions. When
the necessary condition disappears or a problem occurs, the duration of its
life [imposition of form upon matter] comes to an end. When it was said that
once their time is terminated they come to me and do not leave me [he meant] it
is impossible for that which has perished to return since “that which perishes
does not only perish in appearance.” This means once a change occurs in a
compound (murakkab) [substance], each simple (basit) [substance]
yearns towards its natural state and therefore that form accepts corruption and
thereby [wants] to return to its origin and its return is no longer possible.
With new children, new appearances follow the corrupted forms through emanation.
S: The
other old masters, however, have only one child who is responsible for a mill,
and who continuously affirms his mastery of that place.
C: Meaning
that the souls that influence the heavens are permanent, contrary to the forms
that are corruptible [and from which] new forms result.
S: One
of [their] children is stronger than one of [my] children. The help [my]
children receive in [their] mill is from their children.
C: That
strong child is the “archetypal ego” (nafs-i kulli) which is caused by
the “first intellect.” Just as the first intellect influences other intellects,
the first ego influences other egos. When he said “the aids in the mill are my
children,” he means the souls that are descendants of the Original Soul are
effective in the creation of forms.
S: [I
said] how does this birth and reproduction in accordance with being a bachelor
occur? He said, “Know that my state does not change and I have no mate except a
Sudani’s maid whom I never look upon. No motion emanates from me except that
which is focused in the center of the mill and the black maid’s sight lies in
the rotation of the heavens. Whenever during the rotation, the eyes of the
black maid gaze upon me, from me a child is conceived in her womb without
causing any change or motion [in me] ,17
C: Non-existence
of his archetype is apparent here. By depicting a black Sudani’s maid, [he
shows] how matter is separated from form and by attributing blackness to her
[he wants to] show “non-existence”, meaning matter cannot exist without form. Absence
of motion in the old master is necessary since motion is one of the properties
of matter. And when he said that his attention was on the rotation of the mill
[he] means that he expects the emanation of form from one who bestows form
[upon matter] (wdhib al-suwar). And when he said whenever in my presence
a child is conceived in her womb, [he] means, whenever it [matter] becomes
worthy [of receiving a form], from me the giver of form, a form will be
bestowed upon that matter.
S: I
said, “How is this view and worthiness conceived?” He said, “The purpose of
these words is none other than worthiness and ability.
C: He
means that these words are worthy of these meanings we have stated. That is,
understanding of the intellect with our corporeal self is not conceivable but
that such potentiality and worthiness of matter necessitates form.
S: I
asked the old master, “How is it that you have descended to this state having
claimed that no change or motion occurred within you?”18 He replied,
“Oh, pure hearted, the sun is always in the heavens but if a blind man does not
have the consciousness to understand and experience its state, the absence of
this ability does not cause the absence of the sun in its position. If the
inability of a blind man vanished, he could not complain to the sun, “Why you
were not present in the world before and did not benefit me?” The sun has
always been moving and change has been in the blind man and not the sun. We are
always in the same state; your not seeing us is not a reason that we do not
exist and is not an indication that we undergo change in your state.
C: The
purpose of all these words is that the grace and benefit which are spiritual
essences continuously emanate upon the worthy. There is no jealousy and if one
does not benefit from their grace is not because of the absence of their grace
but is his inability and lack of attention to the [spiritual] world and his
engagement within the world of the sensibles.
S: I asked the old master
to teach me the art of tailoring. He smiled and said: “Oh, shadows and your
type cannot learn and such beings as you cannot master this. However, you will
be taught enough so you may make something from your cloth. And this much he
taught me.
C: As I
indicated in the beginning of the treatise, “tailoring” consists of imposing
form upon matter, and man does not have the ability to comprehend this. By
saying, “you will be taught enough so you may construct a building,” he is
alluding to the science of medicine and body as a theurgy or a building. He
said to turn your Sufi dress into a building, and did not say sewing which is
the composition of the form and matter since that is not what he can do; it was
previously discussed.
S: I asked the master to
teach me the word of God. He said: “It is inconceivable for you to learn much
about God as long as you live in this city.”
C: As
long as you are in the world of sensibles you will not know the universals and
the truth of all the sciences.
S: The master said, “I
will teach you in accordance with your ability.” He took my tablet and taught
me a strange mantra such that with it I could know every secret I desired.
C: Tablet
is the common sense and by “word” he means logic is relative to the world of
knowledge (hikmat).19 By saying, “I could
solve any problems I
wanted,” he means that any problem he encountered in science, he could resolve
using logic as a criterion.
S: The
master said: “Anyone who does not come to know of this secret will not know the
secrets of the divine word as he [God] necessitated, and he who knows this word
attains inner peace.”
C: This
means that anyone who has not studied logic cannot distinguish between right
and wrong since knowledge requires composition of inferences and construction
of analogies and inferring conclusions so the unknown becomes known, and all
these are clarified through logic.
S: After
that I learned the science of letters (abjad)20 and my
“tablet” was beautified by it such that I gained power and went beyond matter,
and then from divine word many mysteries appeared to me that are beyond any
limit or comparison.
C: The
science of letters refers to the science of hikmal and Abjad
stands with respect to the worldly sciences. The tablet after it has attained
the secret, discovers the science and knowledge and they [the old masters] call
this the science of transcendence (laduniyyah) through which the hidden
secrets in this science reveal themselves and this has no limit.
S: Every
time a problem was posed, I offered it to the master and the problem was
solved.
C: This
means that every time two analogous situations arose in my mind, I relied on
the intellectual world so the result of that analogy through the path of grace,
from the giver of forms, would emanate upon me.
S: Often
we discussed the “blowing of the spirit.” The master pointed that it emanates
from the holy spirit.
C: The
souls of animals and illuminated beings are numerous and are emanated from the
active intellect.
S: I
asked the master, “How is this order?” He said, “Know that God Almighty has
many supreme words and those words are illuminated and the center of some is
above that of others.”
C: These
“words” refer to the intellects, meaning that the essences are luminous
intellects which are numerous and are emanated from the Necessary Being, the
most high. Some are above others in their dignity and status, though not
spatially.
S: The
first Light is the supreme word beyond which there is no superior one. The
relation between this in luminosity and apparentness with other words is like
the sun to other planets.
C:
The first Light is the
“first intellect”, and no status amongst beings is higher than this.
S: The master said, “From
the ray of this word, another word was attained.”
D:
This means the “first
intellect” is the cause of the “second intellect” and the second [is cause of]
the third and so on until a perfect number which is ten was attained. God said,
“Ten is perfect.”
S: The word is useless.'21
E:
This means that his grace
is continuously descending upon those who are worthy of it.
S:
At the end of these words
is Gabriel and the soul of men from this world is the last.
C:
It is clear that Gabriel
is the last intellect in rank and that the souls of men belong to him and this
has been illustrated.
S: [the original manuscript
is not clear]
D:
For instance, once the
conception is complete in the womb and [fetus] becomes worthy of [receiving] a
human form from the “active intellect” a soul emanates so it may be united with
it.
