Çeviri
SHAYKH KHALID, GÜRCÜ NECIB PASHA AND THE NAQSHBANDIYYA-KHALIDIYYA
TEMPORAL AND SPIRITUAL POWER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
OTTOMAN POLITICS: SHAYKH KHALID, GÜRCÜ NECIB PASHA
Sean FOLEY
Abstract
This study, analyzes (researches) of the questionable
relationships in 1820ies between one of the Muslim saint and religious savant
Naqshbandiyya Shaykh Khalid (1776-1827) with Mehmed Ali and the loyal political
actors of the Ottoman Empire. It criticizes of the point of the view about
Khalid of Buturus Abu-Manneh, Hamid Algar and the other researchers. Including
to these researchers, Khalid, himself and Khalid’s religious order which is
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidayya engages in a confederation with Ottoman Empire and
Orthodox Sunni Muslim. Instead of this, by using Halid's letters, court
decision and Ottoman archives this study discusses those: Shayk Khalid at the
basic seeked for a follower group and he did not think the Naqshbandiyya-
Khalidayya religious order as an Ottoman or Sunni institute. Even though this
study finds out some proofs about the relationship between the Sunni Muslims,
Ottoman government members and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidayya, it shows those:
Right along with Iranian Shia Muslims, the Arabs in Iraq and Syria who were
fighting with the central Ottoman government constantly tied up with this
religious order.
Key words:
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidayya, Shayk Khalid, Sufi, Ottoman State, 19th Century
Political History, Mehmed Ali Pasa.
Ondokuzuncu Yüzyil
Osmanli Siyasetinde Bolgesel ve Ruhani Güçler: §eyh Halid, Gürcü Necip Pa$a ve
Nak^ibendi-Halidiyye
Ozet
Bu çalismada Ondokuzuncu
yüzyilin onde gelen mutasavvif bilginlerinden Naksibendi §eyhi Halid
Hazretleri’nin (1776-1827) Mehmed Ali ve Osmanli Devleti’ne sadik diger siyasal
aktorlerle olan 1820’lerde soru isareti uyandiran iliçkilerini incelemektedir. Bturus Abu-Manneh, Hamid Algar ve diger arastirmalacilarin
Halid hakkinda ileri sürdükleri bakis açisini elestirmektedir. Bu
arastirmacilara gore Halid’in kendisi ve kendi sufi tarikati Naksibendi-
Halidiyye basli basina Osmanli Devleti ve Ortodoks sünni islam ile ittifak
kurmustur. Bu anlayisin yerine çalismamizda, Halid’in mektuplari,
mahkeme kayitlari ve diger Osmanli kaynaklarini kullanarak su tartisilmaktadir:
§eyh halid olabildigince genis bir takipçiler toplulugu olusturmaya çalisti ve
bu baglamda Naksibendi-Halidiye tarikatini ilke olarak bir Osmanli ya da sünni
bir kurum olarak düsünmedi. Çalismamizda sünni müslümanlarla Osmanli
hükümetinin üyeleri arasinda iliskiye dair kanit bulunsa da, bu tarikatin
Osmanli hükümeti ile sürekli mücadele eden Suriyeli ve Irakli Araplar da iranli
§ii Müslümanlar da bu tarikatla iliski içindeydidler.
Anahtar kelimeler: Naksibendi-Halidiyye, §eyh
Halid, Tasavvuf,
Osmanli Devleti, 19. yüzyil Siyasi Tarihi, Mehmet Ali Pasa
“The tarikat is a religious
institution or an institution that translates the needs and ideals of a social
organization or movement. We are also able to see the tarikat’s beliefs
as being in line with social needs and aims since the tarikat translated
its needs into a social system which differed geographically by urban, rural
and nomadic milieu.”
Halil inalcik[1]
“The Naksbandia was probably the most powerful single
social, political, and ideological force shaping the cultural history of Asian
Islam, in general, and the Ottoman Empire, in particular, during the nineteenth
century.”
Kemal Karpat[2]
Few organizations have had as profound an impact on the development of the
Muslim world and the Ottoman lands in particular than the Naqshbandiyya tariqa. Founded
in Central Asia during the fourteenth century, the order spread rapidly and
created a wide network of followers from the Balkans to China. By the sixteenth
century, the Naqshbandiyya had assumed three crucial roles in the Ottoman
Empire. Firstly, the order provided Ottoman Sunni Muslims with a cultural and
political link to Sunni Muslims in other parts of Asia—especially after the
rise of the Safavid Empire cut off the natural land route through Iran.
Secondly, the Naqshbandiyya tariqa, along with other Sufi orders,
served as a mediator between the Ottoman government and various linguistic,
ethnic, cultural, and regional groupings within the Empire. Thirdly, the
Naqshbandiyya often provided Islamic “legitimacy” to government officials who
affiliated with the order, which championed strict observance of the shari‘a
along with Islam’s tradition of tajdid to correct the perceived excesses of syncretistic
Islam.
No individual was more important to the success of the Naqshbandiyya in the
Ottoman lands in the nineteenth century and beyond than Shaykh Abu al-Baha’
Diy’a al-Din Khalid al-Shahrizuri al-Naqshbandi bin
Ahmad
Efendi, [3] or Shaykh
Khalid. Throughout his life, Shaykh Khalid functioned on the intellectual,
social, and political frontiers of the Middle East. He was born around 1776 in
Qaradagh,[4] a village in the
district of Shahrizur in Iraqi Kurdistan, and rose over the next five decades
to become a leading religious and political figure in the Ottoman Empire.
During that time, he had thousands of Sunni Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, and Iranian
followers, and his suborder of the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya, the
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, spread from Kurdistan to the Arab and Turkish lands
of the Ottoman Empire and eventually to Indonesia. Among the adherents of the
Naqshbandiyya- Khalidiyya were the leading ‘ulama and merchant families of
Baghdad and Damascus along with prominent Ottoman, Kurdish, and Iranian
politicians at all levels of government.
