Springer The Intend/Foresee Distinction and the Problem of "Closeness"
Author(s): William J. Fitzpatrick
Source: Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol.
128, No. 3 (Apr., 2006), pp. 585-617
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4321737
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Philosophical
Studies (2006) 128:585-617 DOI 10.1007/sll098-004-7824-z
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK
THE INTEND/FORESEE DISTINCTION AND THE
PROBLEM OF “CLOSENESS”
ABSTRACT. The distinction between
harm that is intended as a means or end, and harm that is merely a foreseen
side-effect of one’s action, is widely cited as a significant factor in a
variety of ethical contexts. Many use it, for example, to distinguish terrorist
acts from certain acts of war that may have similar results as side-effects.
Yet Bennett and others have argued that its application is so arbitrary that if
it can be used to cast certain harmful actions in a more favorable light, then
it can equally be manipulated to do the same for any kind of harmful action. In
response, some have tried to block such extensions of the intend/foresee
distinction by rejecting its application in cases where the relation between
the plainly intended means and the harm is “too close”. This move, however, has
been attacked as vague and obscure, and Bennett has argued that all the
plausible candidates for explicating the idea of excessive closeness ultimately
fail. In this paper, I develop and defend an account of excessive closeness
with the aim of rescuing the intend/foresee distinction from such charges of
arbitrariness. The account is based on the distinction between merely causal
and constitutive relations among states of affairs, and I show
both how it escapes Bennett’s objections to other accounts and how it applies
to a variety of cases. Finally, I also examine Quinn’s alternative move of
shifting the focus of the intend/ foresee distinction in an attempt to sidestep
the issue of closeness, and argue that it is not ultimately successful. In
fact, Quinn’s view has shortcomings that can be resolved only by returning to
an appeal to some notion of closeness, underscoring the need for the sort of
account I offer.
1.
INTRODUCTION
The intend/foresee distinction has long played a role in ethical
thought, and while some of its traditional applications no longer have much
appeal outside of the Catholic Church, it continues to be widely cited in a
variety of ethical debates. Even those who reject traditional moral appeals to
the intend/foresee distinction in voluntary end-of-life cases, for example,
often
find it indispensable to a proper characterization of terrorism, and
of what sets terrorism apart from other acts that may have similar results as
unintended side-effects (Quinn, 1993b). It also figures prominently in debates
over cloning for biomedical research, and not just from religious perspectives
(see FitzPatrick, 2003a). 1
The
intend/foresee distinction has typically (though not exclusively) been employed
in connection with the doctrine of double effect (DDE) - the idea, broadly,
that it is sometimes permissible to bring about as a foreseen but
unintended sideeffect some harm it would have been impermissible to aim
at as a means or as an end, all else being equal.1 We may distinguish,
for example, between foreseen but unintended harm to civilians (“collateral
damage”) caused by strategic strikes on nearby military targets, on one hand,
and intended harm to civilians brought about through terrorist strikes that
target civilians deliberately as a means to military, political or religious
ends, on the other. Acts involving the former are certainly not always or
easily justifiable, even in the context of an otherwise just war. Still, it is
a common and plausible thought that such acts may at least sometimes be morally
justified, while acts involving the deliberate targeting of civilians as means
are either never justified or are so only in much rarer and more extreme
circumstances. And while it may be possible to account for this thought in
part by appeal to consequentialist considerations (“terrorism doesn’t work”),
many feel a strong pull to locate the moral difference directly in the
intend/foresee distinction itself - in the idea that there is something
distinctly problematic about intending harm to innocents as a means to one’s
ends. This seems to get at something missed not only by consequentialist
accounts, but also by accounts that focus exclusively on other constraints,
such as one built around the doing/ allowing distinction, since one is
plainly doing the harm to innocents in both bombing cases above.2
I
shall not be concerned here to try to show that the intend/ foresee distinction
is indispensable in normative ethics, though I believe it is. Instead, I wish
to examine and respond to a fundamental challenge that, if not
successfully answered,
threatens to undermine any serious role for it. This challenge
involves the charge that the application of the intend/foresee distinction is
so arbitrary and flexible that if it can be used to help justify what we would
like it to, then it can equally be manipulated to help justify almost
anything. Typically, this involves arguing that if one can drive a wedge
between what is intended and what is merely foreseen in one kind of case (e.g.
strategic bombing of military targets), then with a little cleverness one can
do the same even in what is usually offered as the contrasting case (e.g.
terror bombing of civilians). The distinction therefore appears too arbitrary
for principled moral application.
In
response, proponents of the moral significance of the intend/foresee
distinction may take either of two paths. One is to try to block such
extensions of the distinction to the “wrong” cases, giving a principled account
of why, for example, the deaths of civilians in the terror bombing case cannot
properly be described as unintended in any relevant sense. Thus, one might try
to show (following a suggestion from Anscombe and Foot) that the relation
between the plainly intended means and the harm in such cases is simply “too
close” to allow talk of aiming at the one without aiming at the other. The
second option is to shift the focus of the intend/foresee distinction away from
harm, so as to sidestep the whole issue of “closeness”. If what really
matters, for example, is not whether the harm itself is intended as a
means or end, but only - as Warren Quinn has argued - whether some involvement
is intended as a means where that involvement is foreseen to be harmful, then
we needn’t worry about clever arguments designed to show that even in the
disfavored cases (such as terror bombing) “the harm itself” may not be intended
(Quinn, 1993b, pp. 178-180).
With
regard to the first option, many have rightly complained that more needs to be
said about the obscure notion of “excessive closeness” before it can be relied
upon as a principled restriction on unwelcome extensions of the intend/foresee
distinction.3 Indeed, it was apparently pessimism over the prospects
of such an account that largely motivated Quinn’s shift to the second
alternative in his revisionary formulation of
the DDE, despite the fact that this involves a significant departure
from the real focus of the DDE, as Kamm has pointed out (1992, pp. 379-380).
But such pessimism is premature for two reasons. First, many cases - including
the terror bombing case, which largely motivated Quinn’s revisionary move - may
largely be handled just by clearing up confusions about their true structure,
without even getting into the issue of closeness. (Though we will see that if
one presses the case in a certain way then the issue of closeness can arise
here after all and will need to be dealt with.) Second, in cases where the
notion of closeness really is the primary issue, we can flesh out the notion of
excessive closeness in terms of a distinction concerning the relation among
relevant states of affairs, thus providing a principled way of blocking
implausible applications of the intend/foresee distinction.
I shall take up these points in turn, beginning in Section 2 with an
examination of how a familiar range of problem cases can largely be handled
without even appealing to the notion of closeness. I will then go on in
Sections 3,4 and 5 to develop and defend a positive account of “excessive
closeness” to deal with the kinds of cases that genuinely require it, beginning
with relatively clear cases and then exploring a number of complications to
flesh out the account. I do not pretend that the proposed account eliminates
all gray areas, which I believe is a dubious aim in any case. It will be enough
if it allows us to defend a wide and important range of applications of the intend/foresee
distinction in ethics against the above charges of arbitrariness. Finally, I
will conclude by arguing that Quinn’s alternative, while it can successfully be
defended against many objections that critics such as Bennett have raised
against it, has shortcomings that can be resolved only by returning to an
appeal to some notion of closeness - underscoring the need for the sort of
account I offer here.4
2.
MISTAKING PROXIMATE MEANS
FOR SIDE-EFFECTS
There is a class of cases that might at first seem to threaten
limitless applications of the intend/foresee distinction unless we
block them by restrictions on “closeness”, but which upon
examination can largely be dismissed by resolving a basic misunderstanding over
their structure. A well-known example comes from Bennett (though his use of it
has changed somewhat over the years): what is to stop even a terror bomber
from claiming that he does not intend the deaths of the civilians he targets
with lethal force, on the grounds that all he really needs is for them
to appear dead for long enough to demoralize the enemy and hasten the
end of the war? Since “there is nothing requiring that the people actually
become dead”, why can’t the terror bomber say he intends only to bring
about the appearance of death, merely foreseeing that his bombs
will kill people? (Bennett, 1981, pp. 111-113; 1995, pp. 210-212).