S: I said, “Tell me of
Gabriel’s wing.” He said, “Know that Gabriel has two wings: one is the right
wing and that is pure light. That wing is its incorporeal existence and a
relation [idafd] to truth. There is a wing to the left which indicates
the darkness such as the dark spots on the moon. It resembles the feet of
peacocks and that is the sign of its existence which is juxtaposed to the nonexistent.
Once you see the relation between its existence and the existence of truth, it
does have the attribute of existence. If you look at the worthiness of its
essence, it is worthy of non-existence. These two concepts are like two wings;
the added (attributes) are due to a grace from the east, and the possibility of
self subsistence from the west.
E:
We have indicated before
that the first Intellect contains three entities and it is because of each of
them that something is emanated. Here, by saying the “wing of Gabriel”, he
means two characteristics. One is “necessary”, meaning that if you look at its
cause, you will find a necessary being due to the presence of its cause and
this was what the master was alluding to when he said: “It is from pure Light
and incorporeality which is its relational existence to that truth and it is
this necessity that is the attribute of truth. The other attribute is
possibility, meaning if you look at its essence it is contingent.” The master
is alluding to this when he says, “Its sign is darkness such as the dark spots
on the moon and
that darkness is the sign
of contingency.” He attributes darkness to contingency since non-existence
comes from a contingency and because of this it was said: “If you look at the
worthiness of its essence, it is worthy of non-existence.” It is these two
concepts that are like two wings: the east [wing] is an attribute of truth
which is “necessary” and the west [wing] is an attribute of himself and that is
contingency and [therefore] non-existence.
S:
As God almighty has
stated: “The angels were sent [in sets of] twos, threes and fours.”22
The closest number to one is two, then three and four. Indeed that which has two
wings is more virtuous than that which has three and four. In the science of
reality and visionary discovery there is much to elaborate on this but not
everyone can understand it.
C:
All this means that if
multiplicity would decrease, closeness to the source of unity would increase
and once closeness intensifies, so does virtuosity. It is for this reason that
he said, “That which has two wings is more virtuous than that which has three
and four.” When he said, “In the sciences and discoveries, not everyone can
understand,” he means that the virtuosity of that which has two wings is
different than that which has three wings and that which has three wings to
that which has four and so on. Indeed, not everyone can understand the truth.
S:
The world of ego is the
shadow of Gabriel which is emanated from his leftwing, and the illuminated
souls come from his right wing.
C:
This means that the
corporeal and corruptible worlds come from his contingent nature since they are
perishable, and human souls are emanated from the aspect of its necessity
because it is not perishable.
S:
The realities which come
to mind as it is said, “It was written within their hearts with faith, and we
blow unto them from our spirit,”2’ and the voice of the angel [who
said] “We called upon him, oh Ibrahim.”24 Other than these are the
sound of Gabriel’s wing.
C:
It has become apparent
that Gabriel is the intermediary between the Necessary Being and human souls
and it is because of this that revealing the truth through divine voice, is his
task.
S:
Vengeance and the
occurrence of events are also from Gabriel’s voice.
C:
It thus became known that
it is he who influences the world of permanence and corruption and it is here
that events occur. Therefore, everything is due to his influence.
S: I
asked, “Finally, what does this Gabriel look like?” He said, “Oh, you ignorant
one, do you not know that all these are secrets, if taken exoterically, are
useless utterances?”
C: He
(Gabriel) has a face and voice that cannot be identified; however, he uses
[human] language so the masses may understand.
S: I
was in the Sufi house when the “good day” occurred; they closed the exterior
door and opened the door of the city. The merchant entered and the group of
elders disappeared from my sight. Of their absence I remained wondrous.
C: Once
worldly engagements prevailed over disengagement and the exterior door, which
is the world of spirit, was closed, the city, which represents the material
world, became dominant. The merchants who are the bodily functions, meaning the
sense perceptions, took over. He alluded to them as merchants since they are
the ones who plant the seeds of understanding the particulars so the result can
be the universals. When he said, “The elders disappeared from my sight”, he
means that once drawn into the sensible world, the Intellect is turned away.
Suffering that results
from the absence of the observation of the intelligible world and incorporeal
essences is necessary.
Notes
1
This translation is based
on the version that Mas‘ud Ghasimi has edited. The article has appeared in:
“Sharh-i awaz-i par-i Jibra’il” in Ma'drif no.l, (March 1985): 77-99.
2
This work represents one
of the masterpieces of Suhrawardi’s Persian writings. For a complete version of
this mystical narrative see: Suhrawardi, Opera 3, 208-223.
3
Not much is known about
the author’s life except that he must have been affiliated with a spiritual
order and has practiced the ishraqi doctrine. The author’s commentary
indicates that he was well versed in the ishraqi tradition and its
symbolism.
4
One can find a great
depository of such texts in India. For example, in Reza library in Rampur and
in Khudabakhsh library in Patna there are a great deal of ishraqi texts.
Spreng, the German scholar who in the 19th century traveled to India had
brought 1966 texts in Arabic, Persian and Hindi back to Germany, many of which
are commentaries on The Philosophy of Illumination. Catalogue of the
Biblioelheca orientalis Sprengerianna (Gillssun: Wilhelm Keller, 1857).
5
The treatise begins with
several verses of the Quran which are not translated. The verses are: Quran,
XI, 96-XXIV, 35; and XXXVI, 56.
6
Suhrawardi and the
commentator both use the word kidr meaning that which does not allow
light to pass through it easily.
7
Ajhaluni, in the Kashf al-khifa’,
has attributed this saying to Imam Ali. See: V.2, 312. However, Sha’rani in his
Tabaqdt has attributed this saying to the famous Sufi, Sahl Tustari.
8
Ibn Hajar considered this Hadith
to be a saying of the Sufi masters and not the prophet himself. See: Kashf
al-khifd\ v.2, 291.
9
For more information on
Suhrawardi’s angelology see: G. Webb, The Human/Angelic Relation in the
Philosophies of Suhrawardi and Ibn ‘Arabi (Ph.D. Diss., Temple Univ., 1989).
10 Suhrawardi believes that the first being God created was the
“first intellect” (al-‘aql al-awwal). His argument is partially based on
the Quranic verse that states: “The first intellect then emanates the active
intellect which he identifies with the ‘giver of form’ (wdhib al-suwar) or
‘luminous old master’ (Pir-i ruhani).”
11 By the ten categories he is referring to the Aristotelian
categories. Suhrawardi reduces these categories to five, which are quantity,
quality, essence, relation and motion. Adding motion to the Aristotelian
categories is Suhrawardi’s original contribution, which later on in Mulla
Sadra’s philosophy became the basis of the theory of “Trans- substantial
Motion” (al-harikat al-juwhariyyah).
12 In the text it is phrased “meaning the eighth heaven”, which
the editor has judged to be erroneous and should be “supreme heaven.”
13 Khirqah or the Sufi dress is a long
and white cloth often made of rough materials which the spiritual master offers
to the novice at the time of initiation.