This study examines the importance of Shaykh Khalid’s ties— however tenuous
they may appear to be initially—to Muhammad Ali and other political figures
whose loyalties to the Ottoman state were in some question in the 1820s. A
critical part of the study is a letter Shaykh Khalid sent to one of his most
prominent followers in the Ottoman central government in Istanbul, Gürcü Necib
Pasha, requesting him to assist ‘Abdullah Pasha, the governor of the Province
of Acre (Sayda) and one of Khalid’s leading followers in Greater Syria. The
undated letter is part of a previously unknown manuscript collection of
Khalid’s Arabic-language letters housed in a private collection in Turkey. It
sheds light on Khalid’s complicated relationship with a powerful politician in
Greater Syria along with a leading figure in Istanbul in the 1820s. Throughout
the letter, Khalid lauds ‘Abdullah’s personal qualities; he also implicitly
threatens severe retribution if Gürcü Necib does not heed his request and
promises great rewards if he does. The letter is one of the few instances in
Khalid’s writings where he uses the term “Jihad.” In addition, the letter
raises the possibility that there were ties—perhaps indirect ones—between
Khalid and Muhammad Ali, the then governor of Egypt, since Necib and ‘Abdullah worked
closely with M. Ali in the 1820s. In the 1820s, Gürcü Necib acted as Muhammad
Ali’s official Agent in Istanbul; ‘Abdullah often sought Muhammad Ali’s support
in negotiations with the Ottoman central government,
and Muhammad Ali
helped to restore ‘Abdullah’s position as governor of Acre in 1821. The
indirect ties may have extended into the 1830s since Egyptian authorities
subsidized Khalid’s followers and family in Damascus during Egypt’s
administration of Syria in the 1830s. [5] [6]
This study builds on the groundbreaking work of Albert Hourani, Butrus
Abu-Manneh, Hamid Algar, Itzchak Weismann and others on Khalid’s political and
socio-religious framework, the factors and motivations that guided his actions
during the 1820s, when he lived in Damascus and his political influence was at
its peak. Abu-Manneh merits special recognition for identifying critical
differences between passages in Bughyat al-Wajid fi Maktubat Mawlana
Khalid—a collection of Khalid’s letters published by the Ottoman government
during World War I—and a manuscript version of Khalid’s letters housed in the
Istanbul University Library Rectory. Just as Abu Manneh used differences in the
passages to illustrate important aspects of Khalid’s teachings and worldview
either abandoned or forgotten by his successors, I use a new set of Khalid’s
letters to reconstruct an aspect of Shaykh Khalid’s career which has been so
far overlooked: Khalid’s and his followers’ links to Muhammad Ali. In addition,
I build on Halil inalcik’s insight into the role of Sufi tariqas in Ottoman
society generally and Kemal Karpat’s understanding of the importance of the
Naqshbandiyya in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.6
From the start of his career in the 1810s in the Kurdish districtof
Shahrizur on the Ottoman frontier with Iran, Shaykh Khalid maintained close and
often friendly ties with regional and central government officials of the
Ottoman Empire. The letters in Bughyat al-Wajid, a manuscript
in the Istanbul University Library, Rare Books Section, and the published
writings of Claudius James Rich (1787-1821)—Great Britain’s agent in Baghdad in
the 1810s—paint a consistent picture: Khalid benefited from his close ties with
Mahmud Pasha, the governor of the Kurdish border district of Shahrizur, and
with Dawud Pasha, the governor of Baghdad. Mahmud purchased a house for Khalid,
built a zawiya for him and his followers in Sulaymaniyya, and
ordered that the proceeds from several rich agricultural communities in
Sulaymaniyya be used to pay for the upkeep of the zawiya. Dawud
sought Khalid’s support and guidance and provided him with a grant of 30,000
gold pieces, an enormous sum at the time; he also subsidized the upkeep of the
Naqshbandiyya- Khalidiyya’s zawiya in Baghdad.[7] [8] Moreover, Dawud reassured Ottoman
central government officials as to Khalid’s loyalty to Istanbul’s interests and
insisted that the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya was not a religious movement akin to
the Wahhabiyya in the Arabian Peninsula. Not surprisingly, Khalid’s nearly
simultaneous falling out with these two men is widely seen as the event which
triggered his decision to immigrate to Damascus and to leave his native Iraq
forever.[9]
While Khalid’s extensive contacts with Ottoman provincial officials during
his time in Iraq have rightly received substantial attention from Abu- Manneh
and others, little scholarly attention has been given to his contacts with
political
officials beyond the Ottoman governing framework. Here it is
important to note that Shaykh Khalid’s multi-layered identity—Jaf tribesman,
Kurd, Shafi‘i Sunni Muslim, and Persian speaker—provided him with multiple ways
to forge ties with various populations in the Ottoman Empire as well as in the
Qajar Iranian Empire. Although the majority of Iranians were Shi‘a Muslims,
Khalid shared a common language—Persian—and “cultural” outlook with most
Iranians. In the early nineteenth century, Kurds in Shahrizur and other nearby
regions adhered to Iranian cultural norms and styles, and Rich records numerous
instances of Kurdish elites following the latest Iranian trends, including
speaking Turkish in public.[10] According
to many biographies of Khalid and to the poems in his Diwan, Khalid
traveled extensively in Iran, studied there as a young man, and retained close
ties with Iranian Sunni Kurdish scholars.[11] [12] [13] Modern Iraqi Kurdish oral histories
even maintain that one of these scholars, Shaykh Muhammad Qasim of Sindaj, was
the first khalifa, or deputy, in the Naqshbandiyya tariqa1
Other Iranians, such as Abbas Mirza (1788-1833), the son of the Qajar Shah
of Iran, and the governor of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, subsequently
affiliated themselves with Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya tariqa1 Khalid
also sent representatives to the Iranian city of Nishapur. [14] Khalid’s decision
to include Iranian officials in his order suggests that he sought a broad base
of followers and that he did not initially envision the Naqshbandiyya tariqa as
solely a Sunni or Ottoman institution. He may have also been preparing for the
possibility that he might wish to ally himself with Iran’s Qajar government so
that he might flee there to escape political
persecution in
Iraq, or that Iran might control Shahrizur or other regions of the
Ottoman-Iranian frontier and Iraq important to him. It is worth noting that the
Qajar government granted one of Khalid’s khalifas, Shaykh Taha
Kelani, the right to receive the revenues from several villages on the Iranian