In
his most recent discussion of this case, Bennett calls this a “mad result” and
“outright crazy” (1995, p. 211, 210), and uses the case simply to point out the
failure of one particular proposal for delineating the idea of excessive
closeness, which he argues would fail to block such results.5
Originally, however, the example was introduced as allegedly revealing a
general problem for the inherently messy concept of intending something as
a means, which “cannot be given a firm, clear theoretical grounding [that]
implies what we think true and not what we think false regarding what people
intend” (1981, p. 113). The suggestion was that we seem to be stuck with such
absurd results due to the vagueness and arbitrariness of the concept of
intending something as a means, which is precisely why he advocated jettisoning
it from first-order moral thinking. And this argument has been taken seriously:
as already mentioned, it is what led Quinn to abandon the traditional DDE and
to propose instead a significantly revised version that he thought would avoid
such problems. But is it really so hard to dispose of cases like this, so as to
keep a grip on a reasonably disciplined notion of intending something as a
means?
On
the face of it, we can fairly easily see what is wrong with the sort of claim
Bennett’s terror bomber wishes to make about his intentions, and we don’t need
to appeal to any refined notion of “closeness” to explain it. The terror
bomber seems just to be mistaking a more proximate intended means for a foreseen
but unintended side-effect.6
His end is to hasten the conclusion of the war, and the means he chooses to fix
attention on is to make lots of civilians on the enemy’s side appear to be
dead (thus demoralizing the enemy). But the obvious question to ask is: how
does the bomber intend to accomplish that? And the answer is: by
killing them, which he does by dropping lethal bombs on them. For one very easy
and effective way to make lots of people appear dead is to kill them, and that
is exactly the proximate means the bomber has chosen to take (by the
still more proximate means of dropping his bombs) to make them appear dead.
Their being killed, then, is not a merely foreseen but unintended side-effect
of his act, but his relatively proximate intended means to bring about the thing
he prefers to focus on (their appearing to be dead), which is just a relatively
less proximate means along the very same chain. The bomber drops his bombs as
an intended means of killing people, which he intends as a means to make them
appear dead, which he intends as a means of demoralizing the enemy, which he
intends as a means of hastening a favorable end to the war.
The fact that the bomber would be just as happy if “by some miracle”
the bombs he dropped only knocked people out from the shock waves (all the
shrapnel having gathered, by some quantum mechanical accident, in an unoccupied
corner of the village), making them appear dead for a time, is irrelevant. All
that shows is that their deaths were not aimed at as ends, and that the
bomber’s end could conceivably be achieved in other ways - as with the help of
such a miracle. This does not show that he was not in fact aiming at
their deaths as his actual chosen means to his end. On the contrary, it
is clear that he was: for having no control over miracles, and having no
special “knock-out” bombs with which he could honestly try to knock people out
without killing them, he simply dropped lethal bombs on a civilian population;
and he obviously did this because he knew that this was a way to pursue his goals,
making his targets appear dead by killing them, which is what the bombs he used
do. The same may be said in the case of someone who deliberately shoots a
fleeing mugger with lethal force, and then claims that his intent was only to
“stop” him so
that the stolen wallet might be retrieved. It may be true that the
agent intended to stop the mugger as a means of getting his wallet back, but
where a shotgun was aimed carefully at the mugger’s back it is equally obvious
that the means by which the agent intended to stop the mugger was to
kill or at least gravely injure him. This fact cannot be avoided by some “inner
act of ‘directing [one’s] intention’,” because to an important extent
“circumstances, and the immediate facts about the means you are choosing to
your ends, dictate what descriptions of your intention you must admit”
(Anscombe, 2001, p. 63).
This
suggests that Quinn needn’t have been led by worries about such cases to
shift away from traditional concerns about intending vs. foreseeing harm: we
can apparently put a stop to absurd extensions of the idea of merely foreseen
but unintended harm simply by attending more carefully to the structure of the
cases, without even having to appeal to any controversial notion of closeness.
In fact, however, this is too hasty: for there is one response open to the
terror bomber that will in fact lead us right to the real problem of closeness
that arises for other kinds of case as well, so that a complete answer even to
this sort of case will require an account of excessive closeness. The problem
is that the terror bomber might reply to the above argument by saying that his
more proximate intended means of making the civilians appear dead is not killing
them per se, but only impacting them sufficiently with the bombs to put them in
a condition of appearing dead. He doesn’t deny the intention of that proximate
means, but only denies that their death or even their harm as such is
intended as a means, though he admits it is foreseen as a side-effect of the
intended means.7
This
ought, I believe, to strike us once again as sophistry, but it is not as easily
exposed and dismissed as the initial claim. A proper answer to this more subtle
claim will require a careful look at the notion of excessive closeness, to
flesh out and support the plausible idea that (i) people’s being impacted with
ordinary lethal bombs in such a way as to make them appear dead, and (ii) their
being killed, are too closely related to allow conceptual room for the bomber
to intend the first without intending the second (at least where he is aware of
the relation
between the two, and not deluded about how the bombs work). Let us
turn, then, to some familiar cases that highlight this issue more clearly,
without the distraction of potential confusions between side-effects and
proximate means.
3.
EXCESSIVE CLOSENESS: THE
BASIC ACCOUNT8
One classic example presents us with a large man hopelessly stuck in
the exit of a cave, trapping his unfortunate fellow explorers inside: if they
blow him to bits with some handy dynamite as a means to their end of clearing
the exit and escaping, can they then claim that his death was a foreseen but
unintended side-effect of their action - not only unintended as an end (since
they presumably weren’t aiming at his death for its own sake), but equally
unintended as a means? Another familiar case involves a craniotomy abortion: if
a doctor aims at crushing a fetus’s skull as a means of removing the fetus in
an emergency and saving the woman, can he then claim that its death was merely
a foreseen but unintended side-effect - not only not intended as an end, but
also not intended as a means?9 (See Foot, 1994a, p. 268 for both
cases.) We may set aside the question whether so acting in these cases is
ultimately morally justified for other reasons: our concern here is simply with
the plausibility of these claims about intention. And as Foot has observed, to
allow such claims would “make nonsense of [the intend harm/foresee harm
distinction] from the beginning”, rendering it so flexible as to make it
worthless for purposes of moral discrimination (Foot, 1994a, pp. 268-269). We
thus need a principled way of explaining why its application cannot properly be
extended in these ways.
It is not possible to dispense with these claims in the same way we
originally sought to deal with the terror bomber’s claim above (a move that
proved to be incomplete in any event). In the cave case, for example, the
agents grant that they intend to blow the man to bits as a means of clearing
the exit, and we cannot dismiss their further claim not to intend his death by
showing that they aim at his being killed as a more proximate means to
bring about his being blown to bits: for it is not true that they
seek to blow him to bits by killing him (in the way that the terror
bomber was originally accused of seeking to make people appear dead by killing
them); the structure here is plainly different. Similarly with the craniotomy
case: it is not as if the doctor accomplishes his means of crushing the fetus’s
skull by killing the fetus, so he is not guilty of mistaking more
proximate means for unintended side-effects. Instead, the problem in these
cases is the same problem we were left with after considering the terror
bomber’s potential response to the earlier objection - a problem concerning the
splitting of hairs in ways that seem implausible, though it is not easy to
explain why.