14 “Presence” is a key concept in the ishraqi doctrine
and is used in two different contexts. First, it is used within the context of
emanation
meaning the world is the
result of an emanation, and second it is the theory of knowledge by presence,
which lies at the heart of Suhra- wardi’s theory of knowledge. For more
information see Mehdi Ha’iri Yazdi, The Principles of Epistemology in
Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence, with a forward by S.H. Nasr (New
York: SUNY Press, 1992).
15 The word nafs here translated as “ego” has a
pejorative meaning in Islam which Suhrawardi argues is subservient to intellect
in the order of creation but often rebels against it.
16 The four substances are fire, water, earth, wind, which some
of the pre-Socratics argued constitute the primordial substance from which the
world was created.
17 The material world for Suhrawardi represents non-existence (‘adam).
This non-existence should not be mistaken with non-existing but it should
be regarded as the anti-pole to the light of lights. The female character is
the world of senses that is identified with the material world. What Suhrawardi
is alluding to here is that the divine essence can create the existent objects
without change being introduced into his essence.
18 The relationship between change and permanence has been a
central issue in Islamic philosophy. God, by nature changeless, has emanated a
world that undergoes change. Suhrawardi, in the tradition of Ibn Sina, wants to
argue that presence of change does not necessitate that the cause of this
change must also undergo change.
19 The commentator does not use the word hikmah in a
consistant fashion, sometimes using it to mean knowledge and other times refers
to a particular tradition of wisdom as opposed to the peripatetic philosophy.
20 The science of letters is based on a synthesis of Pythagorean
mathematics and the belief that each letter of alphabet represents a sacred
mathematical number. This field, which in Islam is referred to as Jafr, is
also prevalent in Judaism and Medieval Christianity.
21 The word here is lammdt which also means a “prodigious
event” or a great suffering which will come on the day of judgment. It is not
clear in what context Suhrawardi used it.
22 Quran, XXXV: 1.
23 Quran, LV1II: 22.
24 Quran, XXXVII: 104.
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a priori
knowledge. See knowledge, a priori
Abbasid, 146
Abhari, Athir
al-Din, 122, 123
Abraham, 18
Abu Rayyan,
Muhammad ‘Ali, 147 accidental: darkness. See darkness, accidental; intellects,
87; accidental light. See light, accidental
accident (s) (lavasim), 97, 99
Active Intellect.
See Intellect, Active
Agathadaimons, 10
Ahmad-Abad, 138
Ahmad, Sa'd ibn,
146
Ahriman, 43
Ashai, Shaykh
Ahmad, 135
Ahurmazda, 43
Akbar, 138
Akhutas
(Archytus), 9
‘Alawi, Sayyid
Ahmad, 126 alchemy, 18
‘Ali (Imam), 151,
152
‘Ali wa’l-hikmat al-ildhiyyah (‘Ali
and Divine Wisdom),
136
Alleppo, 1, 3
Amuli, Sayyaid
Haydar, 123, 124
Amuli, Shaykh
Baha’ al-Din (Shaykh Baha’i), 126
analytical, 141
Anatolia, 1, 122,
139
ancient wisdom (hikmat al-‘atiq),xv angelic, 45, 85
angelic order,
46, 47, 82;
latitudinal
(‘aradi), 46, 47, 81, 82; longitudinal (tuli), 46, 47, 81,82 ’
angelic world (‘dlam-i qdhriah), 88, 152
angelology, xix,
xx, 25, 43, 45—47, 81, 83, 84
angel (s), xvi,
46, 81, 86, 150, 162
annihilation (fana), 73, 151 annihilation of annihilation (fana dar fana), 73
Anwdriyyah, 138
Apprehension (wahm), 49
Arab, 146
Arab world, 142
Arabic; grammar,
126; poetry, 126; texts, 7; treatises, 147; works, 8, 95
Arabs, 147;
domination over Persia, 4
‘Archange empourpree, 7, 9
archetypal ego (nafs-i kulli), 158 archetypal world (‘dlam
milhdl), 60,
63, 86, 87-89. See also Mundus
Imaginalis
archetype (s) (al-mujarraddt), xvi, 37, 42, 46, 83, 88, 90, 125, 158; of humanity (rabb al-naw ‘al-insdn), 82; of species (Shahriydr), 84; Platonic, 42, 46; Plato’s, 81, 82, 88; supreme (hurmuzd), 82; suspending (muthul
mu'allaqah),
88
architecture,
126, 127
Ardistani, Mirza
Muhammad Sadiq, 128
Aristotle, xviii,
9, 10, 44, 47, 48,
51,
59, 60, 93, 95, 100
Aristotelian, 5,
94; logic. See logic, Aristotelian; categories. See categories,
Aristotelian
Arkhoun, M., 142
Asclepius, 10
Asfdr, 129, 130, 131, 134
Ash’ari’te, 5, 47
Ashkiwari, Qutb
al-Din, 126
Ashtiyani, Mirza
Mahdi, 134, 135
Ashtiyani, Sayyid
Jalal al-Din, xvii, 129, 130, 136
Aspanddrmaz (love), 82. See also love (mihr)
Asrdr al-hikam (The Secrets of
Wisdom), 131
Assar, Sayyid
Muhammad Kazim, 136
Astarabadi, Mir Muhammad
Baqir Damad Husayni, see Mir Damad
astronomy, 101
Atomists, 47
‘Attar, 17
Attraction (jddhibah), 49
attributes, 112
‘ayn al-ya'qin, 132
Avestan Amerta Spenta, 83
Ayyubi, Salah
al-Din (Saladin), 1, 2,3,4,140
Baader, Franz
Van, 142
Babylonians, 51
Bacon, Roger, 141
Bada’uni, 138
Baddyi ’ al-hikam (The Wonders of
Wisdom), 134
Bahman (al-nur al-‘aqrab), 14, 85,86
Bahram (victory), 84
barzakh (body), 80
al-Bastami, Abu
Yazid, 5, 10, 31,
52,
60
al-Baydn wa 'l-tabyin (The Book of
Exposition and Elucidation), 146
Be (kun), 88
Being (wujud), 10, 103. See
also
Inner being;
gradations of Being
Berger, G„ 142
Biddyat al-hikmah (The Origin of
Wisdom), 136
Blark, 64
Book of Kings, 16
Brethren of
Abstraction (ikhwdn
al-tajrid),
4
Brethren of
Purity (ahl-i tajarrud), 70
Bursi, Rajab, 124
Bustdn al-qulub (The Garden of the
Heart), 8, 24, 71, 74
Caliph, 4
Categories, 44; Aristotelian, 44, 46;
of Aristotelian
logic, 9
Chant of the Gabriel’s Wing The
(Awaz-i par-iJibra’il),
xxi, 8, 20-21,84, 87, 151
Chant ofSimurgh, The, 21, 64, 70, 72, 73
Chittick, W„ 137
Christi, 138
Christian, 140
Christianity, 3
city of the soul (shahrastdn-i jdn), 68, 87
combination (yajma), 94
compound (murakkab), 157
compound truth (haqd’iq murakkabah), 97
consciousness,
loss of (fand-i akbar), 73
Conversations, The, see al-Mashdri
’ wa ’l-mutdrahdt
Corbin, Henry,
xviii, 9, 83, 87, 139, 142; on Suhrawardi’s works, 7, 8
corporeal
creation (al-huduth
al-dahri),
125
corporeal
darkness. See darkness, corporeal
corporeal world (‘dlam-i barzakh), 86, 87, 88, 111, 162; See
alsogiti
corporeality (barzakh), 78, 80;
dark (ghdsiq), 91; luminous, 91 cosmological, 47
cosmology, 14,
65, 84, 150 cosmos, 65
creation (huduth), 15, 125 Crusaders, 3
Crusades, 140
crystal ball (jdm-iJam), 25
Damascus, 1
Danielou,J., 142
Dar al-tarjumah, 140 darkness (zulamdt), 80 Dashtaki, Ghiyath al-Din Mansur, 123 '
Dashtaki, Sadr
al-Din, 123
David, 64
Dawani, Jalal
al-Din, 137
De Anima, 48
definition (hadd), 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101
Descartes, 109
differentia, 94,
95, 96, 97
Digestion (hddimah), 49 discursive philosophy. See philosophy,
discurisve
Divine: essence (al-huduth aMhati), 125, 163; flashes (bdriqa-yi
ildhi), 79; Intellect,
18; knowledge of, 83; names (dhikr), 71; soul (nafs al-qudsiyyah), 54; substance, 62; throne, 64; Truth, xviii; Divine Wisdom (al-Hikmat al-laduniyah), 52
domain (dahr), 125
domination (qahr), 40, 46, 79
Durand, G., 142
Durrat al-Tdj, 137
Eastern, 142
ego, (nafs), 32, 66, 111, 152, 157.
