Çeviri
Seeing With Three Eyes Ibn al-'Arabï’s barzakh and the Contemporary World Situation
Original paper UDC
159.954(045)al-'Arabi, Ibn
doi: 10.21464/sp31212
Received January 21st, 2016
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem,
Department of Arabic Language and Literature,
Mount Scopus Campus, IL-9190501 Jerusalem
Ibn al-'Arabï’s barzakh
and the Contemporary World Situation
The author of this paper attempts to write about
the mystery of the barzakh in and from Ibn
al-Arabi’s perspective. Ibn al-Arabi’s perspective observes things from three
dimensions: the two dimensions of the positive and negative, which are familiar
to us by means of our ordinary binary perception, and in addition the third dimension
that belongs neither to the one, nor to the other. This is the dimension of the barzakh, which can be called
tertiary, since it is unitive and inclusive of the two familiar
dimensions. “Seeing” the third dimension of the
barzakh is not accessible to ordinary binary perception; it is accessible,
according to Ibn al-Arabt, only to those who possess a special kind of seeing;
they are the ahl al-kashf those who “see” with
three eyes, as it were. Nevertheless, between the binary and the terti-
ary/unitive perceptions there is a pervasive tension of relatedness. It is a
dynamic tension that makes its mark on all levels of existence, whether
consciously or unconsciously. In other words, although the barzakh belongs to the dimension of the mysterious “third”, it is
powerfully present and influential all around. It manifests itself as the
cognitive function thatIbn al-Arabt calls ‘imagination’ (al-khayal). For him, the barzakh-imagination is the most powerful
cognitive function in the human makeup, and it hinges on a paradox: it makes
everything that it conceives an “it/not it”. God, too, from this perspective,
is “He/not He”. Following from the cognitive field that evolves from the tertiary-barzakh-imaginative perspective, I consider the notion coincidentia oppositorum (‘the union of the opposites’, al- jam' bayna al-diddayn). Finally, I apply the insights stemming
from Ibn al-Arabi’s perspective to the question of ‘identities ’ and to the
ethical dilemmas of our contemporary world.
apophasis, barzakh, binary perception, coincidentia oppositorum, Ibn
al-'Arabi, imagination, paradox, tertiary perception
Muhyi al-Din Muhammad ibn ' All Ibn al-' Arabi,1
known also as al-Shaykh al-akbar (the Great Master), was born in Murcia
in 1165 to a respectable Andalusian family. In his twenties, probably in
Seville, he was formally initiated into the Sufi Path, and, during many years
and in several localities, studied with several Sufi teachers, among them
women. However, he claimed to be, and has thus been considered, an Uwaist,
that is to say, a mystic, whose inspiration and training in the deepest sense
have come not from an earthly master, but from al-Khadir (= al-Khidr),
the undying teacher of those who do not have a flesh-and-blood one.2
In 1200, already widely known as a stimulating
In this
paper referred to as Ibn al-'Arabi or For more on the mysterious figure of Khidr
IA. see
below, footnote 10. spiritual authority
with several literary works to his name, he left al-Andalus and the West for
the Islamic East. After much traveling, he settled in Damascus, where he died
in 1240. During his wandering years, he started working on his huge opus, The
Meccan Revelations (al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya). This, as well as the Bezels of Wisdom (Fusus
al-hikam) - the work on the cosmic panorama
of prophets and prophecy - were completed in Damascus during the last years of
Ibn al-'Arabi’s life.3
* * *
At the threshold of writing this paper, I stand
perplexed; who would not, in view of the formidable corpus of Ibn al-'Arabi’s
works,4 and the daunting volume of the scholarly discussions on him.5
But the bulk of these literary corpora is the least of my concerns; it is IA’s
visionary perspective in front of which I stand perplexed. IA is a master of
creating unique, grand patterns - conceptual as well as linguistic - by
interlacing diverse themes and syntactical patterns together. Unravelling his
complex and interconnected lacework and sorting out neatly its fine threads,
often results in an obfuscated view, unwieldy style and watered-down account.