The
problem, we might again like to say, is that the relation between what is
admittedly aimed at as a means, on one hand, and the harm or death, on the
other hand, is “too close” to allow for talk of aiming at the former without
aiming at the latter (at least where the connection is known to the agent, as
we shall assume throughout). For example, the relation between someone’s being
blown to bits, on one hand, and his being killed or his death, on the other, is
simply “too close” to allow for talk of aiming at the former but not at the
latter, as a means to one’s end. The difficulty, however, is to give an account
of what this means. Bennett has offered the most rigorous and interesting
discussion to date of many of the natural possibilities. Yet while he does
ultimately offer a very minimal and vague way of trying to answer the
sophistical terror bomber, he does not take this to provide much support for a
robust use of the intend/foresee distinction, and he rejects all the more substantive
proposals for understanding “excessive closeness” as clear failures (Bennett,
1995, pp. 203-213). There is, however, an important candidate that he has failed
to consider properly, and it is this idea that I shall build upon. My proposal
may be summarized as follows, to be developed and refined in Sections 4 and 5:
The relation between the intended
means and the harm in question is “too close” to allow for application of the
intend/foresee distinction when the relation between the relevant states of
affairs is a constitutive one rather than a merely causal
one.10
We may begin to elucidate this claim by first considering a simple
case in which the relation is merely causal, and hence not “too close”,
after which it will be easier to see what is different about cases in which the
relation is instead constitutive. In turning a runaway trolley off of the
crowded track on which it is traveling and onto a side track in order to
minimize harm, an agent does not intend the subsequent death of the one
person stuck on the side track, which is no part of her plan even if it is foreseen;
the very presence of the one on the side track is entirely incidental, and his
death is not in any sense being used as a means to accomplish the goal of
getting the trolley turned away from the crowd and minimizing harm, though it
is a foreseen side-effect of doing so (Foot, 1994a, p. 270).11 Similarly,
in the strategic bombing case mentioned earlier, the pilot targets a munitions
plant, intending its destruction as a means to win the war, but does not
similarly intend the foreseeable harm to nearby civilians from the fallout as a
means to anything; that harm is no part of the agent’s plan, and the very
presence of the civilians is incidental to it.
What creates the conceptual space for such claims about intention,
so that they can be made without lapsing into sophistry? The key is that the
relation between what the trolley driver aims at as a means, i.e. the trolley’s
being diverted away from the crowd, and a person’s subsequently being killed
down the side track, is merely causal: the trolley’s being diverted
certainly causes the one down the side-track to be killed, but the trolley’s being
diverted clearly isn’t constitutive of his being killed. We can thus
clearly distinguish between the trolley’s being diverted and various distinct
results of this, such as a person’s being killed down the side-track. And
when combined with the other features of the case, this provides us with the
conceptual space to say without sophistry that the agent aimed at the one thing
(the trolley’s being diverted) but not at the other (the person’s being killed)
as a means to her end. Similarly with a straightforward strategic bombing case
(though we will also have to consider harder cases later): the factory’s being
destroyed certainly causes the nearby civilians to be harmed from the
fallout, but the factory’s being destroyed is plainly not
constitutive of their being harmed, and
this is important to one’s being able to claim that one aimed at a factory’s
being destroyed as a means without thereby aiming at neighboring civilians’
being harmed as a means.
By
contrast, a man’s being blown to bits is not a cause of his being
killed, as a Trolley’s being turned onto a side track is a cause of the one
person’s being killed when it proceeds to roll over him. The detonation of the
dynamite is the cause of the man’s being blown to bits and of his being killed,
but his being blown up is constitutive of his being killed.
The people in the cave aim at his being blown up (as a means to clear the exit
and escape), and the problem is that the constitutive relation between this
and his being killed closes off any space for the intend/foresee distinction:
they can’t aim at his being blown to bits without aiming at his being killed,
because this is not merely a matter of one thing resulting in another distinct
thing (as the trolley’s being turned resulted in the person’s being killed),
but a matter of the one thing’s being constitutive of the other. One can no
more aim at a man’s being blown to bits without aiming at his being killed than
one can aim (literally) at a spot on a target without aiming at the target it
partly constitutes. Similarly with the crushing of a fetus’s skull: the
fetus’s skull’s being crushed constitutes its being seriously injured or
killed, rather than just being a cause of it, so that it is impossible to aim
at the first without thereby aiming at the second (except in the unlikely case
of ignorance of the relation between skull crushing and injury or death, which
we may set aside).12 Again, we can contrast this with the trolley
case, for even though someone is foreseeably crushed in the trolley case as
well, the structure of that case is different: it is not the crushing we are
aiming at as a means, as in the craniotomy case, but just the turning of the trolley
away from the crowd; so there is not in that case the same problem of aiming at
something (the crushing) that is too intimately related to the harm to avoid
thereby aiming at the harm.
It
is sometimes objected to the claim that the physician intends the death of the
fetus in the craniotomy case that “it seems harsh to say that the physician
desires the death of the
fetus”: surely she may “view the death as a tragedy” and desire it
no more than does the physician who performs a hysterectomy on a pregnant
woman in order to remove a cancerous uterus (Delaney, 2001, p. 570). Similarly,
it will be said, in the cave case: the people in the cave do not desire the
man’s death, as shown by the fact that they regret his death, and have no
interest in seeking some more efficient way to kill him (such as lethal
injection), but “confine their satisfaction [and efforts] only to the success
of” the project of clearing the exit (Delaney, 2001, p. 575). This line of
objection, however, misses the point, at least if meant as an objection to the
claim that the deaths in such cases are intended rather than being merely
foreseen but unintended side-effects. The fact that the physician regrets the
death of the fetus in the craniotomy case no less than in the hysterectomy case,
or that the people in the cave are not interested in other ways to kill the
trapped man, shows only that the deaths are not desired for their own sakes,
as ends. It does not show that they are not relevantly intended as
means.13
The same point applies to counterfactual or hypothetical thoughts
such as “if the cancer could be removed without bringing about the death of the
fetus, then [the physician in both cases equally] would have absolutely no
reason to bring it about” (Delaney, 2001, p. 571): this shows that the
physician does not desire the death of the fetus as an end, but it
leaves open the question whether she nonetheless intends it as a means.
This is a point we have already seen in Section 2 about the limitations of
counterfactual and hypothetical “tests”, in connection with the example of the
terror bomber and his dispositions in certain miraculously altered situations.
In the present, more complicated, set of cases, the point is that while the
deaths are not aimed at as ends, there is something that (despite the
counterfactuals and hypotheticals) is in fact clearly aimed at as a means,
which is too closely related to the deaths for the latter to be regarded
as mere side-effects in the course of pursuing the end. The physician, for
example, obviously needn’t desire the death of the fetus for its own sake, but
she does desire and intend the fetus’s skull’s being crushed. And the claim is
that because this is constitutive of the fetus’s being
seriously injured or killed, rather than just being a cause of it,
the physician cannot correctly categorize the fetus’s being seriously injured
or killed as a merely foreseen but unintended side-effect.
4.
DEVELOPMENT AND
CLARIFICATION OF THE ACCOUNT
There are several important points to make about this proposed
account of the notion of closeness. The first is that it is important to attend
carefully to linguistic constructions, and so to whether we are speaking of
states of affairs or of acts. I have claimed that the trolley’s being
diverted and the person’s being killed are distinct states of
affairs, the former being a cause of the latter, rather than constitutive of
it. But this is not to deny the plausible claim that my diverting the
trolley is identical to my killing the person on the side-track,
i.e. that there is one act here - perhaps a single movement of my hand -
that falls under various descriptions, rather than a performance of many successive
acts. (It’s not as if I first turned the trolley and then later did something
else that was the killing; rather, the various effects of my single action
become incorporated as further descriptions of what I did (Anscombe, 1963;
Davidson, 1980) - or so I shall assume here.) This thesis about act-identity is
consistent with my altogether different claim about the distinctness of
certain states of affairs, i.e. the trolley’s being diverted and the victim’s
being killed, one of which is aimed at and one of which is not. Similarly, my
claim about the constitutive relation in the cave and craniotomy cases is
consistent with the Anscombe-Davidson claim but is not to be confused with it: the
doctor’s crushing the fetus’s skull is the doctor’s killing the fetus
(the Anscombe-Davidson claim), but the distinct point I am making is that the
fetus’s skull’s being crushed is constitutive (and not a mere cause) of the
fetus’s being seriously injured or killed.