See also self; I
Egypt, 147
Egyptians, xv, 51
eighth domain (iqlim-i hashtum), 87 eighth heaven (aqlim
al-thdmin),
60 emanation, 150
emanationistic,
86. See also ontology, emanationistic
Empedocles, 10
empiricism, 21,
100 epistemological, 5, 83, 89, 92, 103, 105, 112, 113; Islamic, 107; paradigm,
121; system, 20 epistemology, xvi, xix, 23, 36, 48, 59, 92-93, 96, 101, 102,
111, 117; illuminationist, 60; ishrdqi,
102; philosophical, 92,
100-102 eschatological, 132 eschatology, 49-50, 74 essence (al-mahiyyah), 10, 97, 125, 129; general (jins), 93;
particular (fast), 94; Pure
(Gawhar), 84
eternal city (shahristdn-i azal), 69 eternity (qidam), 15, 125 existence (urujud), 89, 91, 103, 125, 129, 161; incorporeal, 161. See also non-existence experiential knowledge, 127 extent (sudad), 49
Fadi, Shaykh, 138
Faivre, A., 142 fand-i akbar, 73 Fantasy (khiydl), 49 Farabi, 9, 10, 45, 52 Faridun, 10, 16
Farmadi, Abu ‘Ali, 20 farwahar, 83 fasting (chillah), 66 Feeding (ghadhiyyah), 49 Findiriski, Mir Abu’l-Qasim, 127, 139
Firdawsi, 16, 21
first intellect.
See intellect, first form (hay’ah), 80 forms (suwar): suspended (suwar
al-mu’allaqah),
42, 43 formula (qaw[), 94 France, xxi, 142 Fusus, 9
Fusus al-hikam (Bezels of Wisdom), 128 al-Futuhdt al-makkiyya (Meccan
Victories), 127
Gabriel, 20-21,
82, 85, 86, 87, 161, 162, 163. See
also archetype of
humanity
Hermeticism,
xviii, 6, 148 hikmah, xix, 51, 65, 137 htkmat, 1, 10, 50-54, 78, 116, 126, 127, 128, 130, 136, 147, 159,
160
Hikmat al-'arshiyya (The Wisdom of
the Throne),
129
al-Hikmat al-muta‘dliyyah
fi'l-asfdr al-arba'at al-'aqliyyah
(Transcendental Theosophy on The
Four IntellectualJournies of the Soul), see Asfdr
Hilli, ‘Allamah,
122
Hindi, Fadil-i.
Seelsfahani, Baha’ al-Din
Hinduism, 63
Hindu (s), 51,
127
holy spirit (ruh al-qudus), 82
hudhud (hoepoe), 72
Huduth al-‘alam, 127 hukamd’, 1
Hume, 104
Hurakhsh (heavenly sun), 25, 84
Hurqalyd, 84, 88, 135. See also archetypal world
huwa, 103
I (nafs ndtiqah), 62
1-ness (and’iyyah), 103 your-self (and’iyydtuka), 112 Ibn ‘Arabi, 124, 127, 128, 129, 134,
139
Ibn Kammunah, 122
Ibn Khaldun, 146
Ibn Sab'in, 141
Ibn Sina, xvi,
xviii, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 17, 24,31,41,43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50,81,85, 123,
124, 125, 126, 127, 128-29, 131, 137, 140, 142
Ibn Sinian,
xviii, 5, 31, 41, 78, 80, 83, 85, 127; logic. See logic, Ibn Sinian;
metaphysics. See metaphysics, Ibn Sinian icons (sanam), 82 iddfah (relation), 80, 86, 161 ideas (a“ydn al-thdbitah), 46;
' innate, 100,
101 ignorance (ashqiyd’), 49
Ihqdq al-haqq (Attainment of the '
Truth), 139
ihya’ al-‘ulum al-Din
(Reconstruction of the Religious Sciences), 127
Ildhiyydt, 131
Illuminated of
Bavaria movement, 142
illuminated
souls, 162
illumination (ishrdq), xviii, 62, 71, 72, 74, 114, 116, 125; school of, xv, xvi,
xix, 121, 122
illuminationist:
ideas, 89, 139; movements, 141; school, 122, 127, 128, 142, 147, 148
illuminationists (ishrdqiyyun), xv, xvi illuminative philosophy. See philosophy,
illuminative
'Um al-yaqin, 132
imaginal, 87
imaginal world,
xx, 88, 90 imaginary, 87
Imagination (mutakhayyilah), 49 Imams, 122, 134
inanimate
objects. See corporeality incorporeal light. See light, incorporeal
incorporeal
nature, 156 incorporeal existence. See existence, incorporeal
incorporeal
world, (‘alam-i tajarrud), 67, 84, 86. See also minu
India, xxi, 50,
121, 127, 130, 137-39, 150
Indian, 139
indigent, (faqir), 80
Indo-Pakistani,
139, 142
infidelity, (kufr), 69 initiate (murid), 72 inner being (Batin), 22 innate. Seeknowledge, innate innate ideas. See ideas,
Innate inner peace (sakinah), 70 inner senses (‘dlam al-dhawq), 67-68
Intellect (‘Aql), 19, 24, 66, 122, 163; Active, 43, 153, 156, 157; Divine,
18; first (al-‘aql
al-awwal),
85, 156, 158, 161;
last, 161; major
(‘aql-i kulli), 90; minor (‘aql-i juz’i), 21; second, 156; universal (‘aql-i kulli), 21, 155
intellection (istidlal), 90. See also reasoning
intellectual, 89
intelligible
world, 163
An Introduction to Islamic
Cosmological Doctrines, 137 intuition (dawq), xviii, 51;
intellectual, 2,
93
Iran, 126, 129,
130, 131, 135, 136, 138, 139
Iranian, 1 ‘irfdn, 129 Isfahan, School of, xv, xxi, 122, 123, 124-128, 131,
139
Isfahani, Baha’
al-Din (also known as Fadil-i Hindi), 139
Isfahani, Ibn
Turkah, 124
Isfahani,
Muhammad Isma’il, 135 Isfahbad. See Light in the body al-Ishdrdt wa’l-tanbihdt (References and Treatments), 6, 8, 50, 123 ishrdq (illumination), 12, 53, 131, 134, 139; school of, xv, xix,
xx, 9, 26, 66, 137, 139
ishrdqr. analysis, 14, 42, 84; argument, 41;
claim, 16; context, 14; doctrine, 20, 31, 34, 50, 83, 131, 136; dress, 141;
elements, 7; epistemology, 102; figures, 128, 139; foundation, 102; hakim, 126; ideas, 11, 129, 138; implications, 33;
interpreter, 125;
manuscripts, 139; ontology, 43; philosophy, xviii, 60, 123, 134; reading, 10,