Still, the work of scholars is precisely this: to sort, classify, paraphrase,
compare, analyze, and reduce. Moreover, whereas IA’s writing stems from an
inclusive, visionary perspective that transcends conventional forms and
structures, his interpreter, by definition, must limit her reproductions to the
level of the familiar and comprehensible. This is bound to be frustrating,
especially when the binary cognition of the interpreter is the tool by which
she faces IA’s barzakh, what I have termed his tertiary-imaginative
vision. Is scholarly hermeneutics suitable at all to review a visionary
writing such as IA’s? Can we see what he sees in the unitive perspective from
which he sees it?6
IA often warns his readers that to understand
what he is writing, one should be either a ‘mystic’, that is, one who possesses
visionary seeing (min ahl al- kashf), or a pure and simple believer (min
al-mUminin). Those who belong to either of these two groups may follow his
view without speculative argumentations or sophisticated interpretations.7
But for most, the experience of reading him will result in the perplexity (hayra)
about which I am complaining.8 Out of frustration and perplexity the
interpreter may relegate IA’s writing to the category of apophasis, the
language of unsaying, of paradox, of negative theology. But would such a
classification help make the objects of IA’s vision satisfyingly meaningful?
For all these inhibitions, I ask myself why not
give up, from the outset, writing on IA, either in general or on any specific
theme. Well, there is an answer and it is simple: his writing is magnetically
captivating and his visionary perspective alluring; not unlike a detective’s
obsession with deciphering the mystery behind a complex crime. His daring
syntactical structures and the intricacy and mistiness of his writing seem to
suggest that behind them hides a field of truths (haqâkiq) and meanings (ma'am)
worth unravelling; if only one could see it with IA’s eyes.
One mystery in particular has lured me to search
for a meaning. It concerns IA’s mysterious barzakh, the middle, the
‘third’ principle which challenges and even overrides the binary structure of
our cognitive faculties. Through their in-built predilection to hover between
the ‘yes’ and the ‘no’, between viewing something as ‘positive’ and its
opposite as ‘negative’, between an ‘I’ and an ‘other’, our conceptions and
ideologies, even the most precious among them, are built on dichotomies. IA’s barzakh is that fine line,
which belongs neither to the side of the ‘yes’ nor to the side of the ‘no’. How
are we to conceive it? And, since our minds are bound by spatial
configurations - where is this line to be found? Sensing that at the
heart of the barzakh nests the key to IA’s all-embracing outlook, I have
been driven, despite my inhibitions, to ponder this enigma from Ibn al-'Arabi’s
perspective; to enter his mind, as it were.
In my attempt at making some sense of these
questions, I have found it helpful to juxtapose various passages from IA’s
writing and use them as road signs. I shall start by introducing the barzakh
in IA’s own words. In chapter 72 of The Meccan Revelations (= al-Futuhat
al-Makkiyya), he writes:
“The ‘middle’, that which
separates between two sides and makes them distinguished from one another, is
more hidden than they are (akhfa minhuma). For
example, the line that separates between the shadow and the sun; or the barrier
(barzakh) between the two seas - the sweet one and the bitter one; or that which separates between black and white. We know that there is
a separating line there, but the eye does not perceive it; the intellect
acknowledges it, though it does not conceive of what it is, namely, it does not
conceive its ‘whatness’ (quiddity).”[9]
By “the two seas” IA alludes to “the sweet one
and the bitter one” of the Qur’anic verse 25:53. The verse runs as follows:
“And it is He who has released
the two seas, one fresh and sweet and one salty and bitter, and He placed
between them a barrier (wa-jaala baynahuma barzakhan) and a prohibiting partition.”
These two seas, undeniably, are contrary to one
another, entirely different from one another, characterized by opposite
attributes, yet contiguous, sharing an imaginary line, which keeps them apart and
prevents their waters from mixing. The features of “sweet water” versus “bitter
water” are thus kept intact thanks to a barzakh, which IA describes as
“more hidden than they are”. What is, and where is, this “hidden” line that
carries out concurrently two
3
For a comprehensive and
scholarly biography of IA, see Claude Addas, Quest for the Red
Sulphur: The Life of Ibn 'Arabi, trans. by Peter Kingsley,
Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993. See, also, Stephen Hirtenstein, The Unlimited
Mercifier: The Spiritual Life and Thought of Ibn 'Arabi, Oxford, Ashland: Anqa Publishing, White Cloud Press, 1999.