My
proposal thus avoids the difficulties Bennett has raised for the hopeless
attempt to use the Anscombe-Davidson thesis of act-identity to explicate the
idea of closeness. Such a move
would obviously be futile because it would wind up tying things too
closely together even in cases where things are not plausibly “too
close”. Since my turning the trolley just is my killing the person on
the side track, for example, if we took this sort of identification to be
what squeezes out any room for the intend harm/foresee harm distinction, then
we would disqualify the trolley case no less than the cave and craniotomy cases
(see Bennett, 1981, pp. 108-109; 1995, pp. 207-208). Again, this is not a
problem for my proposal, where the idea of being “too close” is understood in
terms of a constitutive relation between states of affairs rather than in terms
of the identification of the agent’s X-ing with the agent’s Y-ing. In some
cases, such as the trolley example, the relation between the relevant states of
affairs is merely causal, and there is room for the intend/foresee distinction;
in other cases, such as the cave example, the relation is a constitutive one,
in which case there is not.
A second important point is that nothing we have said requires in
general that the harm be at most likely but not inevitable if the intend
harm/foresee harm distinction is to apply.14 In the trolley case,
for example, the driver might see with certainty that the one on the side track
will be run over and killed, yet this does nothing to undermine her claim that
it was merely a foreseen but unintended side-effect, entirely incidental to
her plan: it simply underscores the “foreseen”. What matters is the relation
between the intended means and the harm, and if this is merely causal and not
constitutive, then the intend/foresee distinction might apply even if the harm
is foreseen with certainty. It is partly for this reason that I reject the
suggestion (explored and also rejected by Bennett, 1995, p. 209) that causal
necessitation is the relation that makes two states of affairs “too close”
to allow room for aiming at one without aiming at the other: the inevitability
of harm is not to the point. Similarly with the relation of logical
entailment, which Bennett also considers and rejects: that would, among
other things, capture too little, since a fetus’s skull’s being crushed does
not logically entail its being seriously injured or killed, but is intuitively
a central case of excessive closeness. This idea is properly captured by
focusing on the fact that the
fetus’s skull’s being crushed is constitutive of its being seriously
injured or killed.
There are admittedly some things we may not be able to say
where the harm is foreseen as inevitable. It will not be possible, for example,
to say that the harm to civilians from a bombing was an accident in a
case where there was not merely a foreseeable risk of harm from a miss or from
fallout, but virtual certainty of harm given the nature or strength of the bomb
or the degree of proximity. And such actions will obviously be subject to
criticism if insufficient measures were taken to protect civilians, which is
what underlies criticism of the US Army’s continued use of cluster munitions,
for example (as in the latest war in Iraq), which pose special and ongoing
dangers to civilians. Setting that problem to one side, however, the mere fact
of inevitability of harm clearly does not turn the strategic bomber into the
equivalent of the terror bomber, who targets civilians and aims at their harm
as a means: whether the harm is literally “accidental” or not, it is at any
rate not aimed at as a means or as an end.
This point, however, must not be pushed too far. Consider the case
of area bombing, where a broad area containing both civilians and a
targeted militant, for example, is destroyed as a means of killing the latter.
Here again the harm to civilians is inevitable, but there is a difference from
the strategic bombing case. The strategic bomber can honestly say that he was
aiming (literally) only at the munitions plant and not at civilians, striving
to hit it and not them, despite the fact that the fallout would inevitably kill
those very nearby. In such a case, we still have a merely causal relation
between the plant’s being destroyed (which was his aim) and the resultant harm.
By contrast, the area bomber cannot say that he is trying to hit only the
militant and not the civilians: by using a blunt weapon that destroys the
entire area, he leaves behind the possibility of any such discrimination, and
this changes the structure of the case. His means to the end of killing the
militant is to obliterate a large area containing him, which also happens to
contain civilians, and so the question is how the obliteration of this area
that contains both the militant and civilians is related to the
harm to the civilians. The answer, I believe, is that an area’s
being obliterated is constitutive of its occupants’ being destroyed,
making it sophistical to speak of aiming at the one without aiming at the
other. That is, while the bomber’s proximate instrumental means to kill
the militant is to drop the bomb, this works by destroying an entire
area, and an area’s being destroyed is constitutive of its living
occupants’ being destroyed, much as a computer file’s being erased is
constitutive of the contained text’s being erased.15
This serves as an answer to the “casuistical problem” that led Nagel
(1979, pp. 59-63) at one point to shy away from the intend/foresee distinction,
and explains why such cases of inevitable harm preclude its
application. At the same time, to reject the application of the intend/foresee
distinction in the case of area bombing, and to suggest that it is
significantly more problematic than strategic bombing, is not to deny that area
bombing is still morally different from terror bombing. One clear difference is
that in area bombing - and likewise in “human shields” cases, where innocents
are contained within a legitimate target such as a military bunker - the
civilians’ presence is entirely incidental: their welfare is being sacrificed
in the pursuit of the end, but neither they nor their harm are being used as means,
whereas in the terror bombing case their presence and harm are
straightforwardly needed and used as means.16 The area bomber, like
the strategic bomber and the one who attacks even in the face of human shields,
acts despite the harm to civilians, while the terror bomber seeks it
out. The latter behavior is likely to strike us, plausibly, as typically
worse. Again, this is not to deny that the former may be seriously wrong, and
all the more so if the act exhibits callous indifference to innocent life, as
where the goal was of insufficient importance to justify such harm in any case.17
But where all else is held equal, it will clearly be at least as bad, and
plausibly worse, deliberately to seek out the deaths of innocents with a
strategic eye toward using them to further one’s goals, treating innocent
people “as if they were then and there for [one’s] purposes” (Quinn,
1993b, p. 190).
I shall not here attempt to defend this intuitive moral claim, since
such matters lie beyond the scope of the present investi-
gation. But it is worth noting the implausibility of one attempt to
turn the tables here. Bennett (1995, p. 218) suggests that what the strategic
bomber or area bomber (in contrast to the terror bomber) does “is in a way
worse than treating [his victims] as means. He is treating them as nothing;
they play no part in his plan; he is not even treating them as means.”
This is surely unpersuasive. As Bennett himself notes, the agent needn’t be
simply disregarding the value of his victims, “treating them as nothing,” but
may take their value very seriously, acting in spite of it only after
having carefully weighed it against what he takes to be the overwhelming
importance of the military objective. It is hard to see how the fact that he is
not further intending to exploit their deaths in the manner of the terror
bomber can be used against him, as if somehow aiming at the deaths of
innocents as a means to one’s ends shows greater respect for them.
A
third point of clarification is that the proposed way of cashing out the issue
of excessive closeness makes no appeal to the degree to which actions of the kind
in question tend to be associated with the kind of harm in question. Quinn
finds appeals to closeness uninviting because he assumes (following a suggestion
from Hart) that it depends on such a distinction, the idea being that the
relation between an intended means and a harm is too close if actions of that
kind are “invariably connected with” harms of that kind - an idea he goes on
to undermine with counterexamples (Quinn, 1993b, pp. 179-180). But this is a
confusion. What allows the death in the trolley case to be a foreseen but
unintended side-effect is not the fact that trolley turnings are not invariably
associated with killings on side tracks, and what disqualifies the death of the
fetus in the craniotomy case from being a merely foreseen but unintended
side-effect is not the fact that fetal skull crushings are invariably
associated with fetal deaths. What matters is just the nature of the relation between
the intended means and the harm in the individual case - i.e. whether it is
merely causal or constitutive. This focus avoids the difficulties Quinn raises.