side of the Ottoman-Iranian frontier.[15]
Gürcü Necib Pasha and Muhammad Ali
Whatever the reasons for his decision to seek out Qajar officials and other
Iranians, Shaykh Khalid remained open to forming close relationships to
political figures with socio-economic ties beyond the Ottoman bureaucracy and
elites. Even after he moved his base from Sulaymaniyya to Damascus in 1822, he
frequently expressed his personal loyalty to the Ottoman government and continued
to form close relationships with figures whose allegiance to the Ottoman
central government was far from certain. Among the most important of these was
Gürcü Necib Pasha (d. 1851). He was of a prominent family in Istanbul of
Georgian origin who was promoted quickly in the Ottoman administrative and
military bureaucracy. He served as the superintendent for the Ottoman army’s
armaments; he was also an army official in the Morea during the Greek rebellion
and a financial advisor to the commander of the Ottoman army.[16] In
addition, Gürcü Necib was Muhammad Ali’s agent, or kapikahyasi, who
transacted the Wali’s business with the central Ottoman government, and
frequently corresponded with him on sensitive political, military, and economic
issues.[17] This correspondence
proved to be invaluable to the governor of Egypt.[18]
When discussing the character and depth of Muhammad Ali’s relationship with
Necib Pasha, it is worth noting that Kapukehya or Kapukethuda were
traditionally Janissaries who carried the orders of the Grand Vizier.[19] But in the early nineteenth
century this term most often meant an agent, which implies that Necib worked on
Muhammad Ali’s behalf. Given the extensive work that Necib did on Muhammad
Ali’s behalf and their regular correspondence, it seems hard not to suggest
that he was not closely tied to Muhammad Ali. It also suggests that Necib,
while he may have been generally loyal to the Sultan, could not be counted on
as being completed loyal in every instance, especially given his close work for
Muhammad Ali—an individual whose interests were not necessarily the same as the
Sultan’s. Although Gürcü Necib and Shaykh Khalid corresponded often on a
variety of political and socioreligious issues, it is not clear how the two
men got to know one another or if they ever met personally. No record has been
found suggesting that Necib visited Damascus or any other region in which
Khalid resided. Nor do other traditional Khalidi sources indicate that Shaykh
Khalid was in Istanbul or Greece with the exception of Sicill-i Osmânî, a
major Ottoman biographical dictionary. While Khalid’s biographies record that
he went from Sulaymaniyya to Damascus via Baghdad and Urfa, the Sicill-i
Osmânî states that he came to Istanbul before traveling to Damascus.[20] Since there are no sources
beside the biographies and the Sicill for this period in
Khalid’s life, it is virtually impossible to verify the exact route Shaykh Khalid
took from Iraq to Syria. But the reputation of the Sicill as a
credible historical source and Khalid’s cooperation with the elites of Baghdad
and Sulaymaniyya suggest that he had strong incentives to visit Istanbul. There
he could seek the support of senior Ottoman figures and reinvigorate his career
by means of the support of Gürcü and other new political patrons, such as
Shaykh al-Islam Mekki-zade Mustafa
Asim (d. 1846),
with whom Khalid corresponded and whom he saw as a close friend and supporter.[21]
Perhaps a more perplexing question is why Mekki-zade Mustafa Asim or Gürcü
Necib, would wish to affiliate with Shaykh Khalid. One answer may have been the
fact that the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya was already a network of thousands of
Muslims in the 1810s throughout the Ottoman Empire. Just as the Ottoman Sultan
Mahmud II looked to the Mevleviyya tariqa to serve his
interests, so the adherents to the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya may have seen the
order as a way to advance their goals.[22]
Another reason for Gürcü Necib in particular to seek to a close
relationship with Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya was perhaps the
desire of Muhammad Ali to extend his power from Egypt and the Hijaz into the
Levant and other regions of the Ottoman Empire.[23] The
Ottoman governor of Egypt was an emerging political power in the Middle East
whose influence and military forces were greater than that of Sultan Mahmud II,
his official sovereign. At the same time, he recognized that Egypt was far from
selfsufficient in several natural resources he needed in order to maintain his
armed forces: various foodstuffs; timber for his ships, fuel, and charcoal; and
the coal, copper, and iron used in his gun factories and arsenals. He was also
aware that his plans for expansion had already taxed Egyptian finances and
human resources. Syria, by contrast, had abundant supplies of the natural resources
he needed, a substantial population which could be conscripted, and was the
nexus
of several rich
trade routes. Equally important, Syria, as he later told Gürcü Necib, could
serve as a strategic buffer against potential Ottoman advances southward from
Anatolia against Egypt or against naval attacks. As the head of a large and
politically active tariqa based in Damascus with a burgeoning
presence in the rest of Syria, Khalid would have been a natural figure for
Muhammad Ali and Gürcü Necib to seek to influence or to win over as an ally.
Indeed, published Egyptian diplomatic reports suggest that Muhammad Ali
received updates on key members of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya and the
internal dynamics of the tariqa2
Muhammad Ali and Gürcü Necib’s interest in the Naqshbandiyya- Khalidiyya
makes even more sense in the light of Khalid’s political position in Damascus
and his links to senior provincial politicians in the Levant. Not only was
Shaykh Khalid the head of a large tariqa, but he may have held
a socioreligious rank similar to that of a governor—possibly like a Catholic
Bishop of an important city. Here it is important to remember an 1827 ferman which
discusses Shaykh Khalid and “his qa’immaqam [or
representative] in Damascus.”[24] [25] [26] [See appendix.] The term qa’immaqam16 may
be a way of saying khalifa, but it was also a word often used
for deputy governors in Syria in the early nineteenth century; this suggests
that Shaykh Khalid himself might have held a position similar to or with equal
rank to an Ottoman governor. (It is critical to remember that Shaykh Khalid’s
detractors constantly accused him of having political ambitions.) Certainly the
intense interest that the Ottoman
government had in
Khalid’s estate after his death in 1827—as evidenced by the 1827 ferman—is
consistent with the way that Ottoman officials in the 1820s often treated the
various assets of Ottoman governors in Syria when they died.