4
See Jane Clark, Stephen
Hirtenstein, “Establishing Ibn 'Arabi’s Heritage: First Findings from the MIAS
Archiving Project”, Journal of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society, No. 52, 2012, pp. 1-32, http://www.ibnarabisociety. org/articlespdf/clark-hirtenstein-j mias-v52. pdf?
5
See, e.g., the
list of articles on the webpage of the Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society, http:// www.ibnarabisociety.org/articlelist.html. In'Arabi S Cosmology (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1998).
6
For a fine scholarly
elaboration of the bar- zakh, see Salman H. Bashier, Ibn
al-'Arabi’s Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between God
and the World, Albany: State University of New York Press,
2004.
7
See, e.g., IA’s “Introduction”
in the first volume of his Meccan Revelations; Ibn
al- 'Arabi, Muhyi al-Din Muhammad ibn 'All, Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Beirut: Dar al-fikr, 1994, Vol. 1, Supplement (tatimma), p. 169.
8
On the people of reason (ahlal-ra’y) and their perplexity (hayra) versus the people of
mystical seeing (ahl al-kashf), see, e.g., ibid., Vol.
1, Ch. 50: “Concerning Men of
Perplexity and Incapacity ('ajz)”, pp. 611-615.
9
See ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 72, p.
536; for an almost exact parallel, see ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 63, pp. 680-681.
contradictory functions - separating between two
opposites yet holding them together?
The “two seas” of the Q. 25:53 are obviously
associated with the “the two seas” of the Q. 18:60. The group of verses 60-82
of Sura 18, the Sura of the Cave (surat al-kahf), presents one of the
most enigmatic passages in the Qur’an. The protagonist of this Qur’anic passage
is Moses. He and his servant are supposed to meet an enigmatic person, whom God
names “one of Our servants” ( abdan min ïbâdinâ) and to whom God has
given special knowledge ( allamnahu min ladunna ilman [18:65]). The
meeting place is identified only as being “the confluence of the two seas” (majma'al-bahrayn).
Apparently - the Qur’anic verses are not explicit about this - Moses sets out
to seek the enigmatic servant of God[10] at this wondrous place in
order to learn from him the divine knowledge (al- ilm al-ladunni)
bestowed on him. This is why Moses is resolved to search for this person until
he reaches “where the two seas meet (majma ' al- bahrayn)”, though, he
vows, “I may march on for ages”. Moses thus sets out to face three mysteries: a
place, a person and knowledge; and all these as a preamble to the later stage
of his search, in which he will have to face odd, seemingly unreasonable and
unjust deeds performed by this servant of God (see verses 66-82). Indeed Sura
18 is replete with wonders and enigmas,[11] and thus concurs with IA’s
pursuit of the extraordinary and mysterious barzakh.
The enigmatic barzakh of the Qur’anic
verses is, from IA’s perspective, a paradox, a contradiction in terms: “that
which separates between two sides and makes them distinguished from one
another” and yet, “is more hidden than they are”. “More hidden”, that is to
say, belongs to an imperceptible dimension, the dimension of the unseen, or
that which can be revealed only by means of the ‘imagination’ (al-khayal).