Finally,
it is important to note one limitation of the proposal. In all the examples I
have considered, the relevant
relation between states of affairs - whether merely causal or
constitutive - is simply a matter of natural fact. But there are also
cases where the relation is determined by merely conventional
arrangements involving the agency of others, and it may be much less clear what
to say about such cases. For example, there may be a convention in place
stipulating that a student who receives an “F” in any class is thereby
ineligible for financial aid: having an “F” constitutes ineligibility
for financial aid. Now I may or may not be aware of this policy. If I am
unaware of it, obviously I can intend a student’s being given an “F” without
thereby intending his being rendered ineligible for financial aid. But suppose
I am aware of the policy (the same knowledge assumption we made in all
the other cases). If we treat this case in the same way as the others, we must
conclude that I cannot intend a student’s being given an “F” without thereby
intending his being rendered ineligible for financial aid - for the relation is
constitutive, not merely causal. But is that a plausible result? Even if I am
aware of the policy, I may dislike it and regard it as unfair, in which case it
might seem quite possible for me to intend the student’s receiving an “F”
(because he failed my class and I am concerned to give him the grade he
deserves) without thereby intending his being rendered ineligible for
financial aid - this being a merely foreseen but unintended side-effect of my
giving him the grade he deserves.18
It
may be possible to handle this objection by just biting the bullet and
defending the original implication. After all, the doctor who performs the
craniotomy may well regret the death of the fetus, and dislike
the connection between the procedure and the fetus’s death, but that does not
undermine the conclusion that the death is intended in that case rather than
being a mere side-effect. So it is not obvious that the grading case is really
any different. Still, there is significant intuitive force in the thought that
it is, so that it is worth considering whether we can give a principled
explanation for why this case may be an exception, allowing for the intend/
foresee distinction despite the constitutive relation between states of
affairs.
A
plausible answer is that the merely conventional status of the
constitutive relation is what opens up the space for the intend/foresee
distinction here, where there would not be such space in the case of a
naturally constitutive relation; and it does so at least partly because of the
involvement of others’ agency. In the grading case, not only do I perhaps
dislike the policy of making the presence of an “F” on a student’s transcript
constitutive of ineligibility for financial aid, but I can attribute its
existence and enforcement to another agent, such as the university
administration. There is a sense in which I can legitimately say: “I am simply
giving you the grade you deserve for my class, and the rest is someone else’s
doing, which I would prevent if I could.” By contrast, it would be absurd to
try to say something parallel in the cave or craniotomy cases, claiming that I
am simply blowing the man up or crushing the fetus’s skull and the rest is
someone else’s (the universe’s?) doing. There is no other agency in the natural
relation cases, so that the agent is the only one to whom the harm is to be
attributed. Thus, because of the constitutive relation between what the agent
aims at and the harm, there is no room for the intend/foresee distinction. But
in a merely conventional case, where the constitutive relation depends on
conventions involving other people’s agency, there is room for an agent to
distance herself from certain potentially quite arbitrary upshots of the
action. It is that distancing of one’s agency from such upshots that creates
conceptual space for the intend/foresee distinction here, despite the
constitutive relation between the relevant states of affairs.
Let
us, then, stipulate that the proposed account of “closeness” is to be
restricted to cases in which the relation in question is natural rather
than merely conventional. The claim, then, is that if the relation between two
states of affairs is known to the agent, natural, and constitutive rather than
merely causal, then we cannot properly speak of an agent’s intending the one
while merely foreseeing but not intending the other.
5.
COMPLICATIONS AND HARDER
CASES
The cases considered in Section 3 are relatively easy ones, at clear
ends of the spectrum. In the cave case, for example, the agent plainly aims to
do something foreseeably lethal to the victim himself as a means -
namely, to blown him up - and his being blown up is coincident with his
death. These factors make it natural to say not only that he is killed by
being blown up, but that his being blown up plainly constitutes his
being killed. Likewise with the craniotomy case. By contrast, in the trolley
case, the victim’s being killed is clearly distinct in time and place from the
trolley’s being turned, which latter doesn’t itself involve the victim at all,
but only an operation on an object. This makes it easy to say that the
trolley’s being turned is not constitutive of the victim’s being
killed, but only leads to it. But what if we modify the craniotomy or cave
cases to move them closer to the trolley case in certain respects? Suppose, for
example, that instead of the skull’s being crushed, it need only be partially
fractured or even just scratched, though this will foreseeably lead to
complications eventually resulting in the death of the fetus. Or suppose what
we need is not a man’s being blown up, but only his being cut, though this will
again foreseeably lead to his death. Someone might, say, cut an attacker with a
knife in self-defense, where she aims at his being sufficiently injured to
distract him long enough for her to get away, her only interest being in this
temporary distraction, not in his death, though this may foreseeably follow
later (perhaps because there is no medical aid available to stop the bleeding).
These
cases are like the original craniotomy or cave cases in that some injury to
the victim is plainly intended, unlike in the trolley case, where all that
is intended is the turning of the trolley; but these new cases are unlike the
cave and craniotomy cases and more like the trolley case in that the intended
effect - the scratching or cutting - is not coincident with the death,
and may even be quite removed from it. (Note that these cases are thus also
very different from the terror bomber case, where the agent pursues his goal of
making civilians appear dead by killing them. This is clearly not the
structure of the present
cases, since the death of the attacker in the cutting-in-selfdefense
case, for example, doesn’t even occur until after the relevant goal has
been achieved.) What we have here is a structure similar to Bennett’s example
of the politician who deliberately destabilizes a union in December to prevent
a strike at Christmas, foreseeing that this blow will lead ultimately to its
permanent disintegration, but being interested only in the more immediate
result of preventing the Christmas strike, not in the union’s demise (Bennett,
1995, p. 210). What does the proposed account say about such cases?
When the man in the cave entrance explodes, it is relevant that his
dying is not a separate event from his exploding, or at least
is so nearly coincident to it as to make it entirely natural to say of the
corresponding states of affairs that his being blown up is constitutive
of his being killed, as we have done. By contrast, in the
cutting-in-self-defense case, the man’s dying - perhaps a full day later - is
plainly a distinct event from the cutting, on virtually any plausible scheme
for carving up events.19 We say, then, that his being cut leads
to his death (though not that his being cut leads to his being killed,
since that would imply that his being cut led to some other lethal event, as if
it led him to walk in front of a car). And we do not say that his
being cut is (or is constitutive of) his being killed (though we
do say that the agent’s cutting him was her killing him, this
being the earlier point about act-identity). This is again because, unlike in
the case of someone’s being crushed or blown up, the cutting on Monday
is plainly a distinct event from the dying on Tuesday, which makes the
identification of his being cut with his being killed misleading,
despite the act-identity noted above. “His being killed” refers here in a
general way to the overall situation of which the cutting is a constituent, and
of course we will say later that he was killed by being cut. But where
the dying is so clearly a distinct event, as the man’s dying is here clearly
distinct from the cutting, it is not quite right to say that his being cut is
or constitutes his being killed, but only that it causes his
death. And this plausibly opens up conceptual space for the intend/foresee
distinction: the agent can intend his being cut, as a means to her end, without
thereby so intending his being
killed or his death. The sort of case in which she would intend his
being killed as a means to her end would be a different one, where she
deliberately shoots to kill, in order to immobilize him, in order to get away.