‘Abdullah Pasha and Spiritual Power
Khalid had a socio-cultural influence sufficient to earn the considerable
support of politicians. Just as Dawud Pasha and Mahmud Pasha sought out Shaykh
Khalid’s guidance and support in the 1810s, the governor of the province of
Acre, ‘Abdullah Pasha, solicited Khalid’s good will and backing in the 1820s.
‘Abdullah became governor shortly before Khalid arrived in Syria and sought to
expand his power base from the coast and the Lebanese mountains to Damascus.
According to Thomas Philipp, who is the only Western scholar to study the
recent history of Acre in depth, ‘Abdullah was a pious young man when he became
governor and sought guidance from senior ulama and Shaykh Khalid. Citing French
diplomatic records, Philipp notes that ‘Abdullah Pasha met with other Sufis in
the 1820s and participated in dhikr [reciting the name of God
repeatedly] and other ritual exercises. Philipp also notes that ‘Abdullah—to
cement his pious public persona—gave up drinking coffee, reintroduced severe
dress restrictions on non-Muslims, paid Christians to convert to Islam, and
evicted Christians from Acre after Greek nationalists staged an uprising in
Morea in 1821.[27]
Through a variety of letters available in printed and manuscript versions
of Khalid’s correspondence, we know that Khalid and ‘Abdullah discussed a
variety of matters, personal, political, and spiritual in nature. The two men
touched on subjects as diverse as the proper way for a Muslim ruler to govern,
the powers of a Muslim saint (or wali), ‘Abdullah’s desire to
have male offspring, ‘aqida (faith), the prevalence of bid‘a and fasad (non-Islamic
religious practices and corruption) in Syria, free will, important Sufi
religious
figures, and provincial
political and social issues.[28] ‘Abdullah
was sufficiently confident in Khalid’s powers as a wali to
specifically request that Khalid intercede on his behalf before the start of
major military campaigns and was greatly disappointed when Khalid could not
definitely promise him that he would have male heirs.[29] What
favors ‘Abdullah did for Shaykh Khalid are not touched upon in Khalid’s
correspondence, but ‘Abdullah wielded far more power in Syria than any of the
four Ottoman governors who were appointed to administer Damascus between
Khalid’s arrival in 1822 there and his death in 1827: Ahmad Pasha (1823),[30] Salih Pasha (1823),[31] Mustafa Pasha (18231825),[32] Wali al-Din Pasha (1825-1826),[33] and Salih Pasha (1826-1828)
(for the second time).[34] Consequently,
Khalid would have had ample reason to do just about everything he could to
remain on very good terms with ‘Abdullah—if only to ensure that ‘Abdullah would
not use his power to check the growth of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya in Syria.
By contrast, Khalid’s letters to Necib Pasha have left us a clearer picture
of the two men’s relationship and how each sought to promote the other’s
interests whenever it was feasible. Over time this relationship developed into
a quid pro quo relationship, and Khalid openly acknowledged—
but did not specify—Gürcü Necib’s requests and his willingness to carry them
out. At the same time, Khalid openly requests Necib’s assistance in a variety
of political and administrative matters. While he readily praises his devotion
to Islam and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, however, Khalid also leaves the
impression that he does not fully trust Gürcü Necib. Strikingly, whenever
Shaykh Khalid requests that Gürcü Necib completes a favor on his behalf, he couples
it with a combination of potent threats—including ones against Necib’s personal
safety—and various powerful incentives to ensure that he carried out Khalid’s
wishes.
Two of Khalid’s letters to Gürcü Necib illustrate this relationship well.
In the first letter, a copy of which is part of a manuscript collection of
Khalid’s letters housed in Turkey, Khalid requests him to provide immediate
assistance to ‘Abdullah Pasha, who had recently been deposed as governor of
Acre. Although the letter is undated, we can surmise that it was most likely
written between 1822 and 1823—the only period during Khalid’s career when
‘Abdullah would have required this type of assistance. According to Turkish and
Arabic sources of the period, Muhammad Ali sought to expand his influence into
greater Syria in the early 1820s by stimulating political and territorial
disputes between the governors of the region’s provincial centers: Aleppo,
Damascus, Tripoli, and Acre. He sought to benefit from the existing rivalries
between the governors along with the fact that the boundaries of Syrian
provinces were not permanent and that sub-provinces (livas) were
frequently transferred from one province to another.[35]
Muhammad Ali in particular fueled the ambitions of ‘Abdullah Pasha, who
greatly coveted the governorship of Damascus. He also wished to depose the
city’s Ottoman governor, Darwish Pasha, who lent protection to a noted Jewish
family, one member of which, Haim Farhi, ‘Abdullah had caused to be executed
shortly after coming to power in Acre.[36] Confident
of Muhammad Ali’s backing, ‘Abdullah took the audacious steps of fabricating an
Ottoman ferman nominating him governor of Damascus and
ordering his vassal, Emir Bashir, the leader of the Druze of Mount Lebanon to
advance on Damascus with his army. The Ottoman government reacted to
‘Abdullah’s seemingly wanton act of defiance with fury: it ordered that the
governors of Aleppo, Damascus, and Adana send their armies to overthrow
‘Abdullah Pasha in Acre. The Ottoman government also issued a new ferman which
announced the deposal of ‘Abdullah Pasha, declaring him a rebel. The ferman also
appointed Darwish Pasha, ‘Abdullah’s arch enemy, as the governor of both
Damascus and Acre. For his part, the Emir Bashir prudently fled to Egypt rather
than choose between the Ottoman government and his “regional” master. From July
1822 until
January 1823,
Darwish Pasha led a siege of Acre and sought to capture ‘Abdullah.[37]
It is within this context of war and rebellion that we can come to
understand the significance of Khalid’s first letter to Gürcü Necib requesting
that he assist ‘Abdullah. Perhaps aware that Gürcü would be wary of providing
any help, Khalid presents a positive case on ‘Abdullah’s behalf. He asserts
that ‘Abdullah—despite evidence to the contrary—was a loyal and an obedient
servant to the Ottoman state; he had no greater ambition than to promote the
Sultan’s interests: ‘Abdullah was well known for his “truthful and obedient
devotion to the Ottoman state.especially to the Ottoman Sultan” and that he had
no “higher priority—day and night.”[38] Not
only was ‘Abdullah steadfast in his support of the Ottoman Empire, but he was
also a just ruler, dedicated to upholding his responsibilities as a pious
Muslim leader: Khalid notes that ‘Abdullah “was always ready for Jihad to
defend the people and the state” and was never known for “injustice.”[39]
If these factors were not incentive enough to intervene on ‘Abdullah’s
behalf, Khalid then promises Gürcü Necib that the more he helped ‘Abdullah “the
higher you are in my eyes” and that Khalid would watch his actions very
carefully.[40] The final
statement is most likely a threat meant to inform Gürcü that failure to help
‘Abdullah could carry serious consequences, not the least of which was Khalid’s
anger and disappointment.