124; school, xvii, xix, 26, 37, 69, 89, 108, 114, 121, 123, 135, 138, 146, 147;
sense, 141; style, 7; system, 32; teaching, 124; texts, 122, 137, 139; theory
of knowledge, 132; theosophy, 129; thought, xxi, 121;
tradition, 13,
114, 117, 123, 134, 139, 142; view, 123, 126, 135; wisdom, 11, 12, 52, 53,
147; writings,
xviii, 13, 15
Ishrdq al-nayyirayn, 139
ishrdqis, 6, 15, 125, 140
Islam, xv, 3, 5,
6, 22, 63, 83, 123, 127, 129, 147; Shi ite, 3, 6, 75, 122, 124, 127; Sunni, 3
Islamic: hadith. See hadith, Islamic; philosophy. See philosophy, Islamic; rites (shari'ah), 127; sciences, 126; world, 121, 142
Isma'ilis, 15
Ispahbad, 48
Ftiqdd fi’l-hukamd (On the Faith of
the Theosophers),
8
ittihad al-‘dqil wa’l-ma‘qul (doctrine of the knower and the unknown),
131
Jdbilqd, 88
Jdbirsd, 88
Jahiz, 146
Jambet,
Christian, 142
James, William,
xvi
Jami ‘al-asrdr, 124
Jazawdt, 126
Jesus, 138
Jewish:
illuminationists, 141;
Kabbalists, 141;
mystics, 141 jihad, 69
Jili, Majd
al-Din, 1
Jumhur, Ibn A’bi,
123, 124
jurists (‘ulamd), 128
Kaldm (theology), 5, 6, 127, 129;
and Ibn Sina, 6
Kant, Immanuel,
99, 134
Kantian, 101
Kashani, Mulla Muhsin Fayd, 126, 127 ' ’
Kashf al-haqd ‘iq fi tahrir al-daqd
’iq (Discovery of the Secrets and Composition of Spiritual Intricacies), 123
Kaziruni, Khatib
Abu’l-Fadl, 138
Kay Khusraw, 10,
16
Kayumarth, 10
Khaju’i, Mulla
Isma'il, 135 khanaqdh (Sufi house), 20, 22, 65, 152
khardb dbdd (ruinous but prosperous land), 87
Kharrah (incorporeal light), 16
al-Kharraqani,
Abu’l-Hassan, 10, 52
al-Khatat, 146
Khayrabadi
School, 138
khirqah, 156
Khunsari, Aqa
Husayn, 127
Khurddd (Mazdean angel), 46, 47, 82
Khusrawdnian (wisdom), 52
Kilid-i bihisht (The Key to
Heaven), 127
Kirmani, 135
Kitab al-mujli (The Book of
Illuminator),
123
Kitab shark al-hiddyah (Commentary
on Guidance),
129
Kiyan Kharrah, 84
kiyani, 84
knowledge, by
presence (al-*ilm
al-huduri),
xx, xxi, 14, 25, 89, 93, 102-03, 111, 113, 132; by definition, 97, 101; a priori, 94, 99, 100; innate (Jitriyyah), 99
Knowledge and
Presence, 35. See also Knowledge; Presence
Knowledge and the Sacred, 137
Kulayni, 126
Kushki, Mulla
Isma'il, 131
Lahiji, ‘Abd
al-Razzaq, 115, 116, 117, 127
1-ama‘dt-i ildhiyyah (Divine
Flashes), 134
al-I-amahdt (The Flashes of Light),
7, 8, 9
Langarudi,
Muhammad Ja'far, 135 language of illumination (lisdn al-ishraq), 12
language of the Termites, 24, 69
last intellect.
Sec intellect, last Latin, 140
latitudinal order
of angels. See angelic orders
iMwdmi ‘al-ishraq fi makdrim
al-ikhldq (Flashes of Illumination in Practical Virtues), 137
letters (abjad), 160
liberation (khalas), 69 light, 90,91, 112, 160, 161;
accidental (nur ‘aradi), 79, 80; all-encompassing (al-muhit), 80; in the body (Isfahbad), 84;
Incorporeal (nur mujarrad), 79, 80, 91; indignet (faqir), 80; of lights (nur al-anwdr), 32, 46, 92; lordly (al-nur
al-isfahbadi),
45, 82; nearest (nur al-aqrab), 82; regent (nur mudabbir), 81, 82; sacred (al-muqaddas), 80; substantial (nurjawhan), 80; supreme (nur
al-a‘zam),
46, 80, 80, all-victorious (al-qhhdr), 80 logic, xvi, xvii, xviii, xix, 7, 13,
31, 45, 52, 131, 159, 160;
Aristotelian, 9;
Ibn Sinian, 6;
oriental, 142
logical, xvii,
105, 106 logician, xvii longitudinal order of angels. See angelic
orders
lordly light. See
light, lordly love (mihr), 68. See also
Aspandarmaz; mahabbah lower world (Farvadin), the, 84 Lughat-i murdn (language of the
Termites), 8, 24, 69 luminous world, xvi, 111
Luminous Being (al-Nayyir
al-a'zam),
25
Lunbani, Hasan,
128
md bihil-ishtirdk, 79 madrasah
(s), 128, 139 Mafdtih al-ghayb, 131 mahabbah (love), 40. See also
Aspandarmaz; love
al-Mahdjjdl al-baydd’Ji ihyd’ al-ihyd’, 127
Mahbub al-qulub, 126
Majdlis al-mu ’minin, 139
Majlisi, Mulla
Muhammad Taqi, 126 Malik Zahir, 140
Mantiq al-mashraqiyyin (Fogic of
the
Easterners), 50
Maqrizi,
Taqi al-Din Ahmad ibn ‘Ali, 146 '
al-Maqtul (the Martyr), 1. See also Shaykh al-ishraq (the Master of Illumination)
Maraghah, 1
Mashd’zr, 130, 131
Mashdnq al-anwdr, 124, 126
al-Mashdri‘ wa’l-Mutdrahdt ( The
Paths and the Conversations), 7,
8, 11, 12,36,
44,50, 52, 94, 95
Massignon,
L., 7
masters of the
species (arbab al-anwaj, 81
math, 101
mathematics,
Suhrawardi’s
writings on, 7
Mathnawi, 127
Mazdean. See Khurddd
medicine, 159
Memory (hdfizah), 49
metaphysical
doctrine, 81
metaphysics, xvi,
xviii, 24, 83, 84,
134; Ibn Sinian,
6
al-Milal wa’l-nihal (On Nations and
Sects), 147
Mir Damad, 124,
125, 126, 139
Mir Mu'in, 137
Mir Shams al-Din,
137-38
Mishkdt al-anwdr, 31
al-Mizdn, 136
Morocco, 141
Moses, 16, 138
motion, 158
Muhammad, 60, 71,
82
Muhammadean light
(nur
Muhammadi), 122
Muhammadean
tradition, 134
Mulla Sadra, xxi,
7, 32, 114, 115,
117,'122,
123,126, 127,128, 129,
130,
131, 134, 135, 136,137, 139
Mundus Imaginalis, 87-89. See also archetypal world
Muntakhab al-tawarikh, 138
al-Muqdwamdt (The Book of
Opposites), 7, 8, 10-11, 12, 36
Murddd, 46, 82
Muslim gnostics.