It will likely be objected here that while these cases are reasonably
clear in the relevant respects, one can easily describe cases along the
spectrum between the cave case and the cutting case, or between the craniotomy
case and one in which a scratch leads to an infection and death days later. And
this virtually guarantees gray areas where it won’t be at all clear whether or
not the dying is “a separate event” from the intended event, thus
reintroducing obscurity into the account at the level of events. Indeed,
it may seem in many cases to be more a matter of degree than a matter of
the events simply being distinct or not, especially given the vagueness
surrounding the very notion of the event of a person’s dying. Isn’t this,
then, still a problem of the very same sort we began with? Have we made any
real progress?
I believe that we have, and that the above considerations simply
point to a limitation inherent in the nature of the subject rather than a deep
problem for the account. We should fully acknowledge that there will be gray
areas, as there are for most interesting topics. But just as the fact of dusk
does not preclude our distinguishing day from night, the existence of gray
areas in a philosophical account needn’t undermine its interest or usefulness.
It will do so only if the cases we want to have something to say about always
lie squarely in the gray areas, so that the account proves incapable of
providing guidance. This, however, is not the case with regard to the
intend/foresee distinction, and we have made progress insofar as we can
account for a range of philosophically interesting cases where the relevant
factors are reasonably clear. The possibility of unclear cases does not detract
from an account of the clear ones, such as straightforward cases of strategic
vs. terror bombing. This is especially true if we understand why the unclear
cases are unclear - what makes them pull in different directions. If a case
lies along a spectrum somewhere between the cave case and the cutting case, we
may be unable to place it neatly in one or the
other category. But if our account allows us to describe what
matters about the case, what makes it fall where it does along the spectrum,
and perhaps which end it falls closer to, then that is enough to be
illuminating. The facts, and therefore any possible moral implications, may be
no more determinate than that, and an account should not aspire to outdo the
facts with artificially imposed precision.
The upshot for the above cases is that the proposed account allows -
correctly, I believe - that one can in principle intend such injuries as a
cutting, scratching, partial fracture or local disruption without
thereby intending the death or demise that eventually results, even if the
latter is foreseen. If the agent’s interest is only in a certain local effect -
such as distracting the attacker just long enough to get away, or temporarily
disrupting union operations to prevent a Christmas strike - then it is
plausible that clearly distinct further events may be merely foreseen but unintended,
and the account preserves this result. This does not, of course, guarantee that
the action will be morally justified. Whether the bringing about of foreseen
but unintended harms is justified depends on many further factors. In the case
of self-defense, it depends on whether the cutting was reasonably believed to
be necessary to ward off the attack, and whether the foreseen harm was
proportional to the harm being defended against. Similarly, we can recognize
that the politician did not intend the demise of the union as a means or end,
while still condemning his action on the grounds that he had no business doing
something that would foreseeably destroy the union. As Foot has argued,
initiating a harmful sequence of events will often be wrong, even if the harm
is only foreseen but not intended, since this will often violate negative
rights and duties (Foot, 1994a, b). We can thus allow the application of the
intend/foresee distinction in cases with this structure without fear that this
will automatically justify too much.20
In this section, we have so far been discussing hard cases that
share one feature of the earlier clear cases of excessive closeness - namely,
that the agent aims at doing (or allowing) something foreseeably lethal to
(or for) the victim himself as a means - while departing from the earlier
cases insofar as the death of the
victim is no longer roughly coincident with the intended
event. I have argued that this departure is often enough to open up sufficient
conceptual space for the intend/foresee distinction, which is at least
sometimes plausibly of moral significance and so should not be papered over (as
it is by Quinn’s shift in focus, discussed in Section 6). Let us now turn to
the reverse kind of hard case: what if the death of the victim is
roughly coincident with the plainly intended act, as in the cave and craniotomy
cases, but we depart from such cases insofar as the foreseeably lethal
involvement of the victim is now irrelevant to the agent’s purpose,
making it in this respect more like the trolley case?
This
is the structure of the familiar hysterectomy case, where a physician removes a
pregnant woman’s uterus as a means of preventing the spread of cancer,
foreseeably resulting in the death of the fetus. The involvement of the fetus
is not itself intended as a means, as the fetus’s presence is entirely
incidental to the physician’s purpose: she would have proceeded exactly as
before, removing the uterus, had the fetus not been present. This makes the
present case clearly different from the craniotomy case even though the death
may be similarly coincident with the plainly intended event (the removal of the
uterus). I believe it is again plausible to treat this variation as allowing
conceptual space for the intend/foresee distinction, so that the death of the
fetus is not intended as a means, though it is a foreseeable consequence of the
intended removal of the uterus (as a means to contain the cancer).21
The relation is not “too close” here because the fetus’s dying is plainly a distinct
event from the uterus’s removal, despite being roughly coincident in time with
it, and this in turn blocks the claim of constitution for the relevant states
of affairs. Whereas in the other cases, such as cutting-in-self-defense, the
relevant distinctness of events was made clear by temporal differences
(someone’s being cut on Monday is not the same event as his dying on Tuesday),
it is here brought out by the difference in the objects: the removal of
the uterus is plainly not the same event as the dying of the fetus.
As
before, then, while it is true that removing the uterus of a pregnant woman causes
the death of the fetus, we should resist any move to the claim that the
uterus’s being removed
constitutes the fetus’s being killed
in the way that its skull’s being crushed does. What it constitutes is
the initiation of a sequence leading quickly to the death of the fetus, but
that is a looser relation, and again allows conceptual space to speak of
intending the removal of the uterus as a means to the end of stopping the
spread of the cancer, without aiming at the death of the fetus as a means.
Compare: I need a plank for something, but someone is standing on it, so that
when I pull it out he falls and is injured. I intend the plank’s being removed
so that I can use it elsewhere, and the plank’s being removed leads immediately
to his injury, but the plank’s being removed is not constitutive
of his being injured (as his being blown up would be). According to the
account, then, it is possible for me to aim at the plank’s being removed as a
means to my end without thereby aiming at his being injured as a means
at all, his presence being incidental to my purposes. There will probably be
other considerations (such as my likely violation of his negative rights)
preventing the consideration about intention from doing much justificatory
work in this case, but the point is that the intend/ foresee distinction can
nonetheless apply in cases with this structure, and may at least sometimes
be morally relevant.
6.
CAN WE SIDESTEP THE ISSUE
OF CLOSENESS?
I have not attempted to provide a reductionist theory giving
necessary and sufficient conditions for a relation’s being constitutive rather
than merely causal, because I do not believe any such theory to be possible
without imposing unhelpfully artificial precision on a subject matter that is
inherently messy. As Quinn points out in another context, “almost no familiar
distinction that applies to real objects is clear in all cases, and
theoretical reducibility is a virtue only where things really are reducible”
(Quinn, 1993a, p. 157). Indeed, it is noteworthy that Bennett himself
ultimately downplays the significance of the existence of fuzzy borderline
cases, emphasizing instead his claim to have uncovered a much deeper difficulty
that is “less like twilight than like a blazing sun in a black, star-studded
sky” (Bennett, 1981, pp. 113-114). What he means here is his alleged
exposure of the “absurd results” to which our use of the concept of intending
something as a means gives rise. I have tried to show, however, that he has
not succeeded in this: there is no “blazing sun” here.
Still,
some may prefer to avoid reliance on this less than fully analyzed distinction
between merely causal and constitutive relations, at least if there is a
simpler alternative that can equally rescue moral uses of the intend/foresee
distinction from arbitrariness and absurdity. It is thus worth examining more
closely one prominent suggestion along these lines, to see whether it really
provides a satisfactory alternative.
In
an effort to avoid the complications surrounding the appeal to closeness, Quinn
(1993b, pp. 183-188) has proposed shifting the focus away from harm itself, so
that what is discriminated against is not just intending harm as a means or
end, but intending someone’s involvement in some harmful event, as a
means or end (i.e., “direct agency”). It has been pointed out that this is
ambiguous between (1) intending someone’s involvement in some event, as a means
or end, where such involvement will in fact be harmful to the person (whether
this is known to the agent or not), and (2) intending someone’s involvement in
some event, as a means or end, where it is known to the agent that such
involvement will be harmful to the person (Fischer et al., 2001, p. 193 f). I
believe it is clear from the kind of rationale Quinn gives for his view,
however, that it is the second, much more plausible, interpretation that is
intended. Let us, then, restrict our focus to that.