Overall, the letter illustrates an ongoing quid pro quo relationship
between Necib Pasha and Khalid in which the former permits the latter to
exercise his spiritual authority to rehabilitate the moral and political
reputation of a temporal politician, ‘Abdullah. Instead of disputing the facts
that led to ‘Abdullah’s fall, Khalid informs Necib that he should help
‘Abdullah for only two reasons: the governor of Acre is both “loyal” to the
Ottoman government and morally fit. In his eyes, this is more than enough
justification for anyone to support his position, especially an individual as
seemingly loyal to the path of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya as Gürcü Necib.
Khalid’s use of the term Jihad here is also striking because it rarely
appears in his correspondence, or in his works on Sufism, Islamic law, ethics,
and philosophy. Nor does the term appear prominently in the works of his close
followers.
Determining what Khalid means is thus a difficult task—a task made more
complicated by the fact that he does not specify whether he believes that
‘Abdullah adheres to “greater” Jihad (i.e., one’s personal commitment to
staying on God’s path), “lesser” Jihad (i.e., transforming the world to conform
to God’s path or plan), or some combination of the two. Khalid’s language—
“defend the people and the state”—suggests “lesser” Jihad. But as a proponent
of personal active participation in the framework of the Shari‘a, he may well
have been suggesting in addition that ‘Abdullah was ready for “greater” Jihad.
Such a conception would undoubtedly focus on what Khalid saw as the chief cause
of the crises afflicting Muslims in the 1820s: their devotion to the temporal
world or materiality (“dunya”) over the hereafter or spiritual world (“din”).[41] The conception would also—to
paraphrase Halil inalcik—meet the “aims and needs” of the
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya tariqa, and, by extension, those of the
Sunni Muslim communities where the tariqa operated—Syria, Iraq
and the greater Ottoman Empire.
By using the term Jihad, Khalid may have also wished to emphasize
‘Abdullah’s opposition to the Greek nationalist rebellion against the Ottoman
rule in the Morea which started in 1821. This would have been an especially
prudent message to communicate to Gürcü Necib in the early 1820s. He and other
members of the Ottoman elite in Istanbul reacted with fury to the rebellion,
which they saw as a betrayal of their centuries-long policy of tolerance and
cooperation with the Greeks. Gürcü Necib even played a role in directing the
Ottoman military response to the rebellion.
While we lack Necib’s response to Khalid’s letter, it is worth noting that
Muhammad Ali was instrumental in winning ‘Abdullah’s subsequent reinstatement
as governor of Acre in 1823—a fact which suggests that Khalid’s letter may have
carried great weight and that his interests could coincide with those of
Muhammad Ali.[42]
Khalid’s ability to translate his spiritual power into seemingly secular
political matters is further illustrated by another letter in which Khalid
requests that Gürcü Necib help another Ottoman governor in Syria who, in the
1820s, had fallen out of favor with the Ottoman central government: Wali al-Din
Pasha. Khalid’s letter is part of the collection of his correspondence
contained in Bughyat al-Wajid fi Maktubat Mawlana Khalid, but
it is not found in either of the two manuscript collections of Khalid’s letters
housed in Turkey. Although, like the letter regarding ‘Abdullah Pasha, the
letter is undated, we can assume that Khalid wrote it around December 1826
since he begins the letter by noting that Wali al-Din has been deposed as
governor of Syria—an event which Ottoman fermanlar housed in
Syria’s national archives record took place in December 1826.
French diplomatic correspondence from the period indicates that Damascenes
and Ottoman central government officials alike were greatly disappointed with
Wali al-Din’s administration of the 1826 Hajj caravan in which a quarter of the
participants had perished, including several leading Damascenes. They blamed
him in particular for making inadequate provisions for the journey and for
failing to heed the lessons of the Hajj caravans of 1824 and 1825, both of
which had ended in disaster as well: reportedly, nearly half of the surviving
pilgrims in 1826 were compelled to travel back to Damascus on foot since their
camels died of hunger![43]
Despite the clear official and popular anger at Wali al-Din Pasha and his
incompetence, Khalid urges Gürcü Necib to readily support the former governor
of Damascus. To illustrate the sincerity of his convictions, Khalid then orders
Necib to “treat him” as you “would treat me.” [44] Perhaps
fearful that he might be reluctant to assist the dismissed Wali al-Din, Khalid
insists that the former governor is a dignified and morally fit person: “He
never hesitated to help the poor, especially the poor on hajj.” [45] Just as in the case of
‘Abdullah, Khalid expected his affirmation of Wali al-Din’s character to be
sufficient— regardless of the other socio-cultural or political circumstances.