Here, in paradoxical terms, is how IA describes the barzakh in chapter
63 of The Meccan Revelations:
“Since the barzakh is something that separates what is knowable and what is unknowable (ma lum
wa-ghayr ma lum); non-existent (ma 'dum) and existent (mawjud);
intelligible and unintelligible (ma qul wa-ghayr ma qul);
negated (manfiyy) and affirmed (muthbat) - it has been given the term barzakh. In
itself it is intelligible (ma qul), though
there is nothing there but imagination (khayal) [...]. For imagination is neither existent nor non-existent; neither
known nor unknown; neither negated nor affirmed.”[12]
By endorsing the linguistic, or ‘nominal’,
validity of the barzakh (“it has been given the term barzakh”,
summiya barzakhan istilahan), IA asserts that it has an ontic existence of
sorts,[13]
while immediately negating it:
“When you grasp it, being
intelligent, you will know that you have grasped an existent thing (adrakta shay’an
wujudiyyan) on which your gaze has fallen, while you [also]
know categorically, with proof (qat 'an bi-dalil), that
there is nothing there to begin with and in principle (ra’san wa-aslan); what is this thing for which you have affirmed an ontic existence (shay’iyya
wujudiyya) and at the moment of your affirmation you have
denied it?”[14]
With such contradictory attributes of the barzakh
and the perception of it, IA takes us to the field of paradox and apophasis, to
the “mystical languages of unsaying”, to borrow the phrasing of Michael Sells’
brilliant title.[15]
But beyond this comparative classification, may we not consider the meaning of
the epistemological and existential challenges with which IA presents us in
these passages? May we not ask how to ‘see’ the barzakh, while with our
binary perception we can only perceive the contrasting features of objects such
as “the two seas”? And consequently, how to know what is between, or
beyond, the two seas? Is there anything beyond our binary perception
and, if so, what is it? And another question lurks in the vision of the barzakhi
confluence of the two seas: from this ‘third-dimensional’ perspective, do the
separate identities of the “two seas” merge and annihilate in the barzakh,
and hence lose their identifying individual features of “sweetness” and
“bitterness”; or are their ontological identities kept intact notwithstanding
such conflation? IA, it seems to me, encourages us to ponder these questions,
since, by saying “When you grasp it, being intelligent, you will know...” (ch.
63), as well as “the intellect acknowledges it, though it does not conceive of
what it is, namely, it does not conceive of its ‘whatness’” (ch. 72), he
suggests that the ‘intellect’ can grasp something of this tertian universe, at
least the enigma behind our existential-epistemological grasp of reality.
In my attempt to grasp the elusive barzakh
that emerges from the Qur’anic passages above, I muse over another facet of its
polar nature and ask: Being a majma , is the barzakh a
‘coincidence of opposites’? Can we qualify it with this concept borrowed from
the field of the study of religions?10 11 12 13 14 15 [16] On the linguistic level, al-jam
'bayna al-diddayn is precisely identical to the Latin term coincidentia
oppositorum. Looked at from the Arabic terminology, majma ' (as in majma
' al-bahrayn) shares the root j-m-' with jam '. Lexically, majma
' denotes a place of coming together and jam the act
of gathering and holding diverse things together, as well as the state
that results from such an act - collectedness, aggregation, unity. In IA’s
writing, jam ' and its antonym farq (separation, differentiation)
are cardinal concepts upon which his understanding of the God-Creation
relationship is built. Their juxtaposition indicates indeed a coincidence of
opposites.[17]
Notably, IA often quotes a saying which he ascribes to the ninth-century Sufi
Abû Saïd al-Kharraz. When Abû Saïd was asked “By what means have you known
God?”, he answered:
“God is only known by bringing
together the opposites (bi-jam ihi bayna al-diddayn)”
Shift and Meaning Event”, Studia
Islamica, No. 67, 1988, pp. 121-149, doi: https://doi. org/10.2307/1595976, esp. p. 129: “the aporia of trying to use language based upon delimitation to refer to the
unlimited”.
16
See, e.g., John Valk, “The
Concept of the Coincidentia Oppositorum in the Thought of Mircea Eliade”, Religious
Studies, Vol. 28 (1992), No. 1, pp. 31-41, doi: https://doi. org/10.1017/s0034412500021351.
17
See, e.g., the poetic verse in
Ibn al-'Arabï, Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Vol.
6, Ch. 364, p. 47: fa-'ayn al-jam 'ayn al-farq fa-’nzur / bi-'aynika li-’jtima
fi-l-iftiraq: “the essence of jam is the essence of farq look / in your essence
(also: with your eye) for togetherness (ijtima ) in separation (iftiraq)”. For jam and farq (also tafriqa) in Sufi technical terminology, see, e.g., [Abû al-Hasan Hujwïrï,
‘Alï ibn ‘Uthman] The Kashf Al-Mahjúb: The Oldest Persian Treatise on Sufiism
by Alí B. Uthmán Al-Jullábi Al-Hujwírí, trans.
by Reynold A. Nicholson, London: Luzac, 1976, pp. 251260 et passim. On the
topic of ‘coincidence of opposites’, see Sara Sviri, “Between Fear and Hope: On
the Coincidence of Opposites in Islamic Mysticism”, Jerusalem Studies in
Arabic and Islam, No. 9, 1987, pp. 316-349.