The
advantage of Quinn’s shift in the focus of the intend/ foresee distinction is
that we no longer need to try to determine whether “the harm itself” is
intended - i.e. as being “too close” to the intended means - or merely
foreseen: it is enough for “direct agency” that a certain involvement is
intended as a means or end and that this involvement is foreseen to be harmful
to the victim (except in cases where it is independently within the rights of
the agent to bring about such involvement, as discussed below). This is a
significant move, and it is worth
pointing out that at least some prominent arguments against Quinn’s
proposal fail.
Bennett, for example, offers as a counterexample a case in which we
quarantine a group of patients with a highly infectious disease while we await
the arrival of the special masks that will allow the doctors safely to treat
them - though we foresee that after a week the disease will almost certainly
have progressed too far for them to be cured. Now intuitively, we do not
intend their deaths, and this case thus belongs with the easier- to-justify
cases of merely foreseen harm, such as the trolley case. But Bennett thinks
that Quinn will be forced to treat it as a case of “direct agency,” because we
“intend to “involve” the infected people” - even, Bennett thinks, if we
“quarantine” them simply by removing ourselves (Bennett, 1995, pp. 212-213).
This is mistaken, however, for the simple reason that on Quinn’s view we have
direct agency only where the intended involvement is what leads to the harm for
those involved, and while it is true that we intend the patients to be isolated
from us, it is plainly not that “involvement” that kills them: what
kills them is their disease, and we certainly did not intend their continued
involvement with the disease as a means to some end of ours. The latter would
be the case in Quinn’s example of “Guinea Pig”, where we deliberately allow a
disease to progress in a patient for research purposes, but the present case is
obviously not like that.
Another of Bennett’s alleged counterexamples fails for equally clear
reasons. He imagines a case of heroic self sacrifice, where a man ties a line
to himself and swims out toward a ship where the line is needed to rescue the
sailors, though he foresees that given the storm and the rocks he will almost
certainly perish in the process (Bennett, 1995, p. 220). The worry is that
Quinn will be saddled with condemning such an action as involving “direct
opportunistic agency”. But such a worry is misplaced because this is not a case
of direct opportunistic agency at all. We have direct agency, on Quinn’s view,
only where the involvement in question involves a violation of the independent
moral rights of the person involved, and this is not the case where an agent
voluntarily
embarks on an heroic mission. Of course, if we changed the case so
that the man was forcibly tied to the line and set out into the currents, then
we would have a case of direct opportunistic agency. But this is exactly what
we should want to say in that case.22
There are, however, some good reasons for doubting whether Quinn’s
proposal is satisfactory. He will, for example, have to categorize cases such
as area bombing as examples of “indirect agency”, since the involvement of
civilians may be irrelevant to the bomber’s purpose, the civilians’ very
presence being altogether incidental, such that “we act exactly as we would if
they were not there” (Quinn, 1993b, p. 187). Quinn will thus have to group this
case with cases such as trolley as far as intention is concerned. Yet this
seems wrong, for reasons given earlier. Similarly, Quinn’s response to a clever
example from David Lewis is plainly inadequate, as Kamm has pointed out, and
this produces an unattractive result (Kamm, 1992, pp. 377-378).23 We
can see this more clearly by modifying the example slightly.
Suppose someone wishes to demoralize the enemy government during a
war, and knows he could do so by creating the belief that large numbers of
civilians have been killed. He is reluctant to bring this about by deliberately
killing civilians, but thinks he sees a way around this. It turns out that a
major population center has been evacuated unbeknownst to the central
government, so that if it is bombed they will believe that there have
been massive casualties, simply viewing it from afar. He thus plans to go ahead
and bomb the empty city. At the last minute, however, he discovers that the
population has returned. Now suppose he goes ahead with the mission anyway.
Quinn would like to say that the bomber “strictly intends to involve [the
civilians] in something ... in order to further his purpose precisely by way of
their being involved,” thus likening the case to ordinary terror bombing, as
seems plausible. But Quinn cannot really make this out, because although the
bomber foresaw the harmful involvement of civilians in this case, their
involvement was nothing to his purpose: all that is needed in this case is
the government’s seeing the destruction of the city from afar, for which the
population’s presence and hence involvement was entirely irrelevant (which is
why the bomber was prepared to
destroy the city when it was empty). Thus, Quinn’s account does not
give the plausible answer he wants, and it seems that the only way for him to
get it would be once again to fall back on some notion of closeness -
just as I have proposed. For it is precisely the idea of excessive closeness
here that disallows regarding the deaths of the civilians as merely foreseen
side-effects of the destruction of the city, for reasons similar to those in
the area bombing case, and so groups this case properly with ordinary terror
bombing cases, despite its special features.24
Finally, Quinn’s account has the disadvantage of failing to explain
- in a way that employs the intend/foresee distinction - the cases from the
previous section. His version of the DDE discriminates against intentional
involvement of someone as a means where this involvement foreseeably leads to
his death, even if the death itself is unintended. Thus, in order to justify
the cutting-in-self-defense case, he will have to appeal solely to other considerations,
such as the attacker’s having forfeited his usual right not to be killed; the
intend/foresee distinction will not do any justificatory work here, since we
are going against the thrust of its justificatory force on his view. By
contrast, the account I have offered can explain why the act is justified at
least in part by appealing to the intend/foresee distinction itself,
stressing the fact that the death is not intended. Even if the other
considerations would be sufficient to justify the act, the fact that the death
is not intended as a means seems to be relevant, making it at least easier to
justify than cases where the death is plainly intended as a means - where, for
example, one deliberately brings about the death of an attacker as a way of
immobilizing him and thus achieving the goal of getting away. Quinn’s account
misses this.
For the above reasons, then, I believe we cannot avoid dealing head
on with the problem of closeness if we wish to preserve both non-arbitrary and
intuitively plausible appeals to the intend/foresee distinction in normative
ethics. The account I have developed and defended, in terms of the distinction
between merely causal and constitutive relations among states of
affairs, is intended to provide just such an account of excessive closeness,
answering the challenges raised by Bennett and others in a principled and
intuitively plausible way.
NOTES
1
Anscombe
(2001) refers to this general claim as the “principle of sideeffects” to
distinguish it from specific versions of the DDE that spell out the
circumstances under which the bringing about of foreseen but unintended harm is
permissible. I shall be concerned only with the general claim in speaking of
the DDE.
2
This
is a point overlooked by Foot (1994a). She there argued that one could
apparently do all of the work typically assigned to the doctrine of double
effect with (roughly) the doing/allowing distinction, cashed out in terms of
the distinction between negative and positive duties. She later broadened her
view to give a place to both distinctions in normative ethics.
3
Bennett
was once quite dismissive here, giving up almost immediately on the idea “in
the absence of any help” with its meaning (1981, pp. 107-108). His more recent
treatment of “the tight binding problem” (1995, p. 204 f.), however, is much
more searching and extensive, though I shall argue that it is still
unsatisfactory. Others are more sympathetic but likewise troubled enough by
difficulties surrounding intention to marginalize the intend/foresee
distinction in ethics. Nagel, for example, was once led by just such problems
to shift his focus to a different distinction around which he thought a
deontological constraint could be formulated with fewer difficulties (1979), as
described in Section 4 below. He later, however, returned to the intend/
foresee distinction as a central factor in normative ethics (1986, p. 179 f.).
4
There
are, of course, other important problems that also need to be addressed.