Though the nature of Khalid’s remaining requests to his Gürcü Necib is not
known, it cannot be ruled out that they might have been indirectly intended for
Muhammad Ali or at least related to his plans. Two of Khalid’s closest
followers in government, Gürcü Necib and ‘Abdullah Pasha, had connections with
the governor of Egypt, who was determined to dominate Syria, a region where the
Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya was establishing a presence in the 1820s. Just because
Khalid projected an image in his correspondence and other writings that he was
a strong supporter of the Ottoman government and the Sultan does not mean that
he would not cooperate with groups or individuals whose interests were separate
from or even opposed to those of the Ottoman Empire if that suited his
interests or those of the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya. Nor can we assume that
Shaykh Khalid’s teachings were incompatible with the goals of Muhammad Ali’s
program of European- inspired reform and transformation in Egypt. It is worth
nothing that Gümüshanevi (1812-1893) and other Naqshbandi shaykhs were among
the earliest Muslim scholars to synthesize the Islamic tradition with that of
the West.[46]
But perhaps the best evidence of Khalid’s relationship—however
indirect—with Muhammad Ali is the actions of his followers and Egyptian
government officials after his death in 1827, especially during Egypt’s
occupation of Syria in the 1830s. Because of Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-
Khalidiyya’s public support and affiliation with the Ottoman government, one would
assume that Khalid’s family and his supporters would have been among the last
of Syria’s various communities to receive Egyptian state support. But the
opposite appears to be the case. Through published Egyptian diplomatic
documents from the early 1830s, we know that Muhammad Ali provided a generous
salary to Khalid’s family, paid for the maintenance of Khalid’s house and zawiya in
Damascus, and provided funds for his remaining followers in
Damascus
throughout Egypt’s occupation of Syria in the 1830s.[47] While
Muhammad Ali may have been motivated by generosity or a desire to co-opt a
traditionally “Ottoman” institution in Syria, it cannot be discounted that he
was simply reaffirming an alliance which had been established long before. It
is a subject worthy of further research.
Appendix
Text of aferman regarding
Shaykh Khalid’s estate [48]
To: Mehmed Selim
Pasha
From: The Office
of the Grand Vizier
[This Edict]
concerns the Muslim Pilgrims who began their journey on the 15 th day
of Zilkade from Ma‘an and safely arrived in Medayin-i-Salih.
The deceased
Shaykh Khalid has his representative [qa’immaqam] in Damascus.
The associates and followers of the latter’s office were rightfully sent to
Damascus after [both] an imperial document and resulting survey were sent.
Henceforth, if anything from the above-mentioned companions arrives and comes
into possession, it might be claimed that it shall be sent to Baghdad. The
deceased Shaykh Khalid has properties, land, a farm, and a house in Damascus.
Since there is some connection between Shaykh Khalid’s possessions and a future
Imperial edict, it ought to be reviewed by those of illustriously correct
judgment. This time, upon the arrival of the registration, which has been
composed according to the prosperous principles of the Quran, the properties
must be pledged truthfully.
In this regard,
the Imperial document about the Muslims’ safe arrival is sincere. An order from
the Imperial throne was issued on that matter. The link made to the illustrious
ones this time is not related to the group which was sent from Damascus. Since
the abovementioned properties belonged to the Shaykh Khalid, they must be sold
by auction to those who want them according to material circumstance and
religious law. The names of those who buy the items and the signed court record
of the inheritance are to be sent along with the required Imperial orders. In a
similar manner, the value and prices of that which was sold to parties in the
court register should also duly be recorded and sent.
Recorded [in the
“sijill” of Damascus] in Recep, 1244 [January/February, 1829]
Issued by the
Grand Vizier 24 Zilkade, 1243 [June 7, 1828]
1Halil inalcik,
“Tarihsel Baglamda Sivil Toplum Ve Tarikatlar,” in Global-Yerel
Ekseninde Türkiye, ed. Fuat Keyman and Ali Yasar Saribay (istanbul:
ALFA Press, 2005), 92. The author is solely responsible for all translations in
this article. He thanks York Norman for assisting him in writing this article.
He also thanks the Institute for International Education and the U.S.
Department of Education for providing Fulbright IIE and Fulbright-Hays grants
so he could engage in extended research in Syrian and Turkish archives.
2Kemal Karpat, The Politicization of Islam:
Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and
Community in the Late Ottoman State (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001), 107.
[3]This extended version of Shaykh Khalid’s name is based on his brother’s
probate record in the Damascus archives. For more on this issue, see Sean
Foley, “Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandiyya-Khalidiyya, 1776-2005” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Georgetown University, 2005), 79-81 (Hereafter cited as Shaykh
Khalid).
[4]This is very close to the Turkish word, Karadag, which
means “black mountain”.
[5]Muhammad As‘ad al-Sahib (ed.), Bughyat al-Wajid fi Maktubat Mawlana
Khalid (Dimashq: Matba‘at al-Taraqqi, 1334/1915-16) (Hereafter cited
as Bughyat al- Wajid); Maktubat hadaratMawlana Khalid (Turkey:
Private Collection, 1332/191314) (hereafter cited as Maktubat hadarat
Khalid), and Shaykh Khalid, Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi (Istanbul
University Library Rectory, AY 728, folios 1-192, N.D.) (Hereafter cited
as Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi). The only hint of when the Istanbul
University Library Rectory collection might have been compiled is a talisman on
a cover page for a visitor to the court of Ottoman Sultan Abdülmecid, whose
reign began in 1839, more than a decade after Shaykh Khalid died. By contrast,
the collection of letters from the Turkish private collection is dated
1913/1914. I thank Müfid Yüksel for providing me a CD-Rom copy of Khalid’s
letters from the Turkish private collection.