See gnostics, Muslim; scientist, 141; thinkers, 148
Muslims, 3
mu la ‘allihun, 49
Mu’tazilite,
theology of, 4-5 Mystical and
Visionary Treatises of
Shihabuddin Yahya Suhrawardi, 7 mysticism, 6
Nagori, Shaykh
Mubarak, 138 ndkujd abdd, (the nowhere but prosperous land), 64,
68, 85, 87, 153
nafs natiqah, 62
Nasr, Seyyed
Hossein, xviii, 1, 3, 7, 8, 16, 32,51, 123, 124, 129, 136, 137, 140, 141, 142
natural sciences,
Suhrawardi’s writings on, 7
Nazam al-Din,
Sand, 137 nearest light. See light, nearest Necessary Being (wdjib al-wujud), 10, 32, 37-39, 80, 155, 160, 162 neo-Ibn Sinian, xviii. See also Ibn
Sinian
Neoplatonic,
xviii, 6, 62, 78
Neoplatonism, 6,
41
Nihdyat al-hikmat (Extremity of
Wisdom), 136
non-existence (adam), 78, 151, 161, 162
North Africa,
122, 142 noumena, 110
al-Nujum al-zdhirah fi muluk misr
wa ’l-qdhirah (The Astronomy of the Observable in Egypt), 2
Nuri, Mulla ‘Ali,
131
obscurity (ghdsiq), 80, 81. See also darkness
Occidental
philosophy. See philosophy. Occidental
Observations (al-Basa’ir), 1 ontological, 32, 36, 40, 41, 42, 47,
48, 63, 64, 87, 91, 103, 125, 129, 130
ontologically,
91, 103, 111 ontology, xvi, xix, xx, 14, 43, 45, 83, 84, 114, 117, 129, 135,
148, 150; emanationistic, 85;
Islamic, 63;
oriental, 142 Opposites, The,
see al-Muqawamat
Organon, 44, 45
oriental logic.
See logic, oriental oriental ontology. See ontology, oriental
Oriental
philosopy. See philosophy, Oriental
Original soul,
158
Oxford, 141
Pakistan, xxi
Partaw ndmah (Treatise on
Illumination),
8, 14-15, 39, 40, 44, 95
particulars, 163
perennial wisdom (jdwiddn khirad), 68
perfect man, the (al-insdn al-kdmil), 73
Peripatetic; Ibn
Sina’s interpretations, 129; style, 7; view, 45, 46, 95, 99; writings, xvii, 9,
123. See also philosophers. Peripatetic; philosophy,
Peripatetic
Peripatetics (mashshd'is), xv, xix, 6, 10, 11, 12, 24,31,36, 43, 44, 45, 54, 60, 92,
93, 95, 96, 97, 123, 124, 125. See
also philosophers,
Peripatetic; philosophy. Peripatetic
Persia, 4, 5, 16,
21, 46, 121, 122, 123, 128, 130, 134, 142, 147
Persian:
intellectual thought, 136; intellectuals, 149; language, 17, 24, 95;
literature, 18, 20, 24;
mythology, 16,
21; nationalistic movements, xxi, 146 (See
also Shu'ubiyyah);
nationalism, 4;
philosophers. See
philosophers, Persian; poets, 16, 146, 149; treatises, 15; Weltanschauung, 123; works, 7, 8, 14, 24, 95, 126, 131; writings, xviii, 20,
25, 102 Persian (s), xv, 3, 14, 51, 84, 122, 124, 146, 147
Petna, 150
phenomena, 110
philosophers,
Peripatetic, 60;
Persian, xv, 122;
rationalistic.