Thomson (1999, pp. 509-518) and Rachels (1994), for example, press an objection
to the DDE that would be devastating if it worked. I have argued elsewhere,
however, that their criticism is based on a mistaken construal of the DDE
(FitzPatrick, 2003b).
5
The
view he is attacking is the “entailment proposal”, according to which the
relation between the plainly intended means and some effect is “too close” if
and only if the latter is logically entailed by the former (1995, pp. 209-210)
(see Section 4 below).
6
Kamm
(1996, p. 155) briefly mentions a similar response to Bennett, which is
developed along lines similar to what follows in the text by Delaney (2001, pp.
577-578). In Section 6, I will examine a more complicated and interesting
variation on this example.
7
I
thank Anubav Vasudevan for emphasizing this possible reply.
8
This
section and the next build upon an idea that is sketched, though not developed
or defended in detail, in FitzPatrick, (2003a). Parts of these sections borrow
closely from that preliminary discussion to set up the more developed treatment
here.
9
H.L.A.
Hart once made such a claim, denying that the craniotomy case is any different
in terms of intention from the case of an emergency hys-
terectomy performed on a pregnant
woman. Bennett (1981, pp. 105-109) says something similar. I discuss both cases
below.
10
Delaney
(2001, pp. 568-572) considers and dismisses a view that somewhat resembles this
proposal, though he conflates it with a different proposal involving an
undeveloped notion of essential relations (the relata of which are also
specified differently in different places), and does not address the important
issues brought to light by Bennett (1995) in formulating it - issues that make
a crucial difference, as discussed in Section 4 and later sections. Some of his
objections are answered below; others are effectively answered in the course
of developing my account with Bennett’s more developed challenges in mind.
11
We
may here ignore the fact that Foot does not believe that we need to rely on the
intend/foresee distinction in justifying the decision to turn the trolley.
Thomson (1986) likewise offers an account that does not require appealing to
the distinction between intending and merely foreseeing harm. I am not here
making any general claims about when that distinction is or is not crucial to
moral justification.
12
It
is, unsurprisingly, not hard to modify relatively easy cases like this to make
them much less clear, eventually shifting them into the other category. See
Section 5 below.
13
It
would, of course, be incorrect to say that “the physician intends to bring
about the death of the fetus by crushing its skull,” as Delaney (2001, p. 571)
points out. But again, that is just because such a construction would imply
that the death is intended as an end, which it is not.
14
In
this I depart from Anscombe (2001, p. 64), and also from Bennett (1995, pp.
224-225), who does ultimately concede a small potential moral role for
the intend/foresee distinction, but only where the harm is merely likely rather
than inevitable.
15
An
alternative account for at least some cases would be that the area bomber seeks
to kill a certain person (who might not be individually identifiable) by
killing everyone in a containing group (e.g. a village). In that case it is
even more clear that the deaths of the innocents are intended as a means, the
death of the group being the means to the death of a given member.
16
The
human shields case is a complicated one, falling somewhere between area bombing
and strategic bombing. Attacking a military bunker that also contains civilians
is like area bombing and unlike strategic bombing insofar as one cannot
claim here to be aiming (literally) at the military target but not at the
civilians; but it is unlike area bombing and more like strategic bombing in
that one can claim to be targeting just the military target as such,
rather than a wider area that includes it along with civilians. This may well
make a moral difference, especially when combined with the partial shifting of
responsibility to those responsible for putting the civilians in harm’s way as
human shields. I shall set these interesting issues to one side here.
17 This is the sort of criticism that was raised, for example,
in connection with Israel’s bombing of an apartment building in Gaza City in
July, 2002, killing 14 civilians along with targeted Hamas militant Sheik Salah
Shehada.
18 I am grateful to Eugene Mills for raising this objection, and
to other members of the audience at the Virginia Philosophical Association Meetings,
2003 for helpful discussion of these issues.
19 I shall not here attempt to provide or to defend a general
account of the individuation of events. For my purposes it is enough that the
claims about events are consistent with plausible existing accounts, though
someone could of course raise further objections based on alternative accounts
of events. Note also that I bring in events not as the primary category for
solving the problem of excessive closeness, but only secondarily as described
in the text, to explain why some cases plainly do not involve a
constitutive relation among the relevant states of affairs. My account is
therefore not directly vulnerable to the problems Bennett raises for an account
of excessive closeness appealing simply and generally to event identity (1995,
pp. 205-207).
20 It is worth pointing out that where it does justify in
cases of this type it will run counter to the spirit of Quinn’s revisionist
account. This is discussed in Section 6 below.
21 Again, I do not mean to imply that this claim is necessary to
justify the act: the operation might well be justified independently, by appeal
to other factors such as the lesser moral status of the fetus. Our present
concern is simply with the application of the intend/foresee distinction.
22 For more on the rights-condition in Quinn’s view, see Fischer
et al. (2001, fn. 8).
23 Oddly, Kamm does not mention that Quinn discusses this sort
of case in a footnote and attempts to deal with it (see below), but her
discussion does show why his answer fails.
24 Fischer et al. (2001, p. 196, 201) likewise claim that Quinn
will be forced to fall back on some notion of closeness, though for different
reasons that I find less compelling.
REFERENCES
Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963): Intention,
2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell.
Anscombe,
G.E.M. (2001): ‘Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect”, in
P.A. Woodward (ed.), The Doctrine of Double Effect, Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 50-66.
Bennett,
J. (1981): Morality and Consequences, The Tanner Lectures on Human
Values II, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, pp. 45-116.
Bennett, J. (1995): The
Act Itself, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davidson,
D. (1980): Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Delaney,
N. (2001): ‘To Double Business Bound: Reflections on the Doctrine of Double
Effect’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 75(4), 561-584.
Fischer,
J.M., Ravizza, M. and Copp, D. (2001): ‘Quinn on Double Effect: The Problem of
‘Closeness”, in P.A. Woodward (ed.), The Doctrine of Double Effect,
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 189-210.
Foot,
P. (1994a): ‘The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect’, in
B. Steinbock and A. Norcross (eds.), Killing and Letting Die, New York:
Fordham University Press, pp. 266-279.
Foot,
P. (1994b): ‘Killing and Letting Die’, in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross (eds.), Killing
and Letting Die, 2nd ed., New York: Fordham University Press, pp. 280-289.
- + FitzPatrick, W.J. (2003a): ‘Surplus Embryos,
Non-Reproductive Cloning, and the Intend/Foresee Distinction’, The Hastings
Center Report 33(3), 29-36.
- + FitzPatrick, W.J. (2003b): ‘Acts, Intentions, and Moral
Permissibility: In Defense of the Doctrine of Double Effect’, Analysis
63(4), 317-321.
- + Kamm, F. (1992): ‘Non-consequentialism, the Person as an
End-in-Itself, and the Significance of Status’, Philosophy and Public
Affairs 21(4), 354-389.
Kamm,
F. (1996): Morality, Mortality Vol. II: Rights, Duties and Status, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nagel,
T. (1979): ‘War and Massacre’, in Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 53-74.
Nagel, T. (1986): The
View From Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press.
Quinn,
W. (1993a): ‘Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Doing and
Allowing’, in Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, pp. 149-174.
Quinn,
W. (1993b): ‘Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double
Effect’, reprinted in Morality and Action, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 175-193.
Rachels,
J. (1994): ‘More Impertinent Distinctions and a Defense of Active Euthanasia’,
reprinted in B. Steinbock and A. Norcross (eds.), Killing and Letting Die,
2 nd ed., New York: Fordham University Press, pp. 139-154.
Thomson,
J.J. (1986): ‘The Trolley Problem’, in Rights, Restitution and Risk: Essays
in Moral Theory, Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
-+
Thomson, J.J. (1999): ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments’, Ethics
109, 497-518.
Department of Philosophy
Virginia Tech
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126
USA
E-mail: wfitzpat@vt.edu
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