[6]For examples of these authors’ arguments, see the following works: Butrus
Abu- Manneh, “The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman Lands in the Early
19th Century,” Die Welt des Islams 22 (1-2)
(1982): 1-36; Albert Hourani, “Shaykh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order,”
in Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: Essays Presented By
His Friends and Pupils to Richard Walzer, ed. M. Stern, Albert Hourani
and Vivian Brown (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1972),
89-104; Hamid Algar, “The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of its History
and Significance,” Studia Islamica 44 (1976): 124-152; and
Itzchak Weismann, Taste of Modernity: Sufism, Salafiyya, and Arabism in
Late Ottoman Damascus (Leiden: Brill, 2001).
[7]Mahmud gave Khalid a substantial amount of land. An Ottoman ferman completed
in 1851 estimated that the grant included the following properties: the arable
fields of Gedan, Darko, Furali and Salme; four units by the rivers of
Kürekçiyan and Furali; land at the lower end of Sulaymaniyya, and another piece
of land in Haraciyan. For more on these lands and the ferman, see
Foley, Shaykh Khalid, 117 and 130.
[8]Yusuf ‘Izzy al-Din. Dawud Basha wa-Nihayat
al-Mamalik fi al-‘Iraq (Baghdad: Matba‘at al- Sha‘b, 1976), 49.
9For more on these
issues, see Foley, Shaykh Khalid, 62-126. Khalid’s
relationship with Dawud Pasha collapsed after Khalid failed to secure an
agreement between rival Kurdish politicians in Shahrizur in 1820. Khalid’s
relationship with Mahmud Pasha also collapsed shortly thereafter when Mahmud’s
son died from an illness from which Khalid predicted that he would fully
recover.
[10]These cultural practices are covered extensively by
Rich. Claudius James Rich, Narrative of a Residence in Koordistan, and
on the Site of ancient Nineveh with a Journal of a Voyage down the Tigris to
Baghdad and an Account of a Visit to Shirauz and Persepolis (London:
J. Duncan, 1836), Vol. I, 94-95, 117, and 126.
[11]For more on this period in Shaykh Khalid’s life, see
Foley, Shaykh Khalid, 89-101.
[12]C.J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs; Politics,Travel, and
Research in NorthEastern Iraq, 1919-1925 (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957), 77-78. Another Sindaj shaykh who subsequently joined the order
was the Mullah Rasul. Shaykh Khalid’s chief disciple in the Hawraman, ‘Uthman
Siraj al-Din (1781-1867), built on Khalid’s success in Sindaj and initiated
many new followers into the Naqshbandiyya- Khalidiyya. Among the new followers
was the governor of Sindaj, Rizaquli Khan. Sahib, Bughyat al-Wajid, 118-119
and Ferhad Shakely, “The Naqshbandi Sheikhs of Hawraman and the Heritage of
Khaliddiyya-Mujaddidiyya in Kurdistan,” in Naqshbandis in Western and
Central Asia, ed. Elisabeth Ozdalga (Istanbul: Svenska
forskningsinstitutet Istanbul, 1999), 93.
[13]Khalid, Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi, folio 220b. Abbas Mirza
was also one of Iran’s
greatest military generals and reformers in the first third of the nineteenth
century.
[14]Ibid., folio 68b.
[15]‘Abbas al-‘Azzawi, ‘Asha’ir al-‘Iraq, vol.
2, Al-Kurdiyya, 45-48 (Baghdad: Matba‘at al-Ma‘arif, 1937),
233.
[16]Mehmed Süreyyâ, Sicill-i Osmanl (Istanbul, 1308/1890-1315/1897), Vol.
IV.
(Westmead, UK: Gregg
International Publishers Limited, 1971), (Hereafter cited as SO.),
545-6.
[17]Christine M. Philliou, “Worlds, Old and New: Phanriot Networks and the
Remaking of Ottoman Governance in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century” (Ph.D.
Dissertation, Princeton University, 2004), 206.
[18]The importance of Necib’s work on behalf of Muhammad Ali is illustrated by
Khaled Fahmy. He describes him as “Mehmed Ali’s agent in Istanbul” throughout
his monograph on Muhammad Ali’s army: All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmed Ali,
his army and the making of modern Egypt. In one instance, Fahmy notes
Muhammad Ali’s “agent in Istanbul, Najib Efendi, and other informants, updated
him regularly about
developments there
and looked after his interests in the capital.” Khaled Fahmy, “Between Sultan
and Vali: Syria and the Nature of Mehmed Ali’s Military Expansion,” in
Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Mehmet Ali, his army and the making of
modern Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 72
(Hereafter cited as Pasha’s Men). Caesar Farah also observes
that Necib Pasha’s association with Muhammad Ali was sufficiently close in the
1810s and 1820s to make the British highly nervous about his intentions as
governor of Syria in the 1840s. Farah cites official British diplomatic
correspondence in which Lord Palmerston states that Necib Pasha had served
Muhammad Ali for many years. For more on these issues, see C.E. Farah, “Necip
Pasha and the British in Syria, 1841-1842,” Archivum Ottomanicum II
(1970), 115-153.
^Osmanli Tarih Lügati, 2nd ed., s.v. “Kapukehya” or “Kapukethuda.”
20Süreyyâ, SO., Vol.
II., 265-266.
[21]For an example of their correspondence, see
Khalid, Maktubat Khalid Baghdadi, folio 50a.
[22]For more on this issue, see Uriel Heyd, “The Ottoman ‘Ulema and
Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II,” in Studies in
Islamic History and Civilization, ed. Uriel Heyd (Jerusalem: The
Magnes Press at the Hebrew University, 1961), 68-69 and Foley, Shaykh
Khalid, 226.
[23]For more on Muhammad Ali and Syria in the 1820s, see
Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, “Expansion to what end?” in Marsot, Egypt
in the Reign of Muhammad Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), 196-230 and Khaled Fahmy, Pasha’s Men, 38-75. Fahmy
cites a conversation between Ali and one of his French military advisors in
1820 in which Ali stated “I am now the most important man [l’homme de
jour] in the entire Ottoman Empire...I will call back my forces, raise
[new] conscripts, complete my regiments and then grab the pashliks of Damascus
and Acre.I will organize a grande armee and I shall not stop
except at the Tigris and Euphrates.” Fahmy, Pasha’s Men, 38.