59; young, 142 philosophic, perennis, 51;
universalis, 51 philosophical: categories, 127;
gnosis, 13;
methodology, 113; paradigm, 113; schools, 121; sufism. See sufism,
philosophical; synthesis, 124 philosophy, 48; discursive (Yundnt), 58, 111, 125;
European, 134;
Greek, 6; Ibn Sina, 6, 117; illuminative (Yamant), 125; ishrdqi, xviii, 60, 123, 134; Islamic, xv, xvii, xix, xxi, 6,
13,21,43, 106, 113, 117, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 142; Occidental,
125;
Oriental, 125,
142; peripatetic, xviii, 3, 5, 13,31,52, 93, 113, 121, 123, 129, 139;
rationalistic, xv, xvi, xvii, xviii, 6, 21, 58, 111, 116, 125, 127, 140, 142;
scholors of,
xvii; Western, 142 Philosophy of
Illumination, The
(al-Hikmat al-ishrdq), xvi, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13-14,
20, 32, 33, 35, 41, 42, 44, 52, 53, 58, 78, 80,81,88, 93, 94, 96,98, 99, 101,
114, 117, 122, 128, 129, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 physical, xx, 89, 92 physics,
47-48 pir(s) (masters), 72, 84 pir-i burnd, (glorius master), 50 Plato, xviii, 10, 60, 75, 93, 98;
archetypes, 81,
82, 88, 90 Platonic: archetypes, 42, 46; forms (muthul), 42; ideas, 43, 101
Plotinus, 7, 10
Poetics, 44 poor (faqir), 80 Portmann,A., 142 Power, of anger (ghadhab), 49; of desire (nuzu'iyyah), 49; of lust (shahwah), 49; of motion (muharrikah), 49
pre-lslamic, 146
Presence (hudur), 91, 110 principality of essence (asdlat
al-mdhiyyah), 33, 34, 108, 125 principality of
existence (asdlat
al-wujud), 108
Principles of Epistemology in
Islamic Philosophy: Knowledge by Presence, The, 106, 136
prophet (nabf), 75 psychology, 48-49 purgatory (Barzakh), 46, 79
Pythagoras, 10,
52
Pythagorean ism,
6, 148 Pythagorean (s, ) xviii, 6, 9
Qabasdt, 125, 126
Qaf mountain, 21,
64, 72, 88 al-qd’im bi’l-dhdl (necessary being), 103
Qajar period,
128, 130-35 al-Qari, Zahir al-Din, 1 Qasidah, 127
Qazwini, Abu’l
Hasan Rafi’i, 136
Qazwini, Mulla
Khalil, 126
Qtssat al-ghurbal al-gharbiyyah
(Story of the Occidental Exile), 8
Qummi, Qadi
Sa'id, 127
Qumsha’i,
Muhammad Rida, 134
Qunawi, Sadr
al-Din, 124
Quran, 9,’20, 24,
64, 70, 71, 86, 92, 127, 132, 152
Quranic, 15, 47
Rashti, Shaykh
Kazim, 135
Rasul Allah,
Abu’l-Futuh, 4 rational self. See self, rational rationalism, 6, 21, 100,
125 rationalistic, 141 rationalistic philosophy. See philosophy,
rationalistic
Rawdat al-cjulub (Garden of the
Heart), 24
Razavi, Mirza
Abu’l-Hasan, 132
Razi, Fakhr al-Din,
6 reasoning, 65 See also intellection Red Intellect (‘Aql-i surkh), 8, 21-22, 64, 84
reduclio ad absurdum, 107
Religion and the Order of Nature, 137 representation (al-mithdt), 103, 104, 106
Reproduction (muwallidah), 49
Repulsion (ddfi'ah), 49
Retention (mdsikah), 49
retreat (khalwah), 72
revealedness (zuhur), 91
Rhetoric, 44
rich (ghanf), 80
Risdlah fi halat al-tufuliyyah
(Treatise on the Slate of
Childhood), 8, 23-24, 67, 68
RisdlahJi haqiqat al-‘ishq
(Treatise on the Reality of Ijove), 8, 24-25, 68
Risdlah fi’l-'ishq (Treatise on
I.ove), 9, 24
Risdlah fi’l-mi'raj (’Treatise on
the
Nocturnal Ascent), 8
Risalah sana ’iyyah, (Treatise on
Art), 127
al-Risalat al-faqiriyyah, (Treatise
on Spiritual Poverty)
,141
Risalat al-harakah, (Treatise on
Motion), 127
Risalat Hayy ibn Yaqzan, (Treatise
on Hayy itm Yaqzan),
50
Risdlat al-tayr (Treatise of the
Birds), 8, 17-20, 63
Rizvi, Sayyid
Athar Abbas, 137
Romans, 154
ruler (ra’is), 4
Rumi, 126, 127
Rustam, 21
Ruzi bdjamd‘at-i sufiydn (A Day
Among the Sufis), 8, 22-23, 65
Sabziwari, Hajji
Mulla Hadi, 32, 117, 131,’132, 134
sacred light. See
light, sacred
sadness (huzn), 68
Sadr al-Din Shirazi and His
Transcendental Theosophy, 137
Sadrian, 131, 135
Safavid period,
122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 135, 139
Safir-i simurg (’The Sound of the
Griffin), 8
Saladin.
feAyyubi, Salah al-Din salik, xix, 19, 23, 64, 65, 72, 75, 81, 85, 86,
87
sama' (dancing), 23, 68
Sanskrit, 137
al-Sawi, ‘Umar
ibn Salan, 1
Schelling, 142
Schimmel, A.M.,
139
Scholem, G., 142
Science of light ('Um al-ishrdq), 10
School of
Illumination. See illumination, school of
School of
Isfahan. See Isfahan, School of
scientia sacra, 70
second intellect.
See intellect, second
self (dhdt), 59; rational (nafs
ndtiqah),
79, 89. See also ego
self (nafs), 69, 75, 112. See also ego; I
self-knowledge,
92
Semantical, 105,
106
sense perception,
99, 100, 101, 163
sensible world,
163
sensus communis, 49, 88 separation (tafrid), 61
Seven Powers (Amhsaspands), 83 Shah Waliallah, 138
Shdh-ndmah (Book of the Kings), 21 Shahrastani, 146
Shahrazuri, 1,2,
4, 9, 122, 138, 140
Shahriwar, 46, 82
Shahriydr. See archetype of species
Shark al-hiddyah (Treatise on
Guidance), 139
Shark al-manzumah (Commentary on
’Transcendental Theosophy), 131
Sharh-i dwdz-ipar-iJibrd’il (A Commentary
Upon the Chant of Gabriel’s Wing), 150
Sharh-i hikmat al-ishrdq
(Commentary on the
Philosophy of
Illumination), 96 al-Shawdhid
al-rububiyya (The
Divine Witnesses), 129, 131 Shawdkil al-nur fi sharh-i haydkil
al-nur (Luminous Forms in
Commenting on Luminous
Bodies), 137
Shaykh al-ishraq
(the Master of
Illumination), 1.
See also al-Maqtul (the Martyr) Shaykh Baha’i.
SeeAmuli, Shaykh
Baha’ al-Din
Shaykhis, 135
Shaykhiyyah movement, 121, 131, 135
Shifa, 139
Shi’ism, 13, 124,
125, 130. See also
Islam, Shi’ite
Shi’ite. See
Islam; gnostics, 137;
jurisprudence,
126
Shirazi, Muhammad
Dihdar, 139
Shirazi, Qutb
al-Din, 7, 13, 96,
122, 137,138
Shirazi, Sadr
al-Din, 129, 141
Shustari, Qadi
Nurallah, 139
Shu’ubiyyah, xxi,
146, 147, 149 simple (basil), 157 simple truths (haqa’iq basitah), 97 sina'a nazariyya (speculative art), 44 sina'a qanuniyya (axiomatic art of the rules), 44
al-Sirdt al-muslaqim (Straight
Path), 126
Sirhindi, Shaykh
Ahmad, 138 A
Socio-Intellectual History of the
Isnd 'Ashari Shi'ism in India, 137
Socratic Method,
93
Sophia Perennis, 6, 23, 65, 103
Soul, 97
soul (jdn), 72
soul (rawdn), 70
Spain, 122, 140,
141
specific
difference (fast), 93 speculative art. See art,
speculative
Spinoza, 51
spirit of God (Ruh al-qudus), 153.
See also Gabriel
spirits of man (arwdh), 86 spiritual guardian (wait), 75 spiritual jurist guardian (wali-yi
faqih), 75
Substance, 97,
111, 157
substantial
light. See light, substantial
Sudanese, 154
Sudani, 158
Sufi (s), xv,
xvi, 5, 6, 10, 17, 23, 51, 60, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 72,
73, 74, 78,
80,81,88,91,92, 103, 116, 127, 132, 159, 163; doctrines, 37; language, 19;
literature, 14, 18, 20, 21; path, 72, 91, 92; poetry, 21, 126, 131; symbolism,
23, 147; tradition, 138; views, 9; writings, xx. See also Sufism
Sufi Essays, 137
Sufism, xv, xx,
5, 6, 9, 116, 121, 128, 131; philosophical, xx, 78-121, 128; See also Sufi (s)
Sunni. See Islam,
Sunni supreme, the (al-a‘zam), 80 supreme archetype. See
arche- type(s), supreme
supreme light.