Then he recited:
“He is the First and the Last,
the Apparent and the Hidden, (huwa al-awwal wa-l-akhir wa-l- zâhir wa-l-batin) and He has knowledge of all things (Q. 57:3).”[18]
So how does IA perceive the ‘coincidence’? How
does he perceive the nature of reality in the realm of the barzakh? What
happens to the differentiated identities which are held there together? Or
does he leave it out of his existential map as a transcendent territory to
which no man has access? In pursuing these questions, I find help in another
passage from The Meccan Revelations.
Chapter 24 of The Meccan Revelations is
not a long chapter, but it has a lengthy title. Here is the rendering of its
first part: “The Twenty-Fourth Chapter Concerning the Knowledge that derives
from the Ontological Sciences (... jcTat 'an al-'ulwn al-kawniyya) and
the Wonders that it Contains”.[19]
Indeed, the chapter deals with various ‘ontological’ themes that can be
cumulatively described as concerning the relationship of God - qua King and
Owner (malik) - with man and the world - qua kingdom and property (mulk)
subsumed under God’s kingship and ownership. But the picture that IA paints in
this chapter is not of a hierarchical relationship; what interests him specifically
is the fate of the ‘property’, the ‘owned’, the ‘created’ within this
interwoven existence. Or, to put it differently: how can the ‘property’ hold on
to its differentiated, individual identity and attributes within such a
close-knit relationship with its ‘owner’? Here, towards the last third of the
chapter, IA introduces another concept worth contemplating: God’s
‘expansiveness’ (al- tawassu 'al-ilahi). He writes:
“God’s expansiveness (al-ittisaal-ilahi) entails that ‘God is He who gave everything its creation’ (Q. 20:50)
and distinguished each and every thing in this world by this [creative] decree.
He is he who distinguished it from any other; this is the [individual] unity of
each and every thing; hence, no two things are merged in one mixture (fa-ma
ijtama 'a ithnani fi mizaj wahid). [...] There is nothing
but the [individual] unity of each and every thing; never do two things merge
where differentiation has occurred [...]. From this point you will know [how]
the large can mount the small and the broad the narrow without the broad
becoming narrow or the narrow broad; in other words: nothing in their
[contrasting] states changes [...].[20] Concerning this, Abu Sa'id
al-Kharraz said: ‘God is only known by bringing opposites together.’ Then he
recited: ‘He is the First and the Last, the Apparent and the Hidden’ (Q. 57:3).
He meant from one face (min wajh wahid), not
from diverse references (min nisab mukhtalifa)”[21]
In this extraordinary passage IA asserts the
singular individuality and particularity of every existing thing. Every
created thing is unique. God does not clone. Hence, nothing really merges with
anything to the point of losing one’s pre-ordained individual and distinct
identity. Unlike some theologians and philosophers, IA does not subscribe to
the theory of generalized, abstract, isolated ‘ideas’ as the transcendent
exempla of all that is. Everything that is has its own individual
blueprint and its existence is concrete and tangible inasmuch as its fullness
is hidden and unknown. Nothing is the same as anything else. And yet all are
embraced by God, who thus becomes known, according to Al-Kharraz’s saying and
the supporting Qur’anic proof, as a coincidentia oppositorum. This is
the embrace of the ‘First-Last-Apparent-Hidden’ totality in an inclusive unity
of polar opposites. This unity is “the one face” by which God is known, not
unlike the proverbial elephant who, in order to be known qua ‘elephant’, must
be known through all its parts and members.[22] At the same time, none of
the individual attributes is obliterated in this ‘knowing’. Each and every
thing has its place in the unity of opposites. Thus, the coincidentia oppositorum
is not a fuzzy mixture of different aspects or attributes, but a unity in which
diverse parts co-exist. Such unity in all its fullness, suggests IA, is the
paradigm for everything that is, and it allows for wonders and possibilities
beyond the grasp of the binary thought.
* * *
The ethical implications of this vision are
far-reaching, especially at the global moment in which this essay is written.
There is nothing more remote in this moment than the vision of a coincidence
of opposites seen from the tertiary dimension of Ibn al-'Arabi’s barzakh.
Ours is a world of binary thinking, dichotomies, polarization, opposing
opinions and antagonistic value-systems: ‘right’ is contrary to ‘wrong’; ‘good’
contrary to ‘bad’; ‘just’ to ‘unjust’; ‘sacred’ to ‘profane’. Right, good,
just and sacred are praiseworthy; wrong, bad, unjust and profane are
blameworthy. In our world-existence, wherever we are, wars of identities and
values are raging from unrelenting convictions allround - right, left and
center. Far be it for us is to know how to hold on to our singular, individual
identities without devouring the individual identities of others; they seem, to
us, set on cancelling us and each one out. Hence, to preserve our identity
demands that we defend it against its enemies at all cost; ironically, to the
point of sacrificing it. When we tenaciously cling on to what, in our fancy,
makes up our ‘identity’, we are perceived as loyal; when, out of the fold, we
pledge the viability and validity of other identities, we are perceived as
traitors. We pay lip service to the politics of the ‘other’, but culturally,
religiously, socially and politically, in the name of ‘identities’ and under
the umbrella of values, ideologies and dogmas, a culture of blame,
self-righteousness and victimhood thrives. It is never ‘I’ who is responsible
for this or that, it is always ‘you’; and so on, and so forth.
The state of dynamic perplexity vis-à-vis the
shifting faces of reality, and the practice of ‘seeing with three eyes’ derived
from Ibn al-'Arabi’s vision of the barzakh, suggest that the
two-dimensional and binary limits of our cognition miss out on glimpsing a
larger, more inclusive and unitive picture. Ibn al-'Arabi’s perspective teaches
that beyond the dichotomies at the root of our cultural, religious, moral and
political viewpoints - and even beyond the benign slogans of peace and love -
there stretches a larger and wider perspective; if you wish, you can call it
‘mystical’, of a land of marvels, where “the large can mount the small and the
broad the narrow without the broad becoming narrow or the narrow broad”.18
19 20 * * [23]
From this perspective, the singularity of
one of the marvels witnessed in
“the Land of Reality” (ard al-haqiqa) by
people of mystical seeing (ahl al-kashf); see
ibid., p. 339. “In this land”, IA writes, “there are orchards and gardens,
animals and minerals whose measure only God knows. Everything there, is a
living-speaking being” (ibid., p. 338).
21
See ibid., pp. 446-447.
22
For the “Elephant in a Dark
Room” fable, see, e.g., [Jalal al-Din Rumi] The Mathnawi of
Jalalu’ddinRumi, trans. by Reynold A. Nicholson, Leyden,
London: Brill, Luzac, 1926, Book III, pp. 1259-1274.
23
See above, footnote 20.
all things becomes both an apparent and a
marvelous phenomenon. This singularity is not lost within the mesh of variant
and contrasting identities; it is never annihilated in what is named the ‘Oneness
of Being’ (wahdat al-wujud), or the ‘Coincidence of Opposites’ (al-jam
bayna al-diddayn). The water of the “bitter sea” remains bitter and that of
the “sweet sea” sweet. In view of the divine ‘expansiveness’, nothing is lost,
for it allows that in each and every thing there exists its singular and
concrete existence while co-existing even alongside its opposite.
Sara
Sviri
Ibn
al-'Arabijev barzakh i
suvremena svjetska situacija
Autorica ovog rada nastoji pisati o misteriji barzakha u perspektivi Ibn al-Arabija i iz njegove perspektive. Ibn
al-Arabijeva perspektiva motri stvari iz tri dimenzije: dvije dimenzije pozi-
tivnog i negativnog, koje su nam bliske zbog nase svakidasnje binarne
percepcije, i dodatne, trece dimenzije, koja ne pripada ni jednoj ni drugoj. To
je dimenzija barzakha, koju mozemo nazvati tercijarnom jer ona ujedinjuje i ukljucuje ove dvije poznate
dimenzije. »Videnje« trece dimenzije, barzakha, nije
dostizno uobicajenoj binarnoj percepciji, nego je dostizno, sukladno Ibn
al-'Arabiju, samo onima kojiposjeduju narocitu vrstu videnja; oni su ahl al-kashf, oni koji, takoreci, »vide« trima ocima. Ipak,
izmedu binarnih i tercijarnih/ujedinjujucih percepcija po- stoji sveprozimajuca
veza napetosti. To je dinamicna napetost koja obiljezava sve stupnjeve
postojanja, svjesno ili nesvjesno. Drugim rijecima kazano: iako barzakh pripada dimenzi- ji misticnog »treceg«, snazno je prisutan i
utjecajan posvuda. Manifestira se kao kognitivna funkcija koju Ibn al-Arabi
naziva ‘imaginacijom ’ (al-khayâl). Za njegaje
barzakh-imaginacija najsnaznija kognitivna funkcija u ljudskom ustrojstvu i ona
ovisi o paradoksu: ona cini sve sto koncipira »to/nije to«. Takoder, Bog,
motren iz ove perspektive, jest »On/nije On«. Kako slijedi iz kognitivnog polja
koje nastaje iz tercijarne-barzakh-imaginativne perspektive,
smatram da je tajpojam coincidentia oppositorum (jedinstvo
suprotnosti’, al-jam' bayna al-diddayn). Konac- no,
primjenjujem uvide koji proistjecu iz Ibn al-Arabijeve perspektive na pitanje
‘identiteta’ i na eticke dileme naseg suvremenog svijeta.
apofazija, barzakh, binarna percepcija, coincidentia oppositorum, Ibn
al-'Arabî, imaginacija, para- doks, tercijarna percepcija
Sara
Sviri
Ibn
al-'Arabis barzakh und
die zeitgenossische Weltsituation
Die Verfasserin dieses Beitrags macht den
Versuch, über das Mysterium von barzakh in und aus Ibn
al-Arabis Perspektive zu schreiben. Ibn al-Arabis Blickwinkel beobachtet die
Dinge aus drei Dimensionen: zwei Dimensionen des Positiven und Negativen, die
uns dank unserer alltaglichen binaren Wahrnehmung vertraut sind, und darüber
hinaus eine dritte Dimension, die weder der einen noch der anderen angehort.
Dies ist die Dimension des barzakhs, die man tertiar nennen kann, da sie vereinigend ist und die beiden bekannten
Dimensionen einbezieht. Das „Sehen“ der dritten Dimension des barzakhs ist nicht erreichbar für gewohnliche binare Wahrnehmung; es
ist, Ibn al-Arabizufolge, nur für jene realisierbar, die über eine besondere
Art des Sehens verfügen; sie sind die ahl al-kashf, also
diejenigen, die sozusagen mit drei Augen „sehen“. Nichtsdestoweniger existiert
zwischen den binaren und den tertiaren/vereinigenden Wahrnehmungen eine
durchdringende Spannung der Verwandtschaft. Es ist eine dynamische Spannung,
die auf allen Ebenen der Existenz, ob bewusst oder unbewusst, ihre Spuren hin-
terlasst. Mit anderen Worten, obzwar das
barzakh zur Dimension des mysteriosen „Dritten“ gehort, ist es
allenthalben stark prasent und einflussreich. Es manifestiert sich als
kognitive Funktion, dieIbn al-'Arabî„Imagination“ (al-khayâlj nennt. Für
ihn ist die barzakh-Imaginati- on die starkste kognitive Funktion in der
Struktur einesMenschen, wobei sie von einem Paradox abhangt: Alles, was sie
konzipiert, macht sie zu einem „es/nicht es“. Aus dieser Perspektive ist Gott
ebenfalls ein „Er/nicht Er“. Mit dem Ausgangspunkt im kognitiven Feld, das sich
aus der tertiar-barzakh-imaginativen Perspektive
herausbildet, nehme ich den Begriff coincidentia
oppositorum („Zusammenfall der Gegensatze“, al-jam'
bayna al-diddaynj in Augenschein. Schliefilich verwende ich die Einsichten,
die ausIbn al-ArabisPerspektive hervorgehen, bei der Frage der „Identitaten“
sowie bei ethischenDilemmas unsererzeitgenossischen Welt.
Apophasie, barzakh, binare Wahrnehmung, coincidentia oppositorum, Ibn
al-'Arabî, Imagination, Paradox, tertiare Wahrnehmung
Sara
Sviri
Le barzakh d’Ibn al-'Arabî et la situation mondiale contemporaine
L’auteur de ce travail entreprend d’écrire sur le
mystère du barzakh, dans et à partir de la
perspective d’Ibn al-'Arabî. La perspective d’Ibn al-'Arabî observe les choses
sur la base de trois dimensions : deux dimensions, celle du positif et celle du
négatif, qui nous sont proches car notre perception quotidienne binaire
reposent sur elles, et une troisième dimension en plus, qui n’appartient ni à
l’une ni à l’autre. C’est la dimension du
barzakh, que l’on pourrait appeler de
tertiaire car elle unit et inclut les deux dimensions qui nous sont bien
connues. « Voir » la troisième dimension du
barzakh n’est pas accessible à la perception binaire ordinaire; elle est
accessible, selon Ibn al-'Arabî, seulement à ceux qui possèdent une qualité
particulière dans « le voir » : ce sont des ahl
al-kashf, ceux qui, pour ainsi dire, « voient » avec trois yeux. Néanmoins,
il existe entre les perceptions binaires et tertiaires/unissantes une intime et
omniprésente connexion de l’ordre d’une tension dynamique qui révèle tous les
niveaux de l’existence, conscients ou inconscients. En d’autres termes, bien
que le barzakh appartienne à la
dimension mystique du « troisième », il est est fortement présent et exerce son
influence en tout lieu. Il se manifeste comme une fonction cognitive que Ibn
al-'Arabî nomme « imagination » (al-khayâl/ Pour lui,
l’imagination-barzakh est la plus puissante des
fonctions cognitives présentes dans la constitution de l’Homme et repose sur un
paradoxe : elle forme tout ce qui conçoit le « cela/cela n’est pas ». De même,
Dieu, pensé à partir de cette perspective est « Lui/n’est pas Lui ». Sur la
base du champ cognitif qui est apparu à partir de l’idée de l’imaginative-barzakh-tertiaire, je pense qu’il est
question du concept de coincidentia oppositorum (« l’unité des
opposés », al-jam' bayna al-diddayn/ Enfin,
j’applique les idées qui découlent de la perspective d’Ibn al-'Arabî à la
question des « identités » et aux dilemmes éthiques de notre monde
contemporain.
apophasie, barzakh, perception binaire, coincidentia oppositorum, Ibn
al-'Arabî, imagination, paradoxe, perception tertiaire
dispensable
for any study concerning IA are also the two volumes by William C. Chittick, The
Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi S Metaphysics of Imagination (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1989) and The Self-Disclosure of God:
Principles of Ibn al-
Islamic tradition identifies this person with Khadir/Khidr;
in the Sufi tradition, Khidr is
the divine teacher of those who do not have a flesh-and-blood one. For a
discussion on this Qur’anic story, see Sara Sviri, The Taste of Hidden
Things: Images on the Sufi Path, Inverness: The Golden Sufi Center, 1997,
Ch. 4: “Where the Two Seas Meet: The Story of Khidr”, pp. 77-101; see also above, footnote 2.
Note that the root '-j-b, denoting wonder, appears
twice in this Sura - see verses 9 and 63; see also above, footnote 2.
Ibn al-'Arabï, Al-Futuhat
al-Makkiyya, Vol. 1, Ch. 63,
pp. 680-681. '
The link between ‘words’ and ‘beings’ is one of the core
themes in IA’s worldview, but it calls for a separate discussion.
See Ibn al-'Arabï,
Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Vol. 1, Ch. 63, pp. 680-681.'
of Unsaying,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. See, also, Michael A. Sells, “Ibn 'Arabi’s Polished Mirror: Perspective
See Ibn al-'Arabi,
Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya, Vol. 1, Ch. 24, p. 447. For further references
and elaborations of this saying, see Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in
the Sufism of Ibn 'Arabi, trans. by Ralph Manheim, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981, p. 188; W. C. Chittick, Sufi Path of Knowledge,
p. 67 et passim; W. C. Chittick, The Self-Disclosure of God, pp. 173,
236-237.
Ibn al-'Arabi, Al-Futuhat
al-Makkiyya, Vol. 1, pp.
443-448.
Not: Bazen Büyük Dosyaları tarayıcı açmayabilir...İndirerek okumaya Çalışınız.
Yorumlar
Yorum Gönder