[24]For a more in-depth overview of these issues, see Muhammad H.
Kutluoglu, The Egyptian Question (1831-1841) (Istanbul: Eren
Press, 1998), 51-55 (hereafter cited as The Egyptian Question) and
Asad Rustum, al-Mahfuzat al-Malakiyya al-Misriyya, Vol. 1,
Second Edition (Bayrut: al-Maktaba al-Bulisiyya, 1986-1987), 44-45 (record
#104) and 100 (record #237).
[25]Awamir Sultaniyya, 24 Dhu’l-Qa‘da 1243, 2/232 (June 7,
1828).
[26]According to the Osmanli Tarih Lügati, a
Qaim-maqam, such as the Qaim-maqam of Istanbul, was responsible for
administering the capitol when the Grand Vizier was away on campaign (Osmanli
Tarih Lügati, 2nd ed., s.v. “Qaim-maqam”). The Redhouse
Dictionary states Qaim-maqam means lieutenant, representative, or
substitute. At the same time, the Redhouse notes that a
Qaim-maqam could be the head of a district (Redhouse Yayinevi, 18th ed.,
s.v. “Qaim-maqam”). Kamus-i Türki dictionary also states that
a Qaim-maqam is a substitute or representative vakil, such as a representative
of the qadi naib. But the dictionary notes that the word can mean a public
administrative official who runs a district or someone with a rank within the
Ottoman military (Kamus-i Türki, 4th ed., s.v.
“Qaim-maqam). The Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary notes
that a qa’immaqam is an administrative officer who heads
a qada, a province or district (The Hans Wehr Dictionary of
Modern Written Arabic, 4th ed., s.v. “qa’immaqam”).
Ultimately, this term is best approximately translated as a “district
president,” which could include a religious official or someone who has great
religious status.
[27]Thomas Philipp, “Acre: the First Instance of Changing
Times,” in The Empire in the City: Arab Provincial Capitals in the Late
Ottoman Empire, ed. Jens Hanseen, Thomas Philipp and Stefan Weber
(Beirut: Orient-Institut and Würzburg: Ergon in Kommission, 2002), 90-91 and
Thomas Philipp, Acre: The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian City,
1730-1831 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 182-183 (Hereafter
cited as Acre). Philipp notes in Acre: The Rise and Fall of
a Palestinian City that “Shaykh Khalid...was a spiritual advisor to
‘Abdullah Pasha and corresponded with him from Damascus in the 1820s.”
[28]Sahib, Bughyat al-Wajid, 85-87,
227-228, 228-229, and 244-245.
[29]Ibid., 85-87.
[30]Awamir Sultaniyya, 15 Rajab 1239, 3/37 (March 16, 1824) and Awamir
Sultaniyya, 11 Ramadan 1239, 2/20 (May 10, 1824). Ahmad Pasha died in Homs en
route to Damascus (from Aleppo) and never served as the city’s governor.
[31]Awamir Sultaniyya, 28 Jumada I 1238, 1/78 (February
10, 1823).
[32]Awamir Sultaniyya, 15 Shawwal 1239, 2/41 (June 13,
1824).
[33]Awamir Sultaniyya, 11 Jumada I 1241, 2/118 (December
22, 1825).
[34]Awamir Sultaniyya, 21 Jumada I 1242, 166 (December 15, 1826) and Muhammad
Muti‘ al-Hafiz and Nizar Abaza ‘ Ulama ’ Dimashq wa-A ‘yanuha fi
al-Qarn al- Thalith ‘Ashar al-Hijri, 2 v. (Bayrut: Dar al-Fikr
al-Mu'asir; Dimashq: Dar al-Fikr, 1991), 356-357.
[35]For more on this issue, see Kutluoglu, The
Egyptian Question, 53.
[36]For more on this controversy, see Mikhayil
Mishaqa, Murder, Mayhem, Pillage, and Plunder: The History of the
Lebanon in the 18th and the 19th Centuries, trans.
W.M. Thackston, Jr. (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988),
105-108 (Hereafter cited as Murder).
[37]Philipp, Acre, 91.
[38]Khalid, Makutbat HadaratMawlana Khalid, folio
32b.
[39]Ibid., folios 33a-33b.
[40]Ibid, folio 33b.
[41]For more on Shaykh Khalid’s views of “din” and
“dunya,” see Foley, Shaykh Khalid, 258-264.
[42]For more on Muhammad Ali’s involvement in rehabilitating ‘Abdullah Pasha,
see Mishaqa, Murder, 142. It is worth noting that ‘Abdullah
Pasha and Muhammad Ali had a significant parting of the ways in 1824.
[43]R. Tresse, Le Pelerinage Syrien Aux Villes Saintes De l’Islam (Paris:
Imprimerie Chaumette, 1937), 253-254. (Tresse cites five different reports from
French officials stationed in Beirut, Sidon, and Aleppo in September, 1826).
For more on this incident, see Foley, Shaykh Khalid, 189-191.
[44]Sahib, Bughyat al-Wajid, 181-182.
[45]Ibid.
[46]For more on Gümüshanevi’s ideas, see Foley, Shaykh
Khalid, 248 and 332-333; Butrus Abu-Manneh, “Shaikh Ahmad Ziya al-Din
al-Gümüshanevi and the Khalidi Suborder,” Bulletin of the Israeli
Academic Center in Cairo (6) (1985): 2-3; and §erif Mardin, “The
Nakshibendi Order in Turkey,” in Fundamentalisms and the State:
Remaking Polities, Economies, and Militance: Volume 3, ed. Martin E.
Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991),
212-214.
[47]Imad Ra’uf, al-Iraqfi Watha’iqMuhammadAli (Baghdad:
Bayt al-Hikma, 1999), 68 (#46 and #211).
[48]Awamir Sultaniyya, 24 Dhu’l-Qa‘da 1243, 2/232 (June 7,
1828).
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