See light, supreme Surush (Gabriel), 84 suspended forms. See
forms, suspended
suspending
archetypes. See archetypes, suspending
synthesis (tarhib), 94
Syria, xxi, 1, 3,
122, 139, 140, 150
Tabataba’i,
‘Allamah Sayyid Husayn, 136
Tabaqat al-umam (Categories of
People), 146
Tablets of Tmdd-al-Din, The (Alwdh
‘imadi), 1,
8, 15-17, 44, 88
Tabrizi, Mulla
Rajab ‘Ali, 127 Tahdfut
al-faldsifah (The
Incoherence of the Philosophers), 5 Tahminah, 21
Ta'liqat ‘ala
Sharh hikmat al-ishrdq, (Classes on the Commentary of the Philosophy of
Illumination),
129
Taliqani, Mir
Sayyid Hasan, 128 alTalunhdt (The
Book of
Intimations), I, 8, 9-10, 11, 12, 36, 44, 88, 94, 122,
140, 141 Tamhid al-qawd‘id
(Introduction to
the Fundamental Principles), 124 Taqdisdt, 126
Taqhribirdi,
Yusuf ibn, 2
Taqwim al-imdn (Rectification the
Faith), 126
Tdrikh al-fikr fi 'l-falsafi
al-Islam
(History of Philosophical Thought
in Islam),
147
Thackston, W.M.,
7
Thaldth rasa il fi ’l-hikmat
al-isldmiyyah (Three Treatises on Islamic Philosophy), 136
Theologia, 10
theology, 116
theosophers, 58,
59, 100; Persian
(hukamdyi Fars), 84;
transcendental,
133
theosophia, 58
theosophical:
epistemology, 20;
ideas, 127;
system, 20
theosophist (hakim), xviii, 24
theosophy, 16,
52, 53, 58, 59, 116;
israqi, 129; transcendental (al-hikmat al-muta 'aliyyah), 128, 135, 138
theurgy (tilismdt), 82
third teacher (mu'allim al-thdlith), 124
Three Muslim Sages, 137
Topics, 44
transcendence (laduniyyah), 160
treatment (tanbih), 155
Tuba tree, 64
Tughlug,
Sultan Muhammad ibn, 137 '
Tunkabuni, Mirza
Tahir, 135
Turkey, xxi, 139
Turkish, 139
(libraries)
Tusi,
Khwajah Nasir al-Din, 122, ' 123, 137 '
Tustari, 10, 52
twelve-Imam
Shi'ite, 127
al-Ufuq al-mubin (The Clear
Horizon), 126
‘ulamd, 116
al-ummahat (the mothers), 46
universal, 93
universals, 51, 163
universal body, 156
universal
Intellect, See Intellect, universal
Urdibihisht, 46, 82
Usui al-fusul (Principles of
Distinctions),
127
Usuul al-kdfi (The Sufficient
Principles),
126, 129
veil (hijab), 89
vicegerent of God
(khalifat Allah), 4, 52, 53, 75
virtue (husn), 68
vision (mushdhidah), 89, 99, 132; and intellection, 90-92
Vohuman (Bahman), 46
wdhib al-suwar, 158
al-Wariddt wa’l-taqdisdt
(Invocations and Prayers), 7, 9, 25
Weishaput, Adam,
142
West, the, 122,
140
Western, 142
Western world,
140
will power (himmah), 65 wird (mantra), 72 witnesses (shahid), 89 works. See texts
Yazddn shindkht (Knowledge of the
Divine), 8, 24, 50, 51,
74, 75
yearning (mahabbah), 79 young-old master (pir-i
jawdn), 68 yourself (dhdtika), 110
Zal, 21
Zahhak, 16
Zahir, Malik, 1,
2, 3, 4
Zanjan, 1
Zia’i, H., xvii,
4, 44, 45
zodiac, 154, 155
Zoroastrian:
Angelology, 25, 46, 84; angels, 25, 45; community, 137; elements, 3, 4;
dualism, 43; religion, xx, 6, 47, 83;
symbols, 8, 32;
symbolism, 15, 21, 147; tradition, 81, 82;
Weltanschauung 32
Zoroastrianism,
16, 148
Zunuzi, Mulla
‘Ali, 134
Suhrawardi’s classification is based
upon intensity of light or darkness which is different from the traditional Ibn
Sinian concept of hierarchies of realities, each of which are different in the
degree to which they possess “being.” The ordinary light that the eye can see
is only one manifestation of the light of lights with a specific
[1] Logic deals with conception and assent insofar
as they may be true; (2) logic is a speculative art (sind'a nazariyya) which
deals with conception and assent, the form of syllogism and the secondary
intelligibles; (3) logic is an axiomatic art of the rules (sind'a qdnuniyya)
which guards the human mind against error in thinking.38
As far as formal differences between Suhrawardi and Peripatetics are
concerned, Suhrawardi does not adhere to the nine books of Aristotle’s Organon.
First of all, the Categories are absent from Suhrawardi’s analysis and
there are only brief references to them in the Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics.
While there is no separate treatment of Aristotle’s Categories as most
of the Peripatetics (i.e. Ibn Sina) have done, Suhrawardi does consider the
Aristotelian categories and in fact reduces them from ten to four, with motion
being a new category.
H. Zia’i argues in his work, Philosophy of
Illumination,™ that while Suhrawardi does not deviate from the Peripatetic
logic in a major way in the Intimations and Conversations, he
does offer a “new structure” of logic in the Hikmat al-ishraq. This new
structure according to Zia’i divides the field of logic into three general
areas:
[2] ON
LIGHT AND ITS VARIETIES
The centrality of light as an axiomatic phenomenon in Suhrawardi’s
philosophy has been alluded to before. In the Hikmat al-ishrdq2
Suhrawardi devotes a major part of the book to an exposition of the nature,
place and varieties of light that exist as a hierarchy at the top of which
exists the light of lights, from which all lights emanate. At the bottom, there
is darkness or absence of light (‘adam) represented by corporeality or
inanimate objects (barzakh).
[3] ISHRAQI
PHILOSOPHERS BEFORE THE SCHOOL OF
ISFAHAN
period,
who for all practical purposes are considered to belong to the school of
Isfahan, are Sadr al-Din Dashtaki and his son, Ghiyath al-Din Mansur Dashtaki.
Mansur wrote extensively on the Peripatetics, such as his commentary on the Ishdrdt
and a treatise on ethics. However, it is his commentary on Suhrawardi’s Haydkil
al-nur that shows the extent of Suhrawardi’s influence even on certain peripatetics.
His works offer a perfect representation of ishraqi philosophy and
particularly influenced Mulla Sadra, for whom he was often mistaken. In a
sense, Mansur represents a successful attempt to bring about a rapprochement
between the Peripatetic philosophy as represented by Ibn Sina and the ishraqi
tradition